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**GOAL**  
**OF**  
**BRITISH RULE IN INDIA.**

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1916-17.

## GOAL OF BRITISH RULE IN INDIA.

No. 1.

[ Very Secret.]

TO H. E. THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD PENTLAND, P. C., G. C. I. E., Govr. of Madras.

„ „ „ „ „ „ WILLINGDON, G. C. I. E., Govr. of Bombay.

„ „ „ „ „ „ CARMICHAEL OF SKIRLING, G. C. I. E.,  
K. C. M. G., Govr. of Bengal.

„ THE HON'BLE SIR JAMES MESTON, K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Govr. of the United Provinces  
of Agra and Oudh.

„ „ „ MICHAEL O'DWYER, K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Govr. of the Punjab.

„ „ „ HARCOURT BUTLER, K. C. S. I., C. I. E., Lieut.-Govr. of Burma.

„ „ „ EDWARD GAIT, K. C. S. I., C. I. E., Lieut.-Govr. of Bihar and  
Orissa.

„ „ „ BENJAMIN ROBERTSON, K. C. S. I., K. C. M. G., C. I. E., Chief  
Commissioner, Central Provinces.

„ „ „ ARCHDALE EARLE, K. C. I. E., Chief Commr. of Assam.

„ „ „ Mr. W. M. HAILEY, C. S. I., C. I. E., Chief Commr. of Delhi.

„ „ „ LIEUT.-COL. SIR GEORGE ROOS-KEPPEL, K. C. S. I., K. C. I. E.,  
Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Govr.-Genl., North-West Frontier Province.

*Viceregal Lodge, Simla, July 20th, 1916.*

DEAR —————

Since the beginning of May we have been considering in Council two questions—

(1) What is the goal of British Rule in India ?

(2) What are the first steps on the road to that goal ?

and I am now sending you our provisional conclusions for your own personal perusal and consideration.

You will probably agree with us in holding that it is necessary for the Government of India to have a definite policy with regard to the future; and a policy connotes an objective. Hence our attempt to define the goal of British Rule in India.

You will remember that Lord Hardinge circulated to all heads of Local Governments a memorandum "upon questions likely to arise in India at the end of the war". We have not been unmindful of that memorandum, nor of the answers which it evoked, but we have felt that the form and substance of that memorandum were determined by the invitation of the Secretary of State of that date to Lord Hardinge to record his views upon "the *questions* likely to arise in India at the end of the war". The memorandum consequently dealt with a considerable number of isolated problems which had no intrinsic relation to each other, but which called for solution.

As you are aware, some of these problems are already under consideration, as for instance, the modification of the Arms Act, the improvement of the position of India within the Empire, the abolition of Indentured Labour, the encouragement of Indian Industries.

We feel, however, that the present moment calls for something more than the solution of isolated problems, and demands the consideration and promulgation of a definite policy by the Government of India. We are fully conscious of the danger of pronouncements unaccompanied by action, hence the second question which we have propounded for solution, *viz.*, what is the first step on the road to that goal?

In the course of our discussion we came to the conclusion that there are three distinct roads in three distinct domains along which Indians' fitness for managing their own affairs has advanced. These are—

- (1) The domain of local Self-Government both in towns and in rural areas.
- (2) The domain of more responsible employment under the Government.
- (3) The domain of the Legislative Councils, Provincial and Imperial.

With regard to the answers to the two questions, I may say that we have come as a Council to definite conclusions on the answer to the first question, and as to the steps to be taken on the first two of the roads described above. We have not yet reached a decision as to the advance to be made in the domain of the Legislative Councils; but as several Members of Council are going on tour, and it impossible to continue with advantage our weekly discussion in their absence, I have thought it well to send you our conclusions, where they have been reached, and in the case of the third road two memoranda dealing with the question from somewhat antagonistic points of view.

I hope that, in considering these questions, you will bear in mind that we have no wish to force a stereotyped policy upon Local Governments. We realise to the full the varying conditions of the different provinces and we shall be grateful for any suggestions that you may offer for adapting our broad principles of policy to the particular conditions of your Province. The only point we would emphasise is that we are of opinion that an advance is necessary along these three roads.

With these prefatory remarks, I come to our suggested solution of the problems we have placed before ourselves.

We first tackled the problem of the goal and our answer is to be found in the following formula:—

*The only goal to which we can look forward is to endow India, as an integral part of the British Empire, with the largest measure of Self-Government compatible with the maintenance of the supremacy of British Rule.*

*The special circumstances of India must govern the form of Self-Government with which she shall eventually be endowed. They differ so widely from those of any other part of the British Empire that we cannot altogether look for a model in those forms of Self-Government which already obtain in the great Dominions. In all parts of the Empire which now enjoy Self-Government, it has been the result, not of any sudden inspiration of theoretical statesmanship, but of a steady process of practical evolution, substantially facilitated by the possession of a more or less common inheritance of political traditions, social customs and religious beliefs.*

*In the case of India we contemplate her gradual progress towards a larger and larger measure of control by her own people, but the form of Self-Government which she can ultimately enjoy must be evolved on lines which take into account her special circumstances and traditions.*

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We then proceeded to deal with the three roads of advance in order—

(1) The domain of local Self-Government.

You will notice that we are somewhat elaborate and detailed in our recommendations as to progress on this line.

As you are aware, much spadework has been done on this topic from the time of Lord Ripon down to the Decentralisation Commission's Report, and we felt ourselves able to indicate fully our views with regard to possible progress.

But I hope you will clearly understand—indeed I think it is clear from our note itself—that throughout we recognise the possibility, even the



necessity, of local variations on the skeleton plan arising out of the particular conditions of any particular Province.

Our note is appended to this letter and marked A.

On the second road of advance, *viz.*—

- (2) “The domain of more responsible employment of Indians under the Government,”

we found ourselves limited to pious aspirations, but aspirations which we have very definite intentions of seeing realised in fact.

We have decided, and the Secretary of State has confirmed our decision, to publish the report of the Public Services Commission. It has been impossible for us to consider its recommendations as yet, and we certainly cannot come to any conclusion as to them until they have been examined by the Departments of the Government of India and by the Local Governments. In the meantime we can only record our opinion and policy in the following terms:—

(a) It is essential to the progress of India towards the goal which we contemplate that Indians should be admitted in steadily increasing proportion to the higher grades of the various services and departments and to more responsible posts in the administration generally. It is only by a consistent pursuit of this policy that any large body of Indians can eventually be qualified to take their proper part in a sound scheme of Self-Government.

(b) This policy has indeed received recognition in the past, but in deciding upon the further advance that is now possible, the Government possess a great advantage in having at hand the recent Report of the Royal Commission on the Public Services and their detailed recommendations regarding these services. An important factor in the case must clearly be the circumstances and considerations arising out of the war, and the loyal support which India has rendered to the Empire during that period of crisis.

(c) The public interests no doubt require that the public services shall be filled by competent men, but in pursuing this object we must have regard, as has been laid down in the cognate matter of Local Self-Government, not merely to considerations of departmental efficiency, but to the training of Indians to administer their own affairs. Full opportunity for Indians to qualify themselves for the more important posts in the public services, and to demonstrate by faithful and meritorious service their fitness for still more responsible duties, must be the guiding principle of our administration.

It must however be recognised that intellectual qualifications, combined with physical capacity, should not be the sole tests for admission to important posts in the public services. Due regard must also be given to such considerations as character and the hereditary connections of candidates both with the Government and with the people among whom their work will mainly lie;

while in the present conditions of India it is essential that there should not be a too large predominance of any one caste or class.

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(3) I come now to the third road, *viz.*, "the domain of the Legislative Councils, Provincial and Imperial".

I would remind you here of Lord Hardinge's opinion as expressed in his memorandum of October 1915 with which probably you are already familiar, *viz.*, "The guiding principle should be that in every Provincial Council there should be a majority, however small, even if it be of only one, of elected representatives of constituencies in which the majority of voters are Indians".

But on this road, as I have said above, we have not yet come to any definite conclusion, and so in the circumstances I send you two memoranda upon which I should be glad to have your opinion, especially with regard to the two points on which you will observe they are at variance, *viz.*—

(i) Whether there should or should not be a majority of elected Members.

(ii) Whether the franchise should be on the present basis of "Classes and Interests", or on that of territorial units.

It is of course possible that on this road you may advocate progress on different lines from those suggested, but in any case I should be glad, whatever your views may be, if you would both inform us of them and illustrate them by giving us a concrete example of the manner in which the constitution of your Council would be affected by your proposals as well as ours.

I append the two memoranda marked respectively B. and C.

I should be much obliged if you would kindly let me have your observations and criticisms on the foregoing scheme of political advance by August 25th. It is essential that we should be in a position to reconsider our conclusions in the light of your observations and to address the Secretary of State on the subject by the beginning of October.

You are at liberty to take your chief officials into confidential consultation in this matter, but under no circumstances should the papers go out of your possession. In the case of Provinces having Executive Councils, the Members of Council should be consulted.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.

[SECRET.]

## A.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD BE OBSERVED IN THE  
DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.

The first and foremost principle, which was enunciated in Lord Ripon's Self-Government Resolution of May 1882, and was not long ago emphasised by Lord Crewe, as it had previously been by Lord Morley, is that the object of Local Self-Government is to train the people in the management of their own local affairs, and that political education of this sort must take precedence of mere considerations of departmental efficiency.

2. It follows from this that local bodies must be as representative as possible of the people whose affairs they are called on to administer; that their control over the matters entrusted to them shall be real and not nominal; and that they must not be kept in leading strings, but must learn by making mistakes and profiting by them. Government interference should therefore be reduced as far as possible.

3. In considering the general steps desirable to give effect to these main needs it will be convenient to take as a basis the most important recommendations of the Decentralisation Commission, which were examined, and for the most part endorsed, by the Government of India Resolution on Local Self-Government policy of 28th April 1915. (The framers of that Resolution usually saw the right path to follow; but they were often content to let the Local Governments travel by it or not as these thought fit.)

4. The Decentralisation Commission proposed that municipal boards or councils, and rural boards—district and sub-district—should ordinarily have a substantial elected majority, nominated members being limited to a number sufficient to provide for the due representation of minorities and official experience. In paragraph 6 of the Self-Government Resolution\* the Government of India approved this policy as regards municipalities, subject to the proviso that, where its success might be doubtful, it should be introduced gradually. As regards rural boards, they merely observed (paragraph 27) that Local Governments in general were in sympathy with the Commission's proposal. We think that, as a general principle, the Commission's proposals should be accepted and pressed upon the Local Governments, with the corollary that the franchise should be sufficiently low to obtain constituencies

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\* Hereafter referred to, for brevity, as the S.-G. Resolution.

which will be really representative of the body of the rate-payers. We recognise that a full elective system analogous to that which obtains in the West cannot be immediately or universally applied, but we regard it as the end to be kept in view and worked up to. And as regards the special representation of minorities, where this is necessary, we should prefer, when that is possible, that this should be by some system of communal or proportional representation rather than by nomination. As regards the special representation of official experience, we consider that this might often be adequately attained by the nomination to the board of men possessed of such experience for purposes of advice and discussion, but without the right of vote.

5. The Commission desired that the municipal chairman should ordinarily be an elected non-official, that Government officers should not be allowed to stand for election, and that if a nominated chairman was required, an official should be selected. The Government of India (paragraph 8 of the S.-G. Resolution) accepted this, subject to the following qualifications:—

- (a) In the special cases in which it is necessary to nominate the chairman (election being the ordinary method) discretion should be reserved to Local Governments to nominate non-officials as well as officials.
- (b) Boards should not be absolutely prohibited from electing officials, though the election of an official should be a special matter requiring confirmation by the Commissioner or some higher authority.

We can accept these provisos on the understanding, as regards (b), that the election is by non-official members.

6. The Commission, however, indicated that in the larger cities it would be desirable to adopt the practice which has worked with success in the city of Bombay, where, in order that the large amount of everyday administration necessary should be efficiently carried on, this is placed under the control of a special nominated Commissioner, who is however subject to the general control of the Corporation and of its standing committee. This proposal (commended in paragraph 9 of the S.-G. Resolution) is a sound one. So long, however, as the executive officer of a city is protected from the possible caprices of a council or board by provisions requiring that, though his nomination may be by the board, his appointment should be approved by Government, and that he should not be removed without the sanction of Government—unless, say, by a three-quarters vote of the board, it will not be necessary, to require that he should be a Government official. Competent men might be obtained who have not been, or who no longer are, in Government service.

7. As regards rural boards, the Commission found that in practice the Collector was nearly always the president of the district board, either *ex-officio*

or by nomination, or by election, and that sub-district boards were also as a rule presided over by official subordinates of the Collector. For the reasons given in paragraphs 795-7 of their Report, the Commission held that it was desirable that the presidency of rural boards should continue to vest in the Collector and his assistants, but they added that the vice-presidents should be elected non-officials.

The Government of India in paragraph 28 of the S.-G. Resolution accepted the view of the Commission above cited, with which they said that all Local Governments were in agreement. (This appears to have been an error so far as the Central Provinces were concerned.) They added, however, that they would have no objection to non-official chairmen being retained where they already existed, or freshly appointed where a Local Government or Administration desired to make the experiment. Statistics which have been compiled in the Education Department show that at present out of 191 district boards, only 13 have non-official presidents (elected), all but one of these being in the Central Provinces and the remaining one in Bihar. As regards sub-district boards, out a total of 525 the chairmanship of 41 (mostly in Bengal) is held by elected non-officials, and of 20 (nearly all in Madras) by nominated non-officials. In Madras this is a recent departure, since, when the Commission sat, the sub-divisional officer was universally the sub-district board president. It appears too that the Bombay Government now propose, as an experiment, to have non-official presidents on some of their district boards.

8. The circumstances of district boards and of large sub-divisional boards, such as those in Madras, are of course materially different from those of municipalities, since they need much more time and widely extended travelling on the part of the head of the board if the work is to be done at all properly. We would therefore not compel any province which desired to act on the views of the Decentralisation Commission on this subject to depart from them; but the provinces might well be urged to start, wherever possible, the experiment of non-official, and preferably elected, presidents or chairmen. In that case, however, we think it is essential in regard to district boards, and sub-district boards which deal with large areas, that, as in the case of large cities, the ordinary official work should be largely in the hands of a special executive officer whose appointment should require the approval of Government and who should not be removable in ordinary circumstances without Government sanction. Also if such a board, wishing to save the expense of a special officer, or desirous of remaining under the presidency of the Collector or of one of his assistants, should wish to elect such an official, we think that, as it will ordinarily contain a substantial elected majority, its wishes might be acceded to, subject to the condition we have indicated in the case of municipalities (paragraph 5).

9. The Commission were of opinion that municipalities should have full liberty to impose or alter taxation within the limits laid down by the municipal

laws, but that the sanction of an outside authority to any increase in taxation should be required where the law did not prescribe a maximum rate. The Government of India, in paragraph 17 of the S.-G. Resolution, expressed general sympathy with the Commission's recommendations. They thought, however (1) that power to vary any tax might be reserved by such Local Governments as are unable to accept in full the recommendations of the Commission, and (2) that in the case of indebted municipalities the previous sanction of higher authorities should be required to any alteration of taxation.

The first of these provisos practically renders the general principle nugatory, as it enables a Local Government to decline to act upon it, and we think this should now be given up in the case of boards which contain substantial elected majorities. The second is, of course, sound in cases where the Government has lent money to a municipality, or guaranteed repayment of its loans; and in that case its sanction should obviously be required to any alteration of taxation which might reduce the municipality's resources. Subject to this proviso, we think it is most important that municipal boards should be allowed to vary taxation as proposed by the Commission. If they pile on the rates too much, their constituencies can call them to account, provided that, as we consider essential, the constituencies are so organised as to be really representative of the body of the rate-payers. Moreover, there will be the power of intervention, to which we refer in paragraph 17, in cases of grave abuse.

10. The bulk of the income of rural boards is derived from a cess levied upon agricultural land over and above the land revenue, with which it is collected, and not usually exceeding one anna in the rupee ( $6\frac{1}{4}$  per cent) on the annual rent value or on the land revenue, according to the circumstances of the province. Since 1905 this income has been specially supplemented by a Government subsidy, amounting in the aggregate to 25 per cent. of the cess receipts.

Subject to an exception in regard to railway construction, referred to in paragraph 31 of the S.-G. Resolution, and which has been accepted, the Decentralisation Commission held that district boards should not be empowered to raise the land cess beyond the above-mentioned limit, for the reasons set out in paragraph 774 of their Report.

In paragraph 30 of the S.-G. Resolution the Government of India observed that "under present conditions any proposal to raise the limit imposed by the existing law, would require the previous sanction of the Government of India. Such proposals would need the most careful consideration on the merits, and the Government of India do not consider it necessary for the present to make any pronouncement on the subject". Under the general principle indicated

Paragraph 31, S.-G. Resolution.

Paragraph 30, S.-G. Resolution.

in respect of municipalities, this reservation may be accepted as regards alteration of the existing law, but once that law has been altered, district boards should be empowered, as in the analogous case of municipalities, to raise the land cess to the full limit which the new law allows. It may be observed that the Commission's recommendation that district and rural boards should enjoy the full amount of the land cess has now been acted up to—*vide* paragraph 21 of the S.-G. Resolution.

11. The Commission proposed that, if a municipal or rural board has to pay for a service it should control it, and that where it is expedient that the control should be largely in the hands of Government, the service should be a provincial one. "The Government of India, while not prepared to accept the proposal

\* Paragraph 19 of S.-G. Resolution.

in full have approved it in a somewhat modified form.\* They consider that

charges should be remitted in cases where a local body contributes to Government for services inherent in the duty of supervision and control by Government officers, or for services which cannot be expediently performed except by Government agency. For example, Government may properly cease to charge for clerical establishments in the offices of supervision and control, or for the collection of district cesses which it is clearly expedient to realise along with Government revenue." We might in this respect well go the whole way with the Commission in accordance with the general principle that, if local bodies have to raise funds for any particular object, they should have the control of these. If a board is to provide, for instance, for civil works or medical relief it ought to have real control, subject to such general principles as the Government may prescribe, but should not be under the constant dictation of Government Departments in matters of detail.

12. We similarly endorse the recommendation in paragraph 778 and paragraph 834 of the Commission's Report that the system of requiring local bodies to devote fixed portions of their revenues to particular objects of expenditure should be done away with as unduly limiting their freedom of action—subject, as indicated by the Commission, to outside intervention in cases of grave neglect or misfeasance—*vide* paragraph 17 *infra*. Of course, if the Government give a grant for a particular object, the money must be applied thereto, but we endorse the Commission's recommendation in paragraph 837 of their Report that grants-in-aid should normally take the form of a lump sum grant, or a percentage contribution towards specific services, rather than more definitely earmarked. If again funds have been raised locally for particular objects, they must necessarily be applied to such objects.

13. "Commenting on the minute control exercised in some provinces over

Paragraph 21 of S.-G. Resolution.

municipal finance, the Commission recommended that municipalities should have a

free hand with regard to their budgets; the only check required should, they

thought, be the maintenance of a minimum standing balance to be prescribed by the Local Government. They acknowledged that relaxed control might

Paragraph 843 of Commission's Report.

lead to mistakes and mismanagement, but they were of opinion that municipal bodies could attain adequate financial responsibility only by the exercise of such powers and by having to bear the consequence of their errors. Further checks would be provided by the control which Local Governments would exercise over loans, and by the power which should be reserved to compel a municipality to discharge its duties in case of default." The Government of India, in noticing exceptions suggested by various Local Governments, said that they would accept these reservations for the present, but they nevertheless regarded the recommendations of the Commission as expressing a policy to be steadily kept in view and gradually realised, and we desire to press for its full realisation as soon as possible.

A similar recommendation was made by the Commission in respect of

Paragraph 33 of S.-G. Resolution.

rural boards, and the Government of India considered that the present restrictions on the powers of the boards with regard generally to budget expenditure should be gradually relaxed with due regard to local conditions and requirements. Here again, we should press for the policy of the Commission, subject only (as in regard to municipalities) to control, in the case of rural boards which are indebted to Government.

14. The Commission proposed that the existing restrictions on municipi-

Paragraph 22 of S.-G. Resolution.

palities, which require outside sanction for works estimated to cost more than a certain amount, should be removed, but that Government should scrutinise and sanction estimates of projects to be carried out from loan funds. The Government of India observed that "the majority of the Local Governments are prepared to relax the existing rules in the direction of giving more freedom to municipal boards. The Government of India are in favour of extended freedom subject, where necessary, to proper precautions against extravagant and ill-considered projects". Here again, what is necessary is to press for relaxation of unnecessary control and not to make it a matter of local option.

15. The Commission made a similar recommendation in respect of rural boards, on which it was remarked, in paragraph 34 of the S.-G. Resolution, that "in the opinion of the Government of India, which has the general support of Local Governments, the grant to rural boards of full powers in the allotment of funds and the passing of estimates cannot, for the present at least, be conceded, but the extent of the necessary financial control might depend in the case of rural boards on the competence of the staff employed, and where this varies, it would not be desirable to lay down hard and fast rules for the whole province". We should now go beyond this vague pronouncement, and ask for



definite indication that, allowing for the necessarily different circumstances of different rural boards, there will be a material advance in the direction of the Commission's proposal.

16. "It was recommended by the Commission that the degree of outside

Paragraph 23 of S.-G. Resolution.

control over municipal establishments should be relaxed, that the appointment of municipal secretaries, or other chief executive officers, of engineers and health officers, where these exist, should require the sanction of the Local Government in the case of cities, and of the Commissioner elsewhere, and that the same sanction should be required for any alteration in the emoluments of these posts, and for the appointment and dismissal of the occupants. As regards other appointments, they proposed that the Local Governments should lay down for municipal boards general rules in respect to such matters as leave, acting and travelling allowances, pensions or provident funds and maximum salaries, and that their sanction should be required for any deviation therefrom. Almost all Local Governments (it is said in the S.-G. Resolution) have expressed general approval of the Commission's ideas"—and these should now be emphasised with a view to their being worked up to.

The same applies to the establishments of rural boards, in respect of

Paragraph 35 of S.-G. Resolution.

which the Commission made similar recommendations, and the Government of India came to the same conclusion.

17. As regards outside control, "the Commission thought that the

Paragraph 24 of S.-G. Resolution, and paragraphs 802-3 and 860-61 of Commission's Report.

Collector should retain certain powers, given under the existing Acts, *e. g.*, the power to suspend in certain cases the operation of municipal resolutions, and that the Commissioner should be able to require a municipality which had neglected a particular service to take such action as he may consider necessary. The Local Governments generally and the Government of India are of opinion that special powers of outside control are necessary and should continue".

Paragraph 36 of S.-G. Resolution.

The Commission also recommended that the special powers of control over rural boards vested in outside authorities under the existing Acts should continue, and Local Governments in general and the Government of India accepted this view.

We must certainly maintain such ultimate powers of intervention, which are in no way peculiar to India, and which carry out the view expressed in paragraph 17 of the Ripon Resolution of 17th May 1882, that the control of Government over local bodies should be exercised from without rather than from within. But as has been remarked at the outset, the general principle should be to let local bodies make mistakes and learn by them, and not to interfere except in cases of really grave mismanagement. Another safeguard,

which would in many cases prevent penal action from outside, would be the power, to be exercised by Government, of dissolving a municipal council or rural board and requiring fresh election.

18. There are a variety of other matters on which the Commission made recommendations, but we do not think that it is necessary to discuss these here as general principles. For instance, we need not dogmatise on the methods by which municipal revenues should be raised ; on the precise distribution of duties between local bodies and the Government ; or on the areas and powers of sub-district boards, and the division of functions between these and the district boards, and so forth. These are all matters, which, though important in themselves, do not admit of uniform treatment, and may well be left to the Local Governments.

As regards education again, we have just addressed the Secretary of State as to the proper functions of local bodies in respect of this most important matter.

19. Nor does it seem necessary to lay down any general principles in regard to embryonic municipalities whether these be styled notified areas, or village unions as in Madras, or town *panchayats*, as the Decentralisation Commission suggested. Many of the bodies dealing with these areas will in due course develop into municipal Councils, but until they are fit for this stage, they must obviously be subject to greater control and be less non-official in character. It might often be desirable, for instance, that the chairman should be a non-official. Their development may be left to Local Governments, subject merely to the general instruction that they should be allowed as full discretion as is possible, and that their powers should be gradually enhanced.

20. As regards *village panchayats*, the crucial point is that the Decentralisation Commission, in their proposals in this respect, were not contemplating an additional machine for the promotion of Local Self-Government in the sense used in Lord Ripon's Resolutions and subsequently ; but desired to develop the corporate life of the individual villages and to give the villagers an interest in, and some control over, local village affairs. Consequently they made a clear distinction between the *panchayat* organisation they recommended and artificial union agglomerations such as those referred to in paragraph 698 of their report. The latter may be quite useful as an adjunct to Local Self-Government in Lord Ripon's sense of the term by affording smaller administrative areas in that connection than those administered by, say, *taluk*-boards, but this has really nothing to do with the development of individual village corporate life. See in this connection the following sentence from paragraph 699 of the report—"The common traditions of the village, the fact that its inhabitants are largely connected by ties of blood and caste and by many interests in common and the measure of corporate life still existing in the Indian villages, which is shown occasionally by voluntary taxation for special purposes warrant action of this description,"—*i. e.*, that subsequently proposed by the Commission. We think that this is a sound distinction, and that, in

dealing with the principles governing general proposals in respect of *panchayats*, we should confine ourselves, like the Commission, either to individual villages or to villages which are so closely connected that their people habitually act together.

21. The Commission recognised, however, most clearly (paragraph 701 of report) that the different character of the villages not merely in different provinces but in single provinces and even within parts of these would require the *panchayat* policy to be taken up cautiously and gradually, and that we would emphasise. At the same time it is essential that some effort should be made in this direction. Similarly, while the Commission indicated certain general functions and powers which might be allotted to *panchayats*, they were careful to explain (paragraph 707) that there should be no question of devolving these on any uniform system. As they said, functions must be gradually and cautiously assigned, and they must vary with the circumstances of the locality and with the manner in which the *panchayat* discharges the duties first placed upon it. The general functions proposed, subject to this caution, are summarised in paragraph 37 of the S.-G. Resolution, which also indicates the extent to which the Local Governments were willing to accept them, while in paragraph 39 the Government of India were content to leave the matter in the hands of Local Governments and Administrations, indicating only certain general principles in which they thought that advance was most likely to be successful.

22. As regards these general principles, we would modify paragraph 39(1) by saying that the area should normally be the village unless, as above stated, villages are so closely connected that they may be treated as one; and we should omit paragraph 39 (7) on the ground that at the present stage it is not desirable to make any rigid classification of the connection of *panchayats* with other administrative bodies, from which indeed they should be kept apart as much as possible, while the way in which they do their work should be tested by inspections by the administrative district staff. Also at the outest, such control as is necessary in the way of replacing incompetent *panchayats* or *panchayat-dars* should be exercised by the local revenue officers, provided these be of higher grade than that of *tahsildar*.

23. As regards constitution, the points to which we attach most importance are the association of the principal village officers whether they be hereditary headmen and accountants or, as in the north of India, *lambardars* with the *panchayats*, and an informal election of other members by the villagers themselves. We would, however, let the *panchayat* choose its own president; he need not necessarily be the village headman, as suggested in paragraph 704 of the Decentralisation Commission's Report. Of the possible functions, the most important are, to our mind, village sanitation, village education, in the directions indicated in paragraph 712 of the Decentralisation Commission's Report; and jurisdiction in petty civil and criminal cases. For the last matter, however, it is most desirable that the *panchayat* should be as a rule a body

representing a single village, otherwise you will lose the great safeguard for proper disposal of such cases, *viz.*, local public opinion. It should also be permissible—though not, as the Commission suggested in paragraph 719 (1) of their report, universally necessary—that the *panchayat* should receive some portion of the land cess raised in their villages. Further, we are prepared, differing from the Decentralisation Commission in this respect (paragraph 718 of the Report), to allow them voluntary powers of supplementary taxation, the proceeds of which would be devoted to the special purpose or purposes for which the tax was levied.

24. The legislation required to call these *panchayats* into existence should be as simple and elastic as possible, the fullest scope for details being left to rules, which will be gradually evolved and be improved by experience.

25. We recognise the impossibility of any universal enforcement of a *panchayat* system, by reason of the different circumstances prevailing in different tracts, in some of which indeed there are no regular villages at all. It is essential, however, that an effective beginning should be made where possible, and if the Government of Burma (see paragraph 37 of the Self-Government Resolution), or that of any other province where there is still some real village life, thinks that these recommendations are unsuited to its local circumstances it will be open to it to put forward alternative proposals.

26. Nor do we in any way wish to prevent the establishment of “unions” or “circles” for Local Self-Government purposes. As observed in paragraph 20 *supra*, these may be a very useful adjunct to district and sub-district boards, relieving them of duties which can be better discharged by committees dealing with smaller arrears. Such bodies would be specially useful and desirable in tracts in which it is found impossible or premature to establish a *village-panchayat* system.

*The 30th June 1916.*

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[*MOST SECRET.*]

## B

### MEMORANDUM REGARDING PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

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Between the extreme demand for Provincial autonomy under popular control, calculated to place the Executive Government largely under the direction of a Provincial representative assembly—a demand which is defined in broad terms in Resolution XIX of the Indian National Congress of December 1915

(Appendix I)—and the ultra conservative view that the Morley-Minto reforms are of too recent a date to justify any modification after so short an experience of them, there are several intermediate possibilities.

2. The crisis through which the Empire is now passing has afforded a notable test of the loyalty to British rule on the part of the vast majority of the people of India. The response to that test has been such as on the one hand to induce the National Congress to put forward schemes of constitutional reform, which otherwise might not have seen the light for many years to come, and on the other to render it inexpedient for the Government to close its ears entirely to demands for further progress, and to take a rigid stand on the ground that all constitutional reforms must be matters of slow growth, and that at least a generation should pass before newly-introduced schemes can be fairly tested and properly revised. If there had been no war, no Empire crisis, no test and no response, such an attitude would have been perfectly legitimate; though even in that case some minor modifications at least might well have been considered.

3. The present model on which the several Legislative Councils of India has been framed is that they shall be the Councils of the Governor-General, the Governor, the Lieutenant-Governor or Chief Commissioner, as the case may be, consisting of persons styled Additional Members and summoned to aid the Government for the purpose of making laws and regulations. The assembly is not a house of representatives, but a body of Councillors, and it was to emphasise this essential feature in the Councils that the late Viceroy Lord Hardinge was anxious that, wherever possible, the Council Chambers should form part of the official residences of the heads of the various Governments. For the same reason the principle underlying the constitution of these Councils has been to obtain partly by election, and partly by selection, representatives of the chief groups of interests to be found in the country.

4. The interests which it was hoped would find representation by election under the Morley-Minto reforms were—

*The land*, as represented by large landholders.

*Commerce and Trade*, provided mainly by such bodies as Chambers of Commerce, Mining and Trades' Associations, and the like.

*The professional middle classes*, to be obtained through electorates composed of the Members of Municipal Committees and District Boards.

*Seats of learning*, by University representation, the electors being Members of the Senate and Honorary Fellows of the University.

These were the four main groups from which it was hoped that a body of men representing the various points of view of different sections of the community would be brought together for legislative work, for eliciting information from

the Government, and for making Government acquainted with the interests of the classes to which they severally belonged.

5. The symmetry of this system of grouping interests has been partly upset by the interpolation into it of Mahomedan representation, a course which was rendered necessary in order to fulfil the pledge given by Lord Minto to an All-India Mahomedan deputation in 1906. Mahomedans are neither a class nor an interest in the sense that attaches to those terms in the case of other groups of electorates; and in their case it has simply been representation of a minority professing a different faith, with different traditions, historical and racial, from all other communities in the Indian Empire. In order to secure representation of this minority, special franchises had to be devised which differ from all others and constitute a legitimate grievance to the other classes; for there are several conditions which qualify a man for a vote if he is a Mahomedan, but not if he is a Hindu, a Sikh, a Parsee or Christian. At the same time Mahomedans, if members of other electorates, vote accordingly in addition to the special vote which has been given them on account of their birth. Such a differentiation in favour of those professing a particular faith is open to serious criticism.

6. Besides these patent defects in respect of the representation of Mahomedans, criticisms have been levelled at the constitution of other electorates as well, and on the general results of the working of the existing regulations. These criticisms are—

- (i) That the franchise is too limited, that the electors are in many instances so few that personal inducements to them from the candidates are rendered easy.
- (ii) That the present grouping has resulted in the return to the Councils of a preponderance of lawyers and professional men to the detriment of the other large interests which it was designed to serve.
- (iii) That by narrowing the candidates for the Municipal and District Board representation to persons who are serving, or have recently served, on those bodies, many good men are excluded, while the local bodies themselves may tend to be regarded as mere stepping stones to political ambition, to the sacrifice of the purely local interests which they are intended to secure.

Even the most cursory examination of the composition both of the electorates, and of the Councils themselves as returned in 1910 and 1913, will show that these criticisms have much force, and in Appendix II will be found certain statements showing how the seats are distributed and how they have been filled.

7. In considering possible reforms in the constitution of the existing Councils, in the distribution of seats between selection and election, and in the

nature and character of the electorates which will return the elected Members to the Councils, it is essential to recognise what is the real aim before us.

The aim of the National Congress is the early introduction of Provincial autonomy under popular control which they claim to be foreshadowed in paragraph 3 of the famous Despatch of August 1911, advocating the change of capital from Calcutta to Delhi. Although they may leave the Imperial Legislative Council out of the picture for the moment, it is clear that they desire the introduction of representative Government in India, or Provincial Parliaments, in which the elected Members will be able to impose their will upon the Executive, reckoning that, if the right of the people to the predominant voice in the Provincial Councils is once conceded, a similar right in the Imperial Council cannot for long be denied. History teaches us that in all systems of autonomous Federated States the control of the central Government is regarded with the greatest jealousy, and if this is the case where the central Government is itself elected by the various States that compose the Commonwealth, there can be no question but that in the case of India if the control of Government in the Provincial Councils over the popular representatives were to be relaxed, no barrier imposed by an Imperial Legislative Council governed by an official majority could for long withstand the popular clamour.

Unless, therefore, the Government are prepared to concede the Congress demand, it behoves them to be very wary before they enlarge the Provincial Legislative Councils in such a way as to place the Provincial Governments in so great a minority in their own Councils that the authority of Government can only be preserved by free resort to a power of veto, or by the interposition of the Imperial Legislative Council, expedients which of their nature are intended only for use on rare and special occasions.

8, The existing non-official majorities in the Provincial Councils have been permitted on the supposition that the Councils will contain some European elected Members, some Members who are representatives of the sentiments of the more conservative elements in the community, some nominated non-officials, and that the combination of all these elements against the Government will be so rare that, if the Government should ever suffer defeat, it will be at least as likely that it is in the wrong as that it is in the right.

Any enlargement of the Councils which placed advanced politicians, or their nominees, in a majority over all other elements would bring about the untoward results anticipated in the preceding paragraph. In considering the probability of such results it is well not to be lulled into security by the fact that on the existing Councils the present non-official majorities have not given the Government much trouble. In the first place, the Councils are young and inexperienced, and have not yet learned their own powers; in the second place, owing to the smallness of the non-official majority, and to the fact that it consists partly of Europeans and nominated non-officials, the chance of controlling the

Executive has not yet been clearly within their grasp. If their numbers were to be so enlarged that both the official and the more moderate non-official element (which under present circumstances is inclined to support the Government) could alike be over-borne, there would be every incentive to the majority to use the power now for the first time given to them, and the thirst for power would grow with its satisfaction. The pressure that is even now put upon the more moderate to bow to the advanced party, the pressure put upon moderate candidates at an election to withdraw from the uncongenial experience of a contested election, and the pressure put upon voters to support an advanced politician would be greatly increased, because all these methods would secure what they do not now secure, namely, the realisation of the Congress programme.

9. However gladly we may recognise that the vast majority of the people in India are well affected towards British rule, yet it would be rash to shut our eyes to the fact that a substantial body of politicians, who exercise an influence quite disproportionate to their stake in the country, express their fixed determination to secure a complete command over the Executive Government, first in the Provincial Councils and then in the Imperial Council.

In the present state of Indian society, they have to their hands two most potent weapons. Their ideals and objectives captivate the imagination of the youth of the country, in whom they would find ardent canvassers, and they are able by their command of the press and the platform to cover with ridicule those who express more moderate opinions, while anti-Congress organs are very few and quite uninfluential. Until the influence of this party can be reduced to its proper proportions, the introduction of any kind of representative Government, or the bestowal upon Legislative Councils of power to impose their will upon the Government, might be gravely prejudicial to the interests of the teeming millions whose continued happiness and prosperity must depend upon the maintenance of peace and orderly progress. India requires breathing time during which the moderating sentiments which characterise those who have the greatest stake in the country may become vocal and responsible and hold their own in the constituencies, in the Legislative assemblies, and in the press. No step once taken in the direction of granting representative Government can be withdrawn and prudence demands that no such step should be taken until it has been placed beyond doubt that the new ground affords a sure footing.

10. For these reasons it seems expedient that any departure now made should not be such as to enlarge the existing Councils beyond the statutory limits now fixed by Acts of Parliament, and that the existing model of the Councils as Legislative assemblies to assist the Governor, the Lieutenant-Governor or the Chief Commissioner, as the case may be, should be continued, while no steps should yet be taken which introduces, or can even be interpreted



as introducing, into India a system of representative Government. It is therefore necessary to preserve the existing objective of obtaining councillors who represent the main classes and interests which make up the community. This has been the common objective both of the reforms of 1892 and of those of 1909, and the pronouncements of many eminent statesmen on this subject, of which some of the most notable are reproduced in Appendix III to this memorandum, are sufficient to show why this policy has been consistently followed. A departure from this objective can only be justified by proof either that the pronouncements in question were wrong at the time that they were made, or that subsequent changes among the people have been so great that what was considered impossible then has become possible and desirable now.

The scheme which is put up for consideration in this memorandum is, for the reasons explained, based upon the maintenance of the statutory maximum numbers of the existing Provincial Councils and upon the objective that the Councils should consist of men representative of the main classes and interests of the community in some reasonable ratio to their relative importance. Within these two limitations it is possible to make some experimental advance in the direction of increasing the elected element in the Councils, of remodelling the constituencies and of enlarging the electorates. It is of course recognised that local conditions vary so greatly that in all these three respects local variations may prove necessary, but the scheme now to be described is put forward as a general model.

11. The following are the general features of the scheme. They fall under three heads—

- A.—Composition of the Councils.
- B.—Composition of the Constituencies.
- C.—The Franchise.

#### UNDER A.

- I.—When the Council is less than its statutory maximum to enlarge it up to that limit, but to retain the maximum number of official seats permissible under the existing regulations.
- II.—To examine and consider how many of the existing nominated non-official seats can be suitably transferred to election.
- III.—To experiment in the direction of enlarging non-official majorities, by keeping a few official seats unfilled, or by filling them up by nomination of non-officials, if the Provincial Government concerned considers that course safe. A permanent lien must, however, be retained on these official seats, and no *quasi*-vested non-official interest in them should be allowed to grow up until a definite reduction in the number of official seats has been proved by longer experience to be safe.

## UNDER B.

12. The electorates to represent the classes and interests would be—

- (i) The Landholder electorate.
- (ii) The Municipal or Urban group electorate.
- (iii) The Trade and Commerce electorate.
- (iv) The University electorate.

It is suggested that the seats now allotted to the District Boards, where separate seats now exist, should either be added to the landholder constituency or distributed between landholders and Indian commerce.

- (v) The representation of Mahomedans should be secured by providing as many Mahomedan seats as their numerical strength justifies and by adding these to the urban and landholding constituencies. As many Mahomedans as are qualified on the general franchises of these two constituencies would vote for Mahomedan candidates only and the same would be the rule, *mutatis mutandis*, in the case of non-Mahomedan voters and non-Mahomedan candidates. This would at one stroke equalise the franchise for all classes and abolish the Mahomedan plural vote for which there is no justification.

It should be noted that the system of providing Mahomedan representation would equally be extended to Hindus or Sikhs in provinces where the Mahomedans form the majority of the population and the Hindus or Sikhs a substantial minority.

13. A few words of explanation are necessary in regard to the suggested abolition of the District Board electorates, and the suggestion to find some further place for Indian commerce. The District Board electorates ought to have returned persons of the landed interest, but it has been a more common experience that they return legal practitioners. On the other hand, the landholder seats are entirely inadequate to secure representation for the agricultural interests, while though large trade and commerce in the great cities elect representatives through Chambers of Commerce and Trades' Associations, the large Indian merchant classes do not appear to have secured election through existing constituencies in anything like the ratio which their interests and stake in the country warrant. The suggestion made is therefore that they might find this representation in some of the constituencies of the urban groups, preferably those which contain the most important towns. But if this is considered unnecessary, then seats set free from the District Board electorate could all be allotted to the landholding interest, provided that urban interests were sufficiently represented. The general scope of the changes proposed would be that agricultural interests, namely, the land, should be represented

in the Councils through landholding electorates, and urban interests through the more important rate-payers of the larger Municipal towns, a few separate seats being added, if possible, to the urban groups to be filled by men who are *bonâ fide* engaged in trade and commerce.

#### UNDER C.

14. The following changes are contemplated by the scheme :—

- (i) That in the landholding constituency, the payment of land revenue or an equivalent qualification in land should be the test, the qualifying amount being lowered so as to increase substantially the number of voters, and the franchise should also in all zemindari tracts extend to ryots having rights of occupancy, subject to a fairly high test of rent paid. For example, if the landholder qualification were placed at Rs. 500 land revenue in a zamindari tract, the equivalent payment of revenue in a ryotwari tract might perhaps be Rs. 200, the same amount of rent qualifying an occupancy tenant in zamindari tracts.
- (ii) In the urban groups of electorates, the electors should not be confined to the members of the Municipal Committee, still less to delegates of those members. All Municipal electors who are payers of income-tax, or own property of a particular rating value, should be qualified to vote for the candidate for the urban groups. If a representative of Indian commerce were allotted to any particular urban group, then the same electors would be entitled to vote for him.
- (iii) A further reason for abolishing the District Board electorates emerges from a consideration of the proposed franchise under heads (i) and (ii) above. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to devise an enlarged franchise for this constituency which would not overlap either of these two electorates.
- (iv) The University electorates are at present confined to members of the Senate and Honorary Fellows. It is complained that this is a very narrow electorate, and suggestions have been made that registered graduates of five years' standing should be included. This suggestion deserves consideration.
- (v) A question which has to be carefully considered is how far purely educational tests can be accepted as independent qualifications additional to income and property tests. If the vote is given to registered graduates for the University seats, the case for allowing a special educational vote apart from property and circumstances on the other electorates is very much weakened.

15. The whole basis of this scheme is that the present grouping of classes and interests do not produce members who correspond numerically to the relative importance of the interests which it was desired should be represented. In order to secure this object, a regrouping of the constituencies, and a lowering of the franchise, so as to reduce, if possible, the risk of the electorate being captured by a political caucus are its principal features.

The tables given in Appendix II show the existing constitutions of the Councils—

To take one example—the United Provinces—of the 21 elected Members 12 are legal practitioners, the landholder class is represented by six Members only, and even of these two are also legal practitioners. Banking and Commerce have returned only three representatives.

Thus 14 out of 21 Members, or two-thirds, at the elections of 1913 were legal practitioners, 3 or one-seventh represented Commerce, and the land was represented by 6 out of 21, or two-sevenths, or deducting the 2 who are also legal practitioners, land pure and simple was represented by 4, or less than a fifth. The landholder constituency proper returns only two Members, one for the Agra Landlords and one for the Taluqdars of Oudh. A tentative redistribution under this scheme might possibly allocate the 21 seats as follows:—

Land 8 <i>plus</i> 2 Mahomedans	...	...	...	10
Urban 4 <i>plus</i> 2 Mahomedan seats	...	...	...	6
Commerce	...	...	...	4
University	...	...	...	1
TOTAL				21

If any nominated non-official seats can be transferred to election, some additions might be made. Also as under the proposed scheme non-Mahomedans would not vote for Mahomedans in groups where there are separate Mahomedan seats, it might be advisable to allot more Mahomedan seats in the land electorate.

This suggested re-allocation of the non-official seats in the Council of the United Provinces is purely tentative. Intimate local knowledge alone can say whether it is suitable, and the figures given are merely in illustration of the general purpose of the scheme. So far as these tentative figures go, agriculture and urban interests are equally divided, since the Members for Commerce will also represent urban interests.

In the other provinces the predominance of legal practitioners is not quite so great, but other professions are represented, and in the five provinces together the landholding interests only amount to 25 per cent. of the elected non-official Members and the professional classes absorb 64 out of 112 seats. There is, therefore, a clear case for revision if representation on the Councils is to be in a fair ratio to the relative importance of the interests concerned.

16. The extension of the franchise in the various electorates is based not on the objective of giving every man of particular means a vote, but of devising suitable electorates for each particular class of which the representation is desired on the Councils. For example, a money-lender in a village, who paid income-tax, would almost certainly own land. If his interests in land were sufficient to qualify him for a vote on the land electorate, he would have a vote on that electorate. But if he had no land or insufficient land so to qualify him, he would not have a vote. It would be unnecessary to give him a vote, since the representation of the class and interest to which he belonged could be sufficiently secured in the urban electorates. Similarly mere educational qualifications would not place a man on a land electorate, if he had no place there otherwise, but many educated men would be otherwise qualified to find a place on the land or the urban electorates. The University electorate, if it included registered graduates, would bring on to that electorate all graduates who chose to keep their names on the University rolls. Whether education should form a further qualification in the urban electorates, additional to the payment of income-tax, or the property test, is a point that merits careful consideration. It is one on which opinions may widely differ. On the one hand, it may be urged that men of some education are peculiarly qualified to have a vote. On the other, that education by itself unaccompanied by the ownership of property does not connote such a stake in the country as to exercise a steadying effect on the action which a man might take. An education vote which did not include Government servants would seem unfair to that large section of the educated classes which take up Government service. On the other hand, if Government servants as such found a place on the electorates, very awkward circumstances might arise; for example, if one of the candidates were to be avowedly hostile to Government and held very extreme views. It would not be edifying to see Judges, Magistrates, Government officers generally, and Government clerks going to the poll to record their votes in favour of a man of this kind. The whole subject of a vote based solely on education is a difficult one, and the present scheme leaves the question open so far as urban electorates are concerned.

17. The scheme that has been described above does not contemplate any large changes in the character of the Councils themselves, but it makes an advance along two lines, that of increasing cautiously the elected element in the Councils, and that of expanding largely the number of voters. The first change was all that the late Mr. Gokhale asked as the next step in modification of the present constitution of the Councils. The second is purely experimental in its nature. It could scarcely be contended that the war, or any circumstances connected with the war, have made any sudden change in the direction of bringing into existence suitable candidates for the Councils, where they did not before exist, or in the direction of making people fit to exercise the right of voting if they were not before fit for the exercise of such a right. In fact, the whole history of the reforms shows that, from the

beginning, votes have been conferred upon people, not because they themselves asked for votes, but because a small oligarchy of the *literati* having demanded representation in Councils, it became necessary to devise electorates to return Members. The proposed further advance which this scheme contemplates is again not in response to any demand made by those on whom it is proposed to confer votes, but simply with the desire that the persons who find seats on the Councils should be returned by the suffrages of a larger number of persons. It will be made simply in the hope that the right to exercise a vote may in time create a corresponding sense of responsibility which does not now exist. The scheme has the merit that it experiments along these lines without any danger to the State. At the worst, the enlarged electorates can only return the same kind of men that now find seats on the Councils. At the best, if they return men who are more representative of the sentiments which these new voters themselves hold, they will give the Government the opportunity of seeing how far the new Members can be entrusted with further powers, and whether any first step in the direction of converting the Legislative Councils from being Councils of the Heads of the various Governments to becoming a House of Representatives can safely be taken.

In neither case will there be any risk of the Government being entirely overborne by an Opposition in its own Councils until it has gained a large experience of the quality and disposition of the new Councils. In all old countries votes have been gradually extended lower down the scale of wealth and property upon the vociferous demands of the persons claiming that right. In India the process has been reversed, with the result that the most conservative people in the world are returning as their Members persons who profess to hold the most radical views. The extension of the franchise which this scheme contemplates is proposed merely with the hope, it may be a forlorn hope, that this extension may remedy the incongruities of the present system.

18. Although it is not desirable that non-official majorities in the Councils should be large enough to dominate the Government, it is certainly desirable that the existing regulations regarding Rules of Business and so forth should be re-examined with a view to seeing how far irksome restraints upon the right of interpellation, and the right of moving resolutions, may be relaxed, and more freedom in examining budgets be conceded. It also seems desirable that, when questions are not of such importance that Government is obliged to take a firm stand on one side or the other, the freedom of voting should be conceded to officials. In this way the status of the Council as a Council, where all alike tender their opinions freely, would be preserved instead of a fixed division being formed between officials as the Government and non-officials as the Opposition. Changes of this kind can be best considered, however, when the main questions regarding the constitution and composition of the Councils themselves have been decided.

## Appendix I.

RESOLUTION XIX OF THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
OF DECEMBER 1915.*Self-Government.*

That this Congress is of opinion that the time has arrived to introduce further and substantial measures of reform towards the attainment of Self-Government as defined in Article I\* of its constitution, namely, reforming and liberalising the system of government in this country so as to secure to the people an effective control over it, amongst others, by—

- (a) The introduction of Provincial autonomy, including financial independence;
- (b) Expansion and reform of the Legislative Councils so as to make them truly and adequately representative of all sections of the people and to give them an effective control over the acts of the Executive Government;
- (c) The reconstruction of the various existing Executive Councils and the establishment of similar Executive Councils in Provinces where they do not exist;
- (d) The reform or the abolition of the Council of the Secretary of State for India;
- (e) Establishment of Legislative Councils in Provinces where they do not now exist;
- (f) The readjustment of the relations between the Secretary of State for India and the Government of India; and
- (g) A liberal measure of Local Self-Government.

That this Congress authorises the All-India Congress Committee to frame a scheme of reform and a programme of continuous work, educative and propagandist, having regard to the principles embodied in this resolution and further authorises the said Committee to confer with the Committee that may be appointed by the All-India Moslem League, for the same purpose and to take such further measures as may be necessary; the said Committee to submit its report on or before the 1st of September 1916 to the General Secretaries, who shall circulate it to the different Provincial Congress Committees as early as possible.

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\* *Article I.*—The objects of the Indian National Congress are the attainment by the people of India of a system of government similar to that enjoyed by the self-governing Members of the British Empire and a participation by them in the rights and responsibilities of the Empire on equal terms with those Members. These objects are to be achieved by constitutional means by bringing about a steady reform of the existing system of administration and by promoting national unity, fostering public spirit and developing and organising the intellectual, moral, economic and industrial resources of the country.

## Appendix II.

## NOTE EXAMINING THE CONSTITUTION AND COMPOSITION OF EXISTING COUNCILS.

Table I shows the distribution of Additional Members of Legislative Councils under the existing regulations, showing the maximum permissible number of nominated officials, and the minimum number of nominated non-officials. *Ex-officio* Members are not included in this table.

TABLE I.

PROVINCE.	*Officials (maximum number permissible).	Experts (official or non-official maximum number permissible).	Elected non- officials.	Nominated non-officials (minimum number permissible).	Total number.	Statutory maximum.
Madras ...	16	2	21	5	44	50
Bombay ...	14	2	21	7	44	50
Bengal ...	16	2	28	4	50	50
Bihar & Orissa	15	1	21	4	41	50
United Provinces	20	2	21	6	49	50

\* This does not include the President or Members of Executive Councils, where there are such, or the Advocates-General in Madras and Bombay, who are *ex-officio* Members of the Legislative Councils.

2. Table II shows the actual distribution of Members of the Legislative Councils (including *ex-officio* Members) as they stood on the 1st April 1916.

TABLE II.

PROVINCE.	OFFICIALS.		Experts.	Elected Non- officials.	Nominated Non-officials.	Total number.
	<i>Ex-officio.</i>	Nominated.				
Madras ...	5	14	...	21	7	47
Bombay ...	5	8	...	20	13	46
Bengal ...	4	14	...	28	6	52
Bihar & Orissa	4	14	...	21	4	43
United Provinces	1	19	†2	21	7	50

† 1 official and 1 non-official.



3. Table III shows the non-official majorities, if all official seats were filled by officials.

TABLE III.

PROVINCE.	OFFICIAL MEMBERS.			NON-OFFICIALS.			Non-official majority.
	Non-official.	Nominated.	Total.	Elected.	Nominated	Total.	
Madras ... ..	5	16	21	21	5	26	5
Bombay ... ..	5	14	19	21	7	28	9
Bengal ... ..	4	16	20	28	4	32	12
Bihar & Orissa .	4	15	19	21	4	25	6
United Provinces ...	1	20	21	21	6	27	6

4. It will be observed from these three tables (1) that these non-official majorities take no account of experts seats, which may be filled either by officials or non-officials, and (2) that the scope for the further enlargement of the Councils up to their statutory maximum admits of some additions, excepting only in Bengal.

The following are the possible additions :—

Madras 6.		Bengal <i>nil</i> .
Bombay 6.		Bihar & Orissa 9.
United Provinces 1.		

The Bihar and Orissa numbers were kept deliberately small in order to provide for further electorates when Bihar and Orissa got a separate University and when further experience had been gained of the system of representation.

5. The next Table IV shows :—

(a) the number of official seats to which non-officials have been nominated; and

(b) the non-official majorities on the 1st April 1916.

TABLE IV.  
*Councils as existing on 1st April 1916.*

PROVINCE.	Number of official seats to which non-officials have been nominated.	Non-official majority.
Madras ... ..	2	9
Bombay ... ..	6	20
Bengal ... ..	2	16
Bihar & Orissa ... ..	<i>Nil</i>	7
United Provinces ... ..	1	8

*Note.*—One official seat has been left vacant in Bihar and Orissa, and one elected seat appears to have been vacant in April 1916 in Bombay.

6. The next Table V shows the number of Europeans and Anglo-Indians on the Councils elected and nominated, and also the non-official majority, if these supported the Government, (1) if all official seats were filled by officials; and (2) on the actual composition of the Councils on the 1st April 1916.

TABLE V.

PROVINCE.	Non-official majority.		No. of Europeans and Anglo-Indians in Councils.	Non-official majority if all Europeans vote with Government	
	On Councils with full complement of officials (1).	On Councils as existing on 1st April 1916 (2).		as in (1).	as in (2).
Madras ... ..	5	9	6	—7	—3
Bombay ... ..	9	20	6	—3	+8
Bengal ... ..	12	16	6	<i>Nil</i>	+4
Bihar & Orissa ... ..	6	7	3	<i>Nil</i>	+1
United Provinces ... ..	6	8	2	+2	+4

On any straight issue between advanced politicians and the Government, the Europeans would generally support the Government. In that case the

support of four nominated Members in Bombay, and of two in Bengal and the United Provinces would equalise matters. Madras would not require any such support, and a single supporter would suffice in Bihar and Orissa to save defeat.

7. The last two Tables VI and VII show respectively the distribution of seats in the basic electorates, and the distribution of all elected non-official Members by their professions and occupations.

TABLE VI.

PROVINCE.	Landholders.	Municipal electorates.	District Board electorates.	Combined Municipal and D. B. electorates.	Mahomedans.	TOTAL.
Madras ...	5	...	...	9	2	16
Bombay ...	3	4	4	...	4	15
Bengal ...	4 or 5	6 or 5	5	...	5	20
Bihar & Orrisa ...	5	5	5	...	4	19
United Provinces...	2	1	...	9	4	16

TABLE VII.

			ELECTED NON-OFFICIAL MEMBERS.					
			Madras.	Bombay.	Bengal.	United Provinces.	Bihar & Orissa.	TOTAL.
Landholders ...	...	...	5	4	8	6	6	29
Banking and Commerce ...	...	...	3	6	6	3	1	19
Legal Practitioners ...	...	...	10	8	8	12	11	49
Other Professions ...	...	...	2	1	1	...	...	4
Others ...	...	...	1	2	5	...	3	11
TOTAL ...			21	21	28	21	21	112

It will be observed that of all the existing Councils, Bengal alone has reached its full statutory maximum. It provides for only 16 nominated

officials, or adding *ex-officio* Members, for 20 officials on a full Council. It has already filled two official nominated seats by non-official nominees, and it has no less than 28 elected seats out of 50 open to the Additional Members.

Bombay has only 21 elected seats ; but on the other hand, it has given up six possible official seats to non-officials. These are the two provinces in which the largest non-official majorities have so far been conceded, but they both have six Europeans among their non-official Members.

It is now for consideration how far other provinces are prepared to follow these leads, and whether Bombay and Bengal consider it safe to increase any further the non-official element, or, in the case of Bombay, the non-official elected element.

Bengal is the only province in which elected non-officials have a bare majority over all other classes combined ; but it has to be noted that there are certain kinds of legislation which Bengal is doubtful about its ability to carry in its Council.

## Appendix III.

PREVIOUS PRONOUNCEMENTS REGARDING LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS, AND RELATING  
TO THE REPRESENTATION OF CLASSES AND INTERESTS.

*Extracts from Lord Dufferin's Minute attached to the Government of India's  
Despatch of the 6th November 1888.*

"Though it is out of the question either for the Supreme or for the Subordinate Governments of India to divest themselves of any essential portion of that Imperial authority which is necessary to their very existence as the ruling Power, paramount over a variety of nationalities, most of whom are in a very backward state of civilisation and enlightenment, there is no reason why they should not desire to associate with themselves in Council in very considerable numbers such of the Natives of India as may be enabled by their acquirements, experience and ability to assist and enlighten them in the discharge of their difficult duties."

\* \* \* \* \*

"By this means the field of public discussion will be considerably enlarged, and the various Administrations concerned will be able to shape their course with the advantage of a far more distinct knowledge of the wishes and feelings of the communities with whose interests they may be required to deal than has hitherto been the case; for those wishes and feelings will be expressed, not, as at present, through self-constituted, self-nominated and therefore untrustworthy channels, but by the mouths of those who will be legally constituted representatives of various interests and classes, and who will feel themselves in whatever they may do or say, responsible to enlightened and increasing sections of their own countrymen."

\* \* \* \* \*

"Though we are adopting the 'elective' principle to a modified extent, we must remember that in India, as it exists at present, no real 'Representation' of the people can be obtained; all that we hope to do is, by associating with ourselves in the task of administration a considerable number of persons selected and elected from the educated classes, to place ourselves in contact with a larger surface of Native opinion and to multiply the channels through which we may make ourselves acquainted with the wants and feelings of the various communities for whose welfare we are responsible."

*Extract from the Report of the Council Committee, attached to the same  
despatch.*

"We consider that.....provision should be made for the appointment of representatives of the more important interests which exist in the country."

Taken in their broadest aspects, these are (a) the interests of the hereditary nobility and landed classes, who have a great permanent stake in the country; (b) the interests of the trading, professional and agricultural classes; (c) the interests of the planting and commercial European community; and (d) the interests of stable and effective administration.” \* \*

“We are fully aware that in India at present there can be no such thing as popular representation as understood in Western countries; but we think it desirable that in appointing Members to the Council we should not rely solely on nomination; and that some approximation should be made to the elective principle.”

*Extract from Lord Lansdowne's note interpreting the Mandate of Parliament in connection with the Indian Councils Act of 1892.*

- “(1) It is not expected of us that we shall attempt to create in India a complete or symmetrical system of representation.
- “(2) It is expected of us that we shall make a *bonâ fide* endeavour to render the Legislative Councils more representative of the different sections of the Indian community than they are at present.
- “(3) For this purpose we are at liberty to make use of the machinery of election wherever there is a fair prospect that it will produce satisfactory results.
- “(4) Although we may to this extent apply the elective principle, it is to be clearly understood that the ultimate selection of all Additional Members rests with the Government, and not with electors. The function of the latter will be that of recommendation only.”

*Extract from the Government of India's Despatch to the Secretary of State of the 26th October 1892.*

“It appears to us that, having in view the numerical limits before referred to and their necessary consequence, and the paramount necessity of giving to all important interests in the country as much representation in the Councils as is possible, the first point for determination is the nature and number of the interests which should be represented. Indian society, from historical causes to which we need now not refer, is essentially a congeries of widely separated classes, races and communities, with divergencies of interests and hereditary sentiment which for ages have precluded common action or local unanimity. Representation of such a community, upon such a scale as the Act permits, can only be secured by providing that each important class shall at least have the opportunity of making its views known in the Council by the mouth of

some Member specially acquainted with them. Where such a representation can be secured by the common action of any such bodies as are referred to in Lord Cross's despatch, we are prepared to resort to the method of entertaining an expression of their views and recommendations in the manner suggested by him; but outside such bodies it is clearly necessary to reserve the power of nomination by less formal methods for classes which, though of importance in the community, are not in numerical preponderance or are unaccustomed to act together."

*Extract from the Report of the Committee which considered Lord Minto's  
Proposals in 1906.*

"When in 1893 the Councils were enlarged and the elective principle introduced, it was recognised that territorial representation was unsuited to India, but an endeavour was made so to constitute the electorates that all the more important classes and interests should as far as possible be represented \* \* \* \* \*. The results have not justified the expectations formed. Most conspicuous of all has been the failure of the District Boards to fulfil the expectation that they would represent the landed interests..... It is apparent that the elective system has given to the legal profession a prominence in the Provincial Councils to which it is not entitled, while it has signally failed to represent the more stable elements of the community."

*Extract from the Despatch to the Secretary of State of the 21st March 1907.*

"We are no advocates of representative Government for India in the Western sense of the term; it could never be akin to the instincts of the many races composing the population of the Indian Empire. It would be a Western importation uncongenial to Eastern tastes.....The Government of India must remain autocratic and the supreme power must be vested in British hands and cannot be delegated to any kind of representative assembly.....The proposals, which we recommend for your provisional acceptance represent an advance in the direction of associating the people of India with ourselves in the work of legislating and administration. They may fairly be described as an attempt to give to India something that may be called a constitution framed on sufficiently liberal lines to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of all but the most advanced Indians, while at the same time enlisting the support of the conservative element of Native society.....not an experimental makeshift, but a working machine representing all interests that are capable of being represented, and providing for an adequate expression of the sentiments and requirements of the masses of the people and in particular of the great agricultural class forming two-thirds of the entire population."

*Extract from a Circular reference made in the light of Lord Morley's  
Criticisms of the 24th August 1907.*

"It is the desire of the Governor-General in Council that the Legislative Councils in India should now be enlarged to the fullest extent compatible with the necessary authority of the Government. He desires, moreover, that these bodies should be so constituted in respect of non-official Members as to give due and ample representation to the different classes and interests of the community. In carrying out this system, which the Government of India agree with Lord Lansdowne's Government in regarding as the only one in any way applicable to Indian conditions, they consider it essential that the Government should always be able to reckon on a numerical majority, and that this majority should be strong enough to be independent of the minor fluctuations that may be caused by the occasional absence of an official Member. The principle of a standing majority is accepted by the Government as an entirely legitimate and necessary consequence of the nature of the paramount power in India, and so far as they know it has never been disputed by any section of Indian opinion that does not dispute the legitimacy of the paramount power itself. That is not an open question; and if two men are not able to wield one sceptre, it is idle to dissemble that fact in constructing political machinery. The question then arises, what number of official Members of the requisite standing and experience can, without detriment to the public service, be spared from their regular duties for attendance in Legislative Councils? The enlargement of the Councils is certain to add considerably to protraction of debate, thus entailing larger calls upon the time of their Members. The necessity of maintaining an official majority thus implies the necessity of limiting the number of non-official Members; and the problem which faces the Government of India now, as it faced Lord Lansdowne's Government 15 years ago, is how to "provide for the due representation, within the narrow limits thus imposed, of the vast diversity of classes, races, and interests in the Indian Empire."

*Extract paragraphs 18 and 19 from the Despatch of the Government of India to the Secretary of State, of 1st October 1908, submitting their final proposals after the opinions elicited had been considered.*

"18. *Principle of representation.*—We have carefully considered the proposals of Local Governments on the subject and the large body of non-official opinions submitted. In our judgment these papers bear out to the fullest extent the conclusion that representation by classes and interests is the only



practicable method of embodying the elective principle in the constitution of the Indian Legislative Councils. A great array of authorities may be cited in support of this opinion. Twenty years ago, in the course of the discussions leading up to the report of Sir George Chesney's Committee, Mr. (now Lord) MacDonnell, then Home Secretary to Lord Dufferin's Government, said in a note which was forwarded to the India Office :— "The process of modifying the existing constitution of the Councils should proceed on a clear recognition and firm grasp of the fact that India is a congeries of races, nationalities and creeds, widely differing *inter se* in a variety of ways." On the same occasion Sir George Chesney expressed similar views, and Sir Charles Aitchison observed that "the division of the people into creeds, castes and sects with varying and conflicting interests" rendered representation in the European sense an obvious impossibility. A passage in Lord Dufferin's minute annexed to the Government of India's despatch of the 6th November 1888 describes the population of India as "composed of a large number of distinct nationalities, professing various religions, practising diverse rites, speaking different languages, while many of them are still further separated from one another by discordant prejudices, by conflicting social usages, and even antagonistic material interests". This opinion is not confined to Englishmen, but is shared by competent Indian observers at the present day. In a recent address to a modern political association on the duty of patriotic Indians, His Highness the Aga Khan has given emphatic expression to similar sentiments. "In India", he says, "no such union as is essential to the creation of a strong, independent, homogeneous state is possible without centuries of consolidation. Even if we assume that the forces tending to unification are quickened by the machinery of modern civilisation, generations must pass before India is a nation. In very truth we can detect signs of the advent of that unity which is the first essential to the creation of a modern state."

19. These views receive striking independent confirmation from the debates in Parliament on the Indian Councils Bill which became law in 1892. In the Upper House Lord Ripon referred to the extreme difficulty of "selecting men who represented the various classes of the community, and the various sections of opinion, as well as the various localities of India." Lord Kimberley said— "The notion of a Parliamentary representation of so vast a country—almost as large as Europe—containing so large a number of different races is one of the wildest imaginations that ever entered the minds of men." He went on to emphasise the necessity of ascertaining the feelings of "a most important body.....the Mahomedans of India. If you were to be guided entirely by the Hindu popular opinion you would find yourself in great difficulty." Lord Northbrook considered that provision should be made "for the representation of different classes of people—people of different races and different religions." In a later stage of the discussion Lord Kimberley agreed

with Lord Northbrook, and observed—"It has been found in this country not very easy to protect the interests of minorities by any contrivance that can be devised; but there must be found some mode in India of seeing that minorities such as the important body of Mahomedans, who are frequently in a minority in parts of that country, are fully represented." In the House of Commons the weightiest utterance was that of Mr. Gladstone, who referred to the difficulty of introducing the elective principle "in an Asiatic country like India with its ancient civilisation, with institutions so peculiar, with such diversities of race, religions and pursuits." He also drew attention to "the danger of having persons who represent particular cliques or classes or interests and who claim the honour of representing the people of India," thus anticipating the observation, now made by the Bombay Government, that "the educated classes, although a very small minority, appear to claim to represent the interests of all sections of the people, and are inclined to oppose any measures which appear likely to lessen their influence." Mr. Samuel Smith spoke of "the endless shades of caste, race, and religion in India;" Sir William Plowden and Sir Richard Temple followed in the same strain; and the latter observed that "in fixing the ratio of Members, the interests to be represented, and the classes which constitute the bulk of the people, ought to be the determining factors rather than the population."

*Extract from Lord Morley's speech in the House of Lords on the 17th  
December 1908.*

Parliament was asked "in a very definite way, to introduce election working alongside of nomination with a view to the due representation of the different classes of the community."

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"If I were attempting to set up a Parliamentary system in India, or if it could be said that this chapter of reforms led directly or indirectly to the establishment of a Parliamentary system in India, I, for one, would have nothing at all to do with it. I do not believe—it is not of very great consequence what I believe, because the fulfilment of my vaticinations could not come off very soon—in spite of the attempts in Oriental countries at this moment, interesting attempts to which we all wish well, to set up some sort of Parliamentary system—it is no ambition of mine at all events to have any share in beginning that operation in India. If my existence, either officially or corporeally, were to be prolonged 20 times longer than either of them is likely to be, a Parliamentary system in India is not at all the goal to which I would for one moment aspire."

[SECRET.]

## C.

MEMORANDUM ON THE REFORMS DESIRABLE IN RESPECT OF  
PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

It may be argued at the outset that no material change is desirable in respect of Provincial Legislatures on the ground that only a few years have passed since they were re-constituted under the Morley-Minto scheme, and that it would be better therefore to await further experience of their working. This, however, cannot be deemed a satisfactory solution of the question. It may be quite true that but for the war things might have gone on for some years longer on the lines of the existing Morley-Minto scheme, with perhaps a few minor amendments. But the war has materially altered all this. It has quickened the national life of India and given rise to thoughts and aspirations which are being most cleverly turned to their own account by the *intelligentsia*. It has also, to use a now hackneyed phrase, set up a new "angle of vision" at Home. It is impossible to stand still: a policy of mere inaction would almost certainly, after the present crisis, be overruled from Home. It is essential, therefore, to tackle firmly this question of the Legislative Councils and their powers, and to have a reasoned and well-thought-out policy on the subject.

2. From this point of view, there are three main matters to be considered:—

- (a) Re-arrangement of the existing constituencies and broadening of the franchise so as to make the elected Members more really representative.
- (b) An increase in the proportion of elected Members so that the Councils shall contain an elected majority.
- (c) Expansion of the constitutional powers of the Councils.

3. Taking the last point first, it has to be remembered that leaving out of account the right of interpellation by individual members, the powers of the Councils are two-fold. *First*, the Council has full control, as a legislature, over the law-making activities of Government, *i. e.*, no Government Bill can pass into law without being backed by a majority in the Council. As regards private Bills, if these passed through the Council, they also would become law unless vetoed by the Head of the Province, or the Governor-General, or at a final stage by the Secretary of State. *Secondly*, the Legislative Councils can at present pass Resolutions, either in respect of the Budget or in regard to matters of general public interest. Constitutionally, however, these are not in any way

binding on the Government : they are requests which can be acted on or not as it thinks fit.

It would seem premature, and indeed dangerous, to recommend any immediate expansion of these powers in the direction which a number of "progressive" politicians desire, *i. e.*, to develop the Councils as *quasi*-Parliaments, giving them large financial and administrative control, which must eventually lead up to their having great influence on the constitution of the Provincial Governments. It may not be desirable to exclude development in this direction as a subsequent stage towards the goal which no doubt is in view, though probably still in the far distance.\* But for the present it will be most advisable to limit immediate recommendations to action on the lines indicated in (a) and (b), *i. e.*, to take steps which will make the elected Members more really representative than they now are, and to increase their proportions.

4. These reforms will of themselves enhance the power of the Legislative Councils over legislation, since it would be possible for a Council so constituted to reject or materially amend Government Bills. That, however, is a contingency which must be faced, provided (1) that the electoral system is so devised as to make the Members more really representative than they are at present, and so reduce the risk of mere class combinations; and (2) that the Government shall possess the right of a penal dissolution and thus be able to call on the electors to judge the conduct of their Members. It must be remembered, too, that Indian Governments are by no means infallible, and that the rejection or material amendment of a Government measure may every now and then be really in the public interest, or would at any rate do no material harm. It is suggested, however, that where a Bill as passed by the Legislative Council (while generally useful) contains some obviously undesirable provisions, the Head of the Province shall be able to allow it to pass into law with the provisions in question omitted, *i. e.*, that he may exercise a partial veto instead of disallowing the whole Bill. The same power would of course be exercisable at a later stage by the Government of India as represented by the Governor-General.

As regards the contingency of private Bills of an objectionable character being passed against the opposition of Government, this risk can be met by the power of veto already inherent in the Head of the Province, which might be expanded as above indicated into one of partial veto, where necessary, while beyond him there would, in case of necessity, be the Governor-General.

It must also be remembered that the Resolutions of a Council constituted as now suggested will naturally carry greater weight with the Government than those of the present bodies.

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\* *Extract from formula already adopted in this Council.*

"The only goal to which we can look forward is to endow India, as an integral part of the British Empire, with the largest measure of Self-Government compatible with the maintenance of the supremacy of British Rule."

5. In effect then, it is thought that present circumstances demand some radical reform, and that the practical direction of immediate advance is to enlarge the constituencies and the proportion of elected Members, postponing further material development of the powers of the Councils until the working of these reforms has been tested, and definite progress has been made in the further Indianisation of the higher administration. This would be an intelligible policy, and one on which, if clearly explained, may reasonably command the support of His Majesty's Government. If, on the other hand, there is any shrinking from material reforms in the directions proposed, the eventual upshot will probably be that pressure from Home will result in a considerable increase in the power of the Councils constituted very likely on their existing narrow basis. In other words an oligarchy of the *intelligentsia*.

It may indeed be asked by the Secretary of State why some further constitutional powers cannot simultaneously be given to the Councils; but to that there would be, in present circumstances, a ready answer. After all, the Morley-Minto scheme has only been in operation for some seven years, and it has resulted in the predominance in the Councils of a single class (the professional lawyers) and its allies. What it is now desired to do is so to enlarge the constituencies as to afford a better representation of the mass of the people. Like all electoral reform schemes, this must be to a certain extent a leap in the dark. It is only reasonable, therefore, to wait for a while and see what the results of it are, what sort of men will be returned and what their attitude towards Government will be, whether there will be class combinations and general obstruction to Government measures, or whether the changes will result in healthy differences of opinion and helpful rather than destructive criticism. Also, as has already been said, there will be the parallel development in regard to making the higher administration more Indian in character, while at the other end of the scale a material advance in the direction of local self-government has been suggested. All these are considerations which render it most desirable to pause for the present before effecting any material expansion of the constitutional powers of the Councils.

6. There is, however, one matter in which larger powers might be given. At present there are Finance Committees in the Provincial Legislative Councils which consist, speaking generally in even proportions of officials nominated by Government and of non-official Members selected by their colleagues, and these deal, though subject to the ultimate discretion of Government, with a portion of the Provincial Budget. That portion is, however, a relatively small one, consisting of what is called the unallotted expenditure of the Province, *i. e.*, the amounts which are not considered definitely earmarked for existing establishments and schemes, or for those which have already received the approval of the Secretary of State and the Government of India or are under correspondence with these authorities. Non-official Members

complain, and not unreasonably, that this gives them very little scope for advice, since the really important matters are taken out of their cognisance *quâ* Finance Committee on the plea that the Local Government is already committed. It is suggested that it would be preferable to have two or three non-official Members of the Council (elected for the purpose by their colleagues) associated with the Government as advisers in the preparation of the Provincial Budget as a whole. The full Council would of course still possess the power of passing Resolutions on matters appertaining to the Budget, and of dealing, on its legislative side, with Bills which embodied additions to, or modifications of, local taxation.

7. Coming now to the important matters on which it is thought that an immediate advance could be made, it may be laid down that, speaking generally, the time has come for giving a substantial majority of elected Members in the Provincial Councils.

The exact proportion of elected Members must naturally be a matter for discussion with the Local Governments; but as a general principle—subject to exceptions in particular cases where the necessity of such exception can be clearly demonstrated—it is suggested that not less than 7-12ths of the Council should be elected by direct general constituencies, including, where this is deemed essential, a proportionate representation for important communities such as Mahomedans (or Sikhs in the Punjab) whose numbers and distribution may render it impossible for them to obtain adequate representation in the general electorates. Any special seats which it may be thought desirable to reserve for Universities, Chambers of Commerce and the like bodies should be outside this 7-12ths proportion. Subject to this, discretion would be given to Local Governments as to filling up the remaining seats, *i. e.*, either by officials, or by the special nomination of non-officials to represent those interests for whom no electorate can be devised.

8. As regards the general method of election, the Morley-Minto scheme was mainly based on class representation. Speaking generally, the most important interests represented by special class constituencies were—

- (1) Large landowners.
- (2) Non-official members of (a) municipalities, and (b) district boards.  
Usually there are separate constituencies for (a) and (b), but in Madras and the United Provinces the municipalities and the district boards vote together.
- (3) Small constituencies for the return of specially important commercial and other interests, which brings in the representation of Chambers of Commerce, Trades' Associations, Port Commissions, Universities, and occasionally the planting community.

- (4) In addition to these there is the special representation of an important portion of the general community, to wit the Mahomedans.

The results of this system of "checks and balances" have, however, not been at all fortunate, since in practice the Members returned have been predominantly of the lawyer class, or under its influence. The present constituencies again mostly contain a ludicrously small number of electors, and this tends to the return of Members by personal solicitation and various undesirable methods rather than by reason of their really representative character. There are also other important defects. Thus, although the district boards should primarily represent agricultural interest, these are largely overbalanced by the presence on such boards of professional men. This element is also predominant in the municipalities, and yet the population of most of the Indian municipalities is very largely agricultural. Again, to bring municipalities and district boards into the arena of the Provincial Council elections involves an undesirable mixing up of purely local with provincial and general politics.

Lastly, the special representation of Mahomedans leads to two serious anomalies—

- (a) Mahomedans, besides voting in their own special constituencies, can also vote in the general ones.
- (b) The franchise in the Mahomedan constituencies is often considerably lower than in the others. Consequently a man gets a vote in a Legislative Council election if he is a Mahomedan, though in the same circumstances he would not possess it were he a Hindu.

9. The present proposal therefore is to sweep away this complicated and anomalous system of class interests, based mainly on what are practically pocket boroughs, and to substitute large constituencies primarily based on recognised territorial units, such as districts, and with the franchise pitched sufficiently low to admit of considerable bodies of voters. Under this system the agricultural element would obtain its fair weight, while candidates would have to come into the open and be returned on their political views instead of by their energy in private canvassing. Under such a territorial system the largest cities, representing the distinctly urban areas, would of course have separate representation, and other municipalities can safely be left to make their weight felt in district or other territorial areas. As stated too in paragraph 7, special seats would still be reserved for Universities, Chambers of Commerce and the like, while the question of special minority representation in respect of Mahomedans, &c., will be dealt with later on.

It may be pointed out in this connection that, even if the class system were continued, it would be necessary, in order to apply it properly and in view of the predominantly agricultural character of India, to give the largest share of the elected Members to the landed interests, whose electors ought, it

is considered, to represent not merely large landholders, but the most substantial of the actual cultivators. That being so, it would in itself be necessary to sub-divide the landed representation according to territorial areas, just as under the present system the representation of municipal and district boards is similarly sub-divided. Territorial representation is thus in no way a revolutionary departure. It is merely the fuller application of a system which already exists in the background.

10. I may be argued that under such a system much the same class of people would be returned as previously. The first elections might indeed produce this result, but as time went on the leaven of the new electors would work, and the result would be Members who were much more fully representative of local interests and aspirations. Even if the same men were returned, they would have different classes of constituents to look to and would, as is the case with politicians elsewhere, shape their views and professions accordingly. But even if it were to happen that the same men would be returned, expounding the same ideas, at any rate it would be known that they voiced the opinions of large electorates instead of pocket-boroughs and the Government would have to adjust its appreciation of them accordingly. Lastly the territorial system would in time develop healthy rivalry and divergence among Members returned by it, with reference to conflicting claims from various areas in respect of matters such as administrative improvement and economic development.

11. As regards franchise conditions, this is a matter which must necessarily be discussed with Local Governments, and the prescribed qualifications may, and probably must, vary in different provinces. But speaking broadly, any general constituency should be considered an unsatisfactorily small one which did not include about 3,000 voters. In the present circumstances of India, there must necessarily be a fairly high property test, but this should not be unduly restrictive. All persons, for instance, who pay income-tax, *i. e.*, who possess an income outside the land of at least Rs. 1,000 per annum, should certainly be included. People who get an analogous income from the land should also of course be admitted, as likewise men who could make up the prescribed limit, partly by their income from the land and partly from other sources.

Ordinarily the land revenue assessments would be a convenient franchise basis in the case of the agricultural population, but this would not be a fair criterion in the case of constituencies which include big *zamindaris*, where there are a number of substantial landholders who have no direct revenue connection with the Government. While land revenue assessment would, *per se*, be an automatic test, there would seem to be no reason for preventing a man who does not pay it from showing that he nevertheless derives an analogous income from the land. Also, where the land revenue test is taken, it ought to



be remembered that, while in *ryotwari* provinces the general theory is that the Government takes half the net profits from cultivation, in practice it takes considerably less than this, and that should be considered in fixing a property test corresponding to the payment of income-tax. Indeed, it would probably be just that the balance should be struck rather in favour of the agriculturist, who has so much less opportunity of making his voice heard, and as already indicated (paragraph 9) measures should be adopted which would bring into the electorates men of the substantial *ryot* class.

12. It would also be desirable to supplement property qualifications by others. For instance, a liberal educational franchise should be allowed, going down, it may be, as far as persons who have passed a "vernacular final" and have thus obtained what may be considered a satisfactory middle-school education. Persons who have individually deserved well of the State as evidenced by the bestowal on them of titles, European and Indian, should also be admitted. Further, as regards the property qualifications, it should be borne in mind that in the case of a Government pensioner his existing pension represents roughly not more than half what he at one time got in Government service. Consequently, in the case of these people, one-half the property qualification exacted for others should be allowed.

13. The question has been raised as to whether Government officials should have votes in the Council elections. The principle should of course be emphasised that a Government official should not present himself as a candidate or take any active part in an election, or in any way influence the voters, and this policy should be rigorously enforced. But it would be unreasonable to deny the official in his private capacity his ordinary rights as a citizen.

14. What the areas of the general constituencies proposed should be, would obviously be matters for the Local Governments to determine. But speaking generally, the districts would form the natural units, though small districts might occasionally be grouped together, while a very large or populous district might return more than one Member by sub-division or otherwise.

15. As regards the special representation of Mahomedans, and any like community which is considerable in numbers, but is so scattered that it is not likely to obtain any adequate representation in ordinary constituencies, such a community could be provided for by proportionate representation. Thus taking the Mahomedans in any province they would have a number of seats allotted to them which would bear the same proportion to the numbers returned by the general constituencies as the Mahomedan population bore to the remaining population of the province and the franchise for these special constituencies should be the same as for the general ones. Mahomedans are not entitled to more than this. Nor should persons grouped into special constituencies of this kind be entitled to vote in the ordinary constituencies.

16. As regards University representation, there can be no reason to continue the present narrow limitation of the franchise to members of the Senate and Honorary Fellows. It might well be extended to all registered graduates of five years' standing.

17. Of course, in certain circumstances this system would involve plural voting, *i. e.*, a man might vote both in his University as a graduate, or in a Chamber of Commerce as a member thereof, and at the same time in one of the general constituencies by reason of his residing there and satisfying the property or other tests. There could be no objection to this, since it is not proposed to develop a system of universal suffrage on the basis of one man one vote, but a system under which territorial along with certain special interests will be duly represented. Plural voting of this sort is in quite a different category to that of a Mahomedan voting in his own special constituency, which has been fenced off from the general electorates, and then in one of these also.

18. There should be no residential qualification for candidates, or any condition that they should have put in service on a district board or a municipality. Such conditions could be evaded, and if the constituencies are properly organised, it will be for them to decide whether they will prefer a stranger to a man who has lived and worked among them.

19. It should not be supposed that the breaking-down of the class system of election above proposed in any way weakens the case for Government nominating Members, official and non-official. On the contrary, it may well be held to strengthen it, since if normal election is by general territorial constituencies, there is all the more case for providing specially for the presence in the Councils of men whom these cannot, or will not, elect, and for adding, in the case of officials, a valuable element of administrative experience.

It must be remembered too that the nominated Members represent an element which would ordinarily, in Western countries, find a place in a second Chamber, and as the Indian Legislative Councils are single Chamber bodies, this element must be represented there.

20. As already stated, the re-arrangement of the constituencies under such a scheme would primarily be a matter for the Local Governments, and it may well be that they will find it impossible to provide territorial constituencies which shall not be too unwieldy without some increase in the present maximum number of the Councils. In that case there would be no reason to shrink from asking for the Parliamentary legislation which may be required for this, and which would involve alteration of a schedule in the existing Councils Act. It would also be necessary, however, to amend the Act so as to provide for the exercise of the special power of dissolution and the partial veto suggested in paragraph 6.

No. 2.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR ARCHDALE EARLE, K. C. I. E., Chief Commissioner, Assam.

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*Camp, August 6th, 1916.*

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

With reference to Your Excellency's letter of the 20th July 1916, I send herewith notes on the proposals concerning Local Self-Government and Provincial Legislative Councils. I must ask you to excuse these being in type, as it is impossible to get them printed locally with the requisite secrecy. I send them as early as possible, because, if Your Excellency has time to read them before my visit, you may wish to discuss them with me while I am in Simla.

As regards the formula concerning what is the goal of British rule in India and the general conclusions in respect of the domain of more responsible employment of Indians under the Government, I have merely to express my entire concurrence.

I am, yours respectfully,

(Sd.) A. EARLE.

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[*SECRET.*]

#### PROPOSALS CONCERNING LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.

1. In the first place, I venture to think that, though, no doubt, all the matters referred to in the Memorandum on this subject deserve consideration, they are not by any means of equal importance. I venture to think that the only subjects which will stir the imagination of the public are those connected with the constitution of local bodies, discussed in paragraphs 4 to 8 of the Memorandum, and those connected with village *panchayats* and unions, discussed in paragraphs 20 to 26. I also venture to think strongly that by far the most important question of all is that of the election of non-official chairmen for rural boards, and that unless some more definite pronouncement

can be made on this subject than that indicated in paragraph 8 of the Memorandum, it would be better to drop the question of an advance under the head of local self-government, for I feel sure, that unless a very decided step in advance is made in that direction, it will not be recognised by the public that any material advance at all has been made. This is obviously not the result which we wish to see.

2. I will now deal with the very important questions raised in paragraphs 4 to 8 of the Memorandum. I agree with the proposals made in these paragraphs. As regards the special representation of minorities and official experience, I have always felt that the present system of nomination leaves a good deal to be desired, and I think that, generally speaking, there is much to be said for the proposals made on the subject. Nominations are freely criticised by the public in this province, and, if the proposals are adopted, Government will be relieved of the odium at present attaching to them, while the public will be better pleased.

There is one further remark that I have to make in this connection. In Assam we have no legislative provision assigning a certain number of elective seats to certain communities, and I would deprecate any such innovation here as being unnecessary. There is no such provision in the Municipal Act, while in the Assam Local Self-Government Act,\* "the distribution of elected members among the different sections of the community" is left to the discretion of the Chief Commissioner to be exercised by rule. This is as it should be here.

\* Section 4.

3. As regards the special representation of official experience, I agree that the proposal might be adopted. We have lately had a case somewhat in point. The Postal Department having represented that an official of that Department should be appointed to each rural board, we pointed out that, though the advice of such an official would be useful, he could not, owing to the extent of his charge, be expected to attend the meetings of all the rural boards in his jurisdiction. We have arranged, however, outside the provisions of the Assam Local Self-Government Act, and with the consent of the boards, to give this official the right to attend all meetings of the boards without the right to vote. We could quite easily do the same thing as regards the officials of the district who are ordinarily nominated to the boards.

4. I quite agree with the proposals made in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Memorandum, though I would not allow the executive officer referred to in paragraph 6 to be removed by a vote of the board. It seems to me that it would be quite sufficient to say that he should not be removed without the sanction of Government, and that it would be inappropriate to make the

removal of an officer of this class the subject of a vote. In the rare cases in which removal was desirable, the facts would be sufficiently obvious to all concerned.

5. I now turn to paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Memorandum, which deal with a subject which, as I have indicated in paragraph 1 above, is one of prime importance, both from the point of view of Government and the Indian public, and in which the latter are intensely interested and feel keenly. From the administrative point of view, the arguments employed by the Decentralisation Commission in favour of official chairmen for rural boards are most weighty; and, though at one time I accepted them, I have since changed my views, because, if they are accepted, it means that non-official Indians are permanently debarred from the most interesting, important and extensive work of administration in the country. It was on this ground that, with the approval of the Government of India, I took power in the Assam Local Self-Government Act to direct, where I thought it desirable, that the chairman should be elected by the members of the board among their number, subject to my approval. I have always, however, recognised that the executive work of a board with a non-official chairman would have to be largely in the hands of a special executive officer, as proposed in paragraph 8 of the Memorandum; and it is chiefly owing to the expense involved in providing for such executive officers at a time when no expenditure, except that of an imperative character is allowed, that has prevented progress being made in this direction in this province. This has been a keen disappointment to me. The rural boards of this province have, I may say, no money to spare except for most urgent works of pressing importance, such as communications, education, &c., and the expenditure required for providing special executive officers would have to be met by the Local Government. Legislation will, of course, be required in order to regularise the position of the special executive officers. This can be undertaken at any time.

6. I feel strongly that a pronouncement to the effect that the provinces would be urged to start, wherever possible, the experiment of non-official, and preferably elected, presidents or chairmen, would fall flat. This question of non-official chairmen for rural boards is, as is well known, regarded by the Indian public as one of vital importance, and I fear that a pronouncement merely in the terms indicated would meet with much the same reception as the Government of India's Local Self-Government Resolution of April 1915, that is to say, be regarded as a lukewarm pronouncement. It would be urged that the proposal to appoint non-officials as chairmen of rural boards was made by Lord Ripon's Government, that this question has been under discussion in the press for 30 years or more, and that a much more definite step in advance is called for at the present time. I would, therefore, very strongly urge that Local Governments should be asked to make the experiment referred

to, as soon as the state of the finances permitted, up to 25 per cent. of the total number of posts, it being understood that Governments, which have already begun to make the experiment, may count within the percentage referred to the posts already given to non-officials. I would further urge that, in the pronouncement to be made, it should be stated that the question of making over additional posts to non-officials would be reviewed at the end of a period of, say, 3 years. I venture to think that a pronouncement on the above lines, and nothing less, would be received as evidence of a genuine desire to make a definite advance. I lay the greatest stress on this as being the main question, and the only one on which Indian opinion is likely to be seriously stirred.

7. *Paragraph 9 of the Memorandum.*—I agree with the proposals, but I am constrained to remark that I have never found boards of any kind anxious to “pile on the rates”. It is precisely the opposite tendency that I have always noticed, namely, that of not imposing taxation adequate to meet urgent requirements, through the very natural desire of members to avoid giving offence to their constituencies.

8. *Paragraph 10 of the Memorandum.*—There is no present proposal, as far as I am aware, to alter the law so as to enable local boards to levy a higher cess than that now levied, and the public would not, I think, be interested to know that rural boards will be allowed to raise the cess to the full limit which a new law may allow.

9. *Paragraphs 11 to 17 and 19 of the Memorandum.*—I agree.

10. *Paragraphs 20 to 26 of the Memorandum.*—Here in Assam we have no real villages at all, and so the proposals made in paragraphs 20 to 25 will not apply to this province. All that we have in this province is very scattered blocks of houses without any sort of corporate life. In these circumstances it is impracticable for me to criticise the proposals, as the material for so doing does not exist. In this province we have had to make artificial bodies which we call “village authorities”, and which correspond apparently to what are termed “unions” in paragraph 26 of the Memorandum. I would note, however, that we are giving to these unions precisely the same functions as those indicated in paragraph 23 of the Memorandum, namely, village sanitation, village education and jurisdiction in petty criminal and civil cases, and, generally speaking, all that is advocated in that connection in the Decentralisation Commission’s report. We are, further, making over to them the control of petty public works, such as village roads. I would also note that the legislation enacted to call these unions into being is precisely on the lines indicated in paragraph 24 of the Memorandum, that is to say, as simple and elastic as possible, the fullest scope being left to rules which will be gradually evolved,

and be improved by experience, *vide* Chapter VII of the Assam Local Self-Government Act. Everyone is satisfied that great things may be expected from these village authorities, and we are making rapid progress.

A. EARLE,  
*Chief Commr. of Assam.*

5th August 1916.

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[SECRET.]

#### PROPOSALS CONCERNING PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

1. As in the case of the local self-government proposals, the object aimed at clearly is to confer further privileges. I think accordingly, as in that case, that we must be particularly careful to make sure that what we propose to do will be considered in this light by those whom we are intending to benefit. It would obviously be worse than useless to profess to make concessions, and then to find that our concessions are not valued or that we have merely laid ourselves open to grave suspicion, if nothing worse. I think that it is essential to bear this very clearly in mind.

2. Although there is so much of interest and suggestion in the two Memoranda, I cannot but think that the above point of view has been seriously overlooked. Putting aside for the moment the question whether territorial representation would in itself be better or worse than the present system of representation by classes and interests, an absolutely fatal objection to it would, in my opinion, be that it would be gravely suspected as a trick, the precise object of which was not quite apparent, but which would loosely be regarded as in some way a deliberate blow aimed at the educationally advanced and in particular the lawyer classes. The reduction in the representation of lawyers and professional men is, in fact, one of the professed objects of both the Memoranda.

Similarly, as regards the proposal made in both the Memoranda to abolish the special Mahomedan electorate. To take away what was given only a few years ago by Lord Minto's Government seems to me to be a very drastic measure and one likely to lead to charges being made of a grave breach of faith. It is of course anomalous that the Mahomedans should have a special electorate, and yet also be able to vote as members of other constituencies. But it is an anomaly which exists, and the removal of which would, I think, give the

gravest offence to Mahomedans. It seems to me that the present time is one in which we should be particularly careful as regards the way in which we treat our Mahomedan fellow-subjects, and that it would be a fatal error, when concessions were professedly being made, to take away from them any advantage which they at present possess. Admitting that these advantages are unfair, it seems to me that the only way in which the matter can be set right is, as has been suggested from time to time, by the mutual co-operation and concession of the classes concerned. The time for this is, however, not yet.

3. In paragraph 10 of Memorandum C it is admitted that it might be possible that territorial representation would produce quite as many lawyers as the present system. It does not, however, appear to have been contemplated that there might be a danger of still more lawyers being thus returned. Under the present system, at any rate, other classes concerned have a fair chance of returning non-lawyers, and under the present system as it might be after development such as I shall foreshadow later, there might be a better chance of non-lawyers being returned. Would the lawyers not be likely, under the territorial system, to have it mostly their own way? Is not this the case in England? Under the present system of representation of classes and interests, landholders, for instance, have at least a fair chance of being returned. What chance would they have under the territorial system as against the lawyer classes, who seem to have more time and leisure, as well as more desire and ability? Take the ordinary district and sub-divisional head-quarters, why do the lawyers have so much influence? Is it not because, in addition to their advantages to which I have referred, they are congregated at centres where

\* (a) In one of the two landholders' constituencies in this province, namely, the Assam Valley, the landholders have hitherto returned a practising barrister, who would probably be returned under any system. The runner up is also a barrister.

(b) In one of the two Mahomedan electorates of this province, namely, that of the Surma Valley, the Mahomedans have returned an ex-pleader at both elections. The other Mahomedan electorate, namely, that of the Assam Valley, have returned a pleader on both occasions.

they can make their influence felt owing to the coming and going of their clients from and to the interior, and otherwise? If they can make their influence felt under the present\* system, it seems to me that there is more than a good chance that they would have still greater influence under the territorial system, whereby the barriers of class interests would be broken down. I think that on this ground also the territorial system is to be condemned.

4. Again, supposing that the territorial system is introduced here, and, as seems not improbable, the lawyers gain the upper hand, the special electorates and minorities will be able to say that by taking away their special electorates, we have delivered them body and soul to the lawyers. Under the present system, at any rate, we can say that it is their own fault that they will not exert themselves to prevent the return of lawyers if they are so minded. On all grounds, therefore, I venture to be strongly opposed to this proposal.



5. Apart from the above, what I consider absolutely fatal, objections to territorial representation, I entirely agree with the writer of Memorandum B that the present system of representation by classes and interests is the one to which we should adhere. The weight of authority is, as the writer of that Memorandum has pointed out, so absolutely in favour of this system that, if there is doubt on any score—and, as I have indicated, I think that there is the gravest doubt—there can, I consider, be no question that we should be well-advised to maintain the existing system of representation by classes and interests.

6. Strongly holding, as I do, that we should be wise to adhere to the existing system, I am constrained to join issue with the writer of Memorandum B, when he advises that the district boards representation should be done away with. I venture strenuously to uphold the district boards' electorate on its merits, and to disagree decidedly with the views expressed on this subject in both the Memoranda. I also am constrained to oppose most strongly the view expressed in paragraph 6 (iii) of Memorandum B. and paragraph 18 of Memorandum C. that the restriction of candidates for district and municipal boards to persons who are serving or have served on those bodies, should be done away with. My experience has been that the rule is a most salutary one, and I have not found that good men are excluded by it. It seems to me that it is highly desirable to encourage men to undertake local duties on district (and municipal) boards. It appears to me that such men after such service are, other things being equal, far better qualified for service as councillors than others who are not so qualified. I am always telling people that they must regard work on such boards (and indeed on village councils) as of the highest merit, and I notice that His Excellency the Viceroy preached much the same gospel recently in Calcutta. How would the public reconcile His Excellency's utterance with a pronouncement that such workers were not considered suitable for election to the provincial councils? Moreover, as I have already indicated when dealing with the question of territorial representation, we should be suspect, and it would be extremely difficult to give an explanation which would bear examination. The object aimed at, namely, to reduce the representation of lawyers and the professional classes, would certainly be guessed, and, instead of being regarded as benefactors, we should be severely criticised.

It is true that, as stated in paragraph 13 of Memorandum B, district boards were expected to represent the landed interests and have failed to do so. I fear, however, that the expectation was scarcely one which could have been considered likely of fulfilment in view of the present district boards electorate, and of the strong position of lawyers at district and sub-divisional headquarters. Possibly with the extension of the district boards franchise, recommended in paragraph 13 of this note, this tendency may be somewhat checked,

but I am doubtful—*vide* what is said on this subject in paragraphs 3 and 10 of this note.

7. The other main question on which opinion is invited is whether there should be an elected majority. The writer of Memorandum B combats this proposal in a forcible manner, and points out the possible dangers. I may say, in the first place, that the proposal at any rate appears to me well within the scope of the formula as to what is the goal of British rule in India. That formula lays down that it is legitimate to look forward to endowing India, as an integral part of the British Empire, with the largest measure of self-government compatible with the maintenance of the supremacy of British rule. The formula of course recognises that the progress must be gradual and must be in harmony with the special circumstances obtaining in this country. The giving of an elected majority would not by any means contravene the terms of the formula, and so it is a question, not of principle, but of expediency whether an elected majority should be given at the present time.

8. In paragraph 7 of Memorandum B the write refers to paragraph 3 of the despatch of August 1911, advocating the change of capital from Calcutta to Delhi, in which the development of provincial responsibilities was foreshadowed. It was clearly stated in that despatch that, though the powers of Provincial Governments would be increased as time went on, those of the Imperial Government would be maintained. It is now apparently contended that this is an impossibility, and that, if some measure of popular control is conceded in the case of Provincial Governments, it will inevitably have to be conceded sooner or later in the case of the Imperial Government. I think that we shall have to face the risks such as they may be. As the late Viceroy said in his Memorandum of October 1915, "if India has deserved well of England, and if there is a real desire on the part of the latter to raise her from the position of a mere dependency to a place having some resemblance, however remote, to that of the great self-governing units of the Empire, the reform is possible only by conceding to the people of India some measure of real popular control, especially in provincial questions, as contrasted with questions of wide Imperial concern". It is, I think, impracticable to think too far ahead in these matters. The present policy, as laid down in the despatch, is to increase the powers of Provincial Governments and to maintain those of the Imperial Government, and the late Viceroy's pronouncement, as cited above, seems to conform with that policy. Time alone can show whether it will ever be practicable to concede a similar measure of popular control in respect of the Imperial Government. As I observed in paragraph 7 of my reply to the late Viceroy's Memorandum on this subject, when the regulations were last revised in 1911, there was even then a strong demand for an elected majority in all the Provincial Councils, and I was in favour of the proposal when the matter was

considered in that year in Simla. I also remarked in the same reply that, when I came to Assam and had to submit proposals for the constitution of my own Legislative Council, I naturally would have been glad to see an elected majority established in this province, and I was advised by my officers that there would be no danger in allowing one. In view of the policy of the Government of India, however, which was well known to me, I considered it useless to raise the question, and proposals were accordingly submitted by me for a non-official majority only. I think, therefore, that it will be useless to alter the Council regulations at all, if we cannot concede an elected majority for Provincial Councils. Other minor concessions would, I fear, merely fall flat, or, what is more probable, would give rise to a feeling of serious resentment that so little was conceded. I take it that it is not suggested that an elected majority is proposed in respect of the Imperial Government. As I have already indicated, I consider that that would be a great mistake, and that such a measure is not called for.

9. I now propose to indicate on what lines I advocate progress, and in so doing I shall deal with the various relevant points touched upon in the two Memoranda.

As already indicated, I would firmly adhere to the existing system of representation by classes and interests, and I would not take away any privileges already conceded to any class or interest, for that would, I think, only lead to discontent. As I have already observed, an elected majority for Provincial Councils I regard as a necessary concession if any alteration of the Council Regulations is undertaken. It will be the only concession which will be really valued. Other modifications which have been proposed, and some of which I have accepted as desirable, will not be very popular, but they will be accepted if the major concession is allowed.

10. The difficulty as regards the preponderance of the classes of lawyers and professional men is a real one, but it can, I think, only be dealt with indirectly, if at all. It is in fact doubtful, I think, if it could under any system of representation be entirely met. As I have already observed, lawyers in this country, as in some others, have great influence owing to the many advantages which they possess. A landlord often confines his attention chiefly to his zamindari. The merchant is far too busy as a rule to take an active part in political life. And so on. All this is to the advantage of the lawyer, who, generally speaking, can find time to combine his professional duties with considerable political activities, and, as I have observed before, the fact of the lawyer living at the district or sub-divisional head-quarters, owing to the coming and going of clients, &c., gives him an added advantage. I fear, therefore, that we shall not get rid of the superfluous lawyers merely by

manipulating the constituencies. They will, I think, be always with us, whatever we do. The only way in which we can wisely proceed seems to me is not to endeavour to strike a deliberate blow at the lawyer class—a proceeding which, I believe, will only create much ill-feeling, and will not succeed, but to add seats where they admittedly are required in order to give further representation, and to extend the franchise generally in the hope that this may check the tendency of the over-representation of lawyers. Agriculture is India's greatest industry, and, if it is considered to be inadequately represented, we should be fully justified in increasing the number of seats. Similarly, with commerce and industry. The giving of these additional seats will not, as I have indicated, be particularly popular with the lawyer, professional and educationally advanced classes. On the other hand, these classes can take no possible exception to such a step in view of its obvious fairness. Taken, therefore, with the gift of an elected majority, the addition of such seats will not, I think, lead to any dissatisfaction. Similarly, I fully agree that the franchise requires widening. Here, again, this will be a doubtful boon to the lawyer classes, but, being a liberal measure, it will be taken with a sufficiently good grace.

11. The above are, I think, the main points, and I will now deal with other important points discussed in the two Memoranda. I agree generally with the writers of both the Memoranda on the subject of enlarging the powers of the Councils. If we make the chief concession, namely, that of an elected majority in Provincial Councils, as I propose, I see no reason for increasing the powers of the Councils at present, beyond that extent indicated in the two Memoranda. As suggested in paragraph 18 of Memorandum B, the rules of

\* I have not noticed any inconvenience on this account in this province. business may be examined with the object of seeing how far irksome restraints\* upon the right of interpellation and the right of moving resolutions may be relaxed, and more freedom in examining budgets be conceded; while the proposal made in paragraph 6 of Memorandum C to the effect that two or three non-official Members of the Council (elected for the purpose by their colleagues) should be associated with the Government as advisers in the preparation of the provincial budget as a whole, seems particularly felicitous. Also, as proposed in paragraph 18 of Memorandum B, when questions are not of such importance that Government is obliged to take a firm stand on one side or the other, the freedom of voting should be conceded to officials.

12. I see no reason why, as the writers of both the Memoranda urge, in provinces in which the Mahomedans form the majority and the Hindus and Sikhs a substantial minority, provision should not be made for special seats for the latter. I would certainly not, however, do this in the way advocated in the Memoranda, that is to say, by doing away with the special Mahomedan

electorates, a proceeding which would, I have urged, give the greatest offence, but by creating similar special electorates for Sikhs and Hindus, or giving them proportional representation in connection with existing electorates (such as the municipal and district board electorates), whichever may be thought best and fairest by the provinces concerned.

13. The lowering of the franchise is a most important subject. Taking first the case of the University electorates, I presume that it will be generally considered desirable to extend the franchise to all registered graduates of five years' standing.

I agree that the proposal, made in Memorandum B, that the franchise in respect of municipal electorates might be considerably enlarged. I should not, however, confine the extension to electors who are paying income-tax or own property of a particular rating value, but would make it include all those who have the municipal vote according to the law or rules prevailing in their provinces. In this connection I would observe that in Assam, Bengal Municipal Act, section 15, proviso (iii), education up to a certain standard (the Intermediate) confers the right to vote.

Next, as regards the district boards electorate and the overlapping of votes, anticipated in paragraph 14 (iii) of Memorandum B, I would not allow this difficulty to weigh in the balance, as suggested in the Memorandum referred to, as against what I consider to be the great evil of abolishing the district boards electorate. I would much prefer to face the overlapping. I cannot see that it would in fact do any harm, though the same persons would in many cases vote twice, once for the landholders and again for the district boards electorate. Turning now to the electorate for the district boards, it should presumably, as I have suggested in the case of municipalities, include all those who vote at elections for members of rural boards according to the law or rules in force in the various provinces. In this connection the question of an educational qualification, possibly the Vernacular Final, as proposed in paragraph 12 of Memorandum C, might be considered in addition to other qualifications.

Taking next the franchise for the landholders electorate, this should, as suggested in both the Memoranda, be lowered, and I would very much like to see it lowered so as to include all occupancy tenants and substantial *ryots*, as recommended in paragraph 14 (i) of Memorandum B, and paragraph 9 of Memorandum C. I do not think that the landholders would object, but they should certainly, I think, be consulted informally. I think that the limits suggested in paragraph 14 (i) of Memorandum B (a payment of Rs. 500 land

revenue in a zamindari tract and Rs. 200 in a *ryotwari* tract) will be too high for this province.

Next, as regards the Mahomedan electorate, a considerable lowering of the franchise is, I consider, advisable, but this should, I think, be done after informal consultation with leading Mahomedans in each province. In this connection also the question should be considered whether, as proposed in paragraph 12 of Memorandum C, the Vernacular Final should be adopted as the standard in respect of education for the purpose of qualifying. [The Assam Mahomedan electorate schedule (IV) very nearly, but not quite, goes down as far as this.]

Generally speaking, I may say that, though the lowering of the franchise in all the electorates may be decided on as a general principle, it is impossible to be definite as to details without local consultation.

14. As I have already indicated, I quite agree that commerce and industry should be more fully represented. This has been done hitherto in this province by giving two nominations to members of the trading communities, but an electorate could be devised and would be preferable. It would include all those engaged in a substantial way in trade who were not included in other special electorates for the same purpose, like those of Chambers of Commerce, planting communities, &c. I hardly think that an educational qualification should be included in respect of this electorate.

15. As regards nominated non-officials, I do not know what is the experience of other Local Governments, but here in Assam these appointments are of little use as a means of securing a majority for Government. There is little, if any, opposition to Government here, but the nominated non-officials look upon it as their right to vote precisely as they feel inclined, and their inclinations are almost invariably on the popular side. In the circumstances of this province, at any rate, nominations are of little use from any practical point of view, and I would prefer to reduce them to a bare minimum, so as to provide for the occasional appointment of a suitable person not returned by the electorates.

16. The question of the part that Government servants should be allowed to play in Council elections has been touched upon in both the Memoranda. I may say at once that I entirely agree with the writer of Memorandum C

\* Officials are already, I may observe, barred (paragraph 13) that the principle should be that officials\* should not be allowed to stand as candidates, or take any active part in an election, or in any way influence the votes, but that they should not be denied in their private capacity by the Regulations from standing for election.

their ordinary rights as citizens. Orders to this effect would cover completely the class of case referred to at the end of paragraph 16 of Memorandum B.

17. The opinion has been expressed in Memorandum B that the existing Councils should not be enlarged beyond the Statutory limits fixed by Acts of Parliament. I would, on the other hand, first decide on our policy, and then, if it is necessary, in order to give effect to that policy, to enlarge the Councils, ask for powers accordingly. This seems to me to be the proper course to take.

18. There are two other proposals made in Memorandum C (paragraph 4) which require notice, namely—(1) to take power so as to provide for the exercise of a special power of dissolution in case Legislative Councils reject or materially amend Government measures, and so confer on Government the right to call on the electors to judge the conduct of their members; and (2) to provide so that where a Bill, as passed by the Legislative Council (while generally useful), contains some obviously undesirable provisions, the head of the province should be able to allow it to pass into law with the provisions in question omitted, *i. e.*, that he might exercise a partial veto instead of disallowing the whole Bill.

I do not think that we are sufficiently advanced in India for the first proposal. I do not think that the mass of voters would understand the issue, and that, if the same members were returned, there would be no sort of guarantee that the voters approved of the action of their members and *vice versa*. On the other hand, the action of Government would, I think, generally be misunderstood and much mischief might be caused. I would, therefore, not adopt this proposal. The second suggestion, however, seems to me a suitable one for adoption.

19. I will now show by a concrete example the manner in which the constitution of my Council will be affected by the proposals which I have outlined above as a result of the perusal of the two Memoranda. Generally speaking, I leave the electorates alone, not taking away any existing privileges, but only adding to them. The main features of the changes, in so far as they affect the constitution of the Council, are:—

- (1) an elected majority,
- (2) the addition of seats in connection with the landholders' electorate, so as to provide for the better representation of the landed interest, especially the substantial *ryot*,
- (3) the addition of seats in order to provide for the better representation of commerce and industry,
- (4) the reduction of non-official nominated seats.

The present constitution of my Council is as follows :—

A.—Nominated Members, who shall not exceed 13 in number, and of whom not more than nine may be officials, or, in other words, ordinarily speaking.	}	Nominated official	...	9
		Nominated non-officials	...	4
				13
				—
B.—Elected Members ...	{	1. Municipalities ...	...	2
		2. District Boards ...	...	2
		3. Landholders ...	...	2
		4. Mahomedan community	...	2
		5. Tea Planting community	...	3
				11
				—
		TOTAL	...	24
				—

I would now constitute my Council as follows :—

A.—Nominated Members, who shall not exceed 11 in number, of whom not more than nine may be officials, or, in other words, ordinarily speaking.	}	Nominated officials	...	9
		Nominated non-officials	...	2 (—2)
				11
				—
B.—Elected Members ...	{	1. Municipalities ...	...	2
		2. District Boards ...	...	2
		3. Landholders ...	...	4 (+2)
		4. Mahomedan community	...	2
		5. Tea Planting community	...	4 (+1)
		6. Commerce and industry	...	2 (+2)
				16
				—
		TOTAL	...	27
				—

I have, it will be seen, maintained the full number of official seats, which, I agree with the writer of Memorandum B (paragraph 11), should be maintained. I have not found it necessary, however, to propose keeping any of these unfilled or to propose filling them experimentally by the nomination of non-officials, as suggested in paragraph 11 of that Memorandum.

I have, in paragraph 15 of this note, explained why I would reduce nominated non-official seats to a minimum. An addition of 2 seats to the landholders electorate does not seem unreasonable, in view of the supreme



importance of agriculture, while the giving of 2 seats to commerce and industry represents merely a transfer of 2 nominated non-official seats. The addition of 1 seat for the tea planting community is made in consideration of (1) the reduction of nominated non-official seats; (2) the proposed extension of the Council, and (3) the fact that the present 3 seats are insufficient for the due representation of the tea industry. At present there are 3 seats for the 2 tea associations of the province, 2 seats being assigned alternatively to either of the two associations. This does not work well, and 2 seats for each association are necessary.

20. On such a Council as I have outlined there will be an elected majority of 5. It is to be remembered, however, that 4 of these elected members will be, generally speaking, Europeans, for, though not a few Indians belong to the tea associations, it is not probable at present that an Indian will be returned by the tea planting community. In this province, where so much of the valuable land belongs to Europeans, and where the representation of the tea planting community is on that account necessarily strong, I do not think that the question of an Indian elected majority, as opposed to an elected majority, needs consideration. I will, however, show how the matter stands in that respect. The Indian elected members will be 12 in number, while one of the two nominated non-official seats will almost certainly go to an Indian, who may be assumed, as I have already indicated, to vote with the elected members. The total Indian vote will, therefore, be 13. Against this there will be the Government vote of 9 officials, *plus* 1 (if the remaining non-official nominated seat goes to a European), *plus*, probably, the 4 votes of the tea planting community, or a total of 14. Personally I would prefer not to raise the racial question, and I would give, as I propose, an elected majority of 5. I think that the proposals which I have made for adding 4 elected seats for Indians will give satisfaction. More seats for Indians, to be elected, could, however, if necessary, be given without risk. It is to be noticed that the total number of seats proposed (27) is still within the statutory maximum (30).

21. I have only one more suggestion to make, and that is that persons, whether official or non-official, having expert knowledge of subjects connected with proposed or pending legislation, who are appointed to be Members of Council, should not have the power to vote. This is desirable as tending to make it easier to maintain the requisite balance of power when this is once decided. It is, moreover, unnecessary that the power of voting should be given to these expert Members. They will be able to give their advice and that is all that is required.

(Sd.) A. EARLE,

5th August 1916.

Chief Commissioner of Assam.

## No. 2a.

Extract from a letter from the Right Hon'ble Austen Chamberlain, P. C., M. P., His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 8th August 1916.

6. Willingdon wrote to me as well as to you about a pronouncement on the Home Rule question. I have never seen my way to make a statement which, without embarrassing my successors, would satisfy the public of whom he is thinking. You and I, therefore, feel alike on this matter. Since I last wrote to you, I have read very carefully your formula and your memorandum on two of the roads by which you would propose to proceed. I see nothing to criticise in principle in the detailed measures therein suggested, but I would beg you to consider carefully the enclosed memorandum from Sir Thomas Holderness in regard to your formula. It was, indeed, written before the revised version of your formula had reached me, but it is, I think, full of wisdom and merits your serious consideration. I am not quite sure myself what use you intend to make of the formula. But if I rightly understood you, it is not your intention to publish it, but merely to take it as the guide of your Government in considering the various measures which come before you. It may be of use to you in this respect, and it is in any case all to the good that you and the Members of your Government should have set yourselves seriously to consider whither we are tending; but I am afraid that I share Sir Thomas's doubt as to the extent to which it will help you when applied as a test to particular reforms.

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[ENCLOSURE.]

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[SECRET.]

#### MEMORANDUM ON THE VICEROY'S FORMULA.

The Governor-General in Council, on Lord Chelmsford's initiative, has lately considered the attitude which the Indian Government should adopt towards the demands for self-government on the Colonial model that are being made by the Nationalist party. The following formula has been drawn up, and the Government of India are now confidentially ascertaining the opinions of heads of Local Governments regarding it.

#### FORMULA.

"The only goal we can contemplate as practically attainable is to endow India, as an integral part of the British Empire, with the largest measure of self-government compatible with the maintenance of the supreme authority of British rule.

"With reference to the measure of self-government referred to, we contemplate an India gradually progressing towards a larger and larger measure of control by her own people.

"The special circumstances of India must govern the form of self-government with which she shall eventually be endowed. They differ so widely from those of any other part of the British Empire that we cannot altogether look for a model in those forms of self-government which already obtain in the great Dominions. In all parts of the Empire which now enjoy self government, it has been the result, not of any sudden inspiration of theoretical statesmanship, but of a steady process of practical evolution, substantially facilitated by the possession of a more or less common inheritance of political traditions, social customs and religious beliefs. Self-government in India must be evolved on lines which take into account her special circumstances and traditions."

In a private letter to the Secretary of State, enclosing the formula, Lord Chelmsford writes—

“We go frankly for self-government as our goal, but only so far as it is compatible with the maintenance of the supreme authority of British rule.” He further says—“I am not prepared to agree at the present moment to Colonial self-government as a possible goal. It has grown up, as the formula says, out of the possession of a common inheritance of political traditions, social customs and religious beliefs—not to mention a common language—and is wholly inapplicable to the conditions of India. I think it is important to emphasise our determination not to abdicate our position, nor to contemplate such an abdication. That is for our successors. Within these limits we may say that we look for a gradual extension of self-government.”

It may be useful to compare with the Viceroy's “self-government” formula the statement of policy made by Lord Hardinge in his valedictory speech at the meeting of the Legislative Council on 24th March 1916.

After referring to the frequency with which “self-government, Colonial self government and Home Rule for India” has been discussed of late in the press and in public meetings in India, Lord Hardinge said—

“I wish that some of the speakers and writers could visit the Dominions and see for themselves. A study of the history of these Dominions would show that the development of their present self-governing institutions had been achieved, not by any sudden stroke of statesmanship, but by a process of steady and patient evolution which has gradually united and raised all classes of the community to the level of their enhanced responsibilities. I do not for a moment wish to discountenance self-government for India as a national idea. It is a perfectly legitimate aspiration, and has the warm sympathy of all moderate men. But in the present position of India it is not idealism that is needed, but practical politics and practical solutions to questions arising out of the social and political conditions in this country. We should look facts squarely in the face and do our utmost to grapple with realities. To lightly raise extravagant hopes and to encourage unrealisable demands can only tend to delay and not accelerate political progress. I know that this is the sentiment of many wise and thoughtful Indians. In speaking thus frankly, it is far from my intention to create a feeling of discouragement, for nobody is more anxious than I am to see the early realisation of the just and legitimate aspirations of India, but I am equally desirous of avoiding all danger of reaction from the birth of institutions which experience might prove to be premature.”

Wherein does this statement of policy differ from the Viceroy's formula? They both emphasise the fact that the self-governing institutions of the Dominions are the product of evolution. But whereas Lord Hardinge finds evidence in this that like institutions will be reached in India only by long and patient endeavour and not *per saltum*, the formula hints that India can never expect to attain them in absolute fulness or identity. Lord Hardinge expressly disclaims a wish to discountenance self-government for India as a national ideal. And by self-government he clearly meant the complete political autonomy which the Dominions enjoy, and which makes them sister-states and not dependencies. The formula cuts this down to “the largest measure of self-government compatible with the supreme authority of British rule.”

In his valedictory speech Lord Hardinge had a double purpose in view. His primary object was to bring to the level of practical politics the passionate and grandiose visions of impatient idealists in the Indian national party. At the same time he sought to keep in sympathy and touch with the moderates. With five years' experience behind him, he knew and made allowance for the difficulties of the latter. His policy throughout had been to keep the moderates well disposed towards the Government and prevent waverers from going over to the extremists' camp. He in his time had had to search for a formula; and he had found it in the phrase of a distant goal. His last words to the Council were meant to catch the ear of the only section of Indian intellectuals to which the Government can look for moral support, and to appeal to the better sense of those among them whom the advanced party were seeking to capture by threats or blandishments.

The double objects of the speech would seem to have been attained. It acted as a damper on the dreams of the advanced party who were brought face to face with the realities of the situation which they usually ignore. The angry comments of the Notionalist press showed that the check had been felt. It gave the moderates no opening for complaint, for it dealt with the possibilities of the remote future in terms which approximated closely to the language used a few months before by Sir S. P. Sinha, the fugleman of their party, in his much applauded address to the National Congress.

Sir S. P. Sinha's Presidential address to the Indian National Congress, at its meeting in Bombay in December 1915, deserves careful consideration, both on account of its contents and of the standing and reputation of the speaker. "What", he asked, "should be the political ideal of India?" "It seems to me," he said, "that the only satisfactory form of self-government to which India aspires cannot be anything short of what President Lincoln so pithily described as 'government of the people, for the people and by the people.'" He fortified this position by a well-known passage from one of Mr. John Bright's speeches on Indian affairs. "I believe", said Bright, "that it is our duty not only to govern India well now for our own sakes and to satisfy our own conscience, but so to arrange its government and so to administer it that we should look forward to the time when India will have to take up her own government and administer it in her own fashion". Sir S. P. Sinha next turned to what he termed the unfortunate fact "that a few years ago unhappy statements and even actions of responsible statesmen gave rise to a widespread suspicion among large classes of people in all parts of India that there was a change of policy—a deliberate intention to retrace the steps". To this he attributed much of the unrest and disheartenment of recent years. He then quoted as an earnest of better things a passage from a speech made by Lord Hardinge in October 1915 when taking leave of Simla. Lord Hardinge has spoken with confidence of the attainment by India of its goal, and of a time when "strengthened by character and self-respect, and bound by ties of affection and gratitude, India may be regarded as a true friend of the Empire and not merely as a trusty dependent", but had added the caution that "the day for the complete fulfilment of this ideal is not yet." Sir S. P. Sinha, in quoting these words, accepted unreservedly for himself and for every true friend of India the qualification they contained. "I yield to none", he said, "in my desire for self-government but I recognise that there is a wide gulf between desire and attainment." At the same time he was equally clear that the goal would be attained in time, and should be worked for now. "We differ", he said, "from those who think that the end is so remote as to be a negligible factor in the ordinary work of present day administration." As to the precise moment when the goal would be reached, his words were significant and evidently weighed with care. "When we ourselves", he said, "have so far advanced under the guidance and protection of England as to be able not only to manage our own domestic affairs, but to secure internal peace and prevent external aggression, I believe that it will be as much the interest as the duty of England to concede the fullest autonomy to India."

This speech was hailed at the time by the Anglo-Indian Press as a reasonable and proper statement of the views of the moderate party, embodying aspirations to which exception could not be taken, while administering a well-deserved rebuke to the hot-heads and impatient dealists of the advanced party.

The attitude of Lord Hardinge and of the leader of the moderates towards self-government as a national ideal is thus identical, and their formula the same. Lord Hardinge's vision of India as "the true friend of the Empire and not merely a trusty dependent" means in Sir S. P. Sinha's language "the fullest autonomy." To read into this conception of the ultimate evolution of India, the condition that British supremacy must for ever be maintained, would mean to Indians a sensible narrowing of their political future and would invite their strongest resentment. "The supreme authority of British rule" implies more than a suzerainty or the kind of control that the central authority of a federation of equal states exercises over individual members. By Indians it would unquestionably be taken to mean a perpetuation of the present system, under which the most important offices, civil and military, are in English hands. They might assent to the proposition that the special circumstances of

India must govern the form of self-government which will be evolved. But they would dissent from the inference which the Viceroy's formula would seem to draw that these circumstances necessarily shut out for all time the possibility of attaining the fullest autonomy. The "depression of bondage" which Rabindranath Tagore and his disciples assert to be the fundamental malady of India would take darker shape with Indian nationalists of every variety of thought, if they had a substantial grievance of this kind to work on. The more visionary and unpracticable their political programmes and ideals are, the more completely does a formula possess them, the more do they attach importance to vague possibilities in the future, and the less do they regard the realities of the present.

If there be any truth in this estimate of the political thought of modern India, the disadvantages of a public use of the proposed formula and of trying to close by means of it the daily rhetoric of press and platform and legislative assemblies need no discussion. The question, what would men of the type of Sir S. P. Sinha think of it, and what support would they give it, admits of one answer only. They would not subscribe to it. They would say that you cannot confine the aspirations of a great intelligent people within so limited a horizon. Leave the future open, they would say, and we are with you, however distant you choose to place the ultimate goal of self-government and however resolutely you refuse to describe the form it may take. But do not at least make the goal worthless by negatives.

Is it worth while to quarrel with the moderates over a matter of words? and a quarrel there would be if they were bidden to accept this limiting formula as the last word of the British Government. The movement of the civilised world towards nation states and autonomous institutions is too strong for artificial barriers of this kind. They irritate and invite destruction.

But the formula may be meant solely for the private ear and guidance of the Government of India and the Secretary of State, a sort of *arcanum imperii*, like the apocryphal testament of Peter the Great, or some secret maxim of statecraft of the Kings of Prussia. If that is the intention, its utility is problematical. A political formula has no permanent value. Before long it shows signs of age, and new men faced with new problems pay scant attention to it. Some immediate value it may have as a touchstone by which proposed measures of constitutional reform or everyday problems of administration can be tested. But the particular formula approved by the Government of India seems almost superfluous for this purpose. During the life of the present Government of India it can hardly be needed in order to restrain them from advocating or acquiescing in measures that are clearly incompatible with the maintenance of the supreme authority of British rule. Their innate power of resistance is surely sufficient without the prophylactic of a formula. Nor is their virtue likely to be severely tried, for, as Sir S. P. Sinha said, the day for such catastrophic measures has not yet arrived. The measures which are likely to be pressed upon them and which will give them trouble will not directly threaten the supreme authority of British rule, but will tend to disturb the balance of existing forces, as between the Indian and the European element in the administration or as between popular and governmental control. Here the abstract principle embodied in the formula will not be of much avail. The dispute would turn, whether the formula existed or not, on a question of fact. Is the particular measure, all circumstances considered, a prudent and desirable step in advance, or is it uncalled for and dangerous? It might often happen that of the persons who had unreservedly and willingly accepted the formula, one half might find in favour of, and the other half against, a proposed constitutional reform on the question of fact.

To sum up the argument. It is uncertain whether the formula is meant for public use or as a secret maxim of statecraft. If the former, it is likely to alienate the moderate section of Indian politicians without achieving any particular purpose. If the latter, it is possibly of little particular value.

No. 3.

FROM HON'BLE SIR GEORGE BARNES, K. C. B., Member of the Viceroy's Council.

*Simla, August 10th, 1916.*

DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I send you three documents which I think you will like to have.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) G. S. BARNES.

*Memorandum by Mr. Gokhale (from the Governor of Bombay).*

## PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY.

The grant of provincial autonomy, foreshadowed in the Delhi despatch, would be a fitting concession to make to the people of India at the close of the war. This will involve the two-fold operation of freeing the Provincial Governments on the one side from the greater part of the control which is at present exercised over them by the Government of India and the Secretary of State in connection with the internal administration of the country, and substituting on the other, in place of the control so removed, the control of the representatives of tax-payers through Provincial Legislative Councils. I indicate below in brief outline the form of administration that should be set up in the different provinces to carry out this idea. Each province should have:—

- (1) A Governor appointed from England at the head of the administration.
- (2) A Cabinet or Executive Council of six Members—three of whom should be Englishmen and three Indians—with the following portfolios:—
  - (a) Home (including Law & Justice);
  - (b) Finance;
  - (c) Agriculture, Irrigation and Public Works;
  - (d) Education;
  - (e) Local self-government (including Sanitation and Medical Relief);
  - (f) Industries and Commerce.

While members of the Indian Civil Service should be eligible for appointment to the Executive Council, no places in the Council should be reserved for them, the best men available being taken—both English and Indian.

(3) A Legislative Council of between 75 and 100 Members, of whom not less than four-fifths should be elected by different constituencies and interests. Thus in the Bombay Presidency, roughly speaking, each district should return two Members, one representing municipalities and the other district and taluk boards. The city of Bombay should have about ten Members allotted to it. Bodies in the *mofussal* like the Karachi Chamber, Ahmedabad Mill-owners, Deccan Sardars should have a Member each. Then there would be the special representation of Mahomedans, and here and there a Member may have to be given to communities like the Lingayats, where they are strong. There should be no nominated non-official Members, except as experts. A few official Members may be added by the Governor as experts or to assist in representing the Executive Government.

(4) The relations between the Executive Government and the Legislative Council so constituted should be roughly similar to those between the Imperial Government and the Reichstag in Germany. The Council will have to pass all provincial legislation and its assent will be necessary to additions to, or changes in, provincial taxation. The Budget, too, will have to come to it for discussion and its resolutions in connection with it, as also on questions of general administration, will have to be given effect to unless vetoed by the Governor. More frequent meetings or longer continuous sittings will also have to be provided for. But the Members of the Executive Government shall not depend, individually or collectively on the support of a majority of the Council, for holding their offices.

(5) The Provincial Government, so reconstituted and working under the control of the Legislative Council as outlined above, should have complete charge of the internal administration of the province. And it should have virtually independent financial powers, the present financial relations between it and the Government of India being largely revised, and to some extent even reversed. The revenue under Salt, Customs, Tributes, Railways, Post, Telegraph and Mint should belong exclusively to the Government of India, the Services being Imperial. While that under Land Revenue, including Irrigation, Excise, Forest, Assessed Taxes, Stamps and Registration should belong to the Provincial Government—the services being provincial. As under this division, the revenue falling to the Provincial Government will be in excess of its existing requirements and that assigned to the Government of India will fall short of its present expenditure, the Provincial Government should be required to make an annual contribution to the Government of India, fixed for periods of five years at a time. Subject to this arrangement the Imperial and the Provincial Governments should develop their separate systems of finance, the Provincial Government being given powers of taxation and borrowing within certain limits.

(6) Such a scheme of provincial autonomy will be incomplete, unless it is accompanied by (a) a liberalising of the present form of district administration ;

and (b) a great extension of local self-government. For (a) it will be necessary to abolish the Commissionerships of Divisions except where special reasons may exist for their being maintained, as in Sind, and to associate small District Councils, partly elected and partly nominated, with the Collector, to whom most of the present powers of the Commissioners could then be transferred,—the functions of the Councils being advisory to begin with. For (b) village *panchayats*, partly elected and partly nominated, should be created for villages or groups of villages and municipal boards in towns and taluk boards in talukas should be made wholly elected bodies, the Provincial Government reserving to itself and exercising stringent powers of control. A portion of the excise revenue should be made over to these bodies, so that they may have adequate resources at their disposal for the due performance of their duties. The district being too large an area for efficient local self-government by an honorary agency, the functions of the district boards should be strictly limited and the Collector should continue to be *ex-officio* President.

#### THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

1. The Provinces being thus rendered practically autonomous, the constitution of the Executive Council or the Cabinet of the Viceroy will have to be correspondingly altered. At present there are four Members in that Council, with portfolios which concern the internal administration of the country, *viz.*, Home, Agriculture, Education and Industries and Commerce. As all internal administration will now be made over to the Provincial Governments and the Government of India will only retain in its hands nominal control to be exercised on very rare occasions, one Member to be called Member for the Interior should suffice in place of these four. It will, however, be necessary to create certain other portfolios, and I would have the Council consist of the following six Members (at least two of whom shall always be Indian):—

(a) Interior, (b) Finance, (c) Law, (d) Defence, (e) Communications (Railways, Post and Telegraphs), and (f) Foreign.

2. The Legislative Council of the Viceroy should be styled the Legislative Assembly of India. Its Members should be raised to about one hundred to begin with and its powers enlarged, but the principle of an official majority (for which perhaps it will suffice to substitute a nominated majority) should for the present be continued, until sufficient experience has been gathered of the working of autonomous arrangements for the provinces. This will give the Government of India a reserve power in connection with provincial administration to be exercised in emergencies. Thus, if a Provincial Legislative Council persistently declines to pass legislation which the Government regards to be essential in the vital interests of the province, it could be passed by the Government of India in its Legislative Assembly over the head of the province. Such occasions would be extremely rare, but the reserve



power will give a sense of security to the authorities and will induce them to enter on the great experiment of provincial autonomy with greater readiness. Subject to this principle of an official or nominated majority being for the present maintained, the assembly should have increased opportunities of influencing the policy of the Government by discussion, questions connected with the Army and Navy (to be now created) being placed on a level with other questions. In fiscal matters the Government of India, so constituted, should be freed from the control of the Secretary of State, whose control in other matters, too, should be largely reduced, his Council being abolished and his position being steadily approximated to that of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Commissions in the Army and Navy must be given to Indians with proper facilities for military and naval instruction.

German East Africa, if conquered from the Germans, should be reserved for Indian Colonisation, and should be handed over to the Government of India.

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*Note by the H. H. Aga Khan (from the Governor of Bombay). The Aga Khan apparently had access to Mr. Gokhale's note.*

My object in taking the great liberty of placing these notes before Imperial authorities is my earnest and sincere desire to serve my Master and Sovereign, His Majesty the King-Emperor, and His Majesty's Government.

I am profoundly convinced that, unless serious steps on the lines herein suggested are adopted as soon as possible, after the conclusion of the war, I am afraid there will be great unrest, and probably permanent discontent, in India, far deeper and more wide-spread than the surface movements during the years 1905 to 1912. It would, however, occupy too much time and take me too far away from the main suggestions I venture most respectfully to place before the authorities, if I were to detail in this memorandum my reasons for this conviction. Should it, however, be deemed necessary, or please any of the personages who see these notes, to discuss with me the reasons for my believing that great and genuine changes on the line herein indicated are required, I shall be only too happy to discuss my reasons in person.

I hope I may be forgiven for intruding my views, but there are times when silence and indifference actually constitute disloyalty, and to my mind the present is one of those rare occasions when one should express one's views with freedom.

The suggestions I respectfully desire to make are as follows :—

1. The methods and forms of communications, relations, representation and precedence, &c., between the Imperial Government and the Indian Princes

require reconsideration and readjustment. I, however, beg to submit that any such reconsideration as I suggest should not be one-sided or carried on behind the back of Indian Princes by departmental enquiry or confined merely to private consultations with important Princes only. I suggest that a group of well-known and well-recognised Princes of different categories and grades be invited by formal representation at series of conferences with the representatives of the Imperial Government and a free discussion be carried on till a general and satisfactory agreement was reached. At the same time, some of the minor and constant causes of irritation and heart-burning should be removed.

2. My next submission is that Commissions in the Indian Army and Indian Navy (when created) must be given to Indian noblemen and gentlemen on equal terms with Europeans, and proper facilities and equipment be afforded to them for a thorough military and naval instruction.

3. German East Africa, when acquired from Germany, should be handed over to the Government of India and reserved as an Indian Colony belonging to the Indian Government, just as Samoa is to be given over to Australia and German West Africa to the Cape. On this subject I shall be happy to give my reasons in a more detailed form in regard to the need for such a colony if it please the Government to consult me further.

#### PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY.

4. The grant of provincial autonomy, foreshadowed in the Delhi Despatch, would be a fitting concession to make to the people of India at the close of the war. This will involve the two-fold operation of freeing the Provincial Governments on the one side from the greater part of the control which is at present exercised over them by the Government of India and the Secretary of State in connection with the internal administration of the country, and to a certain extent substituting on the other, in place of the control so removed, the control of the representatives of tax-payers through Provincial Legislative Assemblies. In fiscal matters the Government of India should wholly be freed from the control of the Secretary of State whose control in other matters, too, should be largely reduced and his Council abolished. I indicate below in brief outline the form of administration that should be set up in the six large provinces to carry out this idea.

Each province should have—

- (1) A Governor appointed from England at the head of the administration.
- (2) A Cabinet of five Ministers, two of whom at least should always be Indians, with the following portfolios :—
  - (a) Home (including Law and Justice and Sanitation).
  - (b) Finance.

- (c) Agriculture, Irrigation and Public Works (other than Railways).
- (d) Education and Local Self-Government.
- (e) Industries and Commerce.

The best men available, both English and Indian, should be appointed wherever found, no places being specially reserved for any particular service.

(3) A Legislative Assembly of between 75 and 100 Members, of whom not less than three-fourths should be elected by different constituencies and interests. Thus, in the Bombay Presidency, roughly speaking, each District should return two Members, one representing municipalities and the other district and taluka boards. The city of Bombay should have about eight Members allotted to it. Bodies in the *mofussil* like the Karachi Chamber, Ahmedabad Mill-owners, Deccan Sardars should have a Member each. Then there would be the special representation of Mahomedans, and here and there a Member must be given to communities, like the Lingayats, where they are strong. There should be no nominated official Members, except as experts. A few official Members may be added by the Governor as experts when required to assist in representing the Executive Government.

(4) The relations between the Executive Government and the Legislative Council so constituted should not require responsibility like in the British and French Chambers of the Ministry to the Assembly, but should be roughly similar to those between the American and German Governments and the House of Representatives and the Reichstag. The Council will have to pass all provincial legislation and its assent will be necessary to additions to, or changes in, provincial taxation. The budget, too, will have to come to it for discussion and its resolutions in connection with it, as also on questions of general administration, will have to be given effect to unless vetoed by the Governor. More frequent meetings or longer continuous sittings will also have to be provided for. But I repeat the Members of the Executive Government shall not in any way depend, individually or collectively, on the support of a majority of the Council for holding their offices. Of course, His Excellency the Governor will have a full veto and use it when necessary for legislation.

(5) The Provincial Government, so re-constituted and working under the control of the Legislative Assemblies as outlined above, should have complete charge of the internal administration of the province. And it should have virtually independent financial powers, the present financial relations between it and the Government of India being largely revised, and to some extent even reversed. The revenue under Registration, Stamps, Salt, Customs, Tributes, Railways, Post, Telegraph and Mint should belong exclusively to the Government of India, the Services being Imperial, while that under Land Revenue, including Irrigation, Excise, Forest and Assessed Taxes, should belong to the Provincial Government, the Services being provincial. Of course, the Bengal

Government owing to its antiquated land revenue system will have to find other sources of revenue. As under this division, the revenue falling to the Provincial Government will be in excess of its existing requirements and that assigned to the Government of India will fall short of its present expenditure, the Provincial Government should be required to make an annual contribution to the Government of India, fixed for periods of five years at a time. Subject to this arrangement, the Imperial and the Provincial Governments should develop their separate systems of finance, the Provincial Government being given powers of taxation and borrowing within certain limits.

#### THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

1. The Provinces being thus rendered practically autonomous, the constitution of the Executive Council or the Cabinet of the Viceroy will have to be correspondingly altered. At present there are four Members in that Council, with portfolios which concern the internal administration of the country, *viz.*, Home, Agriculture, Education and Industries and Commerce. As all internal administration will now be made over to the Provincial Governments, and the Government of India will only retain in its hands nominal control to be exercised on very rare occasions, two Members to be called Ministers of Interior and Home should suffice in place of these four. It will, however, be necessary to create certain other portfolios, and I would have the Cabinet consist of the following eight Ministers (at least two of whom shall always be Indian):—(a) Interior; (b) Home; (c) Finance; (d) Law; (e) Defence (Army and Navy); (f) Communications (Railway, Post, Telegraph); (g) Foreign Affairs; (h) portfolio dealing with Native States should be under His Excellency the Viceroy.

2. The Legislative Council of the Viceroy should be raised to about 80 Members to begin with, and its powers should be enlarged, but the principle of an official majority should be continued, until sufficient experience has been gathered of the working of autonomous arrangements for the provinces. This will give the Government of India a reserve power in connection with Provincial administration to be exercised in emergencies. Thus, if a provincial Legislative Assembly persistently declines to pass legislation which the Government regards to be essential in the vital interests of the province, it could be passed by the Government of India in the Viceroy's Legislative Council over the head of the province. Such occasions would be extremely rare, but the reserve power will give a sense of security to the authorities and will induce them to enter on the great experiment of provincial autonomy with greater readiness on the one hand, and a sense of responsibility to the local Councils on the other. Subject to this principle of an official or nominated majority being maintained, the Viceroy's Council should have increased opportunities of influencing the policy of the Government by discussion,

questions connected with the Army (and the Navy to be later created) being placed on a level with other questions.

The Viceroy should usually be a younger son or brother of the Sovereign, but not a distant relative, nor necessarily and always a member of the Imperial family.

BOMBAY,  
7th March 1915.

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(Sd.) AGA KHAN.

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*Meetings of the All-India Congress Committee held at Allahabad on Saturday, Sunday and Monday, April 22nd, 23rd and 24th.*

PRESENT :

1. The Hon'ble Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya (Allahabad),
2. Babu Bhupendranath Basu (Calcutta).
3. Mr. N. Subbarau Pantulu (Rajmuhundry).
4. Mrs. Annie Besant (Madras).
5. The Hon'ble Mr. N. M. Samarth (Bombay).
6. The Hon'ble Pandit Motilal Nehru (Allahabad),
7. Dewan Bahadur L. A. Govindaraghava Aiyar (Madras),
8. The Hon'ble Dr. Nilratan Sircar (Calcutta).
9. The Hon'ble Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru (Allahabad).
10. The Hon'ble Rao Bahadur M. Ramchandra Rao (Ellore),
11. Babu Kishori Mohan Chaudhuri (Calcutta).
12. The Hon'ble Mirza Samiullah Beg (Lucknow).
13. The Hon'ble Rao Bahadur B. N. Sarma (Madras).
14. Mr. Mazharul Haque (Bankipore).
15. The Hon'ble Pandit Gokaran Nath Misra (Lucknow),
16. The Hon'ble Mr. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri (Madras).
17. Mr. Sachchidananda Sinha (Bankipore).
18. The Hon'ble Mr. C. Y. Chintamani (Allahabad),
19. The Hon'ble Mr. A. S. Krishna Rao (Nellore).
20. Babu Nandkishore Lal (Bankipore).
21. The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narain (Lucknow),
22. Mr. C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer (Madras).

23. Babu Prithwis Chandra Roy (Calcutta).
24. Munshi Ishwar Saran (Allahabad).
25. Mr. A. P. Patro (Berhampore).
26. Lala Harkishen Lal (Lahore).
27. Rai Krishnaji (Benares).
28. Rao Bahadur R. G. Mundle (Berars).
29. Babu Satyananda Bose (Calcutta).
30. Mr. Parmeshwar Lal (Bankipore).
31. Babu Surendranath Mullick (Calcutta).
32. Mr. N. A. Dravid (Nagpur).
33. Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru (Allahabad).
34. Babu Chandrabansi Sahay (Bankipore).

1. On the motion of Babu Bhupendranath Basu, the Hon'ble Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, the senior ex-President, was voted to the chair.

2. Telegrams of sympathy from the President of the Sind Conference at Larkana, the Hon'ble Rao Bahadur R. N. Madholkar and the Hon'ble Mr. M. V. Joshi were read by the Chairman.

3. It was resolved on the motion of the Chairman to record regret at the death of Mr. G. Subramania Iyer and of Dewan Bahadur M. Adinarayan Iyah.

4. The Hon'ble Pandit Motilal Nehru called attention to the presence of a Police officer in the ante-room and wanted to know if their proceedings were public and if the officer could be given permission to attend the meeting. He was informed that the meeting was a private one and that no outsider could be present at it.

5. Mrs. Annie Besant proposed that, before other items on the agenda were taken up, the meeting should consider the item No. 7 dealing with the subject of self-government. The proposal was accepted unanimously.

6. The resolution of the last Congress, conveying instructions to the All-India Congress Committee, was then read, and the Committee proceeded to discuss the schemes submitted by the Provincial Congress Committees of Bengal, Bombay and Madras.

The following resolutions were passed, some unanimously and some by majority.

#### I.—PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

1. Provincial Legislative Councils shall consist of four-fifths of elected and of one-fifth of nominated Members.

2. Their strength shall be not less than 100 elected Members in the major provinces, and from 50 to 75 in the minor provinces.

3. The Members of Councils should be elected directly by the people on as broad a franchise as possible.

4. Adequate provision should be made for the representation of important minorities by election.

5. The head of the Government should not be the President of the Legislative Council. The Council should have the right of electing its President.

6. The right of putting supplementary questions should not be restricted to the Member who has put the original question, but should be allowed to be exercised by any other Member.

7. (a) Except Customs, Post, Telegraph, Mint, Salt, Opium, Railways, Army and Navy, and tributes from Indian States, all other sources of revenue should be provincial.

(b) There should be no divided heads of revenue. The Government of India should be provided with fixed contributions from the Provincial Governments; such fixed contributions being liable to revision when extraordinary and unforeseen contingencies render such revision necessary.

(c) The Provincial Council should have full authority to deal with all matters affecting the internal administration of the province, including the power to raise loans, to impose and alter taxation, and to vote on the Budget. All items of expenditure, and all proposals concerning ways and means of raising the necessary revenue, should be embodied in Bills and submitted to the Provincial Councils for adoption.

(d) Resolutions on all matters within the purview of the Provincial Government should be allowed for discussion in accordance with rules made in that behalf by the Council itself.

(e) A resolution passed by the Legislative Council should be binding on the Executive Government, unless vetoed by the Governor in Council, provided, however, that, if the resolution is again passed by the Council after an interval of not less than one year, it must be given effect to.

(f) A motion for adjournment shall be permitted for the discussion of a definite matter of urgent public importance if supported by not less than one-eighth of the Members present.

8. A meeting of the Council shall be summoned on a requisition by not less than one-eighth of the Members.

9. A Bill, other than a Money Bill, may be introduced in Council in accordance with rules made in that behalf by the Council itself and the consent of the Executive Government should not be required therefor.

10. All Bills passed by Provincial Legislatures shall have to receive the assent of the Crown before they become law.

11. The term of office of Members should be five years,

## II.—PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS.

1. The head of every Provincial Government shall be a Governor who shall not, ordinarily, belong to the Indian Civil Service (or any of the permanent services).

2. There shall be in every province an Executive Council which, with the Governor, shall constitute the Executive Government of the province.

3. Members of the Indian Civil Service shall not ordinarily be appointed to Executive Councils.

4. Not less than one-half of the Executive Council shall consist of Indians to be elected by the elected Members of the Provincial Legislative Council.

5. The term of office of Members shall be five years.

## III.—IMPERIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

1. The strength of the Imperial Legislative Council shall be 150.

2. Four-fifths of the Members shall be elected.

3. The franchise for the Imperial Legislative Council should be widened as far as possible on the lines of the present Mahomedan and landholders' electorates and as provided in the case of the Provincial Legislative Councils, the elected Members of Provincial Legislative Councils also constituting electorates for the return of Members to the Imperial Legislative Council.

4. Adequate provision should be made for the representation of important minorities by election.

5. The President of the Council shall be elected by the Council itself.

6. The right of putting supplementary questions should not be restricted to the Member who put the original question, but should be allowed to be exercised by any other Member.

7. A meeting of the Council shall be summoned on a requisition by not less than one-eighth of the Members.

8. A Bill, other than a Money Bill, may be introduced in Council in accordance with rules made in that behalf by the Council itself, and the consent of the Executive Government should not be required therefor.

9. All Bills passed by the Council shall have to receive the assent of the Crown before they become law.

10. All financial proposals relating to the items of expenditure and sources of income shall be embodied in Bills. Every such Bill and the Budget as a whole shall be submitted for the vote of the Imperial Legislative Council.

11. The term of office of Members shall be five years.



12. The matters mentioned hereinbelow shall be exclusively under the control of the Imperial Legislative Council—

- (a) Matters in regard to which uniform legislation for the whole of India is desirable.
- (b) Provincial legislation in so far as it may affect inter-provincial fiscal relations.
- (c) Questions affecting purely Imperial Revenue, excepting tributes from Indian States.
- (d) Questions affecting purely Imperial expenditure except that no resolution of the Imperial Legislative Council shall be binding on the Governor-General in Council in respect of military charges for the defence of the country.
- (e) The right of revising Indian tariffs and customs duties, of imposing, altering, or removing any tax or cess, modifying the existing system of currency and banking, and granting any aids or bounties to any or all deserving and nascent industries of the country, without requiring the sanction of the Secretary of State.
- (f) Resolutions on all matters relating to the administration of the country as a whole.
- (g) A resolution passed by the Legislative Council shall be binding on the Executive Government, unless vetoed by the Governor-General in Council; provided, however, that, if the resolution is again passed by the Council after an interval of not less than one year, it must be given effect to.
- (h) A motion for adjournment shall be permitted for the discussion of a definite matter of urgent public importance if supported by not less than one-eighth of the Members present.

13. A Bill passed by the Imperial Legislative Council and assented to by the Governor-General in Council may be vetoed by the Crown at any time within twelve months after it is passed, and shall cease to have effect as from the day on which the fact of such veto is made known to the Legislative Council.

14. The Imperial Legislative Council shall have no power to interfere with the Government of India's direction of the military affairs and the foreign political relations of India, including the declaration of war, the making of peace and the entering into treaties.

#### IV.—THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

- 1. The Governor-General of India will be the head of the Government of India.
- 2. He will have an Executive Council, half of whom shall be Indians.

3. The Indian Members should be elected by the elected Members of the Imperial Legislative Council out of a panel made of two persons recommended by the elected Members of each of the Provincial Legislative Councils of the major provinces and of one person recommended by each of the Legislative Councils of the minor provinces.

4. Members of the Indian Civil Service shall not ordinarily be appointed to the Executive Council of the Governor-General.

5. The control of all appointments in the Imperial Civil Services shall vest in the Government of India, due regard being paid to existing interests, subject to any laws that may be made by the Supreme Legislative Council.

6. The Government of India shall not ordinarily interfere in the local affairs of a province, and powers not specifically given to a Provincial Government, shall be deemed to be vested in the former. The authority of the Government of India will ordinarily be limited to general supervision and superintendence over the Provincial Governments.

7. In legislative and administrative matters the Government of India should, as far as possible, be independent of the Secretary of State.

8. A system of independent audit of the accounts of the Government of India should be instituted.

#### V.—SECRETARY OF STATE AND COUNCIL.

1. The Council of the Secretary of State for India should be abolished.

2. The salary of the Secretary of State should be placed on the British estimates.

3. The Secretary of State should, as far possible, occupy the same position in relation to the Government of India, as the Secretary of State for the Colonies in relation to the Governments of the self-governing Dominions.

#### VI.—OTHER MATTERS.

1. The military and naval services of His Majesty, both in their commissioned and non-commissioned ranks, should be thrown open to Indians, and adequate provision should be made for their selection, training and instruction in India.

2. Indians should be allowed to enlist as volunteers.

3. Indians should be placed on a footing of equality in respect of status and rights of citizenship with other subjects of His Majesty the King throughout the Empire.

4. It was agreed that the position of Indian States and their rulers should be left out of the Congress scheme.

5. Provincial Congress Committees are asked to formulate schemes for the expansion of local self-government in their respective provinces, and circulate them among the different Provincial Committees and the members of the All-India Congress Committees.

6. Resolved that the consideration of the following proposal of the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee be taken up at the next meeting of the All-India Congress Committee.

"Scattered portions of British territory in India which are outside the scope of the reforms hereinabove mentioned, may be started on a career of gradual progress in the direction of these reforms by the introduction of Advisory Councils, partly nominated and partly elected.

"It would be better, however, provided there are no insurmountable administrative difficulties in the way, if the said areas could be tacked on to the adjoining Provincial Government for the purposes of this *re* reform; for instance, the areas forming part of British India in Rajputana may be joined on to the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh; similarly, Coorg to Madras, British Baluchistan, North-West Frontier Province and the territory under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Delhi to the Punjab, and areas forming part of British India in Central India to the Central Provinces."

7. Resolved that the foregoing scheme be treated as a tentative one to serve as the basis of discussion by the Committee of the All-India Moslem League and by the All-India Congress Committee itself at the next meeting.

8. Resolved that the next meeting be held at Calcutta in the last week of August, and that the Committee of the Moslem League be invited to meet the All-India Congress Committee at that meeting for a joint discussion of the scheme.

9. Resolved that, in the meantime the foregoing scheme should not be published for general information, but be printed and circulated among the Provincial Congress Committees and the members of the All-India Congress Committee, and that any expressions of their opinions be communicated to the General Secretaries to be placed before the next meeting.

10. Resolved that Provincial Congress Committees be authorised to carry on educational and propagandist work at their discretion in their respective provinces.

11. Resolved that the General Secretaries be authorised to appoint an assistant at a cost not exceeding Rs. 1,500 for the rest of the present year for realising subscriptions due to the British Congress Committee and for Congress work generally.

12. Resolved that the members of the All-India Congress Committee who shall not have paid their annual subscription of Rs. 15 be not permitted to vote at the next meeting of the Committee.

13. The proceedings terminated with a vote of thanks to the Chairman and to the Hon'ble Pandit Motilal Nehru at whose residence the meetings of the Committee were held.

MADAN MOHAN MALAVIYA, *Chairman,*

SYED MOHAMMED, }  
N. SUBBARAU, } *General Secretaries.*

No. 4.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR HARCOURT BUTLER, K. C. S. I., C. I. E., Lieut.-Governor  
of Burma.

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*Govt. House, Rangoon, August 11th, 1916.*

[ Very Secret. ]

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

My reply to Your Excellency's very secret letter of the 20th July will be brief. Burma is not mentioned in the papers and is scarcely touched by the proposals.

Personally I share Lord Lawrence's views as to the danger of pronouncements of future policy, which will be settled by events rather than by any aspirations of the present. I should myself hesitate to make any pronouncement until after the war, when some grand surprises may be expected affecting the whole administration of the Empire. Your Excellency will, however, have fuller information as to these than I have.

If an objective is to be declared, I see no objection to that agreed on except that "the supremacy of British rule" is a vague expression. I presume that it involves the supremacy of British ideals and ideas, which requires a strong infusion of British agency. This might perhaps be clearer.

We have no district or local boards in Burma and no *panchayets*. We may build up something on the basis of the co-operative credit movement. I am thinking about our organisation and am going to try experimentally divisional school boards to look after vernacular education. There are outside Rangoon 44 Municipalities. I have no objection to trying experiments there if the Imperial Government will give financial guarantees in the event of bankruptcy, which is regarded as certain to come if control is withdrawn.

I entirely agree as to the increasing employment of Indians, or I should say indigènes, as we have so many classes here, but cannot usefully make suggestions until I see the report of the Public Services Commission. Here the position is complicated by the strong dislike which Burmans and Indians have for each other.

Our little Council of 17 Members, all nominated by me, except the European representations of the Chamber of Commerce and the Rangoon Trades' Association lies far away from the discussions in Council. I have ready for issue a resolution appointing a Committee to consider how the Council can be more representative and whether the principle of election can be introduced. On my present information, I should doubt the practicability of territorial electorates in this province.

I am afraid this is not very helpful; but Burma is quite apart and will be for many years.

Very sincerely yours,  
(Sd.) HARCOURT BUTLER.

[ *VERY SECRET.* ]

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR JAMES MESTON, K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Govr. of the United  
Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

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*Naini Tal, August 19th, 1916.*

DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

Your letter (marked "very secret") of the 20th July and its enclosures have been carefully studied by me, and I now submit my views on the questions they discuss, and thank Your Excellency cordially for giving me an opportunity of doing so.

2. To the symposium which Lord Hardinge collected last year on the subject of *post-bellum* concessions, I made (7th September, 1915) a contribution in which it was suggested that, so far as the British Government is concerned, the gifts appropriate for India fall into two main categories,—political advancement, and the removal of racial disparities. Omitting a number of minor concessions, I classified the more important gifts in these categories thus:—

- "(1) The election by municipal boards of their own non-official chairmen.
- (2) The election by district and local boards of their own non-official chairmen.
- (3) A majority of elected Members in the Provincial Legislative Council.
- (4) The larger employment of Indian officials to the extent recommended by Lord Islington's Commission and accepted by the Supreme Government.

\* \* \* \* \*

This quotation from what I wrote nearly a year ago (page 29 of Appendix B of Lord Hardinge's Red Book) is made in no spirit of egotism, but in order to show Your Excellency how ready I am to support the general policy which is outlined in your letter.

3. The issues discussed by Lord Hardinge and his correspondents were, as Your Excellency says, isolated problems. The idea however which linked them

together was the rewarding of India's loyalty and the timely grant of concessions to India's legitimate aspirations. From this point of view, many of the proposals will be found of value in supplementing any declaration of general policy. They will, I venture to believe, be especially valuable in securing for us the confidence and gratitude of moderate men at a time when the country will be ringing with denunciations of our refusal to concede in full the demands of the advanced party. For, whatever may be the ultimate pronouncement, it will be condemned by that party as inadequate; or, if it comes from a source which renders it immune from open criticism, the procedure for carrying it into effect will be attacked at every step. The extravagance of the demands which most of the political organisations have formulated has put it out of their power to receive gracefully any gifts which they can possibly be offered.

4. Admitting however the value of the concessions which were discussed a year ago, I cordially agree that synthesis and definition are now required. After the war India will pass through a most difficult phase, and its only chance of emerging safely lies in the firm guidance of a definite and definitely-announced policy. This is what the country has been seeking ever since the present agitations began. Many Indians who think for themselves, and are perfectly well disposed, find genuine difficulty in knowing what we regard as disloyalty to Government. How long, they ask, are you going to hold India? and on what terms? What form of self-government may we legitimately claim? at what point does the demand for independence become sedition? Because no authoritative answer is ever given to such questions, men drift into extravagance of statement and toy with ideas which are foreign and uncongenial to them.

5. A pronouncement of our aims, such as Your Excellency contemplates, is thus in every way welcome. The formula, if I may say so without presumption, is admirable. It will at once put the Home Rule agitation into its proper place, and will commend itself to all moderate men. There will, as I have said, be a fierce outcry that it falls short of the immediate and unconditional autonomy which India wanted: but that cannot be helped. Such artificial excitement subsides in time, and in their hearts not even the hottest extremists expect much more than Your Excellency proposes to give.

6. For the caution of the formula there is every justification, not only in the "special circumstances and traditions" of the country, but in the character and minds of the people. Will Your Excellency allow me to give you my own personal convictions, even at the risk of again seeming egotistical? For many years I have watched with sympathy the growing of the sentiment of nationalism. I have known many of its chief exponents, and always tried to work with them rather than against them. During the last four years I have had to harmonise this theoretical liberalism with the practical task of administering

a very large and heavy province. Out of my experience three very clear (and you will probably say very obvious) conclusions have crystallised—

- (1) However skilled or benevolent our rule, it is an alien rule, and as such it will yearly become more difficult and its mistakes more conspicuous. A very wide measure of self-government is the only possible solution and corrective, and it must come as soon as we can give it with any approach to safety.
- (2) At present the people (I refer only to the province I know) are definitely unfit for any wide measure of self-government. It is not to their illiteracy that this is due: but to the absence of any general sympathy between the masses and those who claim to represent them; and also in the case of the politicians, to their almost entire lack of the political sense. This in turn is the result of shallow thinking, the acceptance of catchwords in place of reasoned beliefs, mutual intolerance and distrust, and in some measure racial schism.
- (3) Consequently there rests upon us a heavy and immediate duty in training the people in self-government. It has to come: they are now unfit; it is our business to make them fit. We must associate them more and more in our work. We must give them fields in which they can practise and learn by their own failures. But at the same time we must limit the range of their failures because, until they take it over from us, we cannot divest ourselves of our responsibility for the well-being of the whole community.

7. In writing all this, I trust not to have been guilty of pure verbiage. It has a direct bearing on what comes after, on the three roads by which you propose to advance towards the goal. The pace of advance will probably, and quite unobjectionably, be very different in different parts of India; but the foregoing will show that I readily accept your three roads. Many by-paths have no doubt suggested themselves to you, particularly in the removal of colour disparities and the improvement of social relations; but the three main roads are sound and I cannot suggest a fourth.

8. *Local self-government*.—With a few broad safeguards reserving for Government an ultimate power to veto patent abuses, the whole of this field should now be thrown open. In the Memorandum on the subject which is attached to Your Excellency's letter, there are one or two points to which I could not assent; for example, I feel that in this province we must exercise control over the choice of local taxes until the people are weaned from certain old and vicious traditions which they are loth to forswear. These however are details which can be settled later; and with the general arguments of the

Memorandum I am in complete accord. In the United Provinces a very large measure of freedom has just been given to municipalities by an Act passed in the current year; and it is proposed that, wherever they wish to do so, they shall elect their own chairmen, as well as their own executive officers and other employés.

9. We are almost ready to extend the same privilege to rural boards. Official opinion is more doubtful about this than about the emancipation of urban bodies; but the conclusive argument to my mind for handing over district and sub-district boards to non-official control is the prime importance of employing and interesting the landed gentry in work for which they are specially qualified. If a large landowner can be induced to become chairman of a district board, it gives him useful and engrossing duties, and associates him in the practical business of government to a degree which would otherwise be all but impossible. Again, as to *panchayats* we are preparing to go quite as far as the Memorandum. A provincial commission investigated the whole problem last winter, and drafted a Bill which is now being examined.

10. *Indians in the public services.*—Here also I fully subscribe to the general principles in your letter. Our experience of Indians in higher administrative post has been varied. On the judicial side, especially in dealing with crime, they are in some respects disappointing; lacking in the brusque commonsense which is valued by our simple people. On the executive side, individuals tend to be touchy, interfering, and at times nervous about responsibility, but great allowances have to be made for the difficulty of their position. That we have to proceed fearlessly along these lines, is obvious. It will mean a heavy burden of watchfulness on the diminishing European staff: and it will mean the dethroning of many of our idols. But, apart from all other considerations, it is almost the only, and certainly the most effective, way of preventing the dominance of pure theory in public affairs. The more that the educated classes are leavened with practical knowledge of Government business and its special difficulties, the less irresponsible will tend to become their attitude in the Councils and towards our administration generally. I need say nothing of the inherent right of the Indians to take a growing share, as they become fit for it, in the service of their own country.

11. How far the recommendations of Lord Islington's Commission may go in this direction, none of us know; but it is probable that they do not go so far as some of our political catchwords demand. It is therefore to my mind of such vital importance to deal promptly and firmly with the report that I venture to press the point especially on Your Excellency's consideration. The ordinary Commission's report takes two years—often more—before it goes through the mill of Local Governments, consultation with selected officers, discussion in the press, resolutions by political bodies, and finally its slow digestion in the Simla Secretariats. If Lord Islington's report has the usual fate, all the grace will



have gone out of it before anything is done. Any gifts it offers will have been entirely discounted, and a fresh agitation will be well on its way for further concessions. I venture therefore to advise earnestly that special measures be taken on this occasion to have the findings of the Government of India and the Secretary of State announced with the least possible delay after the report is published.

12. One way of securing this (I offer it merely as a suggestion) would be that, after the report has been examined by yourself and your advisers, Your Excellency should depute a Member of your Council, or some other high officer to go round all the Local Governments and discuss the proposals with them verbally. Informal conversations between the head of the province and his Executive Council or a few of his most trusted officers on the one side, and your delegate on the other, could in a couple of days place the latter in possession of all the points which the Local Government accepts and those to which it demurs. In this way Your Excellency would receive within three months a summary of the best advice which we can all give you: and orders might issue on the cardinal features of the scheme within six months of the publication of the report. Six months is also ample time for the expression of public opinion; for public opinion on every conceivable point has already been disgorged in abundance during the prolonged and public sittings of the Commission in this country.

13. *Extension of the Legislative Councils.*—The main issue here is whether the Provincial Councils should be so reconstituted as to have a majority of elected Members. For this province my answer would be: Yes, subject to three conditions which will be examined later. The present form of Council has served a good purpose, but there is little vitality about it, and its usefulness as an educative agency in self-government is evaporating. The certainty that the elected element can nearly always be outvoted by the officials and nominated non-officials is tending to generate an air of irresponsibility in the former. On the Government side, a number of dumb voters are in reluctant attendance, who would be better employed elsewhere. On the anti-Government side, the Council is used as a forum for badgering unpopular departments, or declaiming manifestoes, or reading speeches which have been written by a paid scribe and bear little or no relation to the real opinions of the Member. The Council is useful in bringing together different points of view, and in giving the official apologist opportunities which are otherwise lacking; but in training the people for the work of government it does little or nothing. The only live discussions that I have seen in the United Provinces Council during my four years' presidency of it have been when a racial issue was directly or indirectly involved.

14. For these reasons I do not think that any tinkering with the electorates will help, so long as the form of our Council remains what it is. There is

much in Memorandum B with which I warmly agree : but its proposals would probably please nobody, nor do I think that they would expedite the instruction of the people ( am I repeating this *ad nauseam* ? ) in the art, the responsibility, the gravity of self-government. I would therefore give the Council a clear majority of Members actually elected by the people, upon electoral rolls of a reasonably democratic character. At present the United Provinces Council may consist of—

- 20 official Members,
- 5 Members nominated by Government,
- 21 elected Members,
- 1 Member representative of Indian commerce,
- 
- 47, with two experts when necessary.

In future I would suggest that its constitution might be something as follows :—

- 18 Members elected by non-Moslems,
- 6     "     "     " Moslems,
- 6     "     "     " landowners,
- 1 Member     "     " the University,
- 1     "     "     " the Chamber of Commerce,
- 12 official Members,
- 3 Members nominated by Government,
- 
- 47, with two experts when necessary.
- 

The number of elected Members is based on constituencies which I have in my mind but with which I need not trouble you at present. The official Members would consist of the absolute minimum necessary to represent the policy of Government :—the five Secretaries, two Members of the Board of Revenue, Legal Remembrancer, Director of Public Instruction, and three other senior officers.

15. There is no use in shutting one's eyes to what a strong elected majority will imply. It will imply much amateur, and at the outset some very perverse, law-making. It will imply much discomfort for the executive, and frequent friction between the popular party and the authority which has to veto impossible Bills. But it is worth trying. It will bring home a sense of responsibility in time, and the foundation of Government will be in theory, to a greater extent than at present, the expressed will of the people. There are however three reservations which, in my judgment, are absolutely essential if this great

experiment is to have a reasonable chance of success. The first two are general; the third I put forward only for my own province :—

- (1) The Council must have no power to vote upon the budget;
- (2) Resolutions of Council must not be binding upon the Government;  
and
- (3) Election must secure the representation of classes and interests.

16. The first of these seems to me so self-evident that I should not have formulated it if certain suggestions had not been made from time to time for giving the Councils larger control over finance. There can be no objection to extending the range of the advisory functions now exercised by a non-official committee which assists the Local Government in framing the budget. But to allow the legislature to reject or alter the budget would simply mean that the Government could be thrown out of power and that an opposition could take its place. On this point, therefore, there can to my mind be no compromise. Any yielding on it would involve the steady paralysis of our executive and the negation of our whole scheme of administration. Even in England, with its party system, the Treasury has been established in a position which is virtually independent of Parliament : how much more necessary is this security under a system where the Government is liable to be in a permanent minority. Very similar is the necessity for the second reservation. The Government (and this means of course not only the Local Government, but the Government of India and the Secretary of State) will assuredly be willing to meet the wishes of a local legislature as far as possible, but they cannot possibly subordinate their policy to its wishes. The legislature cannot, in other words, direct the details of the work of an executive authority which it cannot replace. Both these reservations stand firmly on the ground of political theory, quite apart from any question of the fitness of our Councils to undertake the duties with which the absence of these stipulations would invest them.

17. The third reservation, which bargains for the elected Members being representative of classes and interests, brings into issue the chief propositions in Memorandum C. With much that is contained in that Memorandum (and certainly with its first seven paragraphs) I am in ready accord; but when it comes to discuss the basis of representation, I must beg for careful reconsideration so far as this province is concerned. The proposals from which I differ are those for sweeping away the system of class interests including the special representation\* of Mahomedans, and for replacing it by a system of large constituencies based on territorial units. It is suggested that the Members thus elected would be, and would have to be accepted as, the true mouthpieces of the people, even apparently if they were the same men as those who now sit in our Councils and express the same ideas. The hope, however, is held out that time

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\* This, however, the writer of the Memorandum subsequently restores, on a strict population basis without plural voting.

would bring not only more fully representative members than at present, but also a spirit of healthy rivalry in pressing the claims of different constituencies. If I hesitate to accept these arguments and forecasts, Your Excellency will understand me as speaking entirely for the province which I know and not as venturing on any generalisation regarding parts of India where more democratic ideals may be nearer.

18. Regarding Mahomedans, I need do no more than quote from Lord Morley's speech of the 4th March, 1909, on the Indian Councils Act of that year :—

“The Mahomedans demand three things \* \* \* They demand the election of their own representatives to these Councils in all the stages \* \* \* Secondly, they want a number of seats in excess of their numerical strength. These two demands we are quite ready and intend to meet in full.”

That is a promise to which the Mahomedans have every intention of holding us. Apart from this special constituency, my conviction is that in this province, for at least a generation, we must have separate representation for the landed interests. The territorial system might produce a rivalry, as the Memorandum foresees, but it would be a rivalry for grants and privileges. It would not be, during any period of time that most of us are likely to see, a healthy rivalry between rural and urban interests, between the landed classes in the districts and the professional classes in the towns. The latter will dominate, the former will be nowhere.

19. Now, I have not a word to say against the professional classes; many of the denunciations to which they are subjected are grossly unfair. They have come to the front by hard work, they have seized education because they first saw its advantages, and they have become the protagonists of political progress;—all to their credit. But we need not secure these advantages to them in perpetuity, and there must be a balance in the State. I see no near prospect of such a balance accruing in this province by the free play of competition. On the contrary, I believe that, with a territorial system of representation, the professional or politician class will continue to appear in our Council, to strengthen its hold, to give voice to the same ideas, and gradually to oust all rivalry on the part of the more stable and conservative elements.

20. My reason for this belief is the very limited spread of the political sense among the people of this province. The big landlord or the yeoman farmer is particularly defective in it. He has not been educated, and is not educating his sons, as the townsmen are. The only politics he knows is the constant struggle between landholder and tenant. The only legislation which interests him is the long series of land laws, in regard to which the fear that

Government will side against him makes him unwilling to burn his fingers in ordinary public affairs. Almost his only distraction is endless litigation with his tenants, his co-sharers and his relatives, which makes him dread and dislike the lawyer as a class. The consequence of all this is that he cannot and will not face the modern methods of a contested election, the facile speech-making, the obloquy of the press, or the heckling which cuts his dignity like a lash. In small constituencies such as we have at present or among his own class, he will occasionally stand, confining himself to writing a few letters and sending round his estate-agent to canvas for him; but with large mixed constituencies this would be impossible and he would be wiped out. He will come readily enough to Government officers and complain of our allowing the *vakils* to monopolise all power; but I cannot imagine him taking any constitutional measure to wrest it from them.

21. Such a result would be a grievous misfortune both to the landed interest and to ourselves. It is essential that the landed class should be in a position to defend the cause of agriculture, which must always be the mainstay of the country and the greatest of all our industries. It is most inadvisable that Government should be in our Council at the mercy of a clear majority of representatives of the professional classes, who will frankly press for the domination of their own political ideals and will not hesitate to make the task of government as difficult as possible in the meantime. We must trust the landed classes to help us in opposing hasty and unfair experiments in legislation. We must also be ready to stand by them, if confiscatory measures are threatened by the advanced party to bring them to heel. But our alliance will be in vain unless we give them special facilities for entering our Councils. In parts of India where the political sense is more widely distributed than with us, or where the landowner is not, as with us, an outstanding feature in provincial life, undiluted territorial representation may be practicable. In the United Provinces I would most earnestly deprecate it.

22. There are many points in the three Memoranda upon which I could write at length; but I take it that Your Excellency desires only a discussion of general issues at this stage. I have also avoided any such details as the qualifications of voters, the measures against plural voting, and the like. These are matters which will present no real difficulty, once the fundamental principles are settled.

23. Your Excellency's letter has been shown by me to nobody except Mr. Burn, my Chief Secretary, and Sir Verney Lovett, the Commissioner of Lucknow. The latter handed me a note, of which I attach a copy.

Believe me, Your Excellency, with the utmost respect,

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) JAS. S. MESTON.

NOTE BY THE HON'BLE SIR VERNEY LOVETT ON HIS EXCELLENCY'S LETTER OF JULY 20TH AND ITS ENCLOSURES.

1. The formula on page 2 seems to me unexceptionable. Some such declaration is much required for reasons apparent to any intelligent observer of the present trend of Indian politics. I attach particular importance to the words "compatible with the maintenance of the supremacy of British rule". I trust that these will nowhere be altered. Also the sentence "In all parts of the Empire \* \* \* \* religious beliefs" is of special value.

2. I attach great importance to the second part of clause (c) on page 4. It expresses an objective, which, however difficult to attain, must be tenaciously grasped.

I think the Government of India are right in publishing the report of the Public Services Commission. It may act as a corrective to the Home Rule agitation, and will give the politicians something practical to think of.

*Note (a).*

3. The only criticism which I would offer on this note is that perhaps it ignores the fact that, if municipal boards are given a free hand in varying taxation (page 5), their tendency will be not to "pile on the rates too much", but to whittle them down until municipal services become largely inefficient or financial chaos necessitates Government interference. Our new Municipal Bill constitutes a great advance on the path indicated in this note. If the experiment proves a success, we might proceed on the same lines with district boards (introduction of non-official Chairmen and executive officers), but there is no hurry about this, and in every local interest I would like to keep the District Magistrate Chairman of the district board. I recognise, however, that in other interests our hands may be forced.

4. As to *panchayats*, village unions, &c., this matter has lately been and is still under the consideration of Government. I may add that a Bill has been already framed and is shortly to be introduced into the Bengal Legislative Council which embodies the recommendations of the recent District Administration Committee in this connection and will probably interest His Honour. Of course Bengal villages and pre-existing circumstances differ greatly from ours.

*Notes (b) and (c).*

5. I now come to Memoranda B and C which relate to Provincial Legislative Councils. Both contain good things. But however desirable and sound the proposals in B may be, they would certainly leave our politicians exceedingly cold. From this point of view, they would not be worth undertaking. It is not clear to me that they would be worth undertaking from any other

point of view. If this is all that can be done, it might be as well to leave things as they are, revising the Council Regulations in minor respects.

6. Memorandum C proposes to give the Councils elected majorities, and there can be no doubt that this innovation would be hailed with satisfaction by the advanced party. The satisfaction would be, of course, considerably alloyed by the fact that Council resolutions would still not bind the executive, but, nevertheless, there would be substantial satisfaction. How far the resultant pacification, which would be temporary and evanescent, is for us a really valuable objective, is another matter. It would certainly be followed by strenuous efforts to make the new Councils "true controlling bodies".

7. Should such a concession be granted, it must be accompanied by *most determined* precautions against domination of the new Councils by the lawyer and journalist politicians. Nearly 100 years ago Sir Thomas Munro, then Governor of Madras, wrote that a free press in India would render the attainment of fitness for self-government "utterly impracticable"; for "by attempting to precipitate improvement, it would frustrate all the benefits which might have been derived from more cautious and temperate proceedings". Our lawyers and editors are at present free, to an extent undreamt of by Sir Thomas Munro; and impelled by growing racialism, by growing appetite for posts, they are more and more inclining to use their freedom in precisely the manner which he predicted. This being the case, a territorial system of representation which would hand over more powerful Councils than those now existent to the complete control of such persons would be a serious obstacle to the progress and well-being of India. I do not demonstrate that such a transfer of power would be the result of a territorial system, as I am aware of His Honour's views in this connection. Nor is there need to expose the fallacies contained in the last two sentences of paragraph 10 of Memorandum C.

8. It would be folly, in our endeavours to conciliate those whom we never shall permanently conciliate, to deprive ourselves of ability to take care of our friends, the landed classes and masses. We have also to consider the effect of any projected constitutional changes on our best friends of all, the Ruling Chiefs, who are well aware that there is a fundamental antagonism between the objectives of the advanced party and the substantial supremacy of British rule. At the same time we wish to work up to the formula on page 2 of His Excellency's letter, and we can hardly announce this formula without appreciably raising the status of the Legislative Councils. Our position therefore is extremely difficult. We must make the best compromise that we can. I would like to see some visible and definite connection between the Ruling Chiefs and the Imperial Council or, if this be impracticable, between the Ruling Chiefs and the deliberations of the Government of India. And as regards the Provincial Councils, it is difficult to see what can be done that is worth doing

if we do not concede elected majorities subject to the precautions on which I have above insisted. Even with these we may have substantial cause to regret the concession; and without them I would go no further than the ground covered by the proposals in Memorandum B.

9. Perhaps the most burning questions of all are military service and volunteering. None are so prominent in the minds of genuine Indian idealists. The recently announced Bengal experiment is a wise step and will afford valuable guidance for the future.

H. V. LOVETT.

*The 18th August 1916.*

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No. 6.

FROM H. E. THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD CARMICHAEL OF SKIRLING,  
G. C. I. E., K. C. M. G., Governor of Bengal.

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*Govt. House, Dacca, August 20th, 1916.*

[Private.]

DEAR CHELMSFORD,

Here is my reply to your letter of July 20th.

I consulted the Members of my Executive Council and I discussed some of the points which you raised with several of my officers, though I did not tell them why I did so. I did not give my colleagues a copy of your letter, but I gave each of them a paraphrase of it, which varied but little from the original, and I read the original through to them while they had the paraphrase in their hands so as to make sure that they fully understood it; I also gave to each a copy of an abstract which I made of the three memoranda which you sent me, and allowed them each in turn to read the actual memoranda and make such extracts from them as they desired. They promised to destroy, or send back to me, the paraphrase and any extracts they might make. I gave the memoranda to my Chief Secretary to read and myself read to him your letter. My Private Secretary has seen your letter and the memoranda. I hope this sufficiently meets your wish that the matter should be kept very secret.

Sir William Meyer, while in Calcutta, and Sir Sankaran Nair, while staying here, both spoke to me about the memoranda. I gathered that your Government have not come to conclusions quite so definitely as my first reading of your letter led me to think they had. I have therefore felt justified in travelling more widely outside the ground covered by your letter and its enclosures than I would otherwise have done.

My Government is, as you know, just now trying to formulate definite proposals in reply to your Government's letter No. 1519 of 6th May, which we were asked to answer within six months of its despatch. In these proposals we shall deal with some of the same matters as those about which I now write; it may therefore not be altogether possible to avoid what may seem needless repetition in the letters.



My colleagues and I do not always agree. Their longer and more intimate knowledge of India must, I admit, often in some respects make their conclusions better worthy of attention than mine, even when I do not feel convinced by their arguments. I send you a memorandum giving you my own ideas for what they are worth; and for fear lest I should state their views less clearly than they deserve to be stated, I send you along with this a note by each of my colleagues. You know some at least of the things which may have warped my judgment before I came to India and you know for how short a time I have been here; you will therefore probably realise where my colleagues are better guides than I am. Sir Syed Shams-ul-Huda seems to be wonderfully little biased by the fact that he is a Mahomedan. Mr. Lyon and Mr. Beatson Bell are both keen observers; but as Mr. Lyon's service has been principally in the Secretariat and Mr. Beatson Bell's in the *mufassal* they frequently look at things from a somewhat different point of view, and as far as I can judge, Mr. Beatson Bell generally seems to speak with more conviction than Mr. Lyon does. Mr. Lyon sends with his note the draft which he, as Member in charge of the Political Department, has prepared as a basis for our reply to your Government's letter referred to above; this draft was written before I got your letter of July 20th and it covers a somewhat wide field. Mr. Lyon is anxious that you should know what his own personal views are; and, as he fears the draft may be considerably modified before it issues in the form of a letter from the Governor in Council, I have agreed to send it to you along with the note which he has now written.

Yours very sincerely,  
(Sd.) CARMICHAEL.

MEMORANDUM BY LORD CARMICHAEL FOR HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY AS TO  
GOAL OF BRITISH RULE IN INDIA.

I agree with you that it is necessary for the Government of India to have a definite policy with regard to the future; and I agree that a policy connotes an objective. I was therefore glad to hear that you have been considering with your Council how to define the goal of British rule in India. I think that the promulgation of a definite policy is almost as necessary as its consideration; and I am therefore not surprised to learn that you intend eventually to make your idea as to the goal widely known throughout India, and thus win the sympathy of as many of her people as possible. Sir Sankaran Nair tells me you contemplate a Royal Proclamation, which would certainly be a most striking and a very popular way of letting people know what the goal is. The only objection which, as it seems to me, may be urged against the use of a Royal Proclamation is the risk—in view of the importance which attaches to every word spoken by His Imperial Majesty—of raising hopes which will not be fulfilled. It is essential that the wording of the Proclamation should make it as unlikely as possible that any future action by

Government officers shall have the appearance to Indians of going contrary to its terms; and it is almost as essential that, if possible, none of its words shall be of such uncertain interpretation as to lead to acrimonious disputes. Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1858 was hailed with delight by Indians, who speak of it as their Magna Charta; it was couched in clear language; its meaning seemed very obvious; but it was qualified by a sentence which necessarily imposes on Government officials the duty of limiting the direction in which those, who hoped to profit by the Sovereign's expressed will, can do so, where these officials, from whose decision there is no appeal, consider that they are not fit. Not a few of the actions of Government during the last 50 years have seemed entirely at variance with the words of the Proclamation in the minds of those who take a different view of fitness from that taken by the members of the Civil Service. The result is that many Indians believe that they have been deliberately cheated, not indeed by the Sovereign, but by officials who have refrained, they think, from carrying out the wishes of the Sovereign, because they were more loyal to their own service than to the Crown. Lord Lytton's words, so often quoted, in which he stated that the Government of England and the Government of India have used every means in their power to break to the heart the words which they had uttered to the ear seem to most Indians whom I have met amply justified; and I cannot deny that they would seem amply justified to many Englishmen if they were in the position of those Indians. I do not know whether anyone foresaw in 1858 that this must happen, but we ought to be on our guard now. We should take the utmost care to avoid the possibility of unnecessary disappointment as the result of a Royal Proclamation. It may often be eventually impossible to carry out promises genuinely made; but wherever there seems to be any risk of this, the promise should be made otherwise than in the King's own words.

The goal must necessarily be a distant one—it hardly matters how distant. A few years ago I should not have said this; before I came to India I should have argued that in politics we ought never to commit ourselves to anything very far ahead, but I realise that Indians as a people look much farther into the future than we do, and are more likely than we should be to accept a goal which clearly cannot be reached for many years. Indeed I believe that, provided only they foresee continuous progress, however slow, they prefer to aim at something which we might think beyond the range of practical politics. Where Hindus are concerned, their idea of *Karma* has probably something to do with this. Their religious philosophy is a very widespread and very real force; it teaches them to think of æons of time far beyond our conception, and this tinges their whole outlook on life. Mahomedans too, though to a less degree, seem in Bengal at any rate to be curiously content to look to a distant future. At the same time both Hindus and Mahomedans are quick to take words literally and to seek a concrete form for their ideas. The goal, therefore, however distant, must be defined with so much precision that those who hope to reach it may feel as little uncertain as possible as to

whether any given road will lead to it. We ought, too, to state most clearly that a long time must be taken in travelling along the roads. A large portion, even though an irresponsible portion, of Indian Nationalist opinion expects very sweeping changes after the termination of the war. Our greatest danger, I fear, lies in that expectation, and we ought to do our best to guard against it.

The goal which you propose is certainly far off. Your formula is carefully worded, but I am not sure that it avoids danger as much as it might. The criticism which I would make is that it gives more prominence to self-government than is perhaps wise unless you are prepared to say definitely what self-government is. To me self-government implies the control of their own nation's affairs by a large proportion of the people governed, acting through elected representatives. This may not be an accurate definition, even of my own ideas; but as a working definition it seems to me near enough; and when applied to their own country, the majority of our fellow-countrymen would probably not find serious fault with it. I do not think they would say that self-government of this sort is in itself undesirable, and they would admit that we have practically attained it in Great Britain. I and most of my fellow-countrymen would gladly see it attained in many of the other countries forming the British Empire, where it has not yet been fully attained if the people in those countries wish for it. But we should find divergence of opinion, even among those who would accept the definition, as to the possibility and still more as to the advisability of giving such self-government to India. I do not feel at all sure that Indians generally, when they speak of self-government, mean the same thing as most Englishmen do. No form of self-government which is not frankly democratic would, I take it, be looked on just now by any British Parliament, whether sitting in London or Overseas, as a desirable form of Government for any portion of the British Empire; yet as far as I can judge, the form of self-government desired by the most highly educated Indians for their own country is distinctly oligarchic. Few Indians agree with me as to how the best representatives can be obtained; many of them would perhaps disagree among themselves, for they would differ as to who are to choose representatives; and most of them would certainly take a different view to that which the majority of our Government officers would take about the proper interpretation of several sentences in your formula.

You propose "to endow India with the largest measure of self-government compatible with the maintenance of the supremacy of British rule", and you consider that India must be "an integral part of the British Empire". I do not think that any Indians, of whom we need take thought just now, would quarrel with the limitations which these words imply, provided they may put their own interpretation on them. Few people in Britain would deny that India must be an integral part of the Empire, but many in British Colonies would refuse to accept the idea unless the words "an integral part" are to convey a different meaning from that which we usually apply to them. This may not matter, for I feel confident

that agreement will be reached on this point between the Colonies and the mother country, in a sense nearly approaching the view taken by the latter, long before there is anything more dangerous than academic discussion about it here; and in any case, India's position as an integral part of the Empire is *the* thing on which we must insist. But the phrase "the compatibility with the maintenance of the supremacy of British rule" may easily lead to dispute. The Members of my own Executive Council do not all interpret it in the same way. The Calcutta Chamber of Commerce and the members of the Mahajan Sabha or of any other Indian trade organisation here would certainly differ about it. The interpretation given will, I think, depend on the view which the interpreter takes of the object with which the British are in India at all; at any rate its discussion will involve the consideration of that object. It is often said that we are here for the good of India, and that our position is that of Trustees. But is it so? We certainly did not come here for the good of India—we came for trade, and we have stayed for trade—among other reasons I hope—but still undoubtedly largely for trade, in order to secure in India a market and a source of raw material for England's use. If they did not believe that this is, in practice, our aim, a very large proportion of the British population of Bengal would leave India. Anything which seems to these people calculated to hurt their trade will be thought by them to weaken the supremacy of British rule; and many things which Indians desire and which Indians would try to get if they could, fall under this category. I believe many English people think that the supremacy of British rule in India is primarily intended to uphold the supremacy of British trade, and will fiercely resent anything which they fear may damage that trade. But there is another and very practical reason why we are in India and why we must remain in India, the consideration of which should, it seems to me, guide our policy. It is vital to our Empire that India shall not come under the control of any other Power. In all the other parts of the Empire people of British descent—or who do not widely differ in race from people of British descent—practically predominate; such people, even if they separated from us, would not be easily turned against us by a hostile nation. But it is not so with India; for apart from our treatment of them I know of no reason why we should expect the Indian peoples to love the British race more than any other alien race. Now the Indian Army is a most valuable asset to us; so valuable I believe that we cannot afford to run any risk of losing it. Whatever its value may have been in Europe in the present war—you know whether it has been of real value or not—the Indian Army would clearly be of much greater value in any war in Asia. Civilian Indians, realise that; probably military Indians do so also. It is in the nature of things that the Indian Army must be affected by the general feeling of Indians civil as well as military. In order that we may run no risk of losing the Indian Army, it seems to me that every political step we take in India ought

to be conditioned by the maintenance of the supremacy of British rule outside India quite as much as in India, and this should be made clear. I can imagine a form of Home Rule in local matters which would be self-government, and which by giving ample compensation for British capital sunk out here, and by granting favourable terms to British merchants, might meet with no opposition from those who look on trade as the supreme consideration, which might in no way endanger the supremacy of British rule in India as long as no one outside the British Empire intervened, and which yet might eventually prove fatal to our Empire. Indians would, I believe, suffer even more than we should from any disaster due to such a form of Home Rule; but Indians might not think this; although I hope it would not be difficult to convince those of them who are educated that it is so, provided we set about doing it in the right way. The present war is helping to convince them; it is teaching them that the British power, though a great power, is not as omnipotent as they once thought it was; and those Indians who think most are beginning to realise that their best chance for the future lies in developing their own strength in close alliance with ours. Dreamers there will always be, but the majority of educated men here in Bengal are guided by reason. The majority of educated Bengalis do not love British rule as they now know it, but they recognise its real advantage to themselves. They may not fear Englishmen so much as their fathers did, they probably have a higher opinion of themselves, but the war has taught them to dislike some other Europeans more, and curiously enough they both dislike and fear Japan. If we show ourselves inclined to accept their co-operation in developing and strengthening their own nation, Bengalis will, I believe, quickly realise that India cannot occupy quite the same relation to England as a British Colony does. They will learn that India cannot afford to be separated from Britain; but they will learn this more quickly if they realise that we feel that Britain cannot afford to be separated from India. We cannot teach them this better than by showing them that we trust Indians. They are not content to be looked on as an inferior race; they know that an inferior race can never become an integral part of our Empire, and no fair words which we may use will ever convince them that we are not going to continue to treat them as an inferior race, until they find that we are allowing Indians to join with us in actual executive work. We ought to give them self-government, as soon as we can and as widely as we can, but we can only do this as they become fit for it. In some directions and in some places they are fit for it now, in others they will very quickly become fit; in those directions and in those places we should give it at once without waiting till those who are not so fit advance. I know something of Bengal and something of Madras; it appears to me that in those two provinces fitness for self-government is not shown in quite the same directions; and I know that both these provinces claim to be less backward than other places are. I welcome your assurance that your Government have no wish to force a stereotyped

policy upon Local Governments; and I trust that Local Governments may be given much discretion, and encouraged to advance, some quickly and some slowly, wherever they can. The advance must vary in pace, and where it is fastest it may perhaps be spasmodic; for in the past we have done little where I think we might more wisely have done much; we have advanced in form, if not in substance, farther along the third of your suggested roads than along the first. This was natural, but it brings its own nemesis. Self-government in bigger things cannot go too far ahead of self-government in small things, and we must pause in our advance at the top till greater progress is secured below. It will then be hard to convince those who think chiefly of the top that any progress is being made at all, and there will be a loud demand for a form of self-government in which the Executive may be subordinate to a Legislative Council of elected Indians. This is an easy thing to ask for; it may seem to be—perhaps it is—the logical outcome of our desire to grant self-government; but it will not be a fortunate outcome if it is granted too soon, or until it can be safe-guarded otherwise than in a way which will render it innocuous by rendering it futile. Such self-government can only delay the time when India will develop into an integral part of the Empire in a sense which will secure for her the respect of other parts of the Empire. But such self-government may be quite compatible with the maintenance of the supremacy of British rule, and may satisfy some interpretations of the words “an integral part”. There is, I think, a real danger of India asking for such self-government; and when we think of how thought moves in England, I fear there is a real danger of such self-government being granted. A self-governing India will only win the respect of the Empire as an integral part of the Empire when the vast majority of Indians have ideals as to Government which the people of the Empire generally respect. Many Indians have such ideals already, but their number is small relatively to the huge population of India, and it may be a long time before it becomes large. *Karma* may in itself have hitherto caused, and for a long time may cause, a lack among educated Indians of ideals such as Englishmen respect. Where religion is such a real force, as it is here, it must take a very long time before any idea which seems contrary to a man’s religion can become truly assimilated by him, even though his reason may accept it. Indians if promised something, which they think desirable, will be loud in their thanks, but they will be louder in their clamour if they see a pause made in the progress towards it. Progress along your second road, the more responsible employment of Indians, may satisfy them for a time, but it must soon slacken in pace. Progress on your first road will be slow, and will not appeal to those who shout most loudly. Progress on your third road may be fast at first, but ought soon to be very slow, and its slowness will seem irksome to those who can most effectively express their feelings.

There are two things which would, I believe, continuously and safely help to develop self-government in India, while making her a really integral part of the Empire, and which therefore in the interests of the whole Empire we ought to give to India. One is widespread elementary education; without this we cannot have an electorate capable of wisely choosing representatives; and without such an electorate any form of self-government, whether in big matters or in small, can only be an oligarchy of the worst type, because it will masquerade as a democracy. To me it seems that elementary education is really the most urgently wanted thing in India; and there is nothing which I regret more than the fact that many members of the present classes of educated Indians, especially of those who take an active part in politics, do not seem to be very keen to secure it quickly for their fellow-countrymen.

The other thing which we ought to give, and can I believe safely give, is an increased share to Indians in the Executive Government of their own country. Good Government is of even more importance than self-government. The chief reason why we value self-government is that it has been shown to be a means to bring about good Government. It is not the only means—it may not be the best means here until the people of India are better educated than they are;—and I have no hesitation in saying we ought to go cautiously in developing it. But no Government is good which does not bring contentment to those who are governed. We are often told that the mass of the people of India are contented, because they can cultivate their own land without being harried by hostile troops, and because when they are almost starved they will be given food, provided they are starving in sufficient numbers. But the present form of Government is not the only form which could secure contentment of this sort; and as far as I can learn, there are no Indians who do not desire a change in the form of Government if a change is once suggested to them. I do not believe Indians will ever be contented as a whole until Indians have a real share in the Executive. They may not be contented then, but till then they will be no more contented than Englishmen in similar circumstances would be; and until they are given share in their own Government we cannot expect British people in the Colonies to have much respect for them, or to look on India as a source of strength to the Empire. I believe we could to some extent safely give them such a share now. Both in Madras and in Bengal there are enough capable, patriotic, truly loyal Indians to make this possible; and I have no reason to suppose that there are not enough in other places also. No increase in the number of Indians employed by Government even in the highest grades, no extension of the franchise, nor multiplication of the number of elected Indians in the Legislative Councils will bring the Government of this country so much into living touch with the feelings of this country, or make co-operation between the rulers and ruled so likely as an increased share taken

by Indians in Executive Government would do. I feel perfectly certain that both when in Madras and while in Bengal, I should have been a more efficient Governor, and a fairer Governor, and could have done more to help to make India an integral part of the Empire in a real sense, if I had had more than one Indian on my Executive Council. I do not complain of the Indian Councillors who have been my colleagues; far from it, they were all three most valuable colleagues—one of them, I think, would have made his mark anywhere. They were all listened to attentively by my official colleagues, who I can truly say gave what seemed to me due weight to their arguments. But however fair-minded a Governor and his colleagues may be, there must needs be a great difference in the outlook of a Civil Service official, who for a long time will usually be an Englishman, and that of an Indian non-official. Even if it were only to give the lie to the general belief that the Civil Service cannot forget their own interests, it would be an advantage to give non-official Indians a stronger position. No one, I think, can pretend that there is not an honest difference between the way in which officials look at some of the questions which most nearly touch the happiness of the people of India, and that in which non-officials look at them. We have but to go to a club and talk with non-official Englishmen, to find that there is much difference between official and non-official ideas even where Englishmen are concerned; how much more must there be a difference in ideas between Indians and those of us who are in Government service. In the field of social legislation where I believe we could do more good to India than in any other, we constantly shrink from attempting to do what we would like to do, because we are ignorant of Indian thought. If we had a stronger Indian element in our Executive, we might be bolder and I believe Indians would welcome our boldness. It is fair to say that Sir Syed Shams-ul-Huda tells me he would not like to see two Indians on the Executive Council of Bengal, because he thinks that, if there were, one would almost always be a Mahomedan and the other a Hindu and he fears these would usually take different sides. Sir Syed however does not think the present system a good one; he would like to remedy it either by taking away one of the official Members and leaving the Governor with an Executive Council of two, one being an Indian non-official and the other an English Civil Servant; or if two be considered too small a number, he would again add a third Member, but would provide that he should be an English non-official. For my part I think the Governor of Bengal ought to have six colleagues on his Executive Council, three of them being Indians and three of them British, one of these latter being always a non-official, but I fear I can hardly hope for this; for it is a change which, so far as I know, has not been suggested until now, and certainly has never been generally asked for; all the same I feel quite certain that it would be a change very much for the better, and probably it has only not been asked for, because those who know anything of the working of the present system from inside are necessarily



very few and have practically no experience of any other method. But I do hope that you will seriously consider the question of adding one other Indian Member to the Council, for I know of few things which I think would be better worth doing. Objections will be put forward to the suggestion. It will be said that it would add to expense; it would do so, but—though no doubt this is a question of opinion, and I can only give my opinion for what it is worth—I believe it would be well worth the expense. It will be said that there is not enough work for four Members of Council; some Civil Servants have told me that the Members of Council have not now got a full day's work. To that I would reply that I feel certain that more leisure in which to think and to discuss with others, is very much needed by the Members of my Council. I say this in no captious spirit; I feel sure it is true. Even if each Executive Councillor had only half the files to attend to which he has at present he would—if he is, as I trust all Members of Council will always be, a good servant of the State—easily find work enough to occupy his time fully, and his files would be all the better seen to. As things are, there is a difference in the amount of work in different places.

I was in Madras before I came to Bengal, I knew less about Indian matters then than I do now. It took me longer to master a given piece of business then than it now does. In Madras, I personally looked into a larger proportion of the files than I have ever done here; yet I know that I have to give a much larger number of minutes to that sort of work here every day than I did in Madras; and I am certain that my colleagues here have not as much time as my colleagues in Madras had, in which to do work which in both provinces is very useful which is not exactly office work. Again it will be said that, if a Governor has an equal number of Indian and of British colleagues, he may often find himself in the disagreeable position of having to decide by his own vote between Indians and his own fellow-countrymen. This presupposes that division of opinion in his Council will often be on racial lines. I do not think there is any need to fear this. There will always be discussion, and neither Indians or Englishmen, such as those who will be chosen as Members of Council, are likely to refuse to listen to argument; if they are, it is obvious that under present conditions the Indian view must constantly be at a disadvantage. I do not believe any Governor will wish to shirk the responsibility of deciding matters which he has heard fairly discussed, but I know that I have sometimes felt that my Indian colleague was too diffident in pressing his views if the other Members of Council strongly opposed them. This, from the Governor's point of view, is not a good thing, and I believe the presence of two Indian Members might go far to avoid it.

It would be necessary to determine how the second Indian Member, if one be determined on, is to be found. Unless it be thought to put too much power into the hands of the Governor, he might, I think, for a time, be selected as

the other Members are at present by the Secretary of State from three names submitted to him with criticisms by the Governor;—that is the procedure which Lord Crewe and Lord Hardinge thought correct, though I know of no definite orders laying it down, but eventually perhaps the selection of names of non-officials, to be submitted to the Secretary of State might, at least in the case of one Indian Member, be entrusted, with advantage, to the non-official Members of the Legislative Council.

I now come to your three roads. The first is in “the domain of Local Self-Government”. The proposals made in your Memorandum A seem to me on right lines. A real effort should be made to introduce local self-government in the towns and in the rural areas: the franchise should, I think, be kept as low as possible and our aim should be to make the members of the local governing bodies as representative as possible. In my opinion the Members should work out their own salvation, power of control being exercised by Government from outside, and not from within by means of official majorities or official presidents. Gazetted officers of Government ought not, I think, to be allowed except under very exceptional circumstances to be members of local governing bodies; but ministerial officers would, I think, often be very useful members, specially in small towns where they bulk largely among the educated population, and I see no reason why they should not continue to be eligible as such, although I hope the majority—in fact, I would say the great majority—of the Councillors may be elected non-officials.

In town areas the proportion of the population sufficiently educated to be able to choose efficient representatives is and will, probably for a long time, be larger than in the rural areas, and the electors will, I fancy, have a fair knowledge of all portions of the town area; there will therefore I hope be a real feeling of responsibility to the people in urban Councils. I would therefore aim at giving to the urban areas as complete self-government as they have at home while retaining power, as in England, to interfere from without. No servants of the Councils ought, I think, to be Members of the Council. If on account of their experience it is considered necessary to give them or any Government officials—such as the Civil Surgeon—a place on the urban Councils, I would give them that place as advisers with a right to speak, but not a right to vote. Even in Calcutta I should follow the same course. I would accept the Bombay principle, but give the board the power to nominate either an official or a non-official as seemed to them best.

In rural boards the case for such a complete measure of self-government is as yet not so strong. The number of electors with enough education to take an intelligent interest in the elections is, I fear, very small. I should make the franchise much lower; this would enlarge the electorate, but under existing circumstances here would not render it any the less intelligent. The “constituencies” ought to be territorial, and here again I should reduce the

unelected and official element to a minimum, and even then I should not give a vote to any official member who is not also an elected member. The President should be a non-official elected by the board, but the Executive should be in the hands of an officer who cannot be removed except with the permission of Government. Mr. Beatson-Bell draws special attention to the conditions of Bengal and asks that the district officer should be retained as an ex-officio President, but he asks this more with a view to enabling the district officer to keep control over his district than from any consideration of local self-government. If local self-government is developed on any lines which make it really *self-government*, the district officer must necessarily lose some of his power, and I admit that consequently his position in the eyes of the people may suffer. It may well be that in Bengal, where the district officer has not so much power as he has in other provinces, conditions are on this very account more favourable to the rapid development of local self-government. It might, I think, be well, and it would certainly be economical, from the point of view of the boards, to retain the district officer as head of the Executive in the first instance. There is a very great lack here of men with the knowledge desirable in the holder of an administrative post of this kind; this will be the greatest obstacle to our success, and it may be a long time before we can overcome it; meanwhile the district officer has opportunities of learning the wants of the district as a whole; he is often just now the only man who can judge of the relative importance of local needs, and his knowledge and advice would be of the greatest value. The only other man likely to have at all a wide knowledge is the district engineer, but his knowledge is generally confined to his civil works department and does not extend to such questions as education and medical relief; he is moreover the chief spending officer of the board and for this reason is, I think, pre-eminently unsuited to be head of the Executive. Much of the influence of the Government over rural boards should be exercised as in England by means of grants-in-aid; the fear of losing a grant is often a powerful incentive to better administration.

It seems to me that the most important thing in connection with Local Government, in Bengal at any rate, is to secure real self-government for the villages. Perhaps, therefore, you will forgive me if I dwell on this at some length.

Until recently little advantage was taken of the provisions of Act III of 1885, which authorise the establishment of union committees; but for this the system of self-government introduced by that Act is largely responsible. Its main features are that the district board is the administrative unit, and that other local bodies, namely, local boards and union committees, are subordinate to it, and are mainly dependent on it for grants to enable them to carry out the limited duties entrusted to them. Such

a system of local self-government was not contemplated by the framers of the Bill which eventually became Act III of 1885. Their intention was that union committees should form the basis of local self-government. The committees were to be elected by the villagers themselves by such simple processes as might be familiar to them. They were to be entrusted with the management and control of primary schools and pounds in the union and were to be responsible for the roads, tanks, drains and general sanitation of the union. The local boards were to have the general control of the union committees and were to be entrusted with the powers and duties now exercised by district boards. In their turn they were to be under the control of a central board in Calcutta. The Secretary of State however objected to this system. He opposed the idea of a central board ; and desired that most of the powers to be conferred on the central board should be vested in district committees presided over by the district officer, who, he insisted, should be more closely connected with the system of local self-government. The Lieutenant-Governor who was convinced that the sub-division should be the largest unit for local self-government, protested, but his protests were not heeded. The Bill was accordingly recast, and eventually became law in its present form. Under it the local boards are merely the agents of the district boards with restricted powers, while the union committees are, as the District Administration Committee point out, "optional appendages of the superior bodies, having more limited powers of raising funds by local taxation, and then only for specific purposes".

I should add that in 1883-84 the Government of Bengal was so convinced of the need of building up local self-government from the bottom that they deputed a special officer to create a net work of unions which could come into operation as soon as the Bill was passed. Within a year this officer formed no less than 150 unions, to which committees had been appointed by means of informal elections ; but after the passing of the Self-Government Act attention was mainly directed to the district boards and local boards, and these committees disappeared.

The limited powers which the union committees could exercise under the Act, the absence of permissive powers of self-taxation and the resultant fact that they were dependent on grants from the district boards, were all factors which helped to render the union committees of little use for the purposes of village self-government and prevented any considerable extension of the system. It was not till 1908 that the committees were given (by Act V of that year) wider powers in regard to water-supply, drainage and conservancy, and were allowed to levy taxes in order to defray the expenditure involved in the exercise of those wider powers if the cost of the works carried out by them could not be met from their ordinary income. This Act, moreover, applied only to West Bengal and was not extended to the districts of Eastern and Northern Bengal till 1914, two years after I came here as Governor.

Since 1914 considerable advance has been made. The number of union committees in 1913-14 was only 66, but 11 more were added in 1914-15, while 82 new union committees were established in 1915-16. More have already been started this year and proposals for the establishment of 69 more are now before Government. Since the Public Works cess has been surrendered to the district boards, they cannot plead poverty as a difficulty in the way of financing union committees and the number of those committees should grow steadily.

We now propose to introduce a Village Self-Government Act in order to give effect to the proposals of the District Administration Committee. A Bill has been drafted, and will be considered by conferences of Collectors in September and by the Commissioners' conference in October. If the Bill passes into law, village committees will be constituted for separate villages or groups of villages. They will perform the duties of *chowkidari panchayats* and also of union committees. They will also exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction in petty matters, their orders or decrees being final and subject neither to appeal nor revision, while legal practitioners will not be permitted to appear before them. The definite object of this Bill is to develop a village organisation, to foster among the villagers a real and practical interest in local affairs and to give them wider powers and fuller responsibility. To quote the words of the District Administration Committee—"Our special desire is to secure the performance of those functions essential to village municipal life by a representative village body."

On one point which perhaps some people may not think of great importance, I hope you agree with me. I think business might with advantage be transacted in the smaller local bodies at any rate in the vernacular.

The second road of advance is in "the domain of more responsible employment of Indians under the Government". I am extremely glad to hear that the Public Services Commission's report is to be made public before long. Many service questions have been put aside in the Secretariat for consideration when the findings of the Commission shall be known. This causes much discontent which I now hope we may soon be able to remove. From my short experience I should say that the attempt made by the old Public Services Commission to Indianise the Civil Service has been a complete failure. The original idea was, I believe, to fill up a certain percentage of posts in each grade by Indians chosen in India; it was hoped that these Indians if brought up alongside the officers of the Civil Service, and given the same work to do, would become imbued as far as possible with all that is good in Civil Service traditions. But there was, to my mind, an initial mistake. For reasons, which seemed good no doubt, the pay of the Indian officer was fixed at two-thirds of that of the British officer. Status in this country goes by pay to a very great extent, and the mere fact that an officer's pay is on a lower grade

at once stamps him as inferior. Moreover, the posts intended for Assistant and Joint Magistrates were amalgamated with the higher grades of the Provincial Service; in consequence of this no officers were ever trained as Assistant and Joint Magistrates, and appointment to the higher grades came to be regarded as a reward for senior Deputy Magistrates who have done good work. This ruined any prospect of success the scheme may have had. "Listed" posts are usually held by men nearing the end of their service, who have spent their lives in a subordinate position, who have never been trained in responsibility or initiative, and who after 20 to 25 years of subordinate service are promoted to be district officers. These men often prove incapable of doing with real efficiency the duties which ought to be required of them. The fault, I believe, does not lie in the Indian character, it lies in the training. I have met—both in this Presidency and in Madras—Indians who are discharging their duties quite as they ought, but these are men who, at a comparatively early period in their service, have had opportunities of developing initiative and independence.

There is another thing which prejudicially affects the character of the Indians, whom Government recruits for its "Provincial Services" at any rate in Bengal. They are as a rule appointed by direct nomination. I am constantly asked to appoint young men, and am as constantly told that I need only to say the word and the applicant's future will be secured! Take the case of the Provincial Executive Service: each year a certain number of men are appointed; a notification of the number to be appointed is issued; the Collector in each district chooses two candidates, and sends their names in to the Commissioner; the Commissioner chooses two out of the ten or twelve men thus recommended to him, and submits their names to Government; and of these Government usually takes one, or very occasionally both. The University is asked to nominate two or more men amongst whom Government also makes a choice: and in addition a few places are reserved to which Government appoints its own nominees. This system causes great disappointment to those who are nominated, but not appointed. It makes at least 50 *bhadralog* families discontented every year; and this is I think much to be regretted. The system entails the loss of several years of work at the very time of a young man's life when he can least afford to waste time,—after he has left College, at about the age of 20 and before he reaches 25, the maximum age, as fixed by Government, at which he may enter Government service. During this period or during a considerable part of it the young man and his relations busy themselves in calling on every one who they think may have influence, however remote, with Government. I cannot speak with long personal experience, but on general principles I doubt whether such a system can result in the choice of the best men. The whole system seems to me to militate against independence of character. However careful Government is in making its choice, the Indian public, and the European public also, believe that appointments can only be obtained by favour, and that the candidate who has

the most influential backers gets the appointment. Another serious aspect of the question is this :—Indians often tell me that they believe that men chosen in this way cannot be independent Magistrates or Revenue Officers, because they owe their appointment to the favour of Government. Indians do not expect these officers to be entirely unbiased when Government's interests are concerned; nor do they expect them to decide criminal cases otherwise than as they think Government would like them decided. This may be an exaggerated view and it is looked on by most members of the Civil Service as a libel against a worthy class of officers, but it is the view held by many Indians of good position—including Sir Syed Shams-ul-Huda—and I believe myself there is something in it.

This subject is perhaps away from the question of appointing Indians to more responsible offices, but I certainly think it is one well worth your consideration.

I now come to the third road that is "the domain of the Legislative Councils, Provincial and Imperial". My colleagues as well as I myself prefer your Memorandum marked C on this matter to that marked B.

As I have already hinted, I think we ought not at present, nor perhaps for a long time, to give to the Councils full and direct control over the Executive; until the mass of the people of India are much better educated than they are, it would be madness to do this, unless indeed we are prepared to restrict the franchise so narrowly as to do away with the idea of self-government in the sense which your colleagues and you yourself attach to it. It may take many years to educate the mass of the population, and during these years Indians may find that their political evolution does not develop on the lines which have led to the present British ideal of Government. Our ideal has, as you point out, been gradually evolved. In India some form of self-government may be evolved on quite different lines which may suit Indian conditions better. I sympathise with the suggestion made in paragraph 6 of Memorandum C. to give the Local Legislative Councils, through a committee of each, a larger share than they now have in the preparation of the Budget; but beyond this I do not think we should go at present in giving them control over the Executive. We should give them more freedom in asking questions and in moving resolutions, so that Members of the Councils may be in a better position to learn what their Governments are doing and to let the Governments know what the Councils feel; and I think we might with advantage encourage individual non-official Members to initiate legislation in the provincial Councils. This would not only give the non-official Members a sense of more power to right their own wrongs, but would also compel them to work out the details of their own schemes instead of airily asking for things which it is quite impossible to grant, at least in the form which they profess to desire. We should aim at making Councils more representative of the different classes and

interests in the country, and at widening the basis of the franchise. To do this efficiently in Bengal an increase in the number of Councillors is, I think, absolutely necessary. I have none of the fears expressed in the Memorandum marked "B" as to what might result from an increase in numbers; indeed I think there is far more risk of harm to Government when the possible majority against it is narrow than when it is large. Experience shows that, if a party is to make a good show in the division lobby better whipping is needed when its normal majority is big than when it is small, and it will be a long time before we have good whipping here. Besides if the non-official element in Council is increased, individual Members will show greater independence, and will be less tempted to combine against Government than they are now. It is true that there are some kinds of legislation which Government might not be able to carry through the present Bengal Legislative Council; but a wider representation of interest would considerably strengthen Government's position in cases of this kind, for it would tend to make opposition more reasonable, and would lessen the feeling of irritation always ready to burst out in any deliberative assembly where the majority on either side, under normal circumstances, is narrow. I agree with Lord Hardinge in thinking that in every Provincial Council there should be a majority of elected representatives; but I do not think it necessary to lay stress on this, or on his further desire that the majority should be one representing constituencies in which most of the voters are Indians, for I cannot conceive of any Council which would be of use in Bengal in which these two conditions would not be automatically secured. I would give the Governor the right of enforcing a penal dissolution if he thought that his Council was wrongfully opposing legislation brought forward by Government; but I would not give the Governor the right of a partial veto. Whenever a partial veto was exercised, Government would almost certainly be accused of having allowed a Bill to pass without adequate resistance to the sections which they disliked, relying on the power of the Government to veto those sections, and there might in fact be a real danger of this happening.

I agree that the present electoral system should be recast, and that much of the representation should be on a territorial basis; this would in itself imply an increase in the number of the constituencies; and I think we ought to lower the franchise, as far as the present state of education would allow us to do safely. The consideration of details in each case would require much care, but there is no need to enter into this now.

It seems to me we should consider whether in a country, like Bengal, which is rapidly developing, it would not be a sound policy to arrange for the revision of the composition of the Council at stated intervals.

The general features of a scheme such as is proposed in Memorandum B are—

*First*—That the Council must be enlarged to its statutory maximum and all seats which may lawfully be held by officials should be retained as such. In



Bengal our Council has all along been of its full strength, but the official seats instead of being 16, the full number allowed, are now only 12. We could make them 16, if no other consideration came in the way, but to do so is impossible if we are to carry out the other ideas put forward in this Memorandum, and would in any case, I feel sure be a political mistake.

*Secondly.*—To transfer to election any nominated non-official seats which it is possible to transfer suitably. There are at present two seats to which nominations are still made, because we have not yet been able to create satisfactory constituencies to elect for them. These are the only seats which fall under this category; and if its other suggestions are to be adopted, we cannot treat these as suggested in the Memorandum.

*Thirdly.*—To keep a few official seats unfilled, or fill them up temporarily by non-officials as an experiment. This we obviously cannot do, for we require all the available seats we have for officials.

Mahomedan representation is to be secured by providing as many Mahomedan seats as the numerical strength of the community justifies and adding them to the urban and landholding constituencies.

The Bengal Council is at present constituted as follows :—

Elected by Landholders	...	...	...	...	5
Elected by District and Local Boards	...	...	...	...	5
Elected by Municipal Commissioners	...	...	...	...	5
Elected by Mahomedan special electorates	...	...	...	...	5
Elected by Calcutta Corporation	...	...	...	...	2
Elected by University	...	...	...	...	1
Elected by Bengal Chamber of Commerce	...	...	...	...	2
Elected by Trades' Association	...	...	...	...	1
Elected by Chittagong Port Commissioners	...	...	...	...	1
Elected by Tea-planting community	...	...	...	...	1
				* Nominated representative of the European commercial community outside Calcutta.	1
				* Nominated representative of the Indian commercial community.	1
				TOTAL	30
Nominated non-officials	...	...	...	...	6
Nominated officials	...	...	...	...	12
Governor in Council	...	...	...	...	4
				GRAND TOTAL	52

Under the scheme in Memorandum B the five seats allotted to district boards and the five seats allotted to special Mahomedan constituencies would disappear. The number of Mahomedan seats to be added to the urban and

landholding constituencies, if fixed in due relation to the numerical strength of the community, is 16; we must therefore find six seats which we can convert into Mahomedan seats. We may do this in one of three ways. We may reduce the non-Mahomedan element of urban and landholding constituencies, or abolish some of the present special constituencies, or convert some nominated non-official seats into Mahomedan elected seats. If there are 16 Mahomedan constituencies representing land and urban interests, it would clearly be unfair to give fewer than 14 seats to non-Mahomedan interests of the same kind; consequently 30 elected seats have to be given to land and urban interests. After allowing 16 seats for officials and four seats for the Governor and Members of his Executive Council, we shall only have two seats left for special interests and for nominated non-officials. I do not think we can reasonably be expected to disfranchise the University, the Trades' Association or the Tea-planting community, nor the Chamber of Commerce altogether; unless, therefore, we reduce the number of our officials, we cannot carry out this scheme. The nearest approach which I can think of to a Council on the lines laid down in Memorandum B and which is at all possible would I believe be a Council formed thus:—

Landholders, of these 8 would be Mahomedans	...	...	15
Municipalities, including Calcutta, 8 being Mahomedans	...	...	15
University	...	...	1
Chamber of Commerce	...	...	1
Trades' Association	...	...	1
Tea-planting community	...	...	1
Nominated officials	...	...	14
Governor in Council	...	...	4
<hr/>			
TOTAL			52
<hr/>			

This would entirely disfranchise the Chittagong Port Commissioners and the European commercial community outside of Calcutta and Chittagong, besides taking away half the representation now enjoyed by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce; and even thus we should only provide 14 seats for officials, two less than the maximum number allowed at present.

eight votes are secured to Mahomedans if ever their essential interests should be at stake. It may, especially if the franchise be lowered, probably not be very many years before Mahomedans will secure a large proportion of the territorial seats for themselves. Even now they could by weight of numbers win nearly all these seats. I do not think they are ever likely to win all, nor, for a long time at any rate, to win an overwhelmingly large proportion of them. In the first place, in nine districts in Western Bengal the majority of the population is Hindu and no electorate formed in these districts is likely to return a Mahomedan Member. This is the case too in Darjeeling District. Nor is it by any means certain that a majority of the other electoral units would, with an enlarged franchise, return Mahomedans; it is even conceivable that all of them might return Hindus for the bulk of the Mahomedans are under the influence of a Hindu either as their landlord or as their *mahajan*. This may bring about a change, but meanwhile we must guard against a possible squeezing out of Mahomedans and some day it may be necessary to guard against a possible squeezing out of Hindus. I think we might do this by forming territorial constituencies where candidates may belong to any faith and may be voted for by electors belonging to any faith. My colleagues do not agree with me in this; they think that Mahomedans should only be allowed to vote for Mahomedans and Hindus for Hindus. This seems to me so contrary to the political principles which I hold that I shrink from supporting it. Many Indians, though not by any means all, agree with my colleagues; those who do, for the most part, think that by leading to peace between communities it will strengthen Indians as against people in any dispute. The matter is an important one, and I do not wish to dogmatise; I merely give my opinion for what it is worth. If my view is not taken, we must have a larger Council, that is all. I would make 28 territorial constituencies, the number which I suggest as necessary in a Council based on your Memorandum C without modification. These might return Mahomedans or Hindus in any proportion according as the electors chose to vote. But I should also make it the Governor's duty to nominate eight other Indian gentlemen who seem to him suitable representatives of constituencies of this kind, and he should be instructed to use those nominations in such a way as to secure that there should never be fewer than eight Mahomedans and eight Hindus among the representatives of these constituencies. It would probably never be necessary for the Governor to use all these nominations in securing this minimum number of seats for each community, and he might use those not required for this in giving weight to any *mofussal* interest which seemed to him to deserve it; in practice I think he would be wise to select for nomination those among unsuccessful candidates who by securing a large number of votes showed that they command popular respect.

I should provide the same representation for city interests, as I have suggested while discussing Memorandum C.

As representing special electorates, I would propose to give—

Two seats to Universities on the enlarged franchise suggested in your Memoranda; one of these to be given to Calcutta and the other to be reserved and given to Dacca when the University there has been constructed	...	...	...	...	2
Two seats to Indian commerce, which it seems to me has interests not always quite the same as those of ordinary urban electors	...	...	...	...	2
Two seats to the planting community, one being given to Darjeeling planters, and the other to those in the Duars. The interests of these two bodies are often not identical, and both ought to be represented	...	...	...	...	2
Four seats to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. This number will no doubt be said by the merchants to be small in proportion to that assigned to other interests, but it is double what the Chamber has at present and the members of the Chamber are well able to bring influence to bear on other constituencies	...	...	...	...	4
One seat to the Trades' Association as at present	...	...	...	...	1
Two seats to a new European constituency to be formed from the large number of Europeans, such as professional men, clerks, mill foremen, engineers and the like who are not otherwise directly represented. I should suggest that the franchise in this constituency should be based on the payment of income-tax on Rs. 250 a month or over; this would give a constituency of about 5,000 voters, all of whom would be of the class styled "Sahibs" by Indians and have quite a substantial interest in the country	...	...	...	...	2
Total representatives of special electorates					13

I think 12 officials might be given seats by nomination; and I think that four other seats might be filled up by nomination, in order to give the Governor power to secure representation for any special class or creed, as for instance for the Indian Christians or for the Namasudras or for any big noblemen—like Burdwan or Murshidabad—who for some time to come will refuse to stand for election, or for some special interest such as railways or river steamers which may well deserve representation and yet for some reason or other may not be able to get it otherwise than by nomination.

The Council which I suggest would be composed thus—

I.—General constituencies—

District units, one member each	...	...	28
City Calcutta (5 general wards and 3 special Mahomedans)	...	...	8
City Dacca (1 Mahomedan and 1 non-Mahomedan)	...	...	2
City Howrah	...	...	1

Total General constituencies			...	39
II.—Special constituencies—				
University (Calcutta and Dacca separately)	...		...	2
Indian commerce	...	...	...	2
Planting community	...	...	...	2
Chamber of Commerce	...	...	...	4
Trades' Association	...	...	...	1
General European community	...	...	...	2
				—13
III.—Nominated Indians to secure proper proportionate representation of different Indian communities or interests				
	...	...	...	8
IV.—Nominated non-officials of any race				
	...	...	...	4
Making the total number of non-officials				—64
V.—Nominated officials				
	...	...	...	12
VI.—Governor in Council				
	...	...	...	4
				—16
Total number in Council				80

A Council on these lines would represent, I think, all interests as fairly as any which we could form unless we make one which is very much larger. The so-called "Intelligenzia" might no doubt object to it on two grounds—(a) that it would put power into the hands of any individual or group of individuals who could gain ascendancy over the cultivating classes who would form the bulk of the electors in the district constituencies, or over the poorer electors in the cities; and (b) that European interests are too largely represented. Until Indians are much more widely educated than they can for some time be, it will be impossible to formulate any scheme which is entirely free from the first objection. The other objection is one which Indians would probably look on as theoretical rather than real. Nine non-official Europeans with the possible addition of four more nominated by the Governor, is not a real menace to fair treatment, for even if all of them were of the most anti-Indian type and should happen to find an occasion on which to support a Government blindly determined to oppose Indian feeling, a body of 25 or even of 29 would surely not be able to carry its way in a house of 80 Members unless a good deal in its policy attracted Members away from the Indian majority. Europeans would also I have no doubt complain that they were not given sufficient representation; but as their proportion at present which, including two nominated non-officials, is 7 out of 52 is not quite so large as that which I propose to give them—9 elected Members in a Council of 80 with a possible further addition by nomination of 4 more—I do think we need not trouble about this.

CARMICHAEL.

## MEMORANDUM BY THE HON'BLE MR. P. C. LYON, C. S. I.

As I understand that His Excellency the Governor proposes to file with this note the draft letter to the Government of India which I have submitted for his consideration on the general subject of the political situation in Bengal, I have made some references to that draft in the paragraphs below.

I venture to suggest that the draft letter follows the same train of thought as that which appears in the papers sent down from Simla, although the draft was written before I had been privileged to see any of the papers written in Simla, either in the time of His Excellency Lord Hardinge or since Lord Hardinge left. In that draft I propose that a declaration should be made as to the goal to which the policy of the British Government in India is directed, and I have then gone on to suggest three main lines upon which we must proceed in our gradual progress towards that goal, which correspond closely with the three "roads" specified in Lord Chelmsford's letter. The three main lines indicated in my draft are—

- (1) The nationalisation of the *personnel* of the administration in India;
- (2) the gradual devolution of power from bureaucratic to democratic institutions; and
- (3) the education of the people for self-government in India. I have suggested that, although these three lines of policy must overlap in some respects, they are fairly definite and distinct.

I regret very much that the definition given in the Viceroy's letter of the goal to which we look forward does not indicate a sufficient realisation of the importance or the strength of the spirit of nationalisation (or aspirations for political freedom, or whatever this new spirit may be called) which has long been prevalent in Bengal, and which has extended and increased in force enormously during the progress of the war. It appears to me that the limitation of future self-government to such as is "compatible with the maintenance of the supremacy of British rule", and such phrases as "the special circumstance of India", which "differ so widely from those of any other part of the British Empire", will be looked upon with considerable suspicion, will be misinterpreted by the advocates of reforms among Indians, and may, in fact, be interpreted in a very conservative and restrictive fashion. And while putting aside the model given us in the self-government of the dominions, there is no clear indication that the eventual form of self-government which we contemplate will contain such elements of national freedom as will suffice to constitute India a partner in the Empire rather than one of its dependants. With all deference I venture to urge that, if we are to make a declaration of policy which will strengthen the moderate party among the reformers and avoid the danger of driving the vast number of those who now hesitate between moderate and sane progress and extreme measures somewhat akin to revolution into the

ranks of the revolutionaries, we should go further in the direction which I have indicated in my draft. I do not think that such a spirit as that to which I refer, when once it has been awakened in a country which is subject to the rule of a foreign nation, can ever be exorcised. Nor do I think that we shall ever be allowed by England to attempt to exorcise it. We have hitherto ruled India with the consent and good-will of its peoples, and it seems very doubtful if we can hold India in any other way. And I believe it to be inevitable that, if we attempt to base our rule in India upon the coercion of all who aim at ultimate freedom within the Empire, we shall fail.

The Memorandum attached to the Viceroy's letter which deals with the development of local self-government refers at length to the recommendations of the Decentralisation Commission on the subject. I venture to record my entire acquiescence in the principles laid down in the first and second paragraphs, though I do not feel quite sure that the Decentralisation Commission based their proposals entirely upon such principles. The detailed suggestions made in the Memorandum require very careful consideration, and it would be useless for me at present to attempt to express definite opinions on all the matters which have been dealt with. We have only recently discussed in Council the question of the appointment of non-official Chairmen of district boards, and a draft bill on the subject of *panchayats*, unions and circles is now on our anvil.

I agree to the proposals made in the fourth paragraph as to elections and the representation of minorities by some form of communal or proportional election rather than by nomination. I would venture to suggest, with reference to the paragraphs immediately following, that it may prove undesirable to make the appointment of a new and expensive official as special executive officer a necessary condition before rural boards can be permitted to elect their own Chairmen. I am not certain that much of the work of this officer could not be performed by the District Engineer, the Board's Deputy Inspector of Schools, or such other subordinate officials, and, if this is the case, the extra officer proposed might prove in some cases an unnecessary extravagance. But I would like to have time for further consideration of the proposal.

The limitation of the financial powers of indebted municipalities suggested in paragraph 9 should not, I think, be confined to cases in which those municipalities are indebted to Government, but should be extended also to cases in which they are involved in other financial liabilities.

As to paragraph 11, we should perhaps take into consideration the frequent cases in which Government pays part, and not the whole, of the cost of municipal service.

The second road for advance is the employment of Indians in the service of Government. I have not yet had the advantage of seeing the report of the Public Services Commission, but I find myself in complete agreement with the

definition of the policy to be followed in this respect which is given in His Excellency the Viceroy's letter. It suggests that we may have reason to advance beyond the recommendations made by the Public Services Commission, and the principles laid down appear to provide for a large measure of progress. Lord Morley once informed me that Lord Cromer's policy in Egypt was similar to that indicated in sub-paragraph (c) of the Viceroy's letter. Lord Cromer invariably preferred to select a native of the country, rather than a foreigner, to perform a public duty, if he was competent to perform it, even at the expense of some degree of efficiency.

As to the third road, the reform of our Legislative Councils, two Memoranda are attached to the Viceroy's letter, marked respectively B and C.

It appears to me that the Memorandum marked C is undoubtedly the one which should be accepted as indicating generally the lines upon which our reforms in the matter of Legislative Councils should proceed. The other Memorandum starts with a special reference to the antiquated model upon which Legislative Councils are still framed, *i. e.*, as assemblies of additional Members summoned to the aid of the President to assist him in making Laws and Regulations. Such a constitution has become an anachronism in India, and we ourselves have declared it to be so by giving to these assemblies the power of interrogating Government and of passing resolutions affecting the executive business of the administration. I venture also to add that in these circumstances it appears to me that it will be a mistake to include the Council Chamber of the Imperial Legislative Council as a part of the residence of the Viceroy at Delhi. There is still a vast difference between a Legislative Council in India, even when constituted on a reformed and extended plan, and anything that could be called a Parliament, but there would be a little scope for reform in a Council which remained merely an assembly of gentlemen called together to assist the head of the province in making laws. It appears to me that the line of argument adopted in the earlier paragraphs of this Memorandum is fatal to any real political advance, in that it does not admit the possibility of our trusting the people sufficiently to grant them practical responsibilities in the matter of self-government. And the scheme which is based upon the principles enunciated in these earlier paragraphs is consequently limited to small modifications, which, although they are many of them useful in themselves, do not constitute a sufficient advance in the direction in which we must now proceed.

The Memorandum marked C commences with a preamble which indicates the reasons which call for a very considerable advance in our method of dealing with Legislative Councils, especially those of the provinces. These reasons are, I think, practically the same as those which have been adopted by me as the basis of the draft which is attached to this Memorandum, although I have, perhaps, ventured to emphasise more strongly the quickening of national life in India which has been effected by the present war.



While it is suggested in the earlier paragraphs of this Memorandum that we should not enlarge the powers of these Councils at present, a proposal is made in its sixth paragraph to give it some additional financial powers which are, I think, of considerable importance and will be greatly appreciated by all who are interested in the development of these Councils.

In paragraph 4 of the Memorandum marked C an extension of the power of veto is suggested which would enable the head of the province to exclude objectionable provisions from a bill when finally sanctioning its enactment. I am somewhat doubtful as to this proposal, as it would practically effect a reduction in the existing powers of our Councils. It would enable the head of the Government to secure all he wanted by a bill, and to pass it in the form in which the Government had introduced it, in spite of all opposition in Council. The President cannot at present exercise this veto without losing the benefit of all the provisions of a bill of which he approves, and this undoubtedly protects the party which may oppose Government on any subject from the use of the power of veto merely to defeat the introduction of amendments of which the majority in the Council have approved, but which the Government are unwilling to accept. I would suggest that the proposal required some further consideration. It could not well be adopted unless very radical changes are made in the constitution of the Councils, which would justify the assumption of this extra power as a *quid pro quo*; but I am not entirely satisfied at present that the change is not open to criticism.

I would accept in its general outlines the scheme proposed in this Memorandum for the modification of the electorates which are to return Members to the Provincial Councils. I am inclined to think that it goes somewhat far in suggesting 3,000 as the minimum number of electors to form any constituency. We have recently had many complaints of wholesale bribery in smaller electorates than these, and bribery would likely to increase rather than to diminish as we extended the franchise to less educated classes.

I am also inclined to the view that we should not adopt the change from class representation to territorial representation to the total exclusion of the former system, and that, for a time, at any rate, it is desirable to provide separate constituencies, with a more limited franchise, in order to secure for our Council representatives of the greater Zamindars, who have a considerable stake in the country and who are likely to be valuable Members of Council. It would not be possible to induce some of the best of those to stand as candidates in the general constituencies proposed.

In the matter of the special seats for Mahomedans, also, I do not think that the proposal made in paragraph 15 would work satisfactorily in Bengal. The position in this Presidency is that, while the Mahomedans form a majority of the population, numbering roughly 24 millions to 21 millions of others, they are, and must remain for a long time, in a minority in most of the

general electorates which could be formed in the province, whether the basis of such electorates be landed property, or the payment of income-tax, or educational qualifications. On the other hand, the adoption of territorial representation will assist the Mahomedans to obtain some representation from general electorates which they are unable to secure in the present circumstances.

The general proposals contained in paragraph 12, as to the extension of the franchise to Government pensioners and title-holders, appear to me to be sound, but I am not quite sure that I understand fully the educational qualification proposed in this paragraph and whether it is to be a qualification for a vote in itself, irrespective of other considerations.

Accepting generally the principles laid down in this note, with a few such qualifications as I have ventured to suggest, I will indicate as briefly as possible what I think might be taken as a suitable constitution for a new and reformed Council in Bengal. It will be essential, I think, in the first place, to secure the enlargement of the Council from 48 to 60, exclusive of the two expert Members, the President and the three other Members of the Executive Council. The grand total will thus amount to 66 in place of 54. This extension appears to me to be necessary if we are to give full play to the territorial system and are to secure a proper share of representation to other interests.

Taking the number of Members to be returned by general electorates as 35 or  $7/12$ ths of the whole, excluding the expert Members, we are left with 25 for officials, other nominated Members, and certain elected Members who stand outside this proportion of  $7/12$ ths. I would divide these 25 up as follows :—

Officials	...	...	...	...	15
Nominated Members	...	...	...	...	3
Bengal Chamber of Commerce		...	...	...	2
'Trades' Association	...	...	...	...	1
Chittagong Port	...	...	...	...	1
Tea-planters	...	...	...	...	1
Indian Commerce	...	...	...	...	1
Calcutta University	...	...	...	...	1

It would be understood that the Governor would not be bound to appoint 15 officials, but with the enlargement of the Council it might be desirable for him to do so.

For the 35 Members to be elected by general constituencies I would make the following provisions. I would allot 5 seats to landed proprietors—one for each Commissioner's Division—who would be elected on a somewhat limited franchise, based upon the payment of revenue or cess. I would also allot 6 seats to the Mahomedans, one for each division and one to be elected by Mahomedan graduates of the University. The elections in the divisions might

be by the Mahomedans voting in the territorial electorates, but I would certainly not prevent those Mahomedans voting also in the territorial electorates, though graduates would not vote in the general electorate of the University if the Mahomedan graduates elected a separate Member. I do not think that a system of separating the Mahomedans off from the Hindus in the territorial electorates would be desirable. In some cases they may possibly elect Mahomedan representatives for their particular territorial divisions, and these separate Mahomedan Members are only intended to supplement the inadequate number of Mahomedans who will obtain representation in the ordinary electorates. I do not think that the plan proposed in the Memorandum would work in Bengal. It would mean the election of 18 Mahomedans as against 17 others, in the 35 seats thrown open to general electorates, and this would, in practice, be an unfair proportion of Mahomedans to elect by special means. Moreover, it seems to me that the division of the whole country up into separate Hindu and Mahomedan electorates would be a retrograde measure and would be undesirable for other reasons. Out of the 24 seats left, I would reserve three seats for the Calcutta Corporation, the town of Dacca and the town of Howrah. This will leave us with 21 seats for the general constituencies, which could be distributed on a territorial basis as follows :—

					TOTAL.
<i>Presidency Division—</i>					
The 24 Parganas	...	...	1	}	... 4
Nadia	...	...	1		
Murshidabad	...	...	1		
Jessore and Khulna	...	...	1		
<i>Dacca Division—</i>					
Dacca	...	...	1	}	... 5
Bakarganj	...	...	1		
Faridpur	...	...	1		
Mymensingh	...	...	2		
<i>Burdwan Division—</i>					
Burdwan	...	...	1	}	... 5
Midnapore	...	...	2		
Bankura and Birbhum	...	...	1		
Hughli and Howrah	...	...	1		
<i>Rajshahi Division—</i>					
Rangpur	...	...	1	}	... 5
Rajshahi and Malda	...	...	1		
Pabna and Bogra	...	...	1		
Dinajpur	...	...	1		
Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling	...	...	1		

*Chittagong Division—*

Chittagong, the Chittagong Hill Tracts	1	}	...	2
and Noakhali.				
Tippera	...	1		

The Council as finally constituted would stand thus—

President	...	...	1
Three Members of the Executive Council			3
Experts	...	...	2
Nominated officials	...	...	15
Nominated non-officials	...	...	3
Bengal Chamber of Commerce		...	2
Trades' Association	...	...	1
Chittagong Port	...	...	1
Tea-planters	...	...	1
Indian Commerce	...	...	1
Calcutta University	...	...	1
Landed proprietors	...	...	5
Special Mahomedan seats	...	...	6
Calcutta Corporation	...	...	1
The town of Howrah	...	...	1
The town of Dacca	...	...	1
Territorial constituencies	...	...	21
—			
GRAND TOTAL		...	66
—			

Should legislation be introduced in Parliament to amend the existing Statute on this subject, I would suggest that the maximum number for the Bengal Council should not be less than 75, exclusive of the *ex-officio* Members, as it may prove necessary, before long, to provide for the representation of other interests on it.

Dacca; }  
*The 15th August 1916.*

P. C. LYON.

[CONFIDENTIAL.]

DRAFT ONLY—"Not to issue".

TO THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,

HOME (POLITICAL) DEPARTMENT

*Dated Darjeeling, the June 1916.*

SIR,

I am directed to revert to your letter No. 1519, dated the 6th May 1916, in which the Government of India refer to the subject of the present political situation in Bengal. The question of the submission of a further report to the Government of India on this subject had already been taken up for consideration by this Government before the receipt of your letter and was being dealt with on the general lines which are now indicated in that communication.

2. The Government of India have asked for a full report as to the political situation since the outbreak of the war, with a review of the nature of the action taken under the relevant special legislation which has been the result of the war. They also enquire whether anything further is needed during the currency of the war to strengthen the resources of the Local Government in restoring law and order, and also what, if any, special legislation is desired in substitution for the existing special war legislation when the currency of the latter expires. These subjects have already been dealt with in my communication No. , dated , and the Governor in Council will proceed in this letter to the discussion of the third and last subject dealt with in your letter. This is defined in paragraph 3 (III) of your letter as follows :—

"Apart from actual control over individual suspects, on what remedial lines does the Governor in Council propose to proceed, either during or at the end of the war, in modifying the conditions which have given rise to the present regrettable state of affairs in Bengal, or in checking the influences which have induced it? In this connection the recommendations of the District Administration Committee, and especially those relating to the educational problem and to industrial development, will doubtless receive particular attention."

3. In dealing with this very important question, while the Governor in Council must naturally confine his remarks to the circumstances of the Presidency of Bengal, he does not think that it would be consistent with his duty to refrain from discussing matters which are of all-India importance and which will affect other provinces as well as Bengal. He believes that the

essential features of the problem to be dealt with in Bengal closely resemble those to be found in other parts of India, except, perhaps, in some of the more backward provinces, and, in any case, the situation in Bengal will be in his opinion so profoundly affected by the decision come to in these matters that it appears to him to be impossible to deal adequately with that situation without treating of them in this communication.

4. While the suggestions made in the paragraph which has been quoted above from the Government of India's letter refer more particularly to detailed matters of administration, and whereas the previous communications made by this Government (which have also been referred to above) deal almost solely with matters of law and order and police administration, the Governor in Council is of opinion that the whole position is really dominated by the extent and strength of nationalist feeling in this country, and that, while every effort must be made to keep the peace and to check the lawlessness to which this feeling has at times given some encouragement, it is impossible to determine the general policy to be pursued in the regulation of public affairs in India without taking it very definitely into account. The Government of India are aware that political opinion in Bengal has always been somewhat in advance of that which was apparent in other parts of India, partly owing to the quickness of the Bengalis as a nation to seize upon the salient facts of history and political movements in the West, and to that faculty having been sharpened by the spread of higher education and a knowledge of English among the dominant Hindu castes and classes. It was inevitable, therefore, that a spirit of nationalism should have begun to make itself felt among these classes in Bengal many years back. This spirit was fomented by the annual meetings of the Indian National Congress, and it spread still further in Bengal as a result of the violent agitation which was started among the educated classes at the time of, and immediately after, the original partition of Bengal in 1905. The reforms which were shortly after this introduced during the Viceroyalty of Lord Minto—while they implied an acknowledgment of the existence of this strong feeling and were accepted by many of the more reasonable among the leaders of public opinion as showing that the Government were in earnest in their endeavours to place more responsibility for the government of the country in Indian hands—actually afforded the moderate section of the progressive party further opportunities of explaining their views, and thus led to the still further extension of nationalist ideas among the Bengalis in general. At the same time the extremist party, which had by that time come into prominence, remained wholly unsatisfied with these reforms, and started an energetic propaganda among the rising generation of the educated classes with the object of spreading amongst them the ideas and principles of nationalism, urging without ceasing the necessity of forcible measures to extort progress in this direction from an autocracy which would never make any real advance unless it was compelled by effective pressure to do so.

5. This teaching had undoubtedly made a profound impression upon the younger generation before the present war broke out, and in the opinion of the Governor in Council it has made rapid progress since the commencement of the war. Throughout the nations of Western Europe—the greater as well as the smaller—the dominant passions today are patriotism and the love of country; and every effort is being made by those who rule public opinion in these countries to spread and strengthen these feelings in order to secure that the utmost power of the people may be put forward in assertion and defence of their national rights. It was inevitable that such enthusiasm should be reflected in the minds of educated men here in India, and especially in Bengal; and it is now abundantly clear that they have at last awakened to the fact that their own country is for all practical purposes in the possession of a foreign nation and that they have little real voice in its government. They have consequently initiated a “struggle to be free”, which is the outcome of the education and the training we ourselves have given to them. His Excellency in Council believes that it is no exaggeration to say that the vast majority of the educated community in Bengal are genuinely desirous of progress towards self-government; while those among the young men and students in the Presidency who have any political opinions at all are either openly or secretly in sympathy with the agitation for what they would call the emancipation of their country from foreign domination. And it is necessary further to state that it is impossible to exclude the bulk of educated Mahomedan opinion in Bengal from this category. While it is obvious that the Mahomedans could not contemplate with equanimity the establishment of a purely Hindu Government, they know that the Hindus realise that they will be unable to rule a Presidency in which the majority belong to the Mahomedan faith without the co-operation of the leaders of that majority; and they feel assured that, in the advances we may take towards granting self-government to the Indian people, we shall devise means for protecting the rights of those who are in a minority among the educated and dominant classes. They are also confident that they will soon raise themselves to the level of the Hindus in education and social advance, when these disabilities will disappear. In these circumstances there has been a distinct advance in nationalist opinion among the educated leaders of the Mahomedan community in this Presidency during the past few years.

6. The Governor in Council is aware that these nationalist ideas have not as yet permeated to the uneducated masses of the people, and that it is still true that the educated community to which reference has been made above is comparatively a very small minority of the population of the Presidency. On the other hand, it seems doubtful whether this fact can be rightly used as an argument that we should refuse, in what are believed to be the interests of the masses, to attribute importance to the views of this minority. The leaders of the people are undoubtedly to be found among the educated

community, and those leaders are learning to identify themselves in many ways with the interests of the masses and are active in their work of inoculating the people generally with a distrust of British rule. It is at the same time historically true that great revolutions in government in the West have ordinarily been effected by a convinced and energetic minority of leaders rather than by the great bulk of the people themselves. In these circumstances it is probably unsafe to regard the educated classes as an isolated group in the population; there can be little doubt that they will ultimately carry the people with them—either actively or passively—in their demands that nationalist views should be introduced into the government of the country.

7. If the actual state of feeling in the Presidency has been correctly indicated in the foregoing paragraphs, and if the Bengalis have advanced so far in political education as has been indicated,—and His Excellency in Council has reason to believe that he is rightly informed upon these points,—it appears to this Government that the history and traditions of British rule throughout the Empire suggest that we must now take longer and more rapid strides towards the grant of self-government to India within the Empire than any upon which we have hitherto ventured. The Governor in Council has no desire to minimise the difficulties attendant upon such a policy, or to disguise the fact that the ultimate goal is yet far distant; but the adoption of an avowed and open advance towards self-government in India has already been foretold by responsible statesmen in England, and it is consistent with the whole policy of the Imperial Government towards its own Colonies and as the champion of the independence of smaller nationalities throughout the world. While it is undoubtedly true that we must still be cautious in granting responsibility and power to those who have not hitherto had opportunities of exercising them, and that we must continue to safeguard the interests of minorities and prevent the reins of government from passing exclusively into the hands of one section of the community, it seems to this Government to be necessary now to translate the hopes which have been raised by recent promises—that affairs relating to the Government of India are to be looked at after the war from a new “angle of vision”—into a policy which is both definite and practical.

8. It must be admitted that, although much has been done in the past 20 years towards the admission of Indians to the counsels of the Government and in the direction of deference to clearly expressed Indian opinion, the progress made in the direction in which the nationalists would wish to move has not been great. The requests of moderate reformers for practical advances towards self-government have been parried for the most part by insistence upon the truth that complete self-government cannot be granted at any early date, and by vague declarations which practically exclude it from the range of vision; and we have confined our attention for the most part to schemes which are intended solely to secure greater efficiency in the Government. The Indian Civil



Service as a whole has concentrated its efforts on the improvement of the methods and the system of government; and as an example it may be noted that the reforms advocated by the District Administration Committee are directed towards effecting modifications in the machinery of Government, improvements in the system of education, and other similar reforms, which have no definite connection, with the aspirations of the nationalist party. In the same way the detailed reforms in our educational system which are advocated by our Education Departments are reforms intended to improve the quality of the education given through more strict and expert supervision, and are calculated rather to reduce the direct control of Indians over the education of their children than to entrust it more completely to their hands. There can be no doubt that our Education Departments have good grounds for the reforms which they have initiated, but it is equally certain that we shall fail in carrying them through unless we can persuade and carry with us the bulk of public opinion. In matters of local self-government also there has been but little advance during the past 30 years; and although considerable schemes for the improvement and extension of rural government have recently been devised, they have not always followed truly democratic lines. The fact is that, on the whole, we have contented ourselves in the main with working for the general good government of the country, and while we have certainly done much in that direction in protecting all classes of the people, in educating them, and in giving them opportunities of Government service in more or less subordinate capacities, we have granted them but little final authority. And we have always held them almost explicitly to be unfit for ultimate command, even in comparatively small matters.

9. The Governor in Council would accordingly recommend that the first step to be taken after the war, in order to restore the confidence of the people and bring our Government into touch with the opinions of their responsible leaders, is that a declaration should be made—possibly by the highest authority in the Empire, and consequently to be accepted by all subjects of it as inviolate—stating that it is the definite policy of His Majesty the King-Emperor in his government of India to work steadily towards the grant of self-government to Indians, in order that India may eventually take her place within the Empire as one of the self-governing nations which are included within it. Such a declaration was asked for recently by Sir Satyendra Prasanna Sinha, who has himself held high Government office, from his place as President at the last session of the Indian National Congress. The terms in which this request was made appear to the Governor in Council to express so clearly the views of a very large number of educated Indians that he thinks that they may be suitably quoted here:—

“I appeal to the British nation to declare their ungrudging approval of the goal to which we aspire, and their inflexible resolution to

equip India for her journey to that goal and to furnish her escort on the long and weary road. Such a declaration will be the most distinguished way of marking their appreciation of India's services and sacrifices, her loyalty and her devotion to the Empire. Such a declaration will touch the heart and appeal to the imagination of the people far more than any mere specific political reforms. These latter may fall short of the high expectations raised by utterances of responsible English statesmen as to the future place of India in the Empire and cause general disappointment. But an authoritative declaration of policy on the lines I suggest will, without causing such disappointment, carry conviction to the minds of the people that the pace of administrative reforms will be reasonably accelerated, and that henceforth it will be only a question of patient preparation. The most appropriate opportunity for such a declaration will be the moment when the victory of England and her Allies will establish for ever the triumph of free institutions over old-world doctrines of military absolutism.

“Let me not be misunderstood. I do not say that all that is wanted,—all that would satisfy us,—is a mere declaration of policy ; what I do say is that there should be a frank and full statement of the policy of Government as regards the future of India, so that hope may come where despair holds sway, and faith where doubt spreads its darkening shadow ; and that steps should be taken to move towards self-government by the gradual development of popular control over all departments of Government, and by the removal of disabilities and restrictions under which we labour both in our own country and in other parts of the British Empire.”

His Excellency in Council considers that this appeal is one to which a definite response should be given.

10. It is not improbable that the policy of progress which is advocated in this letter may be regarded with some misgiving by many members of the Indian Civil Service whose experience and proved ability will give weight to their views. It is doubtless the fact that the actual advance suggested will involve the gradual relinquishment by the Indian Civil Service of the powers of control which it now possesses. This relinquishment may also involve, at any rate for a time, some reduction in the efficiency of the administration, and may consequently affect adversely the poorer classes whom it has been the pride of the Service to protect. On the other hand, the spread of nationalist feeling described in the earlier paragraphs of this letter has undoubtedly served to intensify the view which prevails amongst the educated

classes that the Indian Civil Service is the chief obstacle to the introduction of liberal measures of self-government and as barring the way to the advance of Indians in the public service. The removal of the distrust which such a view implies would greatly facilitate the work of administration, while its continuance will eventually mar the efficiency upon which the members of the Service are rightly inclined to lay much stress. The members of this Service have been trained to the exercise of powers which are in the nature of a benevolent despotism and may find it difficult to lay them aside; but if, as the Governor in Council believes, the gradual transfer of the work of government in India from foreign to Indian hands is desirable, and if such a transfer is determined upon, it will perhaps be the greatest triumph of the Indian Civil Service if it can eventually succeed in organising that transfer of power peacefully and without the disturbance and revolutions which have ordinarily accompanied such a change in other countries.

11. In considering the measures which are to prove to the educated community that the proposed declaration is sincere and is the actual precursor of effectual reforms in the administration, the Governor in Council thinks it necessary to define without ambiguity what is meant by the self-government which is to be the ultimate goal of our policy in India. It is self-government as understood by the Dominions; the Government of India by the people, exercising their power and controlling the executive through such institutions of a democratic nature as may be found to be best suited to the genius of the country; in fact, a complete transference of power from official hands to those of the people themselves. It is only necessary to state the case thus in order to appreciate why Sir Satyendra Sinha referred to the "long and weary road" along which the people must journey to such a goal. It is, however, patent that the leaders of public opinion in India would themselves deprecate any sudden and extensive introduction of the elective principle among the uneducated and half-educated masses of the people. A change of this kind would be likely to fail so conspicuously as to lead to dangerous reaction. It is also obvious that the duty of protecting minorities and the interests of the Mahomedan majority in the population of Bengal preclude such sweeping changes, and that until we can see our way to trust more implicitly to the general sense of the community, we must continue to preserve a certain amount of autocratic power for the Government; and it is inevitable that in the conditions at present obtaining in India we should not exclude trained and experienced officials from the higher posts which constitute the Government of the country. Apart from the need for their knowledge and special capacity in such posts, their exclusion would mean that we should not get the best men in India and in England to carry on the administration. With this difficult transition stage before us it would be undesirable to offer greater prizes to the professional politician than to the trained administrator, or to diminish the attractiveness of the

Services upon which the country depends at present for the work of government. We have, therefore, to meet the nationalist view in the first instance rather by placing the Government in its existing form more in the hands of Indians than by transferring the powers held by Government to non-official hands. In fact, the advanced party in Bengal is making two definite and separate claims: the first being that the Government should be transformed from a foreign into a national Government; and the second, that the form of government should be recast on wholly democratic lines. The reason why the second of these claims is placed in the forefront at the present time is due to some extent to the fact that the existing Government is in foreign hands; but should it be possible to entrust the powers held by Government to trained administrators from among the Indian community, the call for democratic institutions will probably be less insistent.

12. The Governor in Council is accordingly inclined to deal with the general policy which he advocates under three heads, more or less clearly distinguishable one from another. The first line of advance will be in the direction of the transference of such power as must for a time be retained by the Executive Government to the hands of Indians. The second line, but one to be closely associated with the first and contemporaneous with it, will be the extension and acceleration of the general devolution of power from the official bureaucracy to democratic institutions. This constitutes the actual road along which we must pass to the goal which is our aim. But in order that this devolution may be rendered more successful in its results, and may be eventually made complete, we must take action under the third head of our policy, and assist the people in the process of "patient preparation" for their new responsibilities. This preparation will include the education of leaders and followers alike. It will commence at the top, by the grant of greater provincial autonomy by the Supreme Government to Local Governments in financial and other matters, the Local Governments being thus rendered more directly responsible for the administration of the areas under their sway. This should be followed by the grant of larger powers to local Legislative Councils and to boards of various kinds upon which the non-official community is represented; while, lower down in the scale, the responsibilities of district and circle boards must be increased, greater scope being given to village unions and to the people interested in them. And, as an integral part of this preparation, we must include the educational reforms which are to assist in rendering the people more capable of performing the new duties entrusted to them in the best interests of the community at large.

13. In dealing with the question of appointments to the public service, which comes under the first head of the reforms to be introduced, the recommendations of the Public Services Commission will doubtless form

a guide as to the advance to be made, and the proposals of that Commission are bound to affect public opinion on the subject. The Governor in Council has not as yet seen the report submitted by the Commission, but, as their recommendations must have been framed for the most part before the war, with its concomitant advance in public opinion, broke out, it is not impossible that those recommendations may prove to be somewhat conservative, and may not establish to a sufficient degree the general principle that Indians should ordinarily be preferred to Europeans in the service of the Government in India, where Indians can be found who are competent to carry out the work to be entrusted to them. The Governor in Council is of opinion that this principle should be at the root of the progress to be made in this matter, and it will undoubtedly be necessary in the future to admit to the Indian Civil Service, and to other Services which have hitherto been recruited in the main from among Europeans, a large number of Indians who have been educated in India, although in some cases it may be desirable to give the selected candidates an opportunity of completing their education in England before they take up their duties in India. The same principle should be followed in making all other appointments which are paid for out of public funds. Preference should be given to the Indian candidate, provided he is fit for the work to be done. The grant of commissions in the army to Indian gentlemen is not a matter which can well be discussed by the Government of Bengal, which is so little affected by the actual work of the army in India; but there can be no doubt that concessions in this direction would be greatly appreciated by the educated community in this Presidency, as indicating a more real trust in the loyalty of the classes from whom the recipients of commissions will be chosen. In the same way, the admission of Indians to the volunteer forces would be looked upon as another step in a policy of confidence, although it is to be feared that the political advantage to be gained by such a concession may prove to have been discounted to a large extent by the fact that it will be granted after the conclusion of the war, in the course of which the volunteers might have been of practical service to the State. On the other hand, to maintain the disabilities under which Indians labour in this respect at the present time would be resented; and, while the Government of Bengal doubt whether the danger from the enlistment of volunteers will be appreciable, the enrolment of them would be of real advantage, as affording the benefit of discipline and physical training to a considerable number of young men of the educated community.

14. As has already been suggested, the devolution of power from the existing official bureaucracy to democratic institutions will begin at the top by a relaxation of the control of the Supreme Government in India over Local Governments and administrations. This is a necessary preliminary to the grant of any real power to the democratic institutions to be developed within each province. The next step will be to enhance the powers of local Legislative

Councils by giving them some further financial control over the administration. They at present enjoy such control to only a very limited extent, and an advance is indicated which will lead to their being trusted more fully and endowed with more real responsibilities in this respect. The constitution of these Councils may at the same time be overhauled with the object of making them more fully representative of the people of each province, without prejudice to the safeguards already provided against the monopolisation of power by any single community and for the protection of the interests of minorities. This general advance in the direction of making the ultimate authority controlling the administration more popular might be accompanied by the addition of another Indian Member to the Executive Council of His Excellency the Governor, thus ensuring the more effective representation of Indian interests in the inner counsels of the Government itself. These measures will help to develop the political capacities of the leaders of the educated community, and they should be accompanied by a further devolution of powers from Commissioners and Collectors to municipalities and district and other boards, the main object of which will be to give the leading members of the non-official community in each district opportunities for the exercise of official power and for learning through extended responsibility how best to exercise that power.

15. While the leaders of the educated community will thus receive much of their preparation for the duties which self-government will bring upon them through the devolution of authority to democratic institutions, we shall still have to educate the masses of the people of the country to utilise to the best purpose the opportunities which are to be given to them, and to train individuals among them through local self-government for positions of greater trust. For this purpose we cannot do better than adopt as a general basis the carefully considered proposals which have been made in this Presidency by the District Administration Committee. A report has already been submitted by this Government in my letter No. , dated , detailing the action which has been taken to deal with the recommendations made by that Committee; but it must be recognised that those recommendations have not hitherto proved popular and are likely to be somewhat vigorously opposed. This opposition is due, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, to the fact that the Committee did not pay much attention to the claims of nationalism in framing their report and their proposals. It should accordingly be made clear that in carrying out their recommendations we shall maintain the principles laid down in the general declaration of our policy, and place the new unions and boards more definitely under popular guidance than was originally contemplated. It is doubtful whether, if this is not done, we have much chance of securing success for our new scheme of village government in Bengal; whereas, if we can attract to this work the most capable and influential of the non-official population by giving them the

prospect of some real influence in the administration, we shall constitute a practical training ground for the best elements in the population of the districts of the interior in the responsibilities of government. It is not proposed to recapitulate in this letter the various measures for the reform of district administration which were proposed by the Committee and which have been accepted and taken in hand by this Government. The greater number of them require a considerable expenditure of Government funds and progress will only be slow until such funds can be provided.

16. One of the most important subjects dealt with in the report of the District Administration Committee is the condition of education in the Presidency, and some suggestions were made by the Committee for its reform. The state of affairs as portrayed by the Committee is lamentable, but it is accurate, and it is obvious that the changes we propose in the general administration of Bengal should be accompanied by a further vigorous reform of our educational system. The recommendations of the Committee have indicated some of the more important directions in which radical changes are required, and in the proposals laid by this Government before the Royal Commission on the Public Services, a scheme was sketched out under which the control of school education was to be separated entirely from the control of that given in colleges. It was proposed by this Government at that time to place all colleges more definitely under the university or universities in the Presidency, and at the same time to dissociate the universities from any direct connection with schools, leaving them to be supervised by the Department of Education under the Director of Public Instruction. It is unfortunate that Government have not at present been able to carry the bulk of public opinion with them in the matter of this particular reform, but the reason of this does not appear to the Governor in Council to be far to seek. It is the same distrust of the objects and aims of the Government which dictates opposition on the part of political leaders to this as to many other schemes of reform which might otherwise obtain unanimous support. The general sense of the educated community is overwhelmingly in favour of the extension of education in every direction; but it sees in the efforts made by the Education Department to improve the status of teachers and the methods of teaching, to cut down the size of overgrown classes, to introduce more effective inspection and control, and to ameliorate the conditions in which students live, sinister designs upon this extension of education generally. And they also suspect the Government of attempting to extinguish all patriotic or national feeling among the students themselves. It is necessary, therefore, to remove this distrust before we can expect that co-operation on the part of the people which alone can bring success to our schemes for educational reform. His Excellency in Council hopes that the general political reforms which have been advocated above will do much to remove this distrust, and he believes that, if we can convince the advanced section of the

educated community of the absolute sincerity of our proposals, and our desire to assist by means of them in raising the educational equipment of this country to the level of that of other nations, much of the opposition with which we have hitherto been met will be conciliated. In addition to the reforms which are suggested by the District Administration Committee, the Government of Bengal hope that it may be found possible to press forward towards the ultimate goal of free primary education for all, and, at the other end of the scale, to do more than has hitherto been found possible to give to Indians in India as sound an education as is given in the universities of Europe. This education should include not merely a literary education, but also that scientific education which gives expert knowledge, and the absence of which necessitates, and at the same time justifies, our filling most of the higher posts in the Departments of Engineering, Medicine, Forests, Agriculture, &c., by men imported from England. We should accordingly press on with our model university at Dacca; with our training colleges for teachers, both men and women; with our reorganisation of the inspectorate, and with our schemes for the encouragement and improvement of primary education. We must not forget at the same time that the demand for all forms of education is more urgent than ever, and that we have to do our best to satisfy it. In carrying out this policy we shall find it desirable to strengthen rather than to weaken the European element in the Education Department, but while we do this we should take action to preclude such friction as has recently occurred between Europeans and Indians employed in the Education Department by treating all professors and teachers as equals, and scrupulously avoiding the accusations of racial prejudice in favour of the former which have recently done much to render our system of education unpopular.

17. As to the economic remedies proposed at the conclusion of their report by the District Administration Committee, little can be said in this present communication. These remedies are such as will come under the consideration of the important Commission that has recently been constituted under Sir Thomas Holland as Chairman; and the appointment of a Director of Industries in this Presidency, which is a necessary preliminary to the introduction of the reforms suggested by the Committee, has been held up pending the result of the Commission's investigations. But the Governor in Council attaches the greatest possible importance to the development of Indian industries, and does not wish it to be thought that, because he is unable to deal with this subject at length in the present communication, he does not regard it as one of the dominant factors in the present political situation.

18. While the Governor in Council has thought it desirable to recommend in the preceding paragraphs what may be regarded as a broad policy of political and social reform, he considers it important to emphasise his opinion



that such reforms should not be accompanied by any weakness towards political crime or any temporising with those definitely seditious movements which have already given so much trouble in this Presidency. If the Provincial and Imperial Governments are willing to demonstrate that they are sincere in their determination to grant self-government eventually to the people of the country, they have a right to claim in return the support of the people in securing for the country that tranquillity and freedom from internal disturbances which are required to ensure the peaceful development of such a policy. His Excellency in Council believes that the real leaders of the people have no sympathy with crime and outrage in any form, and that it is necessary to punish such ebullitions with deterrent severity. This need not, however, preclude the declaration of an amnesty for political prisoners or mercy being shown towards those who have sinned in the past, provided that such offenders have not been proved guilty of serious crime, and provided that they will give us an undertaking to abstain from all seditious agitation in the future. But, remembering the dangers through which this Presidency has recently passed, and the violence of the anti-British and anti-Government action taken by revolutionaries during the past few years, the Governor in Council cannot afford to allow his hands to be weakened in any way until he has reason to know that the feelings which inspired that action have passed away and that sedition has practically died out. He has accordingly submitted to the Government of India in letter No. , dated , a detailed report as to the powers which he requires to enable this Government to deal with men who may attempt to resuscitate the worst forms of agitation against our rule, and to enforce their views by definite crimes against the State, after the termination of the war, when the Acts under which he is at present dealing with such criminal agitation will come to an end. It may be hoped that the retention of such powers for a time will not be seriously opposed, when the fact is appreciated that a definite advance is being made towards the satisfaction of the demands of constitutional reformers, and that these powers will be used only against extremists whom no measures will conciliate.

19. Before concluding this letter the Governor in Council feels bound to touch upon a matter which, while it can in nowise be made the subject of rules and regulations or pressure from official quarters, cannot fail to have a marked influence upon the developments of any policy of political progress. This is the question of the social relations between Europeans and educated Indians and the association of these two classes on terms of friendly equality. His Excellency in Council believes that there has been a considerable growth of mutual understanding as between English officials and Indian gentlemen in Bengal during the past two decades. There is a better acquaintance on the one side with the character and the culture of Indian society and with the powers and capacities of the educated Bengalis; while these Indians have begun to understand more fully the work which is being done by English

officials in their country. On the other hand, the Governor in Council views with apprehension the gulf that exists between the educated Indians and the non-official European community. He fears that many causes,—such as the closer connection between England and India, the large increase in the numbers of Europeans in such centres as Calcutta, rendering them more independent of their Indian neighbours, and the increase in competition inducing greater absorption in their work,—have combined of late to widen that gulf and produce a greater estrangement between these two communities. And even when efforts are made to bridge this gulf, they are often vitiated by condescension and a feeling of superiority on one side or the other; the Englishman knowing little or nothing of the intelligence, the cultivation, or the aspirations of the Indian; and the Indian failing to appreciate the character, the business qualities, and the standards of social intercourse set up by the former. His Excellency in Council is of opinion that the greatest possible good could be effected by the establishment of social relations on a basis of frank and sincere equality between these two communities, and by their mutual co-operation for the good administration of the country on progressive lines. But the causes of difference are deep-seated, and he fears that this alienation in feeling will remain a constant difficulty, to be recognised and taken into account by all responsible administrators.

20. The Governor in Council trusts that he has been able to make the position in Bengal clear to the Government of India as he himself understands it. It may be briefly summarised as follows:—In the present situation the political views and aspirations of the educated community are of paramount importance, and it is necessary to meet those aspirations by a definite declaration that the policy of the British Government in India is to introduce self-government by gradual but definite steps, in order that the people of this country may eventually be able to take their place among the free nations of the Empire. This declaration must be accompanied by measures which will show that the attainment of this goal is not looked upon as the dream of a future beyond the range of human vision, but as an object worthy of the attention of the practical administrators of today, and to be obtained by the introduction of liberal and progressive measures which will themselves constitute a considerable advance towards that goal. These measures will not necessarily involve sudden or sweeping changes in the present form of the administration, but will rather be directed towards making the government of the country more popular and more national, in order that the distrust with which it is at present regarded may be removed, while providing for the gradual devolution of the powers of Government to democratic institutions and the preparation of the people to receive such institutions. At the same time internal tranquillity must be secured to give this policy a fair chance of peaceful development, and the powers of the Government must not be weakened in

dealing with sedition and crime. His Excellency in Council believes that the adoption of such a policy at the conclusion of the war will do much to dissipate the difficulties which have confronted and hampered the administration in Bengal during the past 10 years; and, on the other hand, he fears that, should our efforts at reform be confined merely to improvements in administrative machinery, without any definite recognition of the strength of the nationalist feeling among the people of Bengal, or should there be reason to condemn such reforms as may be proposed as insincere or inadequate, we must look for an increase rather than a diminution in sedition and in the spread of revolutionary principles in this Presidency in the immediate future.

NOTE BY THE HON'BLE MR. BEATSON BELL, C. S. I., C. I. E.

As requested by Lord Carmichael, I note very briefly my views on the important political proposals which have recently been received from Simla.

As regards the formula in which an attempt is made to define the "Goal of British Rule in India", I have only to say that many persons holding different views could subscribe to this formula, with or without comparatively small changes. Personally I hold the view most strongly that we must constantly remember that the British came to India as merchants and are still here mainly as merchants. The non-official British in Bengal are not mere traders who can remove their trade elsewhere at will. Relying on the permanence and stability of British rule they have sunk their capital in the soil—in jute mills, tea gardens, mines, zamindaris and railways. We are bound to them by every tie of blood and honour. We should propound no formula behind their backs, still less should we issue any proclamation, which is calculated to imperil their position. I cannot see the necessity for propounding any formula, but if there is to be a formula, it should contain a pointed reference to the safety of fellow-countrymen. I would therefore begin the formula as follows:—

"India is, and must always remain, a portion of the British Empire; but we shall gradually endow her peoples with the largest measure of self-government which are compatible with the permanence of British rule in India and with the safety and prosperity of British merchants and British Colonists within her borders."

I would accept the remainder of the formula practically as it stands.

As regards the three "roads" towards the goal, it is useless for us to say much about the second road, namely, "responsible employment of Indians",

until we have seen the report of the Public Services Commission. I can only say now that our policy should be closer co-operation between British and Indian officers rather than gradual elimination of the British element.

Turning to the other two "roads", I may say at once that I am prepared to accept most of what is written in the Memorandum marked "A". As one of the authors of the "Bengal District Administration Report", I am naturally a whole-hearted supporter of true local self-government, but it is essential that the Bengal system should be radically reformed and should be built up afresh from the bottom upwards. The one point in which I differ fundamentally from the Memorandum is regarding the position of the district officer in the scheme of local self-government. Bengal is a permanently settled province. The district officers, having little revenue work in the villages, have gradually lost touch with the people. The results have been disastrous. The one branch of work in which the Bengal District Officer is still in close touch with his people is the work of the district board. In the course of his tours he looks after their roads and bridges, their wells and tanks, their schools and hospitals. The people tell him of their wants and he is able to do them real benefit. If the Bengal District Officer is deprived of this last point of contact between himself and his people, it will seriously militate against the stability of British rule in the province. It may be said that he will still be an inspecting officer and can make suggestions to the district board. The people however will soon know the difference. They will find that the district officer's suggestions are disregarded by the board and they will cease to urge their wants to him. My views on this question are in no way based upon considerations of "efficiency". That is a fetish to which I have never bowed down. I simply appeal, and appeal most earnestly, for the continuance of the Bengal District Officer in the beneficent work of his district. I would prefer that he should remain in his present position of Chairman; but if it is thought desirable that he should not preside at the meetings of the board, I would have no objection to a non-official elected President with the district officer as *ex-officio* Executive officer. It has been suggested that such an arrangement would result in friction, but I have no fears on this point. If the Collector is relegated to the position of an inspecting officer, there *will* be friction. If he is retained as an integral part of the system, there will *not*. The experiment of "elimination" may be all very well in other provinces. In Bengal we must aim at "co-operation".

As regards the Memoranda marked B and C, which deal with the Provincial Councils, I refrain at present from working out any scheme in detail. Our Provincial Council has just been constituted and it should, I think, run its normal course. The present Council should also continue to exercise the same powers and functions as its predecessor. While the present Council,

however, is running its course, the constitution of future Councils may well be considered and all sections of the public, both British and Indian, official and non-official, should be taken into our confidence. My ideas will very likely be modified in the course of the coming discussions; but I note down my present ideas for what they are worth—

(1) It is not *essential* that our present maximum (53) should be raised, but I would have no objection to a maximum of 75 or 80.

(2) Two-thirds of the whole Council should be elected; one-third *ex-officio* or nominated.

(3) Apart from the Members of the Executive Council, we have at present 12 nominated officials, as against eight non-official British Members (three nominated and five elected); I should like to see at least as many non-official British Members as nominated officials.

(4) As regards the Indian electorates, I think the larger they are the better: I would give a vote to practically every raiyat.

(5) I would abolish the district board and municipal constituencies.

(6) I would frame all the Indian constituencies on a territorial basis.

(7) I would have separate electorates for Mahomedans and non-Mahomedans throughout the province, the number of seats allotted to each creed being proportionate to the population of the creed in the province. (The territorial limits of Mahomedan and non-Mahomedan constituencies need not coincide.)

(8) A Mahomedan should have no vote in a non-Mahomedan electorate, and *vice versa*.

(9) The qualifications for Mahomedans and non-Mahomedans should be identical.

N. D. BEATSON BELL.

*The 8th August 1916.*



NOTE BY HON'BLE SIR SYED SHAMS-UL-HUDA, *Kt.*

#### THE GOAL.

"Self-government compatible with British supremacy" is a very high ideal and conceived in as liberal a spirit as any Indian can reasonably expect, but the question will be asked to what limits self-government so defined will extend and how far it will be effective self-government without encroaching upon British supremacy—in short, what will be the dividing line between the two. Anyhow self-government is only to be the ultimate goal and we need not perhaps quarrel over the boundary before we are near it. Self-government is not an end by itself, but only a means to an end, the end being the happiness and contentment of the great mass of people who have no clear ideas of self-government and no particular anxiety for it. To them good government is much more important than self-government. Their happiness can only be secured by material prosperity.

#### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS.

In Bengal economic problems loom largely before the public, and unless the measure of self-government that may be ultimately conceded to India is extensive enough to enable the Indians to regulate their internal affairs, their economic development and their internal and external trade relations, the problem of India's economic salvation is one that should be tackled before almost everything else. The existing discontent in Bengal is mainly due to economic causes. The extension of India's trade and commerce and the protection and development of her industries are the most important means of securing India's prosperity and the happiness of her people and are much more important than any of the three questions discussed in the Memorandum.

Of the three roads leading to the goal most people would consider the second more important than the first or the third.

#### EDUCATION.

Before starting for the journey we must make preparations for it. The first step must therefore be the improvement of education in all its stages. Our masses must be educated to enable them to realise the value of self-government and to take an intelligent interest in public questions and even in their own local affairs. Representative institutions without an intelligent electorate are bound to break down. Primary education must therefore be made free. I have doubts if it should also be made compulsory.

University education, both general and technical, must also be very greatly improved so as to supply the country with efficient public servants for all branches of administration and also with men capable of playing their part in all the new activities of public life that may be introduced as the result of the reforms in contemplation. It should be possible, whatever be the cost, to give to Indians in India as far as possible as sound an education as is given in the Universities of Europe. I have no doubt if an Indian receives the same kind of education as the Englishman does, even if he is not so good in the beginning, he will be so or nearly so in course of time. When speaking of education, I do not mean literary education alone, but include in it all kind of education, literary, scientific and technical, which gives expert knowledge and the absence of which is the necessity and the justification for filling most of the higher posts in departments of Engineering, Medicine, Forest, Agriculture, &c., by men imported from England, who do not possess the local knowledge so essential for success. It is not fair to the Indian that it should be necessary for him to leave his home and to incur heavy expenditure not generally within the means of the middle class people in order to attain the higher qualifications in these branches of knowledge. In order to secure this it will be necessary not only to establish high class educational institutions, but also to create a new educational atmosphere and entirely new surroundings. The preparation having been made, the journey may be undertaken along the roads leading to the goal. A good deal of spade work will have to be done to make the roads level and smooth.

#### LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

One of the roads leading to the goal is no doubt local self-government. I shall deal with this under two heads, "Municipalities" and "District Boards".

#### MUNICIPALITIES.

We have been advancing cautiously along the lines laid down by the Decentralisation Commission, and it may rightly be claimed that our municipalities really and effectually control their own affairs. We have reduced within the last two years the number of municipalities, having a non-elective basis, to a minimum. Out of a total of 113 municipalities only 6 are still included in Schedule I, *i. e.*, the whole municipal board is appointed by Government and it will perhaps be possible within a short time to put almost every municipality in the province on an elective basis. We have also given local bodies greater control over their budgets and in practice have reduced Government interference in all matters to a minimum. The number of municipalities in Schedule II, *i. e.*, those of which the Chairmen were appointed by Government, have also been considerably reduced recently, and we have taken steps to

Progress made.

encourage the election of non-officials as municipal Chairmen with the result that there are only about half a dozen elected officials as municipal Chairmen in the whole province. We are advancing in all these directions steadily, and all that is necessary is to maintain the rate of progress.

#### ELECTED MAJORITY.

Of 113 municipalities in the Presidency 107 are on an elective basis, two-thirds of the commissioners being elected and one-third appointed by Government. With a large elected majority and an elected Chairman, the nominated commissioners are clearly in the minority and can never carry a division. If communal representation is conceded and the Mahomedans are allowed to select their representatives separately, it is possible and even desirable to reduce the number of nominated commissioners to one-fourth, or even less. In municipalities every municipal commissioner knows his ward, the area is small and there is no necessity for representation to any large extent of official experience, and I think we may even do away with nominated members if effect is given to the proposal that those possessing official experience should be nominated only for the purpose of giving advice and should not be allowed to vote. There is however no popular demand for further reduction of nominated members, and the change should be gradual. Unfortunately the Bengal Municipal Act is very inelastic. If a municipality is in Schedule I, the entire number, and if it is outside the schedule, one-third of the total number of members, must be appointed by Government. The law allows of no variation. I should like to see the law altered by providing that for ordinary municipalities, I mean those outside Schedule I, Government should nominate such number of members, not being more than one-third, as the Local Government may from time to time with regard to each municipality determine. As I have said before, the number of municipalities in Schedule I is very small, and their case need not be specially considered. A change in the law, such as I have indicated, will enable Government gradually to strengthen the elective element and ultimately to do away with appointed members altogether.

#### LARGER CITIES.

As regards larger cities, we have already decided to accept the Bombay model for Calcutta and have drafted the new Municipal Bill on those lines. I agree that the nomination of the municipal commissioner, who is to be the head of the executive, may safely be left in the hands of the board, subject to the approval of Government with the other safeguards suggested in the Memorandum. It would not be necessary to insist that he should be a Government official. By doing so I do not think we would be running any serious risk, for the power of veto, if judiciously exercised, would be quite



enough to secure efficiency. I know that my colleagues and myself somewhat differ in our views on this point, but that arises from a difference in our objective. My colleagues set great importance on what is described as departmental efficiency, and if that were the sole consideration, I would have agreed with them, but as has been pointed out, the training of the people is one of the main objects to be aimed at and they should even be allowed to learn by committing mistakes. With a leaven of European members the Calcutta Corporation is less likely to commit mistakes than any other self-governing body in this Presidency.

#### LOWERING THE FRANCHISE.

Regarding the proposal to lower the franchise, I think it is low enough, but the rate-payers prefer to be represented by some one above them in education and social position. In the present state of the country a democratic franchise would not necessarily bring into our local bodies men truly representative of the general body of rate-payers and it will not be possible to prevent a preponderance of lawyers. Want of education is one of the main causes of the present state of things. What is true of municipalities is equally true of other self-governing bodies.

#### DISTRICT BOARDS.

Elected  
Members.

Non-official  
Chairman.

In Bengal the local Self-Government Act does not rigidly fix the proportion of nominated and elected members. But by notification issued under section 7 of the Act, district boards which elect any proportion of members, elect half and Government nominate the other half. So long as this proportion remains and the District Magistrate continues to be the appointed Chairman of the board, it is difficult to call a district board a proper self-governing institution. We are however going to try an experiment with non-official Chairmen in one or two districts. Whether it will succeed or not it is difficult to say. Anyhow the progress in this direction must be slow, especially as it is not always possible to secure the services of a non-official Chairman who would be willing to devote all the time to the work which its magnitude and its importance demand. To do this work efficiently the Chairman must often go round the district and see things with his own eyes. Few non-officials would undertake to do this. We also propose, in accordance with the recommendations of the District Administration Committee, to build up the system of representation from the bottom and work up rather than start from the top and work down. We have drafted a Bill constituting village committees with well defined powers and responsibilities and with power to try petty civil and criminal cases. These will elect the circle boards which would replace the existing local boards and deal with a smaller area. When the village committees and circle boards have come into existence, we have

decided to limit the number of appointed members to one-third. District boards differ considerably from municipalities. The former deal with a much larger area, and the number of elected members, even when the proportion is raised to two-thirds, will not be sufficiently large to bring together men with local knowledge of the entire district. This fact is recognised in the Memorandum. It becomes therefore much more important to have a number of touring officers to represent local knowledge. Altogether there are about 490 members in the district boards of Bengal. If two-thirds were elected and one-third nominated, the number of nominated members will be about 163. At present the representation of official experience and even of local knowledge is secured by the nomination of the following officials—

Official  
experience.

Sub-Divisional Officers	...	...	...	75
Cess Deputy Collectors	...	...	...	25
Civil Surgeons	...	...	...	25
Deputy Inspectors of Schools	...	...	...	25
Superintendents of Police	...	...	...	25
				<hr/>
TOTAL	...	...	...	175
				<hr/>

Thus one-third of the total number of members, if nominated, would not enable us to provide for the official experience now represented in boards. We may, however, exclude the Cess Deputy Collector and the Superintendent of Police. In any case there would be very little room for the representation of minorities. It will therefore be necessary, as suggested in the Memorandum, to provide for the special representation of minorities by a system of communal or proportional representation. If this is done, the proportion of nominated to elected members may at once be reduced to one-fourth in the municipalities and to one-third in the district boards. No further reduction in the district boards seems possible at the present time or perhaps for many years to come. I doubt if all the officers I have named as bringing official experience to boards will take much interest in the work if they are limited to giving advice. To remove the district officer from the Chairmanship of the board will also be very detrimental to the efficient working of these bodies. If, therefore, district boards, like local boards, are to have an elected majority and a non-official Chairman, it would be essential to adopt the suggestion about the appointment of a paid officer with large executive powers whose appointment would be subject to approval of Government and who could not be removed at the mere will of the board.

Communal or  
proportional  
representation.

## POWER OF TAXATION BY LOCAL BODIES.

I now come to the question regarding the power of taxation both by municipalities and district boards. I am in agreement with the views expressed in the Memorandum. The tendency shown by municipal commissioners is to keep down taxation as far as possible and not to raise it. Government have occasionally protested against this tendency when contributions have been asked from them. I also agree with the recommendation of the Commission that, if a municipal or a rural board has to pay for a service, it should control it.

## GOVERNMENT FIXING EXPENDITURE.

As regards the practice of Government fixing the proportion of revenue to be spent on a particular object, I believe in recent years we have relaxed it in the case of expenditure on education, but there is a general consensus of non-official opinion that Government should be authorised to lay down that a definite portion of the P. W. cess. now assigned to district boards, should be spent on water-supply. I think this should be done, so long as rural boards do not have a majority of elected members, and are not put on a more representative basis.

Village  
*Panchayats.*

As I have said, we are making considerable progress in directions recommended by the Commission and will carry out the policy indicated in the Memorandum gradually. I have already referred to the Bill that has been drafted by us to bring into existence village *panchayats*. We have placed these *panchayats* on an elective basis. It has not been found possible to make the village the unit, but a group of villages, the area being about 10 square miles. The difficulty of obtaining men with business capacity in a single village, and of financing such a large number of village *panchayats* with adequate funds to enable them to carry out useful projects, has been at the bottom of this decision. The Bill will be considered at the next Commissioners' Conference and will receive further consideration in the light of the views expressed in the Memorandum. The conditions obtaining in a group of villages conveniently situated would not materially differ from those of a single large village.

Before leaving the subject of local self-government, I wish to state my conviction that Mahomedans in Bengal will not be content with anything short of separate representation in all local bodies, and that it is the best solution of a troublesome question. We have proposed it in the Calcutta Municipal Bill, and the United Provinces Act recently passed has quickened the desire and strengthened the claim for it.

## LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

The Morley-Minto reforms of our Legislative Councils are of too recent a date to require, or even to justify, any radical changes, and yet it cannot be denied that even the short experience we have had of their working have revealed defects that call for a remedy. Although I must admit that there has not been any great demand for a change and I must also concede that it is perhaps unwise to reopen controversies which have died out, I still think that the representation of the Mahomedans may be put on a more logical basis, without injustice to them or to any other community. Mahomedans were given the right to select their representatives upon a separate register and were at the same time allowed to vote in the general elections, because the Mahomedans were not allowed to elect separately the full number of representatives to which by their importance and their numerical strength in Bengal they were entitled to. The scheme of separate representation of the Mahomedans has in practice been fairly successful and has the great merit of avoiding racial differences which are bound to arise in connection with Hindu-Mahomedan contests in mixed elections. The Hindus, however, look upon the system as a pure piece of favouritism shown to the Mahomedans, although in reality it is far from being the case. Difference in the voting qualifications between the Hindu and the Mahomedan electors has also been adversely criticised and is a glaring inconsistency. In the allotment of the seats to the different electorates the landlords have gained an advantage which neither their number nor their contributions to the revenues of the country justify. The object with which an additional seat was thrown open to the commissioners of the Corporation of Calcutta other than those appointed by Government, has not been fulfilled, and both this and the other seat given to the Corporation have in the last two elections gone to municipal commissioners. The rejection of the claim of the educated community as such to representation in Council has caused great disappointment. The non-official majority which was heralded with such a flourish of trumpets has been found to be a myth. The European representatives of the various interests invariably take the side of Government whenever any question not touching their particular interest comes up for discussion, and with their help Government can always defeat the elected representatives of the people. The nominated non-officials also may not always take the side of the latter and may be prone to side with Government. The result is that Government can always defeat the Indian elected representatives. Only once has Government been defeated, and then only by a very narrow majority, over a resolution, this result being mainly due to the absence of some of the official members. This has caused a good deal of irritation and dissatisfaction with the present system, and I think it is very desirable that the elected element should be considerably strengthened. I would provide for two-thirds to be elected and would stipulate that not less than half the total number of members must be

Defects.

Representation  
of Mahomedans.

Landlords.

Corporation.

Educated  
community.Non-official  
majority.Elected  
majority.

Veto.

Partial veto.

Penal  
dissolution.

elected Indians. I do not think we would run any serious risk by the adoption of this course. The power of veto which now vests in the Governor and the Governor-General will be sufficient to prevent any disastrous consequences. probably the power of partial veto as suggested in the Memorandum would further strengthen the position of Government. I am not however in favour of vesting Government with the powers of penal dissolution. This may not be of any practical use. Once Government has taken objection to the conduct of an elected member his chances of being returned again would often be all the greater, having regard to the present temper of the people.

Representative  
character of  
councils.

Low franchise.

I am also in strong sympathy with the suggestion that an attempt should be made so to devise the electoral system as to make the members more representatives of their electors, to substitute larger constituencies with the franchise pitched sufficiently low so as to ensure better representation of the masses of the people. It should however be borne in mind that, however low the franchise may go down, it will not be possible for a very long time to get a body of elected men who would truly represent the interest or the views of those by whom they are returned.

It is undoubtedly very desirable that those returned by a constituency should be its true representative. In dealing with this question we are apt to overlook an important fact. The electors in this country, especially in the popular constituencies as a rule, only care to vote for a person in whom they have confidence and who by his education and abilities is considered fit to discharge the duties of a councillor. They do not send him to the council to represent any particular views or interests. For this reason our Legislative Council is not exactly a council of representatives. The inevitable result is that we get a large number of lawyers elected by every popular constituency. I do not think this can for the present, or for a long time to come, be avoided. The sole aim of the electors is to send to council the best educated men and the ablest of them. Roughly speaking, the educated Bengalis are either in Government service or in the profession of law. The former not being eligible for election, most classes of voters are limited in their choice to the latter. If the qualification required for a candidate for election had permitted it, I would not be surprised at Babu Surendra Nath Banerjee being some day elected by a landholding constituency to represent them. Although therefore it is hopeless to expect that we would either avoid the lawyers or get true representatives of the masses to sit in our councils this should not deter us from attempting to create a democratic constituency. In accordance with these views, I would make the following suggestions regarding the future constitution of our

A democratic  
constituency.Future  
constitution.

council. Altogether the Bengal Legislative council consists of—

Governor	...	...	...	1
Ordinary Members	...	...	...	3
Additional Members	...	...	...	48
				<hr/>
TOTAL				52
				<hr/>

I would throw open to election two-thirds of the total number and would provide that at least more than half of the total number should be returned by constituencies that are mainly Indian in character. I include in this category both the University and the Corporation of Calcutta. The present method of election by members of district and local boards is unsatisfactory, as constituting a ludicrously small electorate and tending to encourage personal solicitation and other undesirable methods and also as excluding a large number of eligible voters on the basis of a democratic franchise which we should aim at. The system of election by municipalities is still worse. Municipalities are given a certain number of votes in proportion to their income and the votes of the majority of members of a municipality gives the entire number of votes to the successful candidate. The better course would undoubtedly be to give the vote to the more substantial rate-payers or at least to every municipal commissioner. I would however prefer the former. Truly urban municipalities have interests in many respects distinct from those living in rural areas, but a large number of small municipalities are not really different from rural areas, and I would give them no votes as municipalities, but would treat them as rural areas for voting purposes substituting rates and taxes for cesses and making other alterations of the same nature. It will perhaps be admitted that important municipalities representing town areas in Bengal (I am excluding the Calcutta municipality) cannot compare in importance with the vast rural areas with their teeming millions. The present arrangement by which municipalities have the same number of votes as the district boards seems to me to be wholly indefensible. I would therefore reduce the municipal votes outside Calcutta from 5 to 4.

Elected majority.

Indian majority.

Municipal and district board representation.

Keeping the above considerations in view, I would make the following readjustment of the elective seats in council:—

Allotment of seats.

Total number of seats	...	...	...	52
Nominated seats	...	...	...	17
Elected seats, two-thirds of 52	...	...	...	35
				<hr/>
				52
				<hr/>

I would distribute these 35 seats among the following bodies :—

Bengal Chamber of Commerce	...	...	...	2
Calcutta Trades' Association	...	...	...	1
Commissioners of the Port of Chittagong	...	...	...	1
Tea-planting community	...	...	...	1
European commercial community outside Calcutta and Chittagong	...	...	...	1
Additional seat for Europeans	...	..	...	1
				—
TOTAL				7
				—

These will presumably return Europeans as they have hitherto done. I doubt if the Port Commissioners of Chittagong are sufficiently important to get one seat in Council. However until a better European electorate can be found, I would not disturb present arrangements for securing European representation and would, as I have suggested above, give them an additional elected seat in council. The remaining 28 seats I would distribute among Indian constituencies as follows :—

1. Landholders	...	...	...	...	3
2. Municipalities	...	...	...	...	4*
3. University	...	...	...	...	1
4. Calcutta municipality	...	...	...	...	1
5. Indian commercial community	...	...	...	...	1
6. Registered graduates with certain property qualifications	...	...	...	...	2
7. Popular electorate, <i>i. e.</i> , residents of rural areas, including rural municipalities paying a certain sum as cesses or as license tax or deriving certain annual income from any source or paying a certain rent.	...	...	...	...	16

This last would be the true popular constituency. Their voting qualifications should be fixed so as not to exclude on the one hand the substantial agriculturists, and on the other hand not to make the electorate unwieldy. I would give no vote to an illiterate person. This would encourage literacy. I would also fix

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\* 3 Hindus and 1 Mahomedan to be separately elected.

the property qualification of persons possessing certain educational qualification lower than the property qualification of persons not having such educational qualification. This would to a great extent give satisfaction to the educated classes. It will be seen from the above that the separate representation of the Mahomedans has been dropped from the scheme. To secure Mahomedan representation I would divide the popular electorate into eight territorial divisions and give each such division two representatives, one to be a Mahomedan and to be elected by the Mahomedans and the other to be a Hindu and to be returned by the Hindus, the voting qualifications being the same in the case of both. The Mahomedans form half the population of this Presidency and no one can cavil at their getting half the seats assigned to a popular electorate. All anomalies now existing with reference to separate Mahomedan electorate would be removed. The undesirability of getting Mahomedans elected by a mixed electorate was fully discussed in connection with the question of council reform, and the objection that Mahomedans so returned would not be true representatives of their community was fully accepted. I need not repeat those arguments.

Mahomedan  
representation.

In order to facilitate the return of representative men, where available, I would require no higher qualification from a candidate for election than from the electors.

Something more than a mere increase in the number of electors is necessary to ensure purity in elections. Corrupt practices have become very common and some drastic measures are necessary to check them. I would throw out the following suggestions for consideration :—

Corrupt  
practices.

- (a) The payment or the acceptance of any valuable consideration for a vote should be made a criminal offence;
- (b) Any voter proved to have accepted a money consideration for his vote and any candidate proved to have offered such a consideration, either by himself or through an agent, should be permanently, or for a period covering two or three elections, be disqualified either as a voter or as a candidate for election.

These may be considered very drastic, but I have reasons to think that corruption and bribery have been so rampant in some of the recent elections that very severe measures are called for. The prohibition against hiring a carriage for the elector to go to the voting station is in this country unnecessarily too stringent and may be relaxed. The rule is more honoured in the breach than in the observance.



Powers and functions of Legislative Councils.	<p>The time is yet distant when we could safely place the executive to any extent under the control of the Legislative Council, but a larger voice in the framing of the budget may without any great risk and under proper safeguards be conceded. I would also give greater facilities to non-official Members to introduce Bills in council. I would allow a private Bill to be presented to the council by a non-official Member, provided its principle is accepted and approved of by 12 other Members, provided also the Government of India and Secretary of State agree to its introduction which is an essential condition for the introduction of all Government Bills. I also think that any resolution, provided it is supported by three-fourths of the entire number of elected Members of council, should be binding on Government except as regards certain excluded matters. This would necessitate practical unanimity among Indian elected Members. Government nominations being reduced to a minimum, non-officials or minorities should have no claim to such nomination. Non-official should come through an electorate.</p>
Private Bills.	
Resolutions.	
Non-officials and nominations.	

#### EMPLOYMENT OF INDIANS.

I come last to the second road to the goal, namely, more responsible employment of Indians under Government. I would venture to make a few preliminary remarks. The dissatisfaction which exists among the educated Indians at the present moment is not to any considerable extent against the local self-government policy or against the constitution and powers of the existing Legislative Councils. What the educated Indian wants may be summed up in one word "equality"—equality between Europeans and Indians. Roughly speaking what is wanted is—

- (1) Equal laws and equal rights ;
- (2) Equal treatment, including equal opportunities for entrance into the public service.

The first will require a modification of the Arms Act and probably some alteration in the Code of the Criminal Procedure. I cannot at present think of any other, and this shows how few the inequalities in our laws are. The second is much more important. I may hope that as a result of the war and their comradeship in arms, Englishmen and Indians will think more kindly of each other and Englishmen will treat Indians with greater courtesy and consideration. The relation should be that of fellow-subjects. It is a common complaint that, apart from the question of treatment, English high officials are often inclined to favour their own countrymen even in the discharge of their official duties. I doubt if absolute equality in the matter is possible so long as all the high officials continue to be Europeans. Sympathy with one's own countrymen is a part of human nature and the only remedy is to have an equal

number of Indians and Europeans holding all important posts in the country. Indians would probably want something more than mere equality in this respect. They would contend that the administration is too costly on account of the large non-Indian element in it, and that the only solution is the employment of larger Indian agency. It is complained that the Europeans occupy too many of the superior posts in all the Departments of Government. The superior services are almost wholly manned by Europeans. In giving any concessions in the directions above indicated, the interest of all communities will have to be safeguarded. If, for instance, recruitment for the Indian Civil Service is to take place simultaneously in India and England by a competitive examination, there should be separate competition between Hindus and Mahomedans; otherwise the concession would lead to serious and even more dangerous discontent on the part of the Mahomedans. We have to safeguard Mahomedan interests not only in municipalities, in district boards and in Legislative Councils, but also in the matter of appointments in the public service. I have heard it often said that racial considerations must be put aside, and that for the public service we must secure the best qualified man available. This is far from being practical politics. Racial differences may gradually disappear, but the millennium is far from being in sight. In Bengal where the Mahomedans are a little more than half the total population, racial considerations cannot be put aside without courting the most disastrous consequences.

As regards the appointment of four Members to the Executive Council, I feel some hesitation in accepting it for Bengal, although I would not oppose it. If two Indians are appointed, one would naturally be a Hindu and another a Mahomedan. It is very likely that this will introduce an element of friction which is very undesirable. Besides it involves a waste of public money for which there may be no sufficient justification. I rather think that the number should be reduced to two so as to constitute a Council of three with the Governor. In that case the Indian Member will not be in the minority he is now and the Governor will hold the balance even between them. If the Governor has the desire to be just both to the Hindus and the Mahomedans it will not very much matter if the Indian Member for the time being is a Hindu or a Mahomedan. The Governor and his European colleague will be able to check any improper tendency on the part of the Indian Member, even assuming that an Indian exalted to the position of a Member of Council will be capable of being consciously unjust to the community other than his own. If Indians are to be given a larger share in the administration there should also be a larger number of Indian Members in the Council of His Excellency the Viceroy.

Executive  
Councils.

As I have said, the question of larger employment of Indians in the public service is far more important than any of the other proposals. If any promise is made regarding this, it has to be very definite. The words of the

Necessity for a  
definite policy.

Queen's Proclamation have been interpreted in a way that has taken away much from its real value. A mere pious expression of a wish regarding the future will not impress anybody. What is necessary, if the principle is accepted, is to lay down that a beginning shall at once be made in the matter of the Indian Civil Service and the number of Europeans appointed should be gradually diminished till a certain definite proportion is reached. I would suggest half and half as the most equitable. But a beginning should be made at once. If this is done, in the course of time there will perhaps be in all the higher posts half Indians and half Europeans. Nothing would strike the imagination of the people of Bengal more than the promulgation of a definite policy like the above.

The other urgent reforms as to which Indian public opinion has been more or less insistent are the following :—

- (1) Separation of Judicial and Executive functions ;
- (2) Increase in the number of Indian Judges of the High Court ;
- (3) Establishment of a Supreme Court of Appeal in India to take the place of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

There are other minor matters which I need not discuss.

S. HUDA.

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No. 7.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR EDWARD GAIT, K. C. S. I., C. I. E., Lieut.-Governor of Bihar and Orissa.

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*Govt. House, Ranchi, August 20th, 1916.*

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I have discussed with my Executive Council the questions referred to in Your Excellency's letter of July 20th and the annexed Memoranda, and enclose a note showing our views on the different points mentioned.

The Maharaja of Darbhanga had left for Simla before the note reached its final shape, but he was present at the preliminary discussions and concurred in all the conclusions arrived at.

He has just sent me two notes on points in which he is specially interested, *viz.*,—

- (1) the landholders' electorate, and (2) a proposed electorate for orthodox Hindus.

Typed copies of these notes are also enclosed.

I hope this will reach Your Excellency before the date mentioned in your letter. There has been some delay owing to our confidential printing being done at present in Bankipore.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) E. A. GAIT.

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[ *Confidential.* ]

NOTE BY THE LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR OF BIHAR AND ORISSA IN COUNCIL.

#### THE GOAL OF BRITISH RULE IN INDIA.

We all agree in the formula which has been drawn up to indicate this goal; but as it is necessarily couched in very general terms, we are doubtful as to the expediency of making it the subject of a public pronouncement which might give rise to misunderstanding and to expectations that cannot be fully realised at least for many years to come. It would be deliberately misinterpreted by advanced politicians.

## THE EMPLOYMENT OF INDIANS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICES.

We entirely agree with what has been said on this subject, but venture to doubt if the extended employment of Indians in the public services is the *only* way in which they can be fitted to take their proper part in a sound scheme of self-government.

## GENERAL PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD BE OBSERVED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.

We fully accept most of what is said on this subject on the understanding that time will be allowed, where necessary, in working up to the desired standard. For example, an enquiry was recently made in this province with a view to the further substitution of elected for nominated Chairmen of municipalities, with the result that the change was made in six municipalities only out of 27. Of the remainder, 15 municipal bodies themselves said that they preferred an official Chairman, while six were held to be too small and backward, or were divided into factions. There appears to be no necessity for forcing the change too quickly. Fresh enquiries can be made periodically with a view to a further advance when circumstances are favourable. We do not consider that the time is ripe for the appointment in Bihar and Orissa of non-official Chairmen of the district boards.

We are not in favour of a very low franchise for reasons that will be mentioned further on.

We accept the view that local bodies should be free from interference in matters of detail, but it must be remembered that in many cases, especially in the more backward municipalities, it is impossible without official pressure to get certain services properly performed throughout the town. In such cases it is not a question of letting the local bodies learn by experience, but rather of pressing them to do their duty in the interests of the general population. There is no reason why the outside control over local bodies in India should be weaker than that exercised by the Local Government Board in England. The power of dissolving a Municipal Council would be a valuable means of ensuring attention to the wishes of Government in cases where it is undesirable to take the extreme measure of suspending a municipality altogether.

The orders requiring local bodies to devote a definite portion of their ordinary revenues to particular objects of expenditure were withdrawn several years ago; but when the proceeds of the Public Works cess were handed over to district boards, it was stipulated that they should spend 10 per cent. of the amount on education and 15 per cent. on sanitation. This condition was imposed at the instance of the non-official Members of Council, who attach great importance to these objects, but recognise that individual boards find it

difficult to resist the temptation to starve them for the sake of better communications in their own districts. We think that there is no objection to conditions of this kind being attached to new grants when they are supported by public opinion.

The proposals regarding the creation of village *panchayats* are hardly applicable to Bihar and Orissa where there are no regular village communities. We have, in place of the village, the area under a *chaukidari panchayat*, which consists of several villages grouped together. A similar system of grouping has been adopted in the case of unions constituted under the Local Self-Government Act. We consider that it would be wiser, rather than to attempt any radical change for which there is no popular demand, to retain our existing *panchayats* and union committees and to devote our efforts to strengthening and amalgamating them, and entrusting them with the disposal of petty civil and criminal cases. It is understood that experiments in this direction are about to be made in Bengal, and we had intended to await their result before taking action ourselves.

#### THE DOMAIN OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

The Morley-Minto scheme has been in force for only seven years, and we consider that a very strong case would have to be made out to justify after so short a period any modification which would involve fresh legislation and the consequent re-opening of the whole question of their functions, powers and constitution. The scheme has in some parts (though not to any marked extent in Bihar and Orissa) failed to afford full satisfaction, because the educated classes feel that it does not in practice give them the additional influence which they anticipated over the course of legislation and the general administration of the country. This is due partly to the smallness of the present elected majority and to the non-official Members not having yet learnt their power, but it is also due very largely to the way in which some Governments have used their own powers. There is often a tendency to prune Bills of the features expected to arouse opposition before they are introduced in Council, and then to use the solid official vote to oppose all material amendments. If the said features were left in, the opposition in Council would (presumably) be concentrated on them, but in their absence other provisions are attacked by the non-official Members. These attacks are resisted, with the result that the Bills are carried very much in the form in which they are introduced. In these circumstances the non-official Members and their critics feel that their powers and influence are inconsiderable, and, to remedy this, they demand a large elected majority. Such a change, however, would be fraught with danger; and the proposals which have been made for augmenting the number of elected Councilors are accordingly coupled with proposals for modifications in the electorate, the object of which is to secure the election of more genuine representatives of the people, and to reduce the predominance of a single class,

*viz.*, that of the lawyer-politicians. It will appear further on that we are very doubtful whether the modifications proposed will have the desired result. Should they fail to do so, the position will be an increasingly difficult one, for it will be impossible to retrace our steps.

In our opinion it would be far better to avoid making any radical change in the constitution of the Councils, but, on the other hand, to increase the influence of the non-official Members in the Councils as now constituted by making a radical change in procedure. Bills should be drafted solely with a view to the object aimed at, leaving the pruning which is needed to render them acceptable to be done openly in Council, instead of at an earlier stage behind the scenes. Further, when Bills are introduced in Council, the official Members should be left free to vote as they think fit, save in those very exceptional cases where a measure or a clause is one of really vital importance. Finally, as explained further on, the non-resident official Members should be required to attend Council Meetings only on special occasions, so that ordinarily the non-officials would be in a considerable majority. It is possible that in some cases this procedure might lead to the maiming of a measure, or even to its withdrawal; but except in the special cases mentioned above, the political advantage of letting the elected Members and the people behind them feel that they have attained a position of real influence, representing a distinct advance towards the

\* This procedure would also give more reality to the voting. At present, rather than incur unpopularity, non-official Members sometimes vote contrary to their interests, relying on the solid official vote to secure the decision which they really desire.

desired goal of self-government, would far outweigh its administrative inconveniences.\* A few successes of this kind would go much further towards satisfying the aspirations of the educated classes than fresh constitutional changes, fenced about with precautions designed, more or less obviously, to minimise their practical effect. On the other hand, if Government persistently uses all its resources to defeat the popular vote, the demand for an increase in the relative strength of that vote will continue to gain force. The people of India will never be satisfied, until they enjoy a large measure of self-government; and it is, we submit, far better that they should enjoy it in the manner indicated, when the Executive Government will still have a reserve of power for use in emergencies, than that we should hasten

† Apart from the obvious objections to the frequent use of the veto, it must be remembered that the main difficulty to contend with would be the refusal of the Councils to pass necessary legislation. We believe that this difficulty has already arisen in more than one province, and it will arise more frequently with each increase in the strength of the non-official majority. The remedy of passing such legislation in the Imperial Council would give rise to serious opposition, even if (which we doubt) it be possible to retain indefinitely an official majority in that Council.

limit of safety being thereby reached or exceeded) it would make further

down the dangerous path of increasing the elected majority which will sooner or later get beyond control, and beat down all the safeguards which may be devised to prevent it from doing so.† Nor must it be forgotten that a rapid advance within so short a period would, on the one hand, arouse hopes of continued progress at the same pace, while on the other (the

progress impossible for a long time to come. The position a few years hence would thus become a very difficult one.

Apart from the change suggested above in the treatment of the Legislative Councils, we think that much might be done towards meeting India aspirations by removing some of the grievances, the existence of which has given strength to the demands for self-government, that is to say—

- (1) by securing for India a more assured place in the Councils of the Empire;
- (2) by giving her greater fiscal independence, *e. g.*, in the matter of the excise duty on cotton manufactures; and
- (3) by a distinct advance in the direction of provincial autonomy.

We have suggested further on, though with diffidence, the possible extension of the functions of the Finance Committee to advising on new schemes requiring the sanction of the Government of India before they are submitted to that Government.

We are strongly of opinion that the main lines of advance should follow the directions indicated above, and that no changes of a general nature should be made in the existing constitutions of the Legislative Councils. Circumstances differ greatly in different provinces, and changes which might safely be made in one province might be harmful or even dangerous in another. We see no objection, however, to cautious alterations in the Regulations framed under the Councils Act of 1909 in individual provinces where the Local Government considers that a further advance can safely be made. In Bihar and Orissa there are at present, in addition to the three ordinary Members, 15 nominated officials, four nominated non-officials and 21 elected Members, including the two representatives of special electorates. We should be prepared (if pressed) to raise the number of elected Members to 23, but further than this we are convinced that it would not be safe to go. It must be remembered that, although the representatives of the existing special electorates in this Province will ordinarily support the Government, they cannot be relied on to do so in any particular case. It must also be remembered that at least two of our present nominated Members will as a rule vote with their elected colleagues. We would not reduce the number of nominated Members, but we would dispense with the attendance of four of the nominated officials (Commissioners of Divisions) who are not resident at head-quarters, save at the budget debate and on other occasions of a special nature, *e. g.*, where their local knowledge will enable them to intervene usefully in debate, or where a measure of crucial importance is under discussion. The four non-official nominations, which we at present have, are needed for the representation of special interests.



The two new elected Members might be provided for—

- (1) by creating at once the University electorate constituted as proposed below; and
- (2) by creating a new electorate for commerce and industry. There is no Chamber of Commerce in Bihar and Orissa, but the franchise might be given to persons paying a substantial income tax on their profits from commerce and industries.

The Hon'ble Maharaja Bahadur of Darbhanga would prefer to substitute for the second of these proposed new electorates one to provide a representative of orthodox Hindus. He points out that the great bulk of the Hindus are orthodox, while the lawyer-politicians are very much the reverse. This is undoubtedly the case, but we foresee difficulties in constituting a suitable electorate.

We think it absolutely essential that the various classes in the population should be represented in the Council; and for this reason alone we should disagree entirely with the proposal to sweep away the present class electorates and substitute territorial units. It is suggested that this change would make the elected Members more truly representative, and would remove the predominance of the lawyer class. We are convinced that, in our own province at least, the result would be precisely the reverse, and that it would lead to the disappearance from the Council of all genuine representatives of the landholders and to a greater predominance than ever of lawyer-politicians. No large landholder or other person of good social position in this country would care to face a contested election with a lawyer-politician, partly because he would consider it inconsistent with his dignity and would shrink from the personalities to which he would be subjected in such a contest, partly because he would not be prepared to descend to the methods of canvassing employed by such persons, and partly because he would realise that he could not hope to compete with the powerful electioneering machinery at the disposal of lawyer-politicians in the shape of the bar libraries at district and sub-divisional headquarters, and the various means which the legal fraternity possess of influencing voters through their clients, touts and other agents. Apart from this, it is most important to maintain continuity of policy. The system of a franchise based on classes and interests was adopted after prolonged consideration as that best suited to Indian conditions, and we should deprecate a radical change, even if the objections to such a change were not so serious as we conceive them to be.

We would also deprecate greatly any considerable lowering of the franchise. It appears to be thought that this measure would render it less easy for candidates to employ undesirable methods of canvassing. This idea is entirely at variance with our experience of the elective system in this country.

Even in the present electorates for landholders and Mahomedans, where the franchise is fairly high, many of those who possess it take no interest in the elections and fail to record their votes, while most of those who do, are influenced less by the merits or views of the candidates than by personal considerations and by inducements of all kinds. The following extract from a note by Mr. Oldham, Officiating Member of the Board of Revenue, is a statement of notorious facts:—

“The further down in the scale of social rank and means of livelihood that the franchise goes, the more readily amenable to such influences will the electors be; and a larger number of votes will be procurable at a smaller cost. It is possible that the Government are not fully aware of the extent to which such “influences” are everywhere used. I have myself once actually seen the

\* For election to the Bengal Legislative Council.

(Sd.) E. A. G.

net bags full of the metallic influence in the carriage of a canvassing candidate,\* who was going round to secure votes; and candidates have often spoken to me of the heavy expenditure they have to incur in this way. Among themselves and their friends candidates openly discuss the possibilities of election on a basis of monetary cost, and they can state the current price of a vote of a member of a particular class.”

The existence of malpractices at municipal elections in this province had become so notorious that a Resolution was recently carried in the Provincial Legislative Council, at the instance of a non-official Member, recommending Government to appoint a committee to enquire into the matter and suggest a remedy. A committee was accordingly appointed under the presidency of the Hon'ble Maharaja Bahadur of Darbhanga, and one of its main recommendations was that the amount of tax qualifying for the municipal franchise should be doubled.

It follows, from what has been said above, that we do not approve of any material alteration in the franchise of the existing landholders' electorate. This is the one electorate in which at present lawyers have no chance, but if it were extended in the manner proposed in Memorandum B, we are confident that a genuine representative of the landholders would seldom, if ever, succeed at the polls.

Nor do we think that any useful purpose would be served by the possible alternative course of replacing the district board electorate by one of minor landholders and substantial raiyats. It is true that the district boards in Bihar and Orissa almost invariably elect lawyers, and never representatives of the raiyats, but we have little doubt that this would still be the case if a raiyati franchise were created. No member of the agricultural community could compete with the lawyers' electioneering machinery, and we see no reason, therefore, for making a change, the object of which would be easily understood, and

which would on that account tend to minimise the satisfaction with which any concessions which may be made would be regarded. The only way of securing genuine representatives of the raiyats is by nomination.

We are not in favour of any change in the system of electing representatives of municipalities; but we think that, if any lowering of the franchise is considered essential, this is the electorate in which the experiment would be attended with the smallest amount of risk. From this point of view we should not object to the representatives of municipalities being elected direct by persons who pay a substantial house tax or its equivalent.

There is a good deal to be said theoretically in favour of the extension of the franchise in the University electorate, but if all registered graduates of five years' standing were given the vote, there would be a great danger of mere politicians being elected, to the exclusion of men capable of representing the real interests of the University. On the whole we should be disposed to extend the franchise only to registered graduates of ten years' standing. We think that this extension would render it unnecessary to accept a purely educational test as an independent qualification for other electorates.

We agree that the plural vote, which Mahomedans at present enjoy, should be abolished, and that their representation should be secured in the manner proposed in paragraph 12 (V) of Memorandum B.

We do not see the advantage of associating two or three non-official Members of the Council with the Government as advisers in the preparation of the provincial budget as a whole. Arrangements have already been made in this Province for a preliminary meeting of the Finance Committee in December before the budget takes shape, and this gives the members of this Committee greater influence than they previously had in the distribution of the money available for optional expenditure. We have also agreed in future to allow a few days' interval between the introduction of the budget and its discussion in Council, in order to give non-official Members time to consider the observations made in the speech of the Financial Member when introducing the budget, before drafting their Resolutions. So far as is known, our non-official Members are fully satisfied with the procedure as thus modified; and in any case, we fail to see that any useful object would be attained by encouraging them to discuss the allocation of funds to objects to which Government is already committed.

If any further extension of the powers of the Finance Committee is considered essential, we think it might perhaps be found in requiring the Local Government to refer to them for advice all schemes requiring the sanction of the Government of India on financial grounds before they are submitted to that Government, and to append the opinion of the Committee to the letter

in which the sanction of the Supreme Government is sought. This however would be an important new departure which would require very careful examination.

We have recently agreed to place the answers to questions on the table half-an-hour before Council meets, so as to give Members time to consider the answers and to ask supplementary questions if they wish to do so. We are not aware of any irksome restraints on the right of interpellation or of moving Resolutions.

We do not approve of the suggestion that the Head of the Province may exercise a partial veto on legislation, as it might sometimes happen that the deletion of a section or clause would materially alter the character of the Act, *e. g.*, by removing a safeguard which the non-official Members of Council regarded as essential. There would be a distinct advantage in Government being given power to dissolve a recalcitrant Council, but there is the danger that such a provision would tend to change the present status of the Councils and to assimilate it to that of a House of Representatives.

E. A. GAIT,

*Lieutenant-Governor.*

20th August 1916.

NOTE BY THE HON'BLE MAHARAJA BAHADUR OF DARBHANGA ON A PROPOSED NEW ELECTORATE TO PROVIDE A REPRESENTATIVE OF ORTHODOX HINDUS.

The followers of the Sanatana Dharma, *i. e.*, orthodox Hindus who follow the ancestral faith, custom, observances and usages of their ancestors, form the largest and most substantial portion of the Indian population. A very large proportion of the aristocracy and great zamindars, bankers and leading merchants are orthodox. The landed classes, agriculturists, labourers and artisans and wage-earners are orthodox almost to a man. The same might be said of the Hindu soldiers in the Indian Army. A very large proportion of the Sikhs are also followers of the Sanatana Dharma.

It is only amongst the members of the learned professions, such as teachers, pleaders, lawyers and officials that we find persons belonging to the heterodox class or following the different Samajas that have cropped up in recent years, such as the Arya Samaj, the Brahma Samaj, Deva Samaj, Theosophy, the Khalsa Sikhs and other less known schismatic bodies. These at best form an infinitesimal section of the population. There is a very marked divergence of views and very little in common as regards social and religious beliefs and sentiments amongst the orthodox and the heterodox Hindus and yet we have to submit to

the latter filling all official posts, all seats in the Councils and posing as our representatives, and in some cases acting in opposition to our principles and our interests. This very anomalous condition of things does not only give rise to an unconscious state of aloofness from Government, but it breeds a spirit of apathy and discontent which greatly stands in the way of their being useful subjects of the Empire. The principle of giving separate representation, where a marked divergence of religious belief occurs, has been recognised by Government in the case of separate representation to the followers of Islam, and it seems obviously a matter of fairness and justice that the interest of the 180 millions of the loyal and devoted subjects of His Majesty should be represented in the Imperial and Provincial Councils.

That the orthodox community is deserving of kindly consideration at the hands of our Government needs hardly to be pointed out in so many words. They are unquestionably loyal; it is a cardinal point of our creed (*in vernacular*) that the King is the representative of God amongst men. Their almanacs give the auspicious days on which a subject should do (*in vernacular*) (see his Sovereign.) Their traditions and customs point to the same direction. No considerations similar to Pan-Islamism have any weight with them. They are forbidden to cross the sea or intermarry with any other race or people of any other clime, and hence their interests and hopes are wholly and absolutely confined to India. They are constitutionally averse to anything like sedition, anarchy or any foreign innovations which have been grafted in this country from the Nihilists of Europe, and they have a horror of disturbance of any kind. The agitator has as yet found no root amongst them and I take it, will find none in the future if Government extends its hands towards them and shows them that they have nothing to gain by following the lead of the new politician.

It would not be difficult to find a constituency if the principle is admitted that the followers of the Sanatana Dharma should have some place in the Councils of the Imperial and Local Governments. There are the great spiritual and sacerdotal heads like the three Shankaracharyas of Shringari Math (South India), Govardhan Math (Puri), Sarada Math (Western India), the great heads of the Vaishnava Sampradayas, the leading Abbots (Mahanths) who are scattered all over India, the great *Pandits* of Mithila (Tirhoot in Bihar), Nadia in Bengal, Benares (United Provinces), Nasik in Bombay, Kanjivaram and Tanjore (in Madras), &c. These *Pandits* give *vyavasthas* (rulings) in social and religious questions, and these practically govern the socio-religious affairs of the society. The leading high class Hindu men are looked upon as leaders of the Sanatana Dharma. If the principle is accepted, the Government may commence by nomination in the first instance and substitute election after the system has received a few years' trial.

I am confident that the Sanatana Dharma will, if the sympathy and support of the Government is extended, justify such treatment in good work and in loyal devotion to our Imperial Master and Sovereign.

This note has been submitted with reference to representation to the whole of India; but my remarks are specially applicable to the people of my own province where the Hindus form a very great majority over the followers of any other religion, and where amongst Hindus the followers of the Sanatana Dharma would be about 90 per cent. and the followers of the schismatic sects or heterodox classes are not likely to be more than 2 or 3 per cent. of the Hindu population of Bihar and Orissa.

NOTE BY THE HON'BLE MAHARAJA BAHADUR OF DARBHANGA ON THE POSITION OF  
THE GREAT LANDOWNERS.

I would make a few observations regarding the position of the aristocracy and of landholders generally in the province. Owing to reasons which it would be profitless to enumerate, the landed classes, who were a few decades ago looked upon as the natural leaders of the people have, during the last 60 years, been kept back with the inevitable result that they have greatly fallen in importance, prestige and position and, if nothing is done to check the present march of events, the day is not far distant when they will be compelled by force of circumstances to sink altogether into the background or to cast their lot with the Vakil-Raj and to accept whatever position the learned professions may be pleased to give to them.

The proposed territorial system will still further reduce their importance, and the system of landholders' electorates, if the franchise is greatly reduced, will scarcely benefit them. While it is possible that, for the first few elections in Bengal, Bihar and the United Provinces, a few zamindars may get in, there is hardly any chance of any zamindar getting in when the caucus organisation of the pleader class is perfected. A survey of the situation and of the condition of the landholders will show that the legal profession will practically command all the seats.

The landed classes are mostly uneducated and ignorant; they have no organisation fit to cope with the other one, most of them are entirely led by their legal advisers. The great Landholders' Associations in Bengal and Bihar have got a number of members of the legal professions in them who exercise a very effective control which renders any independent thought or action on the part of the zamindars impracticable and useless. They are afraid of offending the pleaders or of standing in their way for various reasons, whereas, on the other hand, the lawyers have a well-organised caucus in the great cities with ramifications in the districts and sub-divisions which needs very little to make it practically irresistible, and it makes itself felt in every part of a province. It

will be much easier for a member of the caucus to get in where there is an extended electorate and the electors live at great distances from each other, as he can influence them through the members of the caucus in the different towns and sub-divisions, while the candidate, who has no great organisations to back him, will be left to his own unaided resources. The difficulty is further enhanced by the fact of the legal profession having the newspapers with them. These newspapers exercise a most effective influence by the way in which they can praise candidates who belong to the caucus and cry down those that refuse or neglect to join it. They are still further aided by having most of the platform orators with them.

The landed classes are uncertain as to whether they can look for any countenance or support from Government officials when they are unfortunate enough to fall out with the members of the legal profession. The result will be that the more they find that their chances are removed, the more they will hold themselves aloof or follow the guidance and lead of the barristers and pleaders in their districts.

It is impossible for the aristocracy or the landed classes generally to regain any portion of their lost influence and prestige, and the power to serve their country and their Emperor and to do justice to the position which they have inherited, unless they receive the countenance and the sympathy of Government in the future. Rightly or wrongly the belief has gained ground that the policy of Government was at one time to suppress the landed classes. I would impress most strongly upon Government the necessity of Government officials taking them by their hand and encouraging them, and I have no doubt that they will rise to the occasion. The landed classes have now to make their choice as to two alternatives: should they be loyal to the British connection or to the Vakil-Raj? It is impossible for them to stand much longer on their own legs. There is little doubt as to where their inclinations will lead them, but circumstances are stronger than desires, and they cannot follow their inclinations unless they receive the support of Government in no stinted measure.

It is simply because they have a very large status in the country that the Princes of India have behaved so nobly during the war. It is for the same reason that the aristocracy and landed classes have come forward with their offers to help all great movements connected with the relief of the wounded and the sick. Their purse has ever been open; and they are by their traditions extremely loyal. They have no ties, or foreign influence, beckoning them to take their part in anything beyond the boundaries of the Indian Empire, and they will cheerfully respond to any confidence shown to them, or any boon conferred on them by the Government by giving the most cordial co-operation to Government and by loyal devotion to the British connection.

FROM THE HON'BLE LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR GEORGE ROOS-KEPPEL, K. C. S. I.,  
K. C. I. E., Chief Commr. and Agent to the Govr.-Genl., N.-W. F. Province.

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*Camp, August 20th, 1916.*

[ Very Secret. ]

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I beg to thank you for your letter of July the 20th and for the honour you have done me in allowing me this opportunity of expressing my views on the very important questions raised therein—questions in which I have taken a very keen interest throughout my 30 years' service in India.

I fully agree that it is desirable to decide as far as possible the future policy of the Government of India, and that the present time is peculiarly appropriate for its consideration; we must, however, bear in mind that such a policy should be elastic and not too definite, as no ruler can for any considerable time unalterably maintain and carry out his original intentions, as he finds himself in the presence of situations which are always changing and of life and growth which must cause him to vary his course.

While I am in the fullest sympathy with Your Excellency's desire to define the future policy of Government, I must confess some doubts as to the desirability or expediency of its promulgation. Policy in India, as elsewhere, however definitely laid down, reacts to the character and views of the rulers for the time being and to popular movements which find their expression in political agitation by the ruled. Probably in no country in the world under civilised Government is the even course subject to such violent political crises as in India—crises which often demand immediate administrative action and which in their results modify profoundly the policy of Government. We need not look very far back for illustrations of this thesis, the last three Viceroyalties could hardly have been held by rulers more different in opinion, and the combined period of their Viceroyalties has been marked by the very rapid growth of political parties in India and by events connected with this growth which have from time to time profoundly modified the policy of Government.

With an administration which in the ultimate resort depends upon the varying fortunes of political parties in the United Kingdom, it must be impracticable for even the supreme authority to ensure that a particular policy will prevail in the future in all circumstances or that the rate at which effect will be given to it will not be so retarded as to amount to its practical negation. Subsequent administrations may find it difficult to live up to public declarations of policy



and to satisfy claims aroused by such declarations and the necessity of explaining away what have been accepted as definite pledges is much to be deplored. The conclusion appears to be that the fewer of such declarations that are made the fewer difficulties there will be in the way of the official heirs of any administration.

Perhaps the chief consideration in this connection, and certainly the one which most closely touches us, is the manner in which the declaration outlined by Your Excellency will be received in the country. The formula suggested is in itself irreproachable. Will it be accepted as a pledge of real advance and greeted cordially as a proof of our adherence to the principle of Indian nationality or will it at best be regarded as a vague promise for which no particular gratitude is due or at worst be resented as a warning? I fear that educated opinion will discern in the proposed announcement a resemblance to the celebrated proclamation of 1858 (which confirmed the engagement in the Charter Act of 1833 and was itself reaffirmed by the statement of 1870) with regard to the employment of Indians in the service of the Crown. No apology is needed for the repetition of the oft-quoted words of the proclamation:—

“It is our solemn will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our services, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability and integrity to discharge.”

These are noble words, but in Indian eyes the value of the great boon thus announced has since depended entirely on the interpretation of the latter part of the sentence and it is probable that there is nothing in the English language which has during the last 50 years been the subject of so much controversy. In the same way the suggested promise to endow India “with the largest measure of self-government compatible with the maintenance of the supremacy of of British rule” is framed so as to contain the usual precautionary qualification, which in one form or another can hardly be omitted in any public pronouncement on the subject. It is just the crucial question of how much self-government is consistent with the maintenance of our supremacy which has always divided Government and Indian publicists and representative institutions, and I fear that Indians would consider no definite political advancement to be accorded by the declaration.

I have for many years held that our policy should be to take Indians into partnership in the administration, instead of merely granting them subordinate employment with status and pay which no European would accept, to remove much of the existing interference by Government in domestic matters and non-essentials and to aim at the greatest happiness of the greatest number, showing less regard than hitherto to the selfish cries of the professional politician. I thus welcome the three roads of advance mentioned by Your Excellency, though I should prefer to place the second road first, as I consider it the most important.

With regard to the second road of advance, *viz.*, the domain of more responsible employment of Indians under the Government, I regret to note that Your Excellency finds yourself limited to pious aspirations, as I consider that this is not only the most important of the three questions referred to, but that it is also the most easily carried into effect. I have now had more than eight years' experience of the administration of the North-West Frontier Province—a small Province it is true, but the microcosm of a greater—and I should welcome the experiment of throwing open a proportion of the posts of all grades in the Frontier Province to Indians, giving them the same pay and status as when these posts are held by Europeans. The present time appears to be very suitable for making the experiment. All leave has been closed during the war, and after peace is declared there will be a great rush to take furlough, we shall be very short of officers, and Indian Deputy Commissioners, Political Agents and Judges can be introduced, not only with a minimum of friction, but with a maximum of convenience. Six years ago I made some tentative proposals in this sense, but they were defeated by the opposition of the Foreign Department to the admission of Indians into their ranks, but the time has now come when the Department must accept this innovation.

Your Excellency has stated in your letter your very definite intention of seeing the aspirations of Indians for more responsible employments realised in fact and, nearing as I am the end of my official life, it would give me the greatest pleasure to assist in this generous reform before I leave India.

Although I have placed the second of Your Excellency's three roads first, I am not less warmly in sympathy with the other two, which entirely fit in with my conception of a partnership with Indians.

Local self-government in the North-West Frontier Province is still in its childhood, if not in its infancy, but its principle harmonises with the genius of the people, and we should remember that the advent of British rule is comparatively recent, there being still many men living in the province who remember the Sikh and Durani times, when the people managed their own affairs with little or no interference, subject to the payment of very roughly assessed taxes. Thus in introducing real in place of nominal local self-government we are not making an entirely new experiment, but are attempting to revive a system which is dormant, but by no means dead. During the first seventy-five years of the last century the various authorities—Afghan, Sikh or British—took practically complete control of the cities, but in rural areas there was little or no interference, as the Pathan system of the government of villages or groups of villages by local Khans, supported by landholding elders, which the various conquerers found in existence, provided a rough but effective method of administration. Each Khan and his elders was responsible for the quota of land revenue due from his area; if he failed to pay, troops were usually sent to his village which was burned or looted, but, provided

that he paid fairly regularly, which most did, there was practically no interference with internal affairs. The administration, policing and development of rural tracts was left entirely to the Khans, the local Governor confining himself to making main roads, &c., more with a view to military necessities than with any altruistic idea of benefiting the population, the minor evils of centralisation were avoided and the people were on the whole quite contented to be let alone. This system is attractive in many ways, but its obvious drawback is that under it no effort was made by the central authority to benefit the population by the development of the natural resources of the country, that the welfare of each village or group of villages depended on the individuality of the local Khan, and that no combined effort could be made to improve sanitary conditions, to develop trade, to spread education, or generally to ameliorate the condition of the people. It is thus incompatible with our aims, but there is no doubt that the old system of non-interference was more popular than the rather elaborate methods now in force.

In the early days of British rule in the trans-Indus tracts our administrators accepted conditions as they found them and inaugurated a paternal system of administration, living usually on tour and acting as the friend and adviser of the people, as arbiter in disputes and as the ultimate court of appeal. The districts which now form part of the North-West Frontier Province belonged in those days and for half a century afterwards to the Punjab and, with the development of the Punjab Government and the consequent ever-increasing centralisation, local administrators became more and more tied to offices, with the result that paternal administration, which was particularly suited to the country, gradually died out. As an attempt to regain touch and again to interest the leaders of the people in the administration tentative measures of local self-government were introduced. These have been fairly successful in urban areas in spite of their limitation, but they have certainly been a failure outside the towns, despite the fact that in rural areas a tribal organisation still exists which should have made for success. The reasons for these opposite results may be presumed to be that in the cities Councils have worked under the immediate eye of the Deputy Commissioner who has always been the President of each municipality and has taken an interest in it and fostered its growth, whereas district boards have been large and unwieldy, the members widely scattered and each indifferent to the needs of any but his own immediate area; financial powers have been ludicrously small and adequate supervision and aid has been impossible.

By the gradual introduction of the elective principle, alterations in the status and composition of municipal councils and boards, the grant of wider powers, financial and executive, and a real advance in decentralisation, it is I believe possible to make local self-government more successful and far more appreciated than it is at present. I will not burden this letter with the details of my suggestions, but attach them in the form of a note (marked X).

We now come to the domain of the Legislative Councils, Provincial and Imperial. I may begin by stating that I consider that the time has come for the creation of a Legislative Council for the North-West Frontier Province and for the representation of the province by other than European officials in the Imperial Legislative Council. It may be said that legislation affecting this province alone is rare, and that it is taken charge of by the Foreign Department, but it must be remembered that its people are affected by all general legislation, and that it would be advantageous to obtain the best local opinion on any such at the time of its proposal. Also, on the separation from the Punjab of the tract which now forms the North-West Frontier Province, very distinct pledges were given to its inhabitants that they would not suffer in any way by the partition. That they have suffered in some ways is indisputable and amongst their losses I should include the fact that their leaders are debarred from the status and the semblance of power enjoyed by men of not greater standing, wealth, intelligence or education in the Legislative Councils of other provinces. What is however, in my opinion, a stronger argument than the above is the real need of some advisory body in touch with the people and intimately acquainted with the tradition of the administration. I myself have often felt the need of a body of counsellors representing all points of view, but I have been in what is now the Frontier Province for more than a quarter of a century and during that period have made many intimate friends whom I consult freely and whose advice has saved me from many bad mistakes. But the fault of the Frontier Province is the over-centralisation which appears to be inevitable under the present system, though it may be partially due to the perhaps excessive length of my tenure of my present appointment. Be this as it may, I am convinced that a select body drawn from all parts of the province and representing all interests would be of great value to my successor for purposes of informal consultation, as I presume that there could be no objection to using the Legislative Council informally as an advisory body on all questions affecting the people. In its early stages such a Council would necessarily be nominated, but when the elective principle has been established in the realm of local self-government, there would be no difficulty in extending it with reasonable safeguards to the Provincial Legislative Council. It would, I think, be advantageous to allow the latter to elect one of its members (an Indian) to the Imperial Legislative Council in addition to the official Member already nominated from the province.

Neither of the interesting Memoranda on the possible progress of Legislative Councils enclosed in Your Excellency's letter can be said to err on the side of rash experiment. "C" differs from "B", chiefly in the proposals for territorial constituencies. It dismisses the enlargement of the constitutional powers of the Councils as too dangerous and this is not discussed in "B". In both Memoranda emphasis is placed on the necessity for remodelling representation, broadening the basis of the franchise and increasing the elected element in the Councils. In both the plural representation of Mahomedans is

objected to and the excessive representation of lawyers under the present system is pointed out. It will always be impossible to go as far as the extremists wish in the direction of autonomy, but I cannot help thinking that the proposals which are supported in both Memoranda are quite inadequate, having regard to the wide ambitions and high aspirations which we have been responsible for arousing. With the exception of the increase of the elective majority in Provincial Councils, none of the proposals appear seriously to have been asked for either by the Congress, the Muslim League or the spokesmen of the educated classes. The extension of the franchise, so far as I am aware, is not seriously wanted by any political party, while the proposals for the reorganisation of the constitutional Councils, though a necessary feature in any scheme of reform, are by themselves of such a nature that they are likely to be lost in a cloud of complicated regulations, as they contain nothing to strike the popular imagination or to be easily understood by the people. The circumstances of the time do not appear to warrant this ultra caution, the interests of the Government and of the Indian Empire would probably be served better by a definite forward move, and I should advocate not only an increase in the elected element, but also an enlargement of constitutional powers in the direction of freedom of debate in all the Councils, as, while this would be very widely appreciated, I do not think that with reasonable safeguards it would involve any appreciable risk.

I would place in the forefront of any scheme of reform the proper representation of those classes who have really a stake in the maintenance of political equilibrium of the country and a reduction of the absurdly disproportionate representation of the professional *litterati*. The considered opinions of the Secretary of State in 1907 and of the Government of India in 1908 that "representation by classes and interests is the only practical method of embodying the elective principle in the constitution of the Indian Legislative Councils" appear to me to be unanswerable.

Speaking as I do for a constituency of some four million Mahomedans, I must take exception to the proposals in Memorandum "C" to abolish the special representation of Mahomedans. The arguments in paragraph 9 of the Memorandum are plausible, but they will not bear examination; had we a clean sheet, the point might be appropriately debated, but the principle of the separate representation of the Mahomedan minorities has been fully conceded and, apart from the obvious undesirability of constantly upsetting today the decisions of yesterday, the withdrawal of this boon would be most deeply resented and would universally be regarded as a breach of faith. The entry of the Mahomedan minority into the political arena may be said to date from 1906—the year of their deputation to the Viceroy—and during the ten years of their organised political life they have conducted themselves with marked moderation—contrasting in this respect favourably with Hindu party. They

know themselves to be at a disadvantage with the quicker-witted and more numerous Hindus, who have been politically organised for thirty years in respect of ability to secure either political advantages or Government employment and the withdrawal of a privilege, which was formally conceded ten years ago and which was believed to be permanent, for no special reason except an abstract desire to restore apparent symmetry to the electorate, would cause deep and justified dissatisfaction. The present time seems exceptionally unsuitable for the commission of an act of even apparent injustice. Owing to the war with Turkey the position of the Mahomedan community has been a very difficult one, and in spite of the strain upon Musalmans caused by this war they have, in the words of the Government of India, shown "loyalty, caution and forbearance", but they certainly have an uneasy feeling that the Hindu is now the "favourite wife" of the Government of India—a position occupied ten years ago by their community and again ten years before that by the Hindus. Thus the Musalman community is at present nervous and on the look-out for slights and for what it might consider as acts of official vengeance. As I have said above, I consider that it would be a great mistake to tamper with this Musalman minority representation, and that the proposal should be dropped. Plural voting exists in England and in many other countries and, though it is obnoxious to the symmetrical mind, it does remarkably little harm. The Mahomedan minority in India requires constant protection both as regards representation and employment, and in this connection I would venture to quote an extract from a book by my friend, M. Joseph Chailly (*L'Inde Britannique*), in which that acute but not unfriendly critic of our administration sums up in lively and picturesque language the result of the domination of the Hindu *literati* to the detriment of the ruling classes, including Mahomedans—

"In the conflict over Government employment which has now lasted for a quarter of a century between Hindus and Musalmans the Musalmans are incontestably right. I am certainly no enemy of the literary classes, the students and the babus. If one of these were to go to France to make an enquiry into the state of things there, I should probably be classed by him among the babus of that country \* \* \* But to give the administration entirely over to these *literati*, to exclude from it almost all the representatives of the ancient ruling classes of India, who would be left a prey to rancorous discontent, as well as the enormous and humble mass of the people is more than a mistake. It is a political blunder of the worst description, utterly unjustifiable on the part of a people who were themselves for so long a purely aristocratic nation."

Before closing this letter I venture to suggest that the association with Government of the princely houses and the feudal aristocracy of India might be considered once again as a part of any scheme for improving the representation of the responsible classes and introducing a steadying element into the

administration. The practical difficulties in the way of the formation of an Advisory Council to the Viceroy, consisting of Ruling Chiefs and territorial magnates (to whom I would add the great religious leaders of India) are surely capable of solution, although the scheme was dropped in 1908. Were it a question between such a Council and the Imperial Legislative Council, I should unhesitatingly choose the latter, as the former alone would be looked upon as a sham, but I can see no disadvantages and many advantages in having both.

Whatever may be said to the contrary, India is working towards autonomy—we hope autonomy within the Empire—and the Minto-Morley reforms have sown the seed of a representative Government which must come some day, though that day may be a century hence. Representative Government is the lodestar of all Indian opinion, every political reform or concession is a step towards it and, in the direction in which Indian polity is developing, the existence of an aristocratic upper house, composed of men with a great stake in the country and conservative in feeling, may prove of incalculable value to the Government of India, while at worst it can, as far as it is possible to see, do no harm.

I must apologise to Your Excellency for the imperfections of this letter which has been written under circumstances of some difficulty, as I am cut off from much consultation or reference, and I hope that you will excuse the frankness of the expression of my opinion on these important and controversial subjects.

Believe me, &c.,

(Sd.) G. ROOS-KEPPEL.

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[*SECRET.*]

# I.—GENERAL PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD BE OBSERVED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.

*With reference to His Excellency's Secret Memorandum A.*

I am in full agreement with the principles enunciated in the first three paragraphs, with the reservation that the education of local bodies by encouraging them to learn by making mistakes and profiting by them must necessarily be limited to the less expensive mistakes.

*With reference to paragraph 4.*—I am in favour of the gradual introduction of election to replace nomination in municipal councils. This is provided for in the Punjab Municipal Act of 1911, but hitherto all appointments in this province have been made by nomination. For the purposes of this note I will deal with the Peshawar District alone; it is the most important district in

wealth and population in the province and the system introduced in Peshawar can conveniently be taken as a model for the other districts, there being no marked dissimilarity in conditions. In the Municipal Committee of the Peshawar city we have at present fourteen non-official members, of whom seven are Musalmans and seven Hindus. This proportion has been found to work well in practice, although Musalmans are in a majority of about 77 per cent., as the wealth and intelligence of the Hindu minority places them on an equality of interest with the Musalman majority. I am quite prepared to introduce the elective principle in the Peshawar Municipality at an early date, but it would probably be wiser to introduce it gradually rather than to throw open the whole of these 14 seats to election at once. The Hindu franchise would, in the beginning, be most conveniently limited to those who pay income-tax, but the Musalman franchise is more difficult, and perhaps its best solution would be to enfranchise those who own in the city houses of a certain value or occupy houses of a certain rental, as many Masalmans of good position have little or no cash income, but live in Peshawar and obtain their requirements in kind from the lands or villages which they own in the district. The elected Municipal Commissioners would be most conveniently distributed in pairs amongst the different wards of the city, *i. e.*, one Musalman and one Hindu to each ward. Steps have been taken to reduce the official element in the Peshawar Municipality; a minimum proportion of non-officials—two-thirds—is fixed by law, and as a matter of practice officials rarely vote on municipal affairs, but usually confine themselves to giving advice. If, therefore, officials were merely nominated to the Municipal Committee without the right to vote, I should not anticipate any evil consequences, though perhaps in the experimental stages of the introduction of the elective principle it might be wiser to reserve the power to vote to the official members, instructing them not to exercise this power in ordinary cases.

The existing machinery of the municipalities of this province lends itself conveniently to the introduction of the elective principle, but the case of district boards is more difficult. It is very doubtful whether any interest at all would be taken in elections to district boards constituted as they are now, as it must be admitted that they are at present of little or no importance in the scheme of local administration. If in place of the present system we were to substitute either sub-divisional boards or even tahsil boards and these were granted financial powers more interest would be taken in the work and the elective system might have some chance of success. The present district board deals with far too large an area and the members of one tahsil have no interest in the affairs of another. The franchise in the case of sub-divisional or tahsil boards might be granted to all who pay a certain sum annually as land revenue.

*With reference to paragraph 5; in theory I should welcome the introduction of non-official Chairmen on municipal committees. It is however*



improbable in the present state of affairs that any capable man would undertake the task, as he would not be able to afford the time required. Also it is extremely doubtful whether Mahomedans and Hindus would agree to a Chairman of either persuasion. In practice it would, I think, be found that committees would always prefer to elect a British official, and I think that it is desirable that, so long as the elective principle is in its infancy, the discretion of the local administration in the matter of Chairmanships should be unfettered. In cases where the local municipality might agree to a Chairman—European or Indian—and where there appeared to be no prospect of consequent friction, I should welcome any appointment which they might recommend, but in practice it will probably be necessary for some years to nominate an official to the post, and it would be very desirable that the time and services of this officer should be lent to the Municipality for the period of his Chairmanship and that he should be relieved of all other duty.

*Paragraph 6 does not concern this Province.*

*With reference to paragraphs 7 and 8;* I think that it is necessary for the Deputy Commissioner to remain Chairman of the district board or, if the district board is abolished, as I have suggested above, that sub-divisional officers should preside over sub-division or tahsil boards, though I do not think that there would be any practical objection to leaving the post of Chairman open to election, officials being eligible, as I am convinced that the result would be the same as now, rural Pathans being much too jealous of one another to select one of their number as Chairman.

*With reference to paragraph 9;* I agree that municipal committees should have the power to vary taxes or to impose new ones, and this power might be granted after the elective principle has been introduced. At present municipal committees have no power to impose or alter taxes without the previous sanction of Government. The control by Government of taxation in municipalities, to which it has lent money, might be made a condition of each loan without disturbing the general principle. I think it is preferable that the question of the Chairmanship of district, sub-division or tahsil boards should, for the present, remain in the hands of the Local Government. If officers can be lent in the earlier stages of the experiment as Chairmen of municipal committees, these officers could in the smaller districts conveniently act as Chairmen of local boards.

*With reference to paragraph 10;* the amount of the land cess which district boards receive is fixed by law, but if the boards were elected, there would be no danger in giving them power to raise the amount up to a reasonable limit; there is little fear that the boards would over-tax themselves, but power might be retained to the Deputy Commissioner to intervene in the event of anything so improbable happening.

*With reference to paragraph 11*, the recommendation that boards should cease to contribute to the establishment of offices of supervision and control has already been partially given effect to, but more requires to be done, a further step required in this direction being the provincialisation of Civil Surgeons' clerks, whose duties are mainly provincial in connection with vital statistics, &c., but who also have to deal with dispensaries maintained from local funds; district boards can obviously have no control over these clerks, and in the Punjab they have already been provincialised. The question of relations of municipal and district boards with departmental establishments is a difficult one. The Education Department, for instance, is worked purely as a department and the control of the district board is limited in practice to giving the retrospective sanction demanded by the Audit Department to charges already incurred by officers of the department. The entire control of expenditure and of establishment in the Education Department rests at present with the department, and if the control of the district board is to become real, it will be necessary to appoint an education sub-committee in each board and to transfer to it many of the functions of the departmental officer—the District Inspector of Schools; there is much to be said in favour of this change which would give satisfaction to the boards, and the Deputy Inspector of Schools would then confine his attention to his more legitimate duties. The change would probably be opposed by the department, but that is unimportant. The same remarks apply in less degree to the Medical and Veterinary Departments in which a larger proportion of the establishment has been provincialised. Local bodies already have full control of their public works.

*With reference to paragraph 12*; at present percentages of income are fixed which local bodies are obliged to spend on medical, educational and veterinary objects and these amounts are usually exceeded, the difference being met by Government grants fixed for a number of years and based on the average excess in the past. Thus most of the funds of the boards are ear-marked for recurring charges, and any expansion has to be provided by doles from the heads of the departments concerned, money so allotted being almost invariably assigned to special objects under the programme fixed. It would make the powers of the boards real instead of nominal if the entire grants available were allotted to them in a lump and if the various programmes of expansion emanated from them; such a change would doubtless be opposed by the departments most concerned, *viz.*, the Medical and Educational, as their budgets and programmes would be liable to be upset by what they would consider to be the caprice of the boards. In spite of this, however, I think that the principle might be introduced, though in the beginning very close supervision would be required, as the concession, if granted without this qualification, would give the boards almost too wide a field in which to learn by making mistakes and profiting by them.

*With reference to paragraph 13*; the municipalities of this province have already in practice a fairly free hand with regard to their budgets. The

sanction of the Revenue Commissioner is required before a budget can be passed, but interference is very rare. There are however many petty payments which a municipality cannot make without the sanction of the Revenue Commissioner, *e. g.*, rewards to its own servants, cost of uniform for chaprasis, &c, &c., and these somewhat vexatious restrictions might be removed. The same remarks apply to the district boards, but in their case departmental control is necessarily much stronger owing to the apathy of the board which is due to its unwieldy size and to the want of interest of the members in their work.

*With reference to paragraphs 14 and 15*; the rules at present in force require that all works costing over a certain figure require sanction by the Revenue Commissioner, and that all estimates over a certain figure must be passed by the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department. The first provision may be salutary—it has not led to any inconvenience within my experience—but the second should certainly be abolished. We are unfortunate in the North-West Frontier Province in having no real Public Works Department. The Assistant Commanding Royal Engineers of Divisions and Brigades on the frontier are *ex-officio* Executive Engineers for Public Works purposes in addition to their military duties, and these latter are so heavy that the Public Works of the province is the least satisfactory department of the administration. The Assistant Commanding Royal Engineer has no time to check municipal or district board estimates himself, and if they are corrected at all, the work is done by a subordinate. The result is usually unsatisfactory and more often enhances than reduces the cost of the work. A subordinate official of the department occasionally visits a work in progress and passes it as satisfactory, usually after coming to an understanding with the contractor. I would strongly recommend that references to the Public Works Department on the part of any local body should be optional and not compulsory; in many cases these bodies are glad to ask for expert advice and to obtain it from the local officers, but the necessity for the scrutiny of all estimates by the Public Works Department serves no useful purpose, causes great delay and results often in waste and corruption.

*With reference to paragraph 16*; some steps have already been taken to modify the degree of outside control over establishments of local funds. The rules of the Civil Service Regulations are ordinarily followed, and I should deprecate any scheme for laying down maximum salaries for appointments, as the holder of any appointment would be certain to intrigue and to give responsible authorities no rest until he had obtained the maximum, which he would look upon as his right.

*With reference to paragraph 17*; in this province up to the present local bodies have been nominated and the Chairman of each is in every case the Deputy Commissioner of the District. His control is exercised by influence

within the committee and it has never been necessary within my experience for any Deputy Commissioner to exercise his right of veto. If a departure is to be made from the previous practice of having official Chairman and nominated members, it is, I think, necessary to retain a full power of control as long as these changes are in their experimental stage, though officers will be instructed to exercise such powers as sparingly as possible. There are however a number of petty orders of municipal committees on which an appeal lies to the Revenue Commissioner under section 225 of the Municipal Act. This is a very real curtailment of the already small powers of local bodies, and I consider that the power of interference and appeal should be strictly limited to cases of grave mismanagement and not exercised in merely arguable questions.

*With reference to paragraph 18;* this paragraph seems to imply that education is excluded from consideration in the previous part of the note. Education, however, absorbs a very large proportion of the income and time of local bodies, and I have therefore referred to it under the various heads.

*With reference to paragraphs 19 to 26;* the *panchayat* has never existed in this province, though it has to some extent its counterpart in the *jirga* system. I am afraid, however, that any system of general administration by *jirga* is out of the question owing to the jealousies, feuds and vendettas of the people, and that a standing *jirga* in a village or tahsil might become a weapon of oppression and corruption. I prefer to retain the present system of appointing *jirgas* of impartial men in each case or group of cases, although this has the drawback that each case requires a separate reference to the District Magistrate. Honorary Magistrates have on the whole worked well and the system might be extended. I am considering the appointment of benches of Honorary Magistrates for each tahsil, or where there are well-defined tribal areas within a tahsil or lying in the boundaries of two or more tahsils, for that tribal area. Small committees might be appointed in all large villages with certain powers in sanitary and other domestic village matters under the Municipal Act, with power to raise a limited rate. In many villages a *Malba* fund already exists, contributions to it being levied by the village headman, but, as the fund is a private affair, it is, I think, more expended on the entertainment of visitors than on anything else. I should prefer to attempt to extend this system and direct it into a new channel rather than to introduce a new one, but progress would necessarily be slow, as much caution would be required not to raise opposition. In the first instance, the committees should be nominated after full consultation with the villagers and election might be introduced later.

G. R.-K.

20th August 1916.

## No. 9.

FROM H. E. THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD PENTLAND, G. C. I. E., Governor of  
Madras.

*Govt. House, Ootacamund, August 21st, 1916.*

[ Very Secret. ]

DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

My utmost efforts to reply adequately now to your very secret printed letter of July 20th have, I regret to say, been unsuccessful for the reasons which I indicated to you in my letter of July 27th acknowledging receipt of that letter. Only yesterday I received the first instalment of the detailed information which I propose to utilise and, if necessary send to you. In the meantime, as directed, I have discussed the subject, with my Members of Council: two of them have given me an expression of their views; from the third, whom I have reminded, I hope to hear tomorrow, when I shall endeavour to write to you with the least possible delay.

I regret extremely to be thus behind time: but circumstances have been too strong for me: and I trust that you may forgive.

Yours very sincerely,  
(Sd.) PENTLAND.

## No. 10.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR BENJAMIN ROBERTSON, K. C. S. I., K. C. M. G., C. I. E.,  
Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces.

*Govt. House, Nagpur, August 21st, 1916.*

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I forward with this a note on the proposals contained in the enclosures to Your Excellency's letter of July 20th.

As you will observe, I am in favour of granting an elected majority, not by the half-way method suggested in Note B, which would satisfy no one and only raise a pothor, but outright. The majority which I suggest for the Central Provinces is 16 elected to 14 nominated.

I am strongly against the territorial basis for electorates, at any rate so far as the Central Provinces is concerned. The pleader would get in practically every time, and the working of the Council, with an elected majority largely composed of the professional politician class, could probably not be carried on without copious resort to the veto. The latter we must have, but its extensive use is to be strongly deprecated. In my opinion Note C deals too lightly with this aspect of the case. With one hand, it gives a liberal constitution all round, with the other it is prepared to come in with "penal dissolution" and the right of veto more or less as a matter of course.

That at least is how it strikes me. "Penal dissolution" I consider useless; and we wish to avoid the veto. To this end, let us make as sure as we can that we get members on the Council who are of different interests and as many as possible of whom are likely to stand by the Government. I am convinced that we should go by "Classes and Interests". Without the security that is likely to be thus obtained, the elected majority may be a real source of trouble; with this security I think we may safely go ahead.

I am, yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) B. ROBERTSON.

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NOTE ON ACCOMPANIMENTS TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY'S LETTER, DATED THE  
20TH JULY 1916.

1. The papers attached to His Excellency's letter deal with two questions, *viz.*,—(a) the general principles to be observed in the development of local self-government, and (b) and (c) suggested reforms in respect of Provincial Legislative Councils.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.

2. I have little to remark regarding the proposals which have been put forward on the subject of the development of local self-government. I am in substantial agreement with the suggestions made. And in the Central Provinces, as is recognised in the note, we have already made considerable progress in the direction of letting local bodies manage their own affairs. Non-official presidents of municipalities and district boards are of common occurrence. Steps have been taken to relax the financial control over these bodies in accordance with the recommendations of the Decentralisation Commission. And a revision of the local Self-Government Act is about to be submitted to the Government of India, which contains a provision for extending the franchise in the case of elections to district boards.

3. It is only with regard to the institution of village *panchayats* that I would desire to advise going slowly. An enquiry made regarding this subject three or four years ago disclosed that in the villages the people were by no means keen on the *panchayat* system; the idea is foreign to them and is not likely to be generally acceptable. But the administration is being constantly reminded in the Provincial Legislative Council of the necessity for making a beginning, and the matter is likely to be further considered before very long.

REFORM OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

4. I submitted a note to Lord Hardinge last year, containing my views on this subject. I was prepared to accept the proposal for an elected Majority.

majority on the Provincial Councils, but I pointed out that "real popular control" could not be considered as a practical suggestion. In the papers now being considered the question is again raised of giving an elected majority on Provincial Councils, and the further point is discussed of whether the franchise should be on the present basis of "Classes and Interests" or on that of territorial units. The two subjects are very closely bound up with one another; if a Council with an elected majority is to work without unnecessary friction, it is essential that the elected majority should contain substantial diversity of interests, and this is an object to the attainment of which the greatest importance must attach.

5. As already remarked, I am prepared to see an elected majority on the Provincial Legislative Council. And I am in favour of making this advance, not in the tentative manner indicated in note B of the papers, but by giving the concession complete. I am fully aware of what this step involves; it must lead in the long run to more and more power passing into the hands of the popular representatives—as the Councils learn their power, their desire to exercise it will grow. And it may take long for the predominant conservative feelings of the masses and the moderate section of the educated classes to make their weight felt, as also for the theoretical politician to find out that the business of Government is a practical business, that reforms are all very well in their way, but they must be suited to the condition of the people and there must be money to pay for them. The difficulties in the way of making the advance are obvious, but after full consideration I think it is right that it should be made. And if it is to be made, I would not do it by a half measure which would satisfy nobody and would lead to a strong movement which might still further force the hands of Government, supported as it would certainly be by certain political combinations in England. I am not therefore in favour of the proposal put forward in paragraph 11 of Note B for keeping certain seats on the Council unfilled, into which Government could at any time bring official nominees to redress the non-official balance. I would sooner take the step, and take it outright, of granting a small elected majority. The grant of such a majority makes it necessary that the greatest attention should be paid to the question of the constitution of the Council, which will presently be considered. Given strong diversity of interests on the Council, I would trust to the growth of experience and of the ultimate sense of responsibility amongst the Members and to the moderating influence which is bound to come with a substantial increase of the Indian element in the Executive, as factors which will tell in the long run and will tend to make the experiment a workable one.

6. This brings me to the second point which has to be considered, namely, the constitution of the Provincial Councils. And coupled with this is the power of control over the decisions of the Councils which is to be retained by the Executive Government. In Note C it is stated that it would seem premature and indeed dangerous to recommend any immediate extension of the powers

of the Councils in the way of giving them large financial and administrative control, which must eventually lead up to their having great influence on the constitution of the Provincial Governments. Emphasis is therefore laid on the necessity for making the elected Members really representative, and for Government possessing the power of penal dissolution and the right of veto, whether whole or partial.

7. I am wholly in agreement with the necessity for making the elected element on the Council more representative than it is at present—although I disagree, in so far as the Central Provinces is concerned, with the method suggested in the note for attaining this end. In my opinion we must mainly depend for the proper working of the reconstituted Councils on this better representation of divergent interests, and I shall lay stress on the subject when I come to discuss the question further on. The power of penal dissolution and the right of veto cannot be altogether relied on for this purpose. The former proposition I regard as unsound. An adverse vote is carried against the Government on a matter which has raised considerable political excitement; a fresh election would almost certainly lead to a return of Members pledged not to give in—the political wire-pullers would work their hardest for such a result. The Government would be in no better a position than before, the right of veto would have to be brought in, and there would be an increase of resentment and of opposition to Government which would undoubtedly lead to methods of indiscriminate obstruction. Penal dissolution appears to me, therefore, to be a meaningless expedient and I would urge that this weapon be left out of the armoury of Government.

Penal dissolution and right of veto.

8. The right of veto must be retained, but our object should be to have the Council so constituted that the exercise of the right should have to be resorted to as sparingly as possible. It is perhaps unnecessary at this stage to discuss the method of the exercise of this right, whether it is to remain with the head of the Provincial Government or to be transferred in all cases—in cases of resolutions affecting matters of general public interest as well as legislation—to the Governor-General in Council. In my previous Memorandum I had given an opinion in favour of the latter course, *viz.*, that the ultimate power of over-ruling the Provincial Council should rest with the supreme governing body in India. But this is a detail, and a suggestion has since been made to me that, in the case of adverse resolutions, the authority of the Governor-General in Council should only be invoked if a resolution is carried for a second time against the Provincial Government. I think this is an improvement on my original suggestion, as it would enable consultation to take place between the Provincial and the Imperial Governments as to the attitude that is to be finally adopted with reference to the matter in dispute.

9. The main point is that we wish to see the reconstituted Council work with as little friction as possible. We should try to obtain an elected

Basis of Election.



element, which will not contain a preponderance of the theoretical politician type, but which will have a strong strain of men who are really representative of the people. From this point of view, I have no hesitation in asserting that we should maintain the system of election on the present basis of "Classes and Interests". In this respect I am speaking only of the Central Provinces, and my chief officials who, with His Excellency's permission, have been consulted on the matter, are unanimously in agreement with me that, in our present stage of development, election on a territorial basis would result in the Council being flooded with professional politicians of the vakil type. I cannot do better than quote the opinion which has been given me by Mr. Sly, the Commissioner of the Nagpur Division, on this point—

"The Members at present elected are largely of the lawyer-politician class. It is suggested that there should be a considerable lowering of the franchise in order to increase substantially the number of electors. It is urged that this will lessen the risk of capture of the seat by a political caucus, will render it more difficult to practise personal solicitation and undesirable electioneering methods, will make it less easy to succeed by mere energy in canvassing, will force candidates to declare their political views, and will result in the electors choosing candidates who will really represent their views. Personally I have no belief that these results will be secured by an increase in the electorate. It presupposes that the electorate is a body of intelligent opinion prepared to exercise its rights of independent judgment on questions of policy, which is not the case. My forecast is that certainly at first it will increase the power of the extremist section of politicians. If constituencies could be made of small local units, there might be some chance of the election of resident local leaders, but even a Member for each district would involve much too large an increase in the Council. My firm belief is that a unit as large as a district would almost invariably result in the return of the most prominent head-quarters lawyer-politician, with whom the landholders and merchants come into frequent contact in their litigation. Further, canvassing is thoroughly disliked by the men of position and substance, whose traditional dignity is outraged by having to solicit the suffrages of electors lower in the social scale, and this dislike will be intensified by the lowering of the franchise. The extremist section has no scruples in this matter, and its electioneering organisation is far superior to, and more unscrupulous than, that of the moderates. Then again, the number of candidates possessing the class of education required for Membership of a Legislative Council is exceedingly limited in this province amongst the landholding and commercial interests, and the extremist press is unsparing in ridicule of their

defects. I am not opposed to a moderate lowering of the franchise, but I wish to emphasise that, for some years until the electorate is better educated to its political duties, it will result not in a decrease but an increase in the power of the advanced political party. I am strongly in favour of a continuance of the present system of representation by classes and interests, and deprecate most emphatically a change to territorial constituencies."

10. I have no hesitation in agreeing with this opinion of Mr. Sly's, and I would bring out more strongly than he has done the extreme dislike of the better-class landowner or merchant to standing for election against the lawyer-politician. The latter is accustomed to giving and taking criticism—perhaps an even stronger term than this might be used—in his every-day practice in the courts; the methods and epithets of electioneering he does not mind; but it is different with the man of position who values above everything his *izzat*. The latter would not come forward in a general election, to be scoffed at and perhaps abused, and the adoption of any such system would, as matters stand at present, practically mean a close preserve for politicians of the lawyer class.

11. In order to get, as far as it can be secured in existing circumstances, men who will be at all representative of the people, and who can be fairly trusted not to combine against the Government, separate representation for "Classes and Interests" is in my opinion essential. Without this there will be a real danger in enlarging the Councils; for we cannot be constantly bringing the veto into play, we should only be creating resentment and inviting fractious opposition. I recognise that there are certain inconveniences and anomalies involved in this system of representation, but at the present stage it is clearly necessary to think first of safety, and to let the inconveniences and anomalies remain.

12. I have been asked to illustrate the view I take by giving an example of the constitution of the Central Provinces Council remodelled on the above lines. This I have done in the annexure to this Memorandum. I would increase the size of the Council to the statutory limit of 30. At present the number of Members is 25, of whom 10 are elected and 15 nominated. For the reconstituted Council I would propose 16 elected Members and 14 nominated, giving a majority of 2 elected Members. I would strongly deprecate going beyond the present statutory maximum of 30 Members in the present stage of development in these provinces. We should have difficulty in finding suitable representative men for a larger Council, and I have already pointed out how necessary it is that we should have such men on the Council, if the work of administration is to be carried on with a reasonable degree of safety.

Reconstitution  
of the Central  
Provinces  
Council.

General.

13. There are one or two other points on which I should like to note briefly. I am not in favour of supplementing a property qualification by a liberal educational franchise. The proposal for a low educational franchise, even down to the "vernacular middle" standard would result in adding to the electoral rolls a number of voters who have no real stake in the country or other qualifications justifying the grant of this privilege. I should like to see, with the extension of the franchise, the age qualification for a voter raised to 25, or at least 21, years in order to eliminate immature men. Candidates for election should be members of the constituency for which they stand, and where the constituency is a territorial one, they should be permanently resident within the constituency. It has been further suggested to me, and I am inclined to view the suggestion with favour, that a higher property qualification should be demanded for a candidate than for an elector. For instance, in the landholder constituency, the land revenue qualification should be at least double. To my thinking this would help towards obtaining men of position to stand as candidates, which is an important point. I have not specially mentioned the absorption of the district board electorate in the landholder electorate. But I am entirely in favour of the suggestion contained in note B in this connection, for the reasons given in paragraph 13 of that note.

NAGPUR;

*The 21st August 1916.*

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B. ROBERTSON,

*Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces.*


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## APPENDIX.

### SUGGESTED CONSTITUTION OF REMODELLED COUNCIL FOR THE CENTRAL PROVINCES.

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1. The present constitution of the Council is 25 Members, distributed as follows :— Present  
Constitution.

10 elected Members (including 3 for Berar, who are nominated to the Council after election).

10 officials nominated.

4 non-officials nominated.

1 expert (who may be an official or non-official).

2. The new constitution would be 30, *viz.*, 16 elected Members and 14 nominated. Dealing with the latter first, I would propose— Proposed  
Constitution.

*Nominations.*—10 officials nominated (but see below).

1 expert.

1 Member to represent Mahomedans (who are not of sufficient importance or advancement to claim a separate electorate in these provinces at present.)

2 others. (Of these I should like to see one an official. At present there are two Secretaries for Public Works in these provinces, one for Irrigation and one for Roads and Buildings. Only one of them is on the Council, and considerable difficulty is caused when questions are dealt with affecting the branch of Public Works, of which the Member for the time being on the Council does not happen to be in charge).

3. Of the 16 elected Members I would allot—

Distribution of  
elected Members.

5 to urban areas ;

8 to landholders ;

2 to commerce and trade ;

1 to University graduates.

=

Urban Areas.

## 4. The urban electorates might be—

Nagpur city	...	...	...	1
Jubbulpore city	...	...	...	1
Minor municipalities in the Northern Divisions				1
Ditto	Southern	do.		1
Ditto	Berar		...	1
				<hr/>
				5
				<hr/>

I entirely agree with the suggestion that the electors should not be confined to the members of municipal committees, still less to delegates of those members. All municipal electors, who own property of a particular rating value, should be qualified to vote. The existing system is a particularly pernicious one, as it encourages politicians to seek seats on municipal boards for the purpose of electioneering for the Legislative Councils.

Landholders.

5. The landholder electorates are difficult to devise—but I may mention that we should encounter almost the same difficulty in arranging electorates, were we to adopt a general territorial basis. The method I at present favour is—

Nagpur	Division	...	...	...	2
Berar	do.	...	...	...	2
Chhattisgarh	do.	...	...	...	1
Jubbulpore	do.	...	...	...	1
Nerbudda	do.	...	...	...	1
One of the latter two Divisions to elect a second					
Member at alternate elections				...	1
					<hr/>
					8
					<hr/>

I am in favour of lowering the qualification for a vote, which is at present the holding of land in proprietary right, which is assessed at not less than Rs. 3,000 as land revenue in the Central Provinces; in Berar, where the tenure is ryotwari, the limit is Rs. 1,000. I have not yet fully considered the future limits which might be adopted. But I would certainly go down to Rs. 1,000 in the Central Provinces and to Rs. 500 in Berar. Perhaps lower limits might be taken and tenants in the Central Provinces included. But, as has been pointed out in the Memorandum, we may defeat the object we have in view of getting men of real position to stand for the Council, if we require them to ask for the suffrages of people very much below themselves in the social scale.

One further point I would note. If we broaden the franchise as is proposed, I should be inclined to cut out the provision in the existing regulations, which allows Durbaris and Honorary Magistrates to vote in the

landholder electorate. Such a special provision will no longer be necessary in order to "make up" an electorate. Practically all such persons will obtain a vote in one or other of the expanded electorates.

6. The trade and commerce electorates would be composed of persons employed in trade and commerce, who pay income-tax on incomes of Rs. 2,000 and above. I would propose—

Trade and  
Commerce.

For the Central Provinces	...	...	...	1
For Berar	...	...	...	1
				—
				2
				—

It is not anticipated that any difficulty would be experienced in working such an electorate, although there might be questions to be settled as to the representatives of companies and as to whether a person's main occupation is trade and commerce. But it is thought that such points could be settled without trouble. There is an analogous electorate for district boards in these provinces at present. The electorate would not be confined to traders in towns, but would include rural traders as well. Votes would be registered at the head-quarters of each district as in the case of landholders under the existing regulations. It is believed that the number of electors in the Central Provinces would be about 1,000, and rather more than this number in Berar.

7. The Member to be elected by University graduates would be chosen by graduates of 5 years' standing.

8. Plural voting would be allowed. For instance, a trader residing in a town could vote in the trade and commerce constituency and also in the urban area constituency.

### No. 11.

MEMORANDUM BY THE HON'BLE MR. W. M. HAILEY, C. S. I., C. I. E., CHIEF COMMISSIONER, DELHI, ON PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN H. E. THE VICEROY'S LETTER OF JULY 20TH 1916.

1. The administrative class in India is often charged, even by its friends, with undue conservatism; and it is almost habitual to regard it as unwilling to make any sacrifice of efficiency in order to further the political progress of the Indian people. In my experience this is a very incorrect statement of the case. There is an almost universal recognition that Indians must be taken more fully into partnership in government; but what most of us feel is the Government of India, as such, has never either declared a definite policy on the subject, nor indicated the ultimate extent of the share to which it is

proposed to admit Indians in governing the country. We have seen the enlargement of the Legislative Councils, the appointment of the Public Services Commission, and are not forgetful of the occasional declarations of more or less general nature—such as that made by Lord Hardinge at the last meeting of the winter session of the Imperial Legislative Council—which appear to indicate the feelings of particular Viceroy's towards the aspirations of certain schools of Indian political thought. But it is no exaggeration to say that the great bulk of those concerned in the detailed administration of affairs are unaware whether Government has any definite aim before it in regard to what may be called constitutional developments; they regard such action as is now taken as actuated either by short opportunism or even by an unreasonable want of confidence in the strength of our own position. It is for this reason that the attitude of the majority of the administrative service is frankly one of criticism, and even to a certain extent of mistrust. If I may venture to define its own position (I do so with every reservation, but believe that a great majority of men in my service would endorse what I say), it is this; that it would welcome the admittance of Indians to a very much larger share in government, provided that it could feel that power was being given to the right class. Nothing stings the administrative officer more deeply than the reproach, which he constantly hears and is not in a position to deny, that we are gradually establishing a "Vakil-Raj". And as regards a sacrifice of efficiency, he regards Lord Morley as guilty of a certain looseness of thought in his well-known declaration on this subject. There are certain directions in which the great majority of the population would itself resent strongly any slackening of control, whatever the political object in view might be. The people I refer to do not want departmental or mechanical efficiency in police or revenue matters, nor do they ask that municipal administration shall conform to the standards of European towns; but they certainly ask that practical efficiency shall be secured, that there shall be reasonable security of life and property, that revenue shall be assessed by a moderate standard and collected with a due regard to seasonal vicissitudes, and that the main elements of health should be secured without too great an increase in local taxation. It is not the Civil Service, but the great bulk of the population which would object to the surrender of practical efficiency in these directions merely to secure a political object, and it is, I believe, the feeling of the majority of men in the service that they are bound to support the great bulk of the population in this respect.

2. I have ventured to make these general remarks by way of preface, because I thought it might be useful to Your Excellency if I noted on the Memorandum from the point of view of the ordinary man of moderate views concerned in the detailed work of administration. Such men will, I think, welcome the definition of the goal at which we should aim, given on page 2 of Your Excellency's letter of the 20th of July, but they will be inclined to

add two reservations. They will ask that Government should not limit itself to securing for India the largest measure of self-government compatible with the maintenance of the supremacy of British Rule, but will deliberately affirm at the same time that the grant of self-government must be contingent on the ability to secure that it shall assume, in detailed working, such degree of efficiency as shall content the great bulk of the population. Men who have devoted their lives to a career which binds them to work, up to the best of their lights, for the interest of the people among whom they live, would not unreasonably resent any declaration of policy which limited our requirements to the maintenance of British supremacy. A time may come when India at large may prefer (to use the expression of certain publicists) "Indian Government at any cost, even the cost of good government". But that day has not come yet; the great bulk of the population still attaches more importance to the quality of the administration than to the racial origin of the administrator; and if the mass of people were capable of reasoned thought and combined expression, they would undoubtedly ask that our goal should be stated in terms which should satisfy their own needs rather than the aspirations of the politician.

3. There is also a second reservation. I think that many will feel that it would be a pity to state any definition of policy which did not take consideration of the fact that self-government must be mainly provincial, not national. Whatever the trouble caused by the language used in the despatch of August 1911, most people, I think, regard the despatch as of unique importance because it recognised that the true line of development in India is provincial. The real answer to the campaign for Home Rule, and indeed to nationalist aspirations of the extreme type generally, is to develop provincial feeling and a sense of territorial solidarity. There is no question here of the policy of *divide et impera*. The only object is to utilise for the good of India, and in the cause of progress, an already existant and perfectly healthy sentiment, in substitution for a factitious and (so far) exceedingly faint ideal of nationalism. It is only because the very real sentiment of the Bengalis for Bengal has had no proper outlet that it has assumed the form of yearning for the rights of India. The Punjab has a sentiment of its own, of the vigour of which the best guarantee is its profound contempt of the rest of India. We cannot utilise these sentiments unless we are prepared to give greater vitality to provincial politics. If we omit to do so, we run the danger of allowing the growing sense of public duty and political sense in the provinces to be absorbed in the spurious flame of Indian nationalism. And Indian nationalism, apart from any question of danger to our rule, is abhorrent to the class whose views I am endeavouring to represent, because both in its historical origin and in its spirit it is really reactionary.

4. I turn now to the detailed questions referred to in page 3 of Your Excellency's letter of the 20th July. The first of these is the domain of local



self-government. The note marked A shows that the following principles are accepted as regards local bodies.

*I. Constitution.*—(1) Municipalities to have, wherever possible, an elected majority; minorities to be represented by a communal or proportional system rather than by nomination; official experience to be represented by advisers without a vote; (2) the municipal Chairman to be ordinarily an elected non-official; (3) the municipalities of large cities to have an executive officer who need not—subject to the observance of certain conditions regarding appointment and removal—be a Government officer; (4) rural boards to have, if not immediately, at all events ultimately, non-official and preferably elected Presidents or Chairmen; but in the case of boards dealing with large areas, the ordinary official work to be in the hands of an executive officer.

*II. Powers.*—(i) Municipalities to have power to vary taxation within the limits laid down by municipal laws, subject to sanction where the law does not lay down a maximum, and also in case of indebted municipalities; (ii) rural and district boards to be allowed to raise land cess up to any limit allowed by law.

*III. Control.*—(1) Local bodies to have full control, subject to general principles prescribed, over funds raised for any particular object, such as civil works or medical relief; (2) the system of requiring local bodies to devote fixed portions of their revenues to particular objects be done away with; (3) subject to the maintenance of certain reservations for the present, local bodies to have ultimately full control over their budgets; (4) existing rules regarding sanction to works costing over specified amounts to be relaxed; (5) the control over appointments of officials to be confined to sanction to certain important officers and to laying down rules regarding leave, pensions, &c., for others; (6) the present statutory powers of interference in cases of neglect, &c., to be maintained, but in practice interference should be limited to cases of gross mismanagement.

5. If many of us have evinced hesitation in supporting complete self-government in local fund matters, a field in which it might seem easiest to relax control, it is not because we attach importance to efficiency merely for its own sake, but because we recognise that in Northern India at all events public opinion does not discriminate between committee action and Government action. Even when committees are entirely elected and have non-official Chairmen, it will be a great number of years before the public will cease to regard them as a species of Government Department. The principle of representation is so entirely alien to India, that I at all events have never satisfied myself that I have convinced people who complain of municipal misdeeds that their own representatives should be held to account for them. The fact that there is a statutory appeal to the commissioner against

particular acts of commission or omission is held as the strongest proof that the municipal committee, however appointed, is the agent of Government. If we are to educate Indians in self-government, and in the sense of representative responsibility, we must of course relax control over local bodies; this is an elementary proposition which no one would deny; but in the interest of the general administration the relaxation must be gradual. And I venture to think that, if the lesson is to be complete, the relaxation must work to a point not mentioned in the Memorandum, *viz.*, the substitution of the civil courts for the Commissioner as an appellate authority. The civil courts will not of course be instigated by the same instincts as the Commissioner in deciding appeals against infringement of building bye-laws or the like; but the lesson of responsibility will be lost until he assumes his right position as an entirely independent controller of local affairs.

6 My own experience is that there is little difference between the elected and nominated members, in regard to their attitude towards municipal questions; but that the nominated members are men of a better class and nomination allows us to correct the sectional anomalies of election. I should see no objection in the case of Delhi to introduce election for all members, but consider that here, as probably elsewhere in Northern India, it would be necessary to arrange for proportional representation of communities. It is a system which most people interested in the advancement of India cordially dislike, and would accept as a temporary expedient only. But animosities of religious or communal origin here dominate the whole of public and private life; and it would be wrong to connive, in the interests of the ultimate growth of a proper public sense, at the immediate injury which minorities would suffer from a purely electoral system.

7. With the principle of non-official Chairmen, combined with an executive officer in charge of the regular work of administration, I am in full sympathy. Nothing is more striking than the fact that where Punjab municipalities have an official Chairman who can devote no time to them, routine work is practically neglected; where he can and does devote time to them, both initiative and executive are left entirely to him. The precedent set in the recent United Provinces Act will, I hope, be followed elsewhere in Northern India.

8. The problem is of far greater difficulty with district boards, owing not only to the large areas controlled by them, as stated in the Memorandum, but to the fact that there is seldom any real community of interests between different parts of a district, and there are nearly always traditional animosities between the landowners who constitute the majority of the boards. Given, however, the presence of an executive officer, and a reservation of certain functions to

minimum of men who have any influence for good or evil in their own neighbourhood. Given councils properly constituted and more definitely representative, we should be able to face with far greater confidence arguments drawn from the fact that the constituencies were constituted on the English model.

13. I venture to urge therefore that the basis of the electorate should be the district; and that an attempt be made to secure real representation of the two dominant interests now existent, *viz.*, landowning and commercial, by a somewhat wide franchise, based on land revenue and income-tax. (There are cases where it would be necessary to arrange that those who enjoy land revenue remissions should have the same status as revenue-payers, but this is a question of detail.) I would give a vote to all persons holding a University matriculation certificate (or its equivalent, the school leaving certificate), but this vote should be exercised within their territorial unit; the University vote is an anomaly which we have rightly abandoned in England. There seems to me no ground for a separate representation of Indian Universities, for there is not the slightest danger that in the councils, as reconstituted, there will be any lack of persons qualified to represent educated opinion. The system therefore would work as follows; large towns would have a member elected by income-tax-payers, payers of a definite sum of house-tax or profession-tax where such existed and holders of matriculation certificates. The rest of the district would have members elected by revenue-payers (for whom the franchise should be much lower than at present) income-tax-payers, and holders of matriculation certificates; it is further a question whether we should not admit to the vote village headmen as such, in the rare cases where they do not happen to possess the necessary revenue-paying qualification. I would debar Government servants from voting. We rely, and rightly, on a spirit of absolute discipline among our employes; the machinery is too vast to work otherwise. It would impair that discipline if we suggested that Government servants might vote for those who may be critics of the administration. The refusal of a vote would involve no sense of injury on their part.

14. It appears to me that, with councils so constituted, the problem of communal representation would be much simplified. The necessity for standing by the pledge given by Lord Minto in 1906 has already led to great difficulties; the Sikhs and Native Christians have claimed separate representation and there is no logical reason why the low castes, who are certainly not Hindus, should not claim representation also. The Memorandum at paragraph 15 appears to contemplate the grant of communal representation to other communities than the Mahomedan. I venture to think that our efforts should be directed towards the reduction of communal representation rather than to its extension; in the long run we lose rather than gain by the recognition of

communities as separate entities. The prominence given to Mahomedan interests in the negotiations preceding the constitution of the revised councils undoubtedly helped the creation of the extreme Islamic party ; and the tendency will always be for a community, recognised by Government as possessing separate interests, to adopt an extreme attitude on all questions which even remotely affect its existence. Unless the constitution of district electorates clearly give Mahomedans the representation already guaranteed to them, it may be necessary to secure their position in the manner indicated in paragraph 15 of Memorandum C ; but I hope it will be possible to make it clear that this is done simply in pursuance of Lord Minto's pledge, and that it is not intended to extend the principle to other religions.

15. Whatever the immediate inconveniences which may attend the concession of an elected majority in the Provincial Councils, it appears to me inevitable that, if we are serious in our intention to educate Indians in a sense of political responsibility, and if we are to give necessary vitality to provincial politics (which is, as I have ventured to urge above, our sole defence against the further growth of a spurious Indian nationalism), we are bound sooner or later to take this step. For my own part, I should like to see the measure arrived at in two stages, first, the revision of system so as to secure something like real representation, and, second, the alteration of constitution in the direction of giving an elected majority. This policy could be justified by pointing out that the revised councils have, after all, had a very short life. There would certainly be a practical convenience in enabling us to judge of the extent to which the reconstituted councils fulfil the anticipations under which they will have been created.

16. The Memorandum C does not propose at present to grant any increased powers to the Provincial Councils, and merely suggests that a Finance Sub-Committee of the Council should be associated with Government in the preparation of the budget as a whole. There will no doubt be objections to the latter proposal in some quarters, as it will be viewed as a first step in the grant of administrative as distinct from legislative functions. I do not think the objection a strong one. No power of interference with the executive is involved in the proposal ; and there would be a material gain in training Members of the Councils in the real factors dominating the preparation of the budget. At present a Member of Council dealing with the budget presents the appearance, and with few exceptions merits the description, of one *bombinous in vacuo*.

GUREZ, KASHMIR,

The 22nd August 1916.

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(Sd.) W. M. HAILEY.

No. 12.

FROM H. E. THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE LORD WILLINGDON, G. C. I. E., Governor  
of Bombay.

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Govt. House, Bombay, August 24th, 1916.

[ Very Secret. ]

MY DEAR CHELMSFORD,

In your secret letter of July 20th and its accompanying Memoranda, you conveyed to me certain provisional conclusions at which, in consultation with your Council, you have arrived with regard to the future course of development of British Rule in India, and, on these conclusions, you have invited my observations and criticisms.

2. The general question is one which has necessarily been the subject of much anxious thought at the present juncture for all concerned in, and responsible for, Indian affairs, and you will, I am sure, understand that it is by no means an easy task to deal in more than a general manner—which is all that in the time at my disposal I can attempt to do—with your proposals. I should have been glad to have been afforded longer time for the consultation of my colleagues and officers and, so far as is possible in a reference of this nature, of well-informed public opinion on these questions; and, while I have asked each Member of my Executive Council to give me a brief minute of his opinions, which I will shortly send you for your private information, I trust it will be understood that the following remarks merely express *my personal views* on the main principles involved in your reference. I need not emphasise the necessary reservation that, before administrative or legislative effect can be given to them, they will require exhaustive scrutiny in their detailed application.

3. I entirely accept your definition of the 'Goal of British Rule in India'. I would merely add, what I have already urged and for the reasons that I have already laid before you that a declaration to this effect made as soon as possible, on some suitable occasion, by his Majesty, the Secretary of State, or the Viceroy would be of the greatest political advantage.

4. You proceed to indicate three directions in which you consider that the capacity of Indians for a greater share in the work of Government has advanced—

- (1) The domain of local self-government both in towns and rural areas;
- (2) the domain of more responsible employment under Government; and
- (3) the domain of the Legislative Councils, Provincial and Imperial.

5. With regard to the second, I need say nothing beyond expressing a general assent to the conclusions you have stated in paragraphs (a) (b) and (c) on page 3 of your letter.

6. Turning to the first, on which the views of your Council are detailed in Memorandum A, I think that in this Presidency we can claim to have made substantial advances towards internal autonomy in municipal administration, and during the last eighteen months we have been actively engaged in elaborating a scheme for an advance in the same direction in the district boards.

7. I am not prepared to accept literally the proposition that the primary object of local self-government is to serve as a noviciate in administration. That this is a function of the greatest importance I fully admit; but if we lose sight of what appears to me to be the fundamental object of all government, whether local or otherwise, *viz.*, the advantageous administration of public interests, I fear that we shall insensibly be led to unsound and dangerous conclusions. Subject to this reservation, the principles contained in Memorandum A appear to me to outline a policy which has already been in substance adopted by my Government. I attach, however, the greatest importance to the considerations advanced in paragraph 17 of the Memorandum. An effective external control by the Local Government is an essential condition of a liberal policy of internal autonomy for municipalities and local boards, and it is further essential that this control should be not only effective in coercive measures of the last resort, but should be capable of being applied with every degree of pressure, from the lightest to the most stringent. It should afford a stimulus as well as a veto; a means of encouragement and mild reproof as well as of penalty and compulsion. I consider that our existing acts do not provide a control satisfying these conditions.

8. It is true that we have certain coercive powers, including the suspension of municipalities. But naturally this is only resorted to in extreme cases and the preliminaries are usually dilatory and perhaps unnecessarily irritating to local susceptibilities. The control ought to be effective at a stage long before the *ultimum decretum* of suspension is even in sight. Minor measures have usually proved ineffective. During the period since the Municipal Act was passed, we have not been able to induce more than half the municipalities to frame rules and bye-laws, and in many cases those that have been framed have been unsatisfactory or inoperative.

9. The Local Government Board in England possesses controlling powers of the most comprehensive kind and is not slow to exercise them. In the opinion of my Government a similar measure of external control should be established in India. If that is done, the reduction of the number of nominated members and of officials on the boards and, generally, a large measure of relaxation of internal control can be attained without undue

detriment to the public interests from maladministration. Subject to this statement of opinion on general policy, I agree with the views expressed in paragraphs 1—4 of your Memorandum.

10. I agree with paragraph 6 and action in this direction has already been taken. As to paragraphs 7 and 8, my Government have for some time been engaged in a careful consideration of these questions. We have practically decided to nominate non-official Chairmen to a certain number of local boards and are working out a scheme for securing for each board an executive officer and administrative staff. I would accept paragraph 9, though I apprehend little danger of municipalities 'piling on the rates'. Our experience is rather that they will not tax nearly to the extent of their requirements, and this is one of the matters on which Government should have more effective control in the direction of insistence on a scale of taxation adequate to secure proper administration.

I agree generally with the views expressed in paragraphs 10—16.

I cannot usefully give an opinion at this stage on the matter of *panchayats* (paragraphs 19—26). The whole question of local self-government in rural areas is, as I have stated above, already under the special consideration of my Government, and we are endeavouring to frame a scheme which will co-ordinate the local bodies. The question of *panchayats* will necessarily arise in this connection.

11. I now turn to the question of the Legislative Council with special reference to the alternative suggestions contained in Memoranda B and C accompanying your letter. I must commence by stating that the remarks I have to make in this connection must naturally refer to the Bombay Presidency alone, for I have no sufficient knowledge of the widely divergent conditions—political, social and economical—of the other provinces of India.

12. I have carefully considered the proposals contained in these Memoranda, and I unhesitatingly give my adhesion to the general policy represented by Memorandum C.

13. I assent to one proposition—and it is, I recognise, a proposition of fundamental importance—enunciated in Memorandum B, *viz.*, that the constitutional function of the present councils as legislative assemblies to assist and advise the head of the province should not be so modified as to introduce, or to be capable of being interpreted as introducing, into India the principle of Parliamentary government by representative institutions. The time for initiating in this country such a system, with all its vast implications, has not yet arrived. But, while I assent to this proposition, I consider that the proposals in this Memorandum do not entail any real measure of political progress, and I would rather do nothing than accept this scheme as representing either the degree or the direction of advance which the circumstances of

the present time require. If I may say so with all respect, I find lacking in these proposals either a due recognition of the fact that the aspirations of Indians towards a responsible share in the government of their country are natural and legitimate or any serious and considered endeavour to direct them into a course which promises a definite stage of progress towards the admitted objective of the British rule in India.

14. I therefore give my general support to the proposals contained in Memorandum C, though I fully recognise that they involve difficulties and even dangers which it would be idle to ignore. It is my conviction, however, that no genuine progress is possible without encountering such difficulties and dangers, and that this can be done with reasonable prospects of success. I do not propose to discuss these proposals in detail, but to confine myself to the three main issues which appear to be involved, *viz.*—

- (1) whether we should adopt a territorial basis for the constituencies;
- (2) how the elected majority should be constituted; and
- (3) what measure of financial control can be vested in the councils.

15. With regard to (1), I cordially welcome the proposal to readjust the constituencies on a territorial basis. I also agree that, generally speaking, districts or groups of districts would form suitable electoral units; that the franchise should be considerably broadened so that each constituency may comprise from 2,500 to 3,000 voters; and that important cities should be granted especial representation. I also agree, though with considerable reluctance, that racial and religious considerations and the general structure of society in India render it impracticable, at least for the present, to abandon the principle of the proportionate representation of minorities, but that, when such representation is conceded, the minority concerned shall not be admitted to vote in the general constituencies. I concur generally in the suggestions contained in paragraphs 11 and 12 regarding the conditions and basis of the franchise.

16. The proposed constitution of the elected majority in the councils is dealt with in paragraphs 7—10 of the Memorandum. I approve of the principle of an elected majority to consist of approximately 7/12ths of the whole council. I do not, however, see any sufficient ground for excluding from this proportion the representatives of special constituencies, such as the Universities, Chambers of Commerce, &c. These constituencies have the electoral franchise in the fullest sense of the term; they are not, and cannot even plausibly be represented as, in any way under the control of Government; and I consider that their exclusion would not only be illogical, but likely to create invidious and unwarranted imputations on their independence and authority as representatives of important public interests.

17. In order to comply with these requirements, it will obviously be necessary to increase considerably the numerical strength of the councils. On



the above basis, the Legislative Council of this Presidency might be constituted as follows :—

Total strength of council	...	...	...	...	73
Elected	...	...	...	...	42
<i>Ex-officio</i> and nominated	...	...	...	...	31
					73
					—
					—

*Elected.*

Bombay city	...	...	...	...	2
<i>Mofussil</i> cities	...	...	...	...	5
(Ahmedabad, Karachi, Hyderabad, Poona, Surat.)					
University	...	...	...	...	1
Chambers of Commerce—					
Bombay	...	...	...	...	2
Karachi	...	...	...	...	1
Indian Merchants—					
Bombay	...	...	...	...	1
Karachi	...	...	...	...	1
Sardars of Gujarat	...	...	...	...	1
„ in the Deccan	...	...	...	...	1
Jagirdars and Zemindars of Sind	...	...	...	...	1
Musalmans—					
Bombay	...	...	...	...	1
Northern Division	...	...	...	...	1
Central Division	...	...	...	...	1
Southern Division	...	...	...	...	1
Trades Association or other minority interest	...	...	...	...	1
Mill-owners	...	...	...	...	1
Territorial constituencies	...	...	...	...	20
					—
					42

TOTAL ... 42

*Nominated and ex-officio.*

Executive Council	...	...	...	...	4
Advocate-General	...	...	...	...	1
Nominated { officials	...	...	...	...	11
{ non-officials	...	...	...	...	15
					—
					31

TOTAL ... 31

GRAND TOTAL ... 73

The above is merely an illustration of the manner in which a council on the lines suggested could be constituted, and is not intended as a complete and matured scheme.

18. It is, of course, in regard to this proposed elected majority in the council that the most serious risks must be undertaken and it is argued by its opponents that the territorial and municipal constituencies will return to the councils a throng of lawyers, whose object will be to make the work of administration impossible. My answer to this is that in my council I have worked for 3½ years with a permanent non-official majority and, while it is true that Government have been defeated in council on three unimportant occasions, I have never seen any desire on the part of Members to embarrass the administration. They realise that the executive government must be carried on, that there can and should be no idea of *party* under the present constitution, and I am confident that, with diplomatic and sympathetic guidance, the same feeling will exist under the proposed constitution.

19. Finally, with regard to financial control, the existing rules for the transaction of financial business and the practice of my council already afford such opportunity for discussion, criticism and advice, within the limits of provincial finance, as is, I believe, generally regarded as satisfactory by the non-official Members. The only innovation in this respect which I am at present prepared to advocate is the appointment of a standing financial committee, which can be consulted by Government at any stage of the preparation and presentation of the budget or of any other important financial proposal. If such a committee is liberally constituted and is admitted with a reasonable degree of freedom into the financial counsels of Government, I believe that non-official opinion will be fairly well satisfied, and that Government will be able to fortify itself with a substantial body of non-official support in the presentation and discussion of their proposals.

20. These are the main points which I would urge for your consideration, while expressing general agreement with the proposals contained in Memorandum C. If legislative effect is given to them, they will doubtless entail on the Members of the executive government a considerable burden of work of a *quasi*-Parliamentary nature. They may render necessary an additional member of the board, and certainly an expansion of the Secretariat staff for the special purposes of work in, and connected with, the council. Further, the increased number of Members will necessitate an extension of the accommodation in our Council Halls, which is already inadequate and lacking in such almost indispensable adjuncts as a library, writing rooms, and so forth. All this will involve expense on a scale by no means inconsiderable, but this should not be allowed to stand in the way of the prosecution of the scheme.

21. In conclusion, though these specific proposals have only been before me for a month and though, as I have already said, I should have preferred more leisure to examine and weigh them in the precise form in which they are presented, they embody ideas which are in entire consonance with the conclusions to which my own observation and experience have led me and with my

estimate of the needs of the present situation. There are junctures, and this is one of them, when it is necessary to accept risks without ignoring them, and to incur difficulties with a determination that they shall be solved. A policy which is directed mainly to the avoidance of risks and difficulties may succeed in maintaining a precarious equilibrium, but is equally inconsistent with progress or security. If the objective of British rule which you have propounded is to be honestly and practically interpreted, we must proceed with confidence in ourselves and in the results at which our rule has professed to aim and, I think, has striven to attain in the past.

Let me add that I trust that, if some provinces are held to be insufficiently developed for the complete application of this policy, it will not be thought necessary to hold back those which are ready for advance. Give the elected Members in these more progressive provinces the opportunity of showing in the new councils their sense of the responsibility of their task, and of setting an example which may serve as a guide and an encouragement to the others in future years.

Yours very sincerely,  
(Sd.) WILLINGDON.

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[SECRET.]

## MINUTE BY THE HON'BLE MR. CHAUBAL, c. s. i.

I agree entirely with paragraph 3 of His Excellency's Minute of 24th August 1916 and will only venture to add that the political advantage referred to therein would be much greater if the responsible declaration as to the goal of British rule in India were accompanied by a pronouncement on some of the questions considered by the late Viceroy in his Secret Circular which are referred to in the letter of His Excellency the present Viceroy as subsidiary issues. In my opinion such a solemn and responsible declaration would be regarded by the Indian public as a charter and will be cherished by them with the same respect and affection as is evinced at the present day towards the late Queen Victoria's Proclamation.

Paragraph 3  
of H. E.'s  
Minute of 24th  
Augt. 1916.

Out of the three directions, an advance along which is indicated, it is not possible to say at the present time anything more about the second domain than has been said by the Viceroy in the circular letter of the 20th of July. It may, however, be noted here that this is not a new direction; the principle of larger employment of Asiatic Indians in the more responsible posts has always been accepted in theory. What is now anxiously looked forward to and will be jealously watched in the near future is wider and more active recognition of the principle in practice. It is no doubt true that the subordinate services are in the main manned by Indians, but it is also true that the great bulk of higher appointments are held by non-Indians. The result is that the general-ity of Indian servants regard their work as a task. They feel that they are doing somebody else's work, and not their own. The effort is not to do the work to one's own satisfaction, but with an ever present consideration if it will meet with some one else's approval. This in my opinion is the inner cause of the general complaint levelled at Indian servants about their lack of initiative and pushing or driving power and their shirking responsibility. The Indian servant requires to be made conscious that he as much as any European servant of Government is helping to carry on his own Government, and that he is having his part in the administration of his country's government. This consciousness cannot be begotten except by associating a large number of Indians along with Europeans in the work of the administration—not desultory or isolated higher appointments in individual services, but there must be a perceptibly large number of Indians in responsible posts all along the field. If the spirit of the recommendations of the Royal Commission is carried out with this object kept steadily in view, so that Indians and Europeans shall both feel that they are but jointly collaborating for the success of the administration, there is no reason to apprehend any loss of

Paragraphs 4  
and 5.

efficiency in the end. There is a morbid belief in the minds of the higher authorities that for efficiency and high qualification one must look to foreign agency and there is a correspondingly morbid distrust in the capacity and efficiency of all indigenous agencies. It will require the strictest vigilance to see that the larger employment of Indians does not suffer owing to this belief and distrust. The report of the Royal Commission, though published later, was in the main conceived before the great war broke out and India is entitled to claim that the evidence she has given of steadfast loyalty to British rule during the war should do away with this distrust, and that there was no longer any necessity for regarding any services in the country as "security services" in which there must for all time be a preponderatingly foreign or European agency as opposed to indigenous agency.

Memorandum A,  
paragraphs 6 to  
10 of H. E.'s  
Minute.

Turning now to Memorandum A, which relates to the domain of local self-government in urban and rural areas, I am in general agreement with His Excellency's Minute. I may add however that, though strictly the advantageous administration of public interests may be the primary object of local self-government, such government has to be organised in India under circumstances which necessitate that this primary object may have to be often subordinated to the subsidiary objective of political education. This is necessary to make the Local Government regard with requisite indulgence the mistakes that are sure to be frequently committed by local bodies and to administer the corrective at the right time under the powers of control which the central government will provide for by legislation. I agree, however, with the principle that, with a liberal policy of internal autonomy for municipalities and local bodies, the provisions for external control would require to be effective and stiffened where necessary, though as these provisions now stand I see a desideratum only in one point as regards municipalities, namely, the desirability of a provision giving power to the central authority to get anything done by a local body, which in the opinion of such authority requires to be done or carried out in the interests of the public, either promptly or within a reasonable time. A slight amendment in section 174 of the Bombay District Municipal Act would apparently suffice for this purpose; while as regards Local Boards, I think that the present powers of control under Chapter VII of the Bombay Local Boards Act I of 1884 are amply sufficient.

I am in general agreement with the conclusions arrived at in paragraphs 4 to 16 of the Government of India's Memorandum. As regards the franchise, I agree that it should be sufficiently low to obtain constituencies really representative of the body of rate-payers, but I am opposed to any further extension in practice of any system of communal representation. Thus while I would tolerate it in the case of municipalities where the principle has been conceded in the past and where the deprivation of such representation would savour of interference with vested rights, I am averse to introducing it in rural areas

either in district or taluka boards, or in village *panchayats*, if and where these may be brought into existence.

Similarly I would leave more scope for elasticity by Government taking power to declare, in accordance with local conditions, whether officials on the board should have the right of vote or not.

As regards taxation, both urban and rural areas are so averse to any additional taxation and elected Members generally look with so much disfavour on additional taxation in any shape, at the same time the necessity of additional rates and taxes for eking out the income of local bodies for the purpose of their being able to carry out sanitary and other reforms is so great that, though I would concede full liberty to local bodies to impose or alter taxes within the prescribed minimum, I would favour the central authority taking powers to insist on a municipality increasing an existing rate or tax or imposing a new one within or beyond the prescribed maximum where local conditions or the urgency of demand on municipal funds make it necessary. On this point, therefore, I am in entire agreement with paragraph 10 of His Excellency's minute.

The question of *panchayats* is, as observed by His Excellency, under consideration in this province, but so far as the expression of any opinion may be relevant, I am inclined to look with favour upon any scheme for the formation of Union *Panchayats* or *panchayats* for groups of villages and for co-ordinating them as constituencies in direct relation with district boards without the intervention of taluka boards or sub-district boards as they are termed elsewhere.

I entirely agree with His Excellency in giving my unhesitating adhesion to the principles recognised in Memorandum "C" and my equally unhesitating disapproval of Memorandum "B" as being altogether inadequate and insufficient as a measure of political progress, particularly so if it is to be announced as a measure of reform due to the altered angle of vision which is said to have come in owing to the war. Memoranda  
B. & C.

I am prepared to admit the truth of the criticisms levelled at the present constitution of the electorates as stated in paragraph 6 of Memorandum "B". Items 1 and 3 of this criticism are in my opinion real flaws in the present system and do urgently require to be remedied. Item 2, however, in my humble opinion is not a defect of the present constitution and I would further add that, on whatever basis of representation or franchise you arrange the constituencies, you cannot under the present circumstances of India or such as one can foresee for a number of years to come escape the preponderance of lawyers and professional men, unless of course being a lawyer is made a positive disqualification in a candidate for election; nor am I prepared to admit that this result is on the whole to be deprecated. I believe this is so in other countries also where an elective system for representation exists.

Political progress, and indeed for the matter of that, progress in every direction in any country must depend on the number of citizens that it can boast of, who each of them combines in himself the three elements of leisure, wealth and intelligence. Any of such citizens, who have an ambition for political life, are bound to make their mark upon their fellow-citizens. In India any class of these outside the lawyer class can perhaps be only found in Government service, and as these should admittedly not stand for election, a comparatively larger number of lawyers is bound to come in whether you base the franchise on "classes and interests" as at present or on territorial units as suggested in Memorandum "C". Nor do I see where the detriment to the other large interests in the province comes in owing to the preponderance of the lawyer class. I am free to admit that lawyers outside the Council do, and are apt to, indulge in destructive criticism and that there is considerable truth in the observations in paragraph 9 of the Memorandum "B", but I believe there are few lawyers, however advanced in politics, who do not sober down when they actually get into the Council and who do not recognise the responsibility and the dignity of their position. I believe, so far as this Presidency is concerned, experience for the last six years has shown that lawyers and professional men cannot be charged with any activities in the Council, either in the transaction of legislative business or in the moving of resolutions about the budget or on questions of general interest, which can be attributed to any desire to affect prejudicially the large landed and other interests in the country. There is, of course, more independence and fearlessness in their speeches, but that is not in my opinion altogether an undesirable feature. Items 1 and 3 of the criticism which require to be remedied can be effectively remedied if the franchise is based on territorial units.

Paragraphs 12  
to 18 of H. E.'s  
Minute.

The lowering of the franchise is a common feature to both "B" and "C", but in my opinion Scheme "C" is far better calculated to give genuine representation than "B" which entirely fails to recognise the aspirations of Indians to a responsible share in the government of their country and fails to mark any definite stage of advance towards that goal of British rule in India which is so aptly described in the Viceroy's letter of the 20th of July. I would, therefore, support His Excellency's observations as given in paragraphs 12 to 18 of his Minute. I may be permitted to add that, while I am in agreement with the position of the Legislative Council as set out by His Excellency in paragraph 17, I would not rigidly limit it to 73. The present maximum of 50 is in my opinion inadequate, but I would raise this maximum for Bombay to 80, leaving it to His Excellency in Council to add to or diminish the representation for any territorial or other constituency as experience may show to be necessary or desirable. It should not, in my opinion, be necessary to go to Parliament for any change in this respect.

Paragraph 19  
of H. E.'s  
Minute.

As regards paragraph 19 of His Excellency's Minute, I am in agreement with the principle of the innovation proposed by His Excellency. This

innovation is in accord with the provisional conclusion expressed in paragraph 6 of the Memorandum "C"; but in order that the Standing Finance Committee may not be a cumbrous body, I think it would be better to call it a sub-Committee of the Finance Committee, which should consist of only three elected non-official Members, and that while these should, if possible, be associated with Government as advisers on the provincial budget as a whole, their recommendations as regards all additional allowances, new appointments and additional expenditure should be effective. This will safeguard any apprehension as to non-official Members paralysing the administration by not voting for appropriation of money for services already existing.

Similarly in the transaction of legal business there should in my opinion be the safeguards mentioned in paragraph 4 of the Memorandum that Government should possess the power of penal dissolution of the Legislative Council, which should, however, be only exercised in exceptional cases where the power of partial veto as to legislative measures may not be effective.

Lastly, I am respectfully of the opinion that, whether the number of the Members of the Legislative Council is increased or not, and that whether any additional work in consequence devolves upon the Government or not, an additional Indian Member of the Executive Council ought to be provided for, making for Bombay a board of five instead of four. On all other points not specifically mentioned above, I am in agreement with His Excellency's Minute and in general agreement with the principles on which Scheme "C" is outlined.

(Sd.) M. B. CHAUBAL.

31st August 1916.

#### MINUTE BY THE HON'BLE MR. G. S. CURTIS, c. s. i.

I attach, herewith, a few observations on the notes marked A, B and C which His Excellency the Governor has been good enough to forward for my perusal. I am afraid that they are somewhat sketchy; over a fortnight has elapsed since I read the papers. But I trust that, as an attempt to treat the very important issues raised from a practical point of view, they will have some small value.

#### NOTE A.

I propose to make a few observations on the proposals put forward by the Government of India for extension of local self-government on popular lines in India.

2. It seems necessary at the outset to examine the principle laid down in paragraph (1), namely, that loss of efficiency due to the measures now contemplated should be ignored if they provide opportunities for the education and enlightenment of the people.



3. To any one who has been in touch with the working of local self-government of recent years, the enunciation of this principle seems somewhat untimely. The history of the past 20 years of the Government of this Presidency, more particularly the eight years which have elapsed since the beginning of Lord Sydenham's Governorship, has been one of a continuous struggle to grapple with many problems affecting public health and sanitation. Large sums of public money have been invested in works of drainage and water-supply, considerable progress has been made in improving the sanitary staff employed by local bodies and in bettering sanitation, and it is impossible to deny that the general efficiency of the administration has been much improved. But now according to the principle laid down by the Government of India, the struggle for efficiency is to stop. Inefficiency is to be condoned if the persons responsible are endeavouring *bonâ fide* to obtain experience.

4. The conclusion herein arrived at seems to the ordinary observer deplorable, and he may well be pardoned if he is inclined to ask whether it is necessary. Is the maintenance by official pressure of a reasonably high standard of efficiency incompatible with the transfer to non-official agency of a larger share of the responsibilities of administration? I contend that it need not be, if the example set by Government in England is followed.

5. My reasons are as follows:—

It is the fashion now-a-days for critics to enlarge on the bureaucratic tendency of our administration and assume that the control exercised by our officers over local self-government is more close and strict than that exercised in any other country. I propose to show that this supposition is erroneous. I leave out of consideration the arrangements in force in continental countries, as it will hardly be disputed that there official control over local administration makes itself felt at every step. I will discuss the question in so far as it affects Great Britain, where it is often supposed that local authorities are largely independent of control from the Central Government.

6 The general arrangements at present regulating the relations of local authorities with the Central Government in the United Kingdom may be said to date from the passing of the Public Health Act in 1848 and from the constitution of a General Board of Health in accordance with its provisions. The systems introduced by that Act involved a considerable degree of centralisation, which eventually aroused dissatisfaction, and in 1853 the Board was in consequence of this and other causes dissolved. In the 15 following years questions affecting public health seem to have received little or no attention. Parliament was busy with suffrage regulations and changes in the election laws, and as a consequence matters connected with sanitary science came to be entirely disregarded. The state of things then existing was described in the following words, which might be applied as they stand to much of India at the present day:—"The field of Local Government was overgrown with an almost impenetrable underwood of conflicting jurisdictions, while the very existence of the laws as well as the mode of administration depended

upon the whims of particular towns and districts. The voluntary or permissive principle had not wholly served its purpose. The benefits of sanitary science and sanitary law were only partly adopted. Parliament had done its best by introducing scientific laws of public health, but the machinery of Local Government had proved insufficient to translate those laws into actual administration. Generally speaking, local authorities had remained inactive, however unsatisfactory the conditions which prevailed in their districts."

Redlick and  
Hirst, Vol. I,  
pages 150-151.

7. In 1869 public opinion was at last aroused, and a Sanitary Commission was appointed, which submitted a useful report, embodying proposals which eventually became law on the passing of the Public Health Act of 1875. The main feature of this Act was the erection of a central sanitary authority. The Commission recommended that "there should be one recognised and sufficiently powerful ministry, not to centralise administration, but on the contrary to set local life in motion. A real motive power and authority which should be referred to for guidance and assistance by all the sanitary authorities of Local Government throughout the country. Great is the *vis inertiae* to be overcome; the repugnance to self-taxation; the practical distrust of science and the number of persons interested in offending against sanitary laws even among those who must constitute chiefly the local authorities to enforce them".

Report of the  
Royal Sanitary  
Commission,  
Vol. I, page 31.

In addition to the constitution of a central authority, the new Act contained provisions which empowered the central authority on their own initiative and without regard to the wishes of the inhabitants or their representatives to impose a sanitary organisation on urban districts not hitherto provided; to insist on local bodies introducing sanitary improvements; and in the event of the latter failing to carry them out, to take the matter in hand and charge the local bodies with the cost.

Redlick and  
Hirst, Vol. I,  
page 152.

8. As a result of the passing of this Act, the staff of the Local Government Board was largely increased by the appointment of a number of inspectors, whose duty it was to visit places where local administration was inefficient or where improvements had to be made, to enquire into local conditions, to investigate complaints and report how far official aid was required. In fact, the principle to which effect was given in the Act was the principle which has been observed throughout the legislation dealing with sanitary control, *viz.*, the principle of *inspectability*. In other words, the Act rendered local bodies liable to inspection, imposed penalties if the defects discovered by the inspector were not put right and provided the machinery required for this. In certain specified cases it conferred direct powers on the central authority to take steps on its own initiative, *e.g.*, it empowered the authority to direct that certain action should be taken in case of an epidemic.

9. In recent legislation these powers of the Board have been developed on these lines. The Board now frequently sends direct orders to local bodies as to the course which it desires should be taken. For instance, it has quite recently passed orders for local bodies to arrange for the compulsory notification of tuberculosis and syphilis and the consequential medical treatment. It

is true that what may be called the brutality of this direct order is softened by the offer of a large grant-in-aid; but it is there none the less. In another direction the effectiveness of the central control has been increased by the institution under proper legislative sanction of an official audit; and the grant of legal power to recover from members of the local bodies affected amounts, to which the auditors have taken exception.

10. To sum up, the legislature places full power in the hands of the elected representatives of the people; the latter have every opportunity of utilising those powers and gaining experience of the results of such utilisation. But should they fail to take advantage of these opportunities, and should this failure imperil larger interests, then the legislature empowers the Central Government to bring the law into operation and force their hands.

11. The question now is what does the example of the United Kingdom teach us in India? It need certainly not deter us from reducing the official element in our local bodies. We in Bombay have already shown that we have no fear of this experiment. But it does bring home to us the defective state of our municipal law and the inadequate power of control conferred on the executive by that Act, sections 173—179. It is not so much that we have not in the last resort the power of suspending local bodies for inefficiency—section 179 of our Act gives us that. The trouble is that we have nothing else; the result is that the executive generally refuses to interfere until interference becomes an absolute necessity; while the tradition which is so valuable in the United Kingdom that it is the right and duty of the central authority to keep the administration of local bodies up to a reasonable level of efficiency is conspicuous by its absence.

12. At the risk of making the note unduly lengthy, I will mention a case which illustrates very clearly the difference in the relations between the central authority and local bodies in this Presidency and in England. Previous to 1909 there was an acute controversy between the Bombay Government and the Bombay Municipality as to the liability of each to bear certain charges connected with the police hospitals and primary education. The controversy was settled in that year by Government undertaking to pay for the police and certain hospitals; while the municipality made themselves responsible for the cost of other hospitals and for the expenditure on primary education, and took over the entire management of the latter. The remarkable fact is that the whole question was considered from a financial point of view only; and that the desirability of retaining on behalf of the Central Government some power of control over the municipality's proceedings was entirely lost sight of. The result is that the whole control of primary education in the second city of the Empire has been handed over to a small Committee of the Bombay Municipality consisting of eight members who consider that their duties are adequately discharged by meeting once a month for a period of 20 minutes; while the Director of Public Instruction is debarred from active interference and cannot even tender his advice. Contrast with this the arrangements existing

in England; for instance, the relations between the Board of Education and the Education Committee of the London County Council. The former constantly render advice, insist on compliance with standard requirements, enquire into complaints and representations by rate-payers, and so forth. In short in London the central authority exercises a close control; in Bombay there is none at all.

13. I would urge therefore that, while all possible concessions should be given by the removal of internal check on maladministration, care should be taken to constitute a central authority and develop its working on English lines. This will provide all reasonable opportunities of obtaining experience without entailing loss of efficiency with its inevitable consequences—injury to public health and waste of public money.

14. Turning to the recommendations contained in Note A, I do not think that detailed comment from me is called for. In Bombay we are already giving effect to many of them. It would be sufficient to say that the policy which they indicate will, I believe, always command our sympathy, and subject to the reservations indicated in paragraphs 1—13 of this Note obtain our whole-hearted support.

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#### NOTES B. & C.

From the discussion of the question dealt with in enclosure A, I now turn to the proposals for the reconstitution of the Legislative Councils which are discussed in enclosures B and C.

2. Of these the proposals contained in enclosure C are by far the most sweeping and by far the most important. It seems to me that we shall obtain a clearer idea of their scope, if we abandon generalities, and examine closely what changes they involve in the Legislative Council of the Presidency, and what effect they will produce on the position and prestige of the Executive.

3. At the present moment the Bombay Legislative Council consists of 46 Members, of whom 4 are Members of the Executive Council. The balance of 42 are, as to one-half, nominated, and as to one-half elected. Of the 21 nominated Members, 14 may be officials, but in practice only 9 officials have been appointed. Of the 21 elected Members again, 13 are elected by special electorates. In their case it is important to note that the condition precedent to their election is that Members should be qualified as voters in the communities which they represent. The remaining 8 represent Municipalities and District Local Boards.

The net result is that in the ordinary Council there are 33 non-officials and 13 officials; in other words, a non-official majority of 20.

4. Under the proposals outlined in enclosure C all this is to be altered. Of the total number of seats on Council seven-twelfths are to be filled by election by voters grouped on a territorial basis. To these are to be added an unspecified number of seats, which are to be filled by election from among the

\*(This is the outside number.)

special communities, which now send representatives to Council. The balance is to be filled by nomination. Translating these proposals into figures this would mean that out of the statutory maximum number of Councillors (54),\* 31 would be elected on a territorial basis, 9 on a communal basis, while the balance of 14 would include the Executive Council, *plus* 10 nominated Members.

5. The object of these changes is, besides enlarging the elective element, to widen the basis of representation and ensure that the land-holding interests shall be more fully represented by persons cognisant of, and in sympathy with, the needs and aspirations of the agricultural population.

6. Now it seems to me that the main question to be considered is—Has the time come for the acceptance of the principle that the Council shall contain a majority of Members elected on a territorial basis? We have for the past 6 years been working with a Council containing a non-official majority of nominated and elected Members combined. Can we with due regard to the smooth working of the administration accept the position in which the Members elected on a territorial basis would be in the majority?

7. We must remember, in the first place, that the constitution of our present Council must be considered to be still an experiment. When the proposals relating to it were first put forward, the fact that they contemplated a non-official majority was severely condemned by the Government of India, and it was only in deference to the views of the Secretary of State, Lord Morley, that its constitution on its present basis was permitted. While it is true that up to the present time there has been nothing to justify the fears expressed in 1907 by the Government of India, it may be urged that there is at any rate reason for caution, and that a change which would still further weaken the influence of Government should not be lightly undertaken.

8. In the second place, it is essential to bear in mind that the change contemplated by enclosure C involves very much more than the mere numerical strengthening of the electoral at the expense of the nominated element. As I have pointed out above, out of 21 elected Members, 13 represent special communities and must belong to those communities; while the 12 nominated Members can of course be selected to represent minorities. Consequently no less than 25 seats are in practice allotted to the representatives of special interests. But under the new scheme all this is to be swept away. With seven-twelfths of the number of seats to be filled by open election,† only five-twelfths remain for Government officials, representatives of communities and nominated non-officials. Practically this would mean that the nominated non-official class would disappear altogether; while the special class would be a very small one. In other words, it means that all attempts to secure class representation would be abandoned, and that the interests of minorities would be left wholly at the mercy of the ballot.

† Note.—It is not, it is understood, contemplated that there should be any land-holding qualification for Membership of Council.

10. My answer therefore to the question propounded at the end of paragraph 6 is that the proposals in enclosure C, as they stand, are not such as to commend unqualified acceptance. I note, however, that both enclosures B and C are unanimous on one point, *viz.*, that having regard to the loyalty of India during the war, it is necessary to increase the share assigned to Indians in the government of their country; in other words, to increase the strength and influence of the elective element on the Legislative Councils. If this be accepted as a basic principle for future action (as I agree that it should be), it remains to be seen whether we can give effect to it, and at the same time secure that the various classes of the community shall be duly represented, and that no one caste or profession shall obtain an undue share of the seats upon the Council.

11. The following scheme will, it is hoped, satisfy these tests. Taking the number of the enlarged Council as 73, I propose that the proportion of seats to be filled up on the elective principle should be seven-twelfths or 42. So far I agree with the proposals in enclosure C. But I now propose an important modification. The first essential in constituting a Provincial Legislative Council is that classes and minorities should be adequately represented. Therefore I propose to assign at least one-half of the seats to be filled up on the elective principle to this object. In fact, on examining the claims of the various separate interests to seats I find that the total comes to 22. Details are as follows :—

Bombay city	...	...	...	...	2
Mofussil cities (Ahmedabad, Karachi, Surat, Hyderabad, Poona)	...	...	...	...	5
University	...	...	...	...	1
Chambers of Commerce—					
Bombay	...	...	...	...	2
Karachi	...	...	...	...	1
Indian merchants—					
Bombay	...	...	...	...	1
Karachi	...	...	...	...	1
Sardars of Guzerat	...	...	...	...	1
Sardars of Deccan	...	...	...	...	1
Jagirdars and Zemindars of Sind	...	...	...	...	1
Mahomedans—					
Bombay	...	...	...	...	1
Northern Division	...	...	...	...	1
Central Division	...	...	...	...	1
Southern Division	...	...	...	...	1
Millowners	...	...	...	...	1
Trades' Association	...	...	...	...	1
					—
				TOTAL	22

There will then remain 20 seats to be filled up by territorial representatives. For the purpose of election to these seats it is probable that in most cases the district would be a suitable unit of representation; but it is impossible to say with certainty until figures have been obtained. It is suggested, that whatever unit of area be adopted, the candidate for election should possess a substantial property qualification, and should ordinarily be a resident of the area in question. As regards the franchise, the passing of the Vernacular Final Examination does not seem a very suitable qualification. The payment of land-revenue above a certain amount and the payment of income-tax would be far more suitable.

12. Allowing for 42 seats as the number of seats to be filled up by election, there remain 31 to be filled by nomination. Of these 5 will go of necessity to the Executive Council and the Advocate-General. At least 11 seats more will be required for official Members, whose presence is necessary on the Council. There will then remain 15 seats, which will be filled up by the nomination of non-officials. The total number of the Council will then be 73, which may be raised to 75, to allow of the nomination of experts, when this appears to be necessary.

13. I do not seek to disguise the fact that the risk involved in the re-constitution of the Council on these lines is serious, and that, when concessions of this sort are once given, there can be no going back on them. But as I have said before, if we start with the assumption that the war will force us to modify our angle of vision, then some action on the lines above indicated is necessary.

14. As regards the measures necessary to control perverse action on the part of the elective majority, I agree that His Excellency the Governor should have the power of veto; in other words, if he disapproves of any measure which has passed through Council, he should have power to dissolve the Council. But it seems to me that a mere destructive veto would not be sufficient; there should be a constructive veto as well. By this I mean that, if a measure is urgently required in the interests of public security or public health or to meet some urgent public want, and the Provincial Council perversely refuses to pass it, the Supreme Council should have power to direct that it should be put in force without delay. It is to be hoped that the occasions on which it is necessary to make use of the power will be very rare.

15. As regards the power of financial control, it is difficult to see how the powers already given to the Members of the Council in this Presidency can be increased. According to present practice, the Finance Committee discuss all items of expenditure both allotted and unallotted, and their views are duly taken into account before the budget is finally passed. Unless and until the Council loses its advisory character and becomes a Parliament, it is difficult to see how greater powers can be given.

*September 1st, 1916.*

(Sd.) G. S. CURTIS.

## MINUTE BY THE HON'BLE MR. G. CARMICHAEL, C. S. I.

### ADVANCE IN LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.

I agree generally with the views expressed in the Memorandum, but consider that some form of central control is necessary in connection with such matters as education and public health. Though these may be administered by local authorities, they affect the general welfare of the country. They are thus in a sense national services and it is right that the Central Government should help to provide for them and by grants-in-aid stimulate improvement and reform. But if money is spent on these objects from the public purse, the Central Government should have control of the general lines of policy and some machinery to secure that administration is maintained at an efficient standard. Outside these special services, the local authorities should have full freedom subject to the existing general power of intervention.

2. I would, however, make one reservation in freedom to alter taxation. Octroi taxation should always require the sanction of Government on account of possible interference with trade. It is not a form of taxation which should be encouraged, more particularly when one of the objects which must be kept in view is the formation of satisfactory electorates. No voter's qualification can be formed out of payment of octroi dues, however large.

3. The Memorandum alludes to proposals with reference to the functions of the local authorities in the matter of education. If it is intended to take steps towards giving local authorities control of primary education, it seems to me a matter for consideration whether new bodies of the nature of School Boards should not be created. This particular function is a thing apart from ordinary Municipal or Local Board administration and those who exercise it should have a certain amount of special knowledge and an expert staff. If such bodies were created and given power to levy school rates, it is probable that the people, who as a rule, are more keenly interested in the education of their children than in the condition of their roads and street lighting, &c., would be more ready to tax themselves, and until the people are ready to tax themselves, there can be no advance in local self-government.

### LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

4. There is in my opinion much force in the arguments set forth in Scheme B. We have not had sufficient experience of the working of the existing Councils to be sure of our ground. The veto of the Governor-General or the dissolution of the Council would be no safe-guard, but on the contrary would be very apt to behave like a boomerang. For these reasons I would go with more caution than in Scheme C, and would not lay it down as a principle that the elected Members should be seven-twelfths of the whole. It is true that Scheme C does suggest one very efficient safeguard, *viz.*, a partial veto, but I doubt very much whether the seven-twelfths elected majority would be at all popular on such terms. If a choice had to be made, a smaller number of elected members with full power in the matter of legislation would probably be preferred.

5. In Scheme B it is pointed out and truly that the landed interests are not properly represented at present. In Bombay their direct representation



(by election) on the Council is limited to the landed gentry which in this Presidency constitute a comparatively small portion of the total of those interested in land. The remainder are provided for in the Local Board electorates but owing to the nature of the electoral machinery, they have really no voice in the selection of their representative. The only method of giving agriculture its proper weight is that suggested in Scheme C., *viz.*, the territorial system with a sufficiently low franchise. If we accept the territorial-unit principle, the smaller municipalities must merge in the district areas, and to avoid too minute constituencies only large cities should be provided with separate representation. The minimum limit should not be less than a population of 100,000. In this Presidency the dividing line would be clear and would give five cities, of which Bombay should have two representatives and Ahmedabad, Karachi, Poona and Surat one each.

6. Deducting the population of these cities (including their cantonment areas, if any), we have the following main divisions of the Presidency:—

	Population.		No. of representatives.
Gujarat	... 25 lakhs	...	2
Konkan	... 27 „	...	2
Central Dn.	... 62 „	...	5
Southern } Mahratta } country }	... 33 „	...	3
Sind	... 34 „	...	3
			—
			15
			—

For these I would allocate 15 representatives as shown above.

7. The representation of the large landholders or Sardars and of the University and the separate representation of the Mahomedans I would retain as at present existing, but I agree that a vote for a communal representative for a territorial unit or municipality should not be in addition to a vote for the general representative for the same area.

8. For commerce and industry I would allot eight representatives, four for Associations mainly European and four for those mainly Indian.

9. For nominated Members the number should, I think, be at least 11 officials and 15 non-officials. The elected Members would thus be in a majority of six over the nominated and *ex-officio* Members, *viz.*—

#### ELECTED.

	No. of representatives.
Territorial	15
Cities	6
Sardars	3
Mahomedans	4
Commerce and Industry	8
University	1
	—
	37

NOMINATED.					
Officials	...	...	...	...	11
Non-officials	...	...	...	...	15
					—
<i>Ex-officio</i> (including the Advocate-General)					26
					5
					—
TOTAL				...	68
					—

## BUDGET CONTROL.

10. In Scheme C it is suggested that the scope of the work of the Finance Committees should be enlarged, and it is stated that, as a general rule, the Finance Committees consist of an equal number of officials and non-officials. In this Presidency the practice has always been to have 10 non-officials (six elected and four nominated) and only two officials, *viz.*, the Member in charge of the Financial Department and his Secretary. Again the discussion has not been confined to the allocation of allotments for unallotted expenditure. All items of new expenditure have been brought under review and recommendations of the Finance Committee have been accepted, even with regard to new items which were classed as obligatory. As financial resolutions may be moved in Council without regard to the classification of the expenditure as obligatory or optional, it is manifestly right and also saves time in the Council if the Finance Committee is permitted to discuss all new expenditure proposed for entry in the budget.

11. The Finance Committee is appointed in July for the year, so that one Committee can do the work for one budget from its inception till it is finally sanctioned. There would, I consider, be no objection to the Finance Committee being treated as a Standing Committee to which might be referred any important proposals for new expenditure not provided for in the budget, which nevertheless may be deemed of sufficient urgency to provide for by reappropriation and introduce in the course of the year.

12. A more important advance in this connection and one which would be much appreciated would be to give Local Governments more freedom in framing their budget. When the Morley-Minto Reforms were introduced, a large measure of freedom in this connection formed a part of the scheme. But restrictions remain some of which might go by the board with great advantage. The Government of India's control of Local Government budgets has two main objects—

(1) To prevent extravagant expenditure; (2) to regulate their own "ways and means" budget.

The reasons underlying (1) is that, if a Local Government becomes insolvent, the Government of India have to take up the burden. But with the existing safeguard that interest is to be paid on overdrawals, it is not likely that Local Governments will be improvident.

13. As regards (2), I do not propose any radical change, but I am strongly of opinion that there should be less rigidity so far as the provincial budget is concerned. This might be secured as follows:—The Government of India exercise their control mainly by fixing the total amount of expenditure permitted to be entered in the budget. Where provincial balances are large, they lay down the amount within which drawing on balance is allowed. These prescriptions are issued in January and accordingly do not take account of any subsequent improvements in revised revenue estimates for the year or in the revenue budget estimates for the ensuing year. These improvements go entirely to increase the years' resources of the Government of India in their "ways and means" budget. The larger part, if not the whole, should be made available for the provincial budget expenditure. Thus in January the minimum balance which the Provincial Government should keep at credit with the Government of India would be fixed and the Provincial Government should be allowed to draw on the remainder without restriction and to frame its final estimates on the latest possible data. In Bombay the estimates have always been framed with great caution and taking the current year's budget, as an example, the effect of an arrangement, such as I suggest, would have been as follows:—

The opening balance as finally sanctioned exceeded that recommended by the Finance Committee by	... 6.20 lakhs.
The revenue estimates increased by	... 1.50 „
The expenditure estimates were unchanged. The closing balance was thus estimated at an excess over the Finance Committee's recommendations of	... 7.70 „

This amount might well have been released for provincial expenditure. The revenue estimates, on which it is based, were approved by the Government of India.

14. If the course suggested is permitted, it would not be so necessary to adhere to a fixed date in March within which the discussion of financial resolutions must be completed. This would allow more time for the discussion of the budget, first, a general discussion and then a discussion on particular resolutions; we would thus be enabled to dispense with the general discussion on the budget which takes place after the budget has been finally sanctioned by the Government of India. This general discussion serves a useful purpose, but under present arrangements it is difficult to fit it into the programme before the budget is settled, and the heart is taken out of it when it takes place after sanction.

15. The Provincial Governments cannot make the full use of their resources unless they are permitted to borrow on the security of their revenues. The case was fully set forth in a letter from this Government in 1910, and I think the present a fitting opportunity for a reconsideration of the orders then passed.

(Sd.) G. CARMICHAEL.

No. 13.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR MICHAEL O'DWYER, K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Governor of the Punjab.

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*Simla, August 25th, 1916.*

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I enclose a printed Memorandum containing my views on the scheme of political reform put forward in Your Excellency's letter of July 20th.

Pressure of other work has, I fear, made my note a rather hurried production. But I have endeavoured to deal with the main point raised. I am sending separately to Maffey seven spare copies.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) M. F. O'DWYER.

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[ *VERY CONFIDENTIAL.* ]

NOTE ON THE SCHEME OF POLITICAL ADVANCE EMBODIED IN HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY'S LETTER OF JULY 20TH.

At the kind invitation of His Excellency I took part in the Council deliberations which resulted in the scheme on which my observations and criticisms are now asked for. I shall endeavour therefore to make my remarks as brief as the importance of the subject allows.

2. I have availed myself of His Excellency's permission to take some of the chief officials in the province (the Chief Judge, the two Financial Commissioners and the Chief Secretary) into confidential consultation. The first three officers have put in all their service in the Punjab and their experience of the province is therefore greater than mine. On all points where the contrary is not stated I have had the satisfaction of finding that their views and mine are in general agreement. I now take up the issues raised in the order given in His Excellency's letter.

3. What is the goal of British Rule in India.

It might be argued, as I attempted to do in my preliminary Memorandum of 24th May that we already have a definite policy as enunciated in Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1858 which has been solemnly reaffirmed by her successors and is wide enough and generous enough to meet all political developments; that the declaration of our policy does not necessarily involve the

definition of a goal; that any such definition may lead to future embarrassments, charges of broken pledges if the rate of progress is too slow for the advanced politicians and premature attempts on the part of impatient idealists to attain without delay a goal which can only be reached by steady development, patient effort and practical self-discipline. While these arguments cannot be disregarded the special circumstances of the present time and of the near future appear to justify a more courageous policy. The termination of the war, in the prosecution of which India is bearing a great and worthy part, will mark the general triumph of the principles of freedom over those of absolutism, and within the British Empire will undoubtedly lead to a re-adjustment of the relations between the Mother Country and the Dominions involving the admission of the latter to the rights and responsibilities of Imperial partnership. Those circumstances strengthen the claims of the peoples of India to an increased share in the government of their own country and to a clearer recognition of their position in the British Empire. If those conclusions are accepted, there are obvious advantages in our attempting to define the goal of British Rule in India, especially as it is proposed at the same time to indicate that the ideal of colonial self-government—for which the most advanced politicians are striving—is not suitable to India, and that the form of self-government aimed at is one to be evolved in accordance with India's special circumstances and traditions and must be "compatible with the maintenance of the supremacy of British Rule". A declaration on these lines will, I venture to think, clear the air generally; it will show Indian politicians where they stand and what ideals and objects they may legitimately pursue without the risk of coming into collision with authority; it will, by insisting on the maintenance of British supremacy, tend to re-assure the great conservative classes who, being sparingly represented on press and platform, are apt to be overlooked in the din of politics and who in the past have often been confused by the doubt whether Government has any fixed and declared policy; finally, it will enable the officers of Government, who also in the past have had no clear light to guide them, to understand the policy of Government and to adapt their official acts and attitude accordingly.

I therefore strongly favour the policy of defining what the goal is, and publicly declaring it.

#### *The General Formula.*

4. As to the formula proposed for such a declaration, I have a few suggestions to offer—

(a) In the first line for "India" I would substitute "British India" to make it clear that we do not contemplate any interference in the internal Government of Native States. This suggestion has, I think, already been made by me in the Council deliberations and it has now been put forward by the

officers I have consulted. In its present unqualified form the wording might well cause alarm to the Rulers of Native States, many of whom are extremely conservative, while even the most progressive are rightly jealous of anything like interference with their prerogatives or treaty rights. No doubt the institutions of Native States—usually extremely autocratic—are and must inevitably continue to be influenced by those of British India; but it must rest with the Rulers to decide when and how to progress politically on British Indian lines. In fact, some of my officers urge that a clear declaration to this effect should be included in the formula.

With this qualification in the first line the word “India” might stand in the remainder of the formula.

(b) The criticism has been made by the Chief Judge that the grant of “the largest measure of self-government compatible with the maintenance of the supremacy of British Rule”, would be consistent with the complete transfer of the entire civil administration to an Indian *personnel* supported by the British Army and Navy—an ideal which some Indian politicians have made no secret of.

The criticism would have force if the first sentence of the formula stood alone, but the subsequent qualifications make it clear that no such violent change is even contemplated.

(c) A more practical criticism that occurs to me is that, while the formula says much about self-government, it is silent as to good government. No doubt a large and growing number of Indians desire a wider measure of self-government and we are bound by British traditions as well as by motives of honour and policy to endeavour to meet their reasonable aspirations as “education spreads, experience ripens and the lessons of responsibility are well learned”—to quote from King Edward’s Proclamation, dated 2nd November 1908. But *all* Indians desire good government and the Queen’s Proclamation, reaffirmed by her successors, pledges the Sovereign in the most solemn manner—“To administer the Government of India for the benefit of *all* Our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be Our strength; in their contentment Our security; and in their gratitude Our best reward”. In so far as self-government and good government follow the same road, promoting the prosperity and contentment of the people, there need be no hesitation in boldly advancing along that road; but where and while we are in doubt whether self-government will secure good government, we should advance cautiously and tentatively and not allow our desire to meet the wishes of the comparatively small section that desires political reforms to blind us to our obligations to secure good government to all our Indian fellow-subjects. It may be argued that this is sufficiently provided for by the words “the maintenance of the supremacy of British Rule”. But it does not necessarily

follow that self-government even with this limitation will secure good government, and the matter is, I think, of such importance as to justify a specific assurance.

I shall endeavour to make this point clearer. The expansion of local self-government is an object most desirable in itself; one likely to educate the people in self-reliance and a sense of responsibility and thus in time to promote their well-being. But it is a matter of common experience that such expansion, whether in the East or in the West, involves increased expenditure on local objects which must be largely met by increased taxation, local or Imperial, but preferably local. In the present state of opinion, the people in nearly all rural and in many urban areas would, however, prefer to forego the advantages of local self-government rather than accept liability for the extra expenditure it involves. This, in fact, rather than official apathy or opposition, is the main reason for the slow development of local self-government. No doubt the spread of education and of the idea of civic duty and the raising of the standard of comfort may and will in time leaven the views of the masses and lead them to accept the additional burdens. But all expert opinion agrees that light taxation and a minimum of outside interference are what an oriental population in the mass regards as the essentials of good government, and it would be not true statesmanship but political madness on our part to press measures of self-government which endangered or interfered with those essentials. To take a concrete example. A Bill has recently been introduced by Government in the Punjab, based on a recent Madras Act, enabling district boards to levy on the land a special railway cess not exceeding  $3\frac{1}{8}$  per cent. of the land revenue for the purpose of constructing branch lines themselves or offering a guarantee to companies that are prepared to construct them and to admit the boards to a share in the undertaking. The measure would mark a distinct advance in local self-government and at first received general support. But when it came to be examined in Select Committee, the five elected representatives of the district boards unanimously opposed it on the ground mainly that the benefits that would accrue would not compensate for the addition to the burden (small though it is) of the revenue-payers. This Government has accordingly decided not to press the Bill.

I should add that Mr. Maynard (Financial Commissioner) regards the further qualification as undesirable and likely to lead to the suspicion that the Indian Government has not got its heart in its promise.

I therefore venture to suggest that somewhere in the first formula—preferably in the first sentence—an addition to the effect that the contemplated advances in self-government should also be compatible with the recognised Indian ideals of good government.

(d) The formula naturally deals in the first place with the policy to be pursued for India (*i. e.*, British India) as a whole. But it is a commonplace

that the component parts differ widely *inter se* in historical development, traditions, aspirations and capacity for self-government. It is, I think, essential that these differences should receive prominent recognition, for they must materially affect the form of self-government to be evolved in the various provinces, and they must govern the rate of progress towards the goal. If we aim at a uniform rate of progress, it will be too fast for some provinces, too slow for others. This is indeed recognised in the enunciation of principles dealing with local self-government (Appendix A), but I think it would be wise to refer to it in the primary and general formula, and for the concluding words "her special circumstances and traditions", I would suggest substituting "not only her special circumstances and traditions but also those of her different peoples and provinces". It is unlikely that informed Indian opinion will take exception to this safeguard, and the mass of provincial opinion interested in the matter would, I think, welcome it.

### *Local Self-Government.*

5. The principles formulated in Appendix A, which are mainly based on the proposals of the Decentralisation Commission, are a useful general guide to the directions in which local self-government is capable of being developed; and as His Excellency points out, the Government of India recognise the necessity of local variations to suit the particular conditions of individual provinces. Speaking for the Punjab I may say that we have had already under consideration an advance on many of the lines suggested in the local self-government Resolution of 28th April 1915, and would have been able to show some substantial progress were it not for the more pressing pre-occupations of the past year.

6. It must be remembered that only 10 per cent. of the people in the Punjab live in towns—about 130 in number—with a population exceeding 5,000; the remaining 90 per cent. are scattered over some 33,000 villages or revenue estates with an average population of less than 600. Social and political progress is naturally more rapid where the urban population is large and in a position to influence the rural masses. The above facts will help to explain why a province, which within the last generation has made such strides in material progress, is still so backward in those forms of local self-government which are associated with municipal and rural boards. A further explanation is to be found partly in the fact that the western or purely Mahomedan portion of the province is still backward in development and the rural organisation rests on a rough tribal system which still retains considerable vigour; while in many of the towns throughout the province the social and sectarian divisions arising from the differences of race and religion are so strongly marked as seriously to hamper the development of co-operation and corporate effort which are essential to successful local self-government. The Hindu-Mahomedan



question may be troublesome at times in many provinces; here it is generally acute in the towns; while the existence of a Sikh community with strongly marked individuality leads to Hindu-Sikh and Mahomedan-Sikh complications as well. Hence in many parts of the province the system of election, which is the key-stone of the edifice of local self-government proposed in Appendix A, so far from producing healthy competition is likely to provoke sectarian or racial prejudices, and to bring to the front not the wise counsellor (*vir pietate gravis*), who can still the passions of an angry mob, but the rabid sectarian who attains notoriety by arousing and keeping them alive. Accordingly where the tribal traditions are still strong and where faction feeling of the above type has been marked, it has been in the past considered unwise to introduce the elective system.

7. Consequently there is at present no election for the rural boards of two out of the five divisions of the province (Rawalpindi and Multan) and for 30 out of the 104 municipalities.

In regard to the latter, Government has recently expressed its willingness to introduce the elective system if the majority of the people within municipal limits desire it and the change can be made without arousing serious faction feeling, and the question is now being investigated on those lines. For the rural boards I am willing to make a similar experiment if local feeling favours it. But the tribal system is still very powerful in the districts in question; under present conditions the leading men of the tribes are usually nominated as members of the rural boards and undoubtedly prefer that system to one of election; the elective system, which is by no means popular in those rural areas where it is already in force, would, if introduced, probably give us much the same tribal representatives as at present; but if it should not, it would be likely to create friction and bad feeling among communities where these lead inevitably to violence and crime.

8. These general remarks will indicate how far removed a great part of the Punjab is from the conditions in which the principles for the development of local self-government on elective lines could be safely applied.

However, I am quite prepared to push forward and even to take some risks. Thus in regard to municipal boards we contemplate an early extension of the elective system; I readily accept the principle of an elective majority—indeed such is already the rule where election is in force; our Municipal Act (Punjab Act III of 1911) already provides that every committee shall *elect* one of its members to be President (subject to the approval of Government in 1st class municipalities and of the Commissioner in other cases); and though in practice 77 official Presidents have been elected against 15 non-officials, I am quite willing to extend the system of non-official Presidents on the line suggested in paragraph 5 of Appendix A. I also heartily support the proposals for the removing of financial restrictions and extending the committee's powers of

taxation with the safeguards indicated, even though the withdrawal of official control may in some cases lead to bankruptcy. It has been suggested by Mr. Maynard (Financial Commissioner) that here, too, we might with advantage form the larger municipalities into a special group and give to them much more extensive powers than to those which are smaller and less enlightened, and this suggestion has my support.

9. In regard to rural boards the advance in the Punjab must be more cautious. The rural masses are still as a rule apathetic, and their interest is mainly aroused when any proposal is on foot to increase taxation; interest in elections is of the most languid kind (see paragraph 16 below) and the rural boards generally for some time to come need official guidance and control. Still the experiment of a non-official Chairman has been tried in one or two advanced districts in the past, and I am prepared to repeat it after due enquiry and consultation with local officers and local opinion.

10. For small towns, including notified areas, which do not desire or are not ripe for municipal institutions, we are now drafting a separate Bill with simple provisions which will, it is hoped, give them within modest limits a workable system of local self-government, and where possible we shall endeavour to introduce the elective system and the non-official President, though ordinary prudence will require a measure of official guidance till the new bodies have found their feet.

11. Finally, as regards the village *panchayat* system advocated in paragraphs 20—26 of Appendix A, I fully sympathise with the policy “to develop the corporate life of individual villages and to give the villagers an interest in, and some control over, local village affairs”. I would point out, however, that we already have come fairly close to this ideal in the Punjab. Our Punjab villages are, as above explained, small communities—the average may be taken as 100 houses containing 500 souls paying Rs. 900 land revenue to Government, and contributing about 10 per cent. on that, *i. e.*, about Rs. 90 to the rural board in rates for rural expenditure on roads, schools, medical relief, sanitation, &c. Those communities mainly consist of peasant proprietors, their tenants and dependents and a few small traders, and have already a well-defined and long-established system of self-government based on the ties of consanguinity which usually unite the proprietary body, and the distribution of the land some of which is still as a rule held jointly. The community is controlled by one or more headmen (the average would be two) generally representing the eldest branch of the proprietary body and each sub-division, tribe or sub-tribe of any importance has usually a separate representative. The office is by custom hereditary, subject to the exclusion of the unfit, and vacancies are filled by the Collector. These headmen represent the community in its dealings with Government and the outside world generally; they collect the revenue and cesses (receiving a percentage of 5 per cent. in return), are responsible

with the help of the village watchman (who is nominated by them subject to official approval) for the maintenance of law and order, arrest of offenders, reporting crime and for rendering assistance in the other branches of the administration whose functions extend to the village, *e. g.*, irrigation, education, &c.

Most villages have a special fund (*malba*), raised by a separate cess not exceeding 5 per cent. on the revenue or by light taxes on non-owners or on sales, which is administered by the headmen for village purposes; but otherwise they have no power of taxation.

12. From the above description it will be seen that the association of other individuals chosen by informal election with the headmen would tend to disintegrate the existing village system, which for administrative convenience it is so important to support and strengthen, and to engender friction and dissension. Any such action would also be resented as an encroachment on the rights of the proprietary body.

For the same reason the suggestion to endow the headmen or the suggested *panchayat* with civil and criminal jurisdiction in petty cases would usually be out of place.

I may explain that the village communities are grouped into *zails* or circles, the grouping being based as far as possible on tribal distribution of the proprietary bodies. The *zail* contains an average of 20 to 40 villages or estates under the control of the *zaildar* who is selected by the Collector from among the influential headmen of the locality and receives either a percentage of the revenue (generally) 1 per cent., or a cash *inam* varying from Rs. 150 to Rs. 350 per annum. The *zaildars'* functions are much the same as the *lambardars'*, but of course extend over a wider area. He is, in my opinion, one of the most valuable assets in our administration and is specially useful in maintaining that close connection between the Government and the people, which is particularly desirable and, I venture to think, particularly marked in the Punjab. The office, though its emoluments are not great, is looked on as one of great honour and dignity, and is as a rule eagerly sought after by even the most influential *Sardars* and landowners, who regard it in the same light as the ancient *chaudhriyat* system which the statesmanship of the wise Moghal Emperors recognised and supported in many parts of Northern India. Many of these *zaildars* already exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction in defined areas, and I would prefer to extend this system—in some cases forming two or more into a Bench—rather than confer powers on a *panchayat* or body of headmen who would rarely be qualified to exercise them, at least in the Punjab.

13. My last word on local self-government is this. We can easily enough alter the machinery and reduce official interference and control, but any real advance in local self-government, as understood in the West, involves considerable pecuniary sacrifices. Thus in France, where local self-government is most

highly developed, the *conseils généraux* (district boards) [I quote from the article of Mr. A. Galletti, I. C. S. (Madras), in the *Indian Review* 1914] raise a revenue of £ 20,000,000 and the 36,000 communes (village *panchayats*) a revenue of £ 40,000,000 by local taxation. I take Madras as the Presidency where local self-government is most developed.

The Madras district and other local boards with a population exceeding that of France raise only 101 lakhs, or about two-thirds of £1,000,000. In Italy with a population less than that of Madras, the State land-tax is about £ 1,000,000 or practically the same as that of Madras. The local cesses raised by the district boards and communes in Italy amount to £ 7,000,000 or nearly double the land-tax; in other words, they amount to 29 annas per rupee, whereas in Madras they amount to only one anna per rupee in most districts. In the Punjab they range from  $1\frac{1}{3}$  to  $1\frac{2}{3}$  annas per rupee, and as above pointed out any attempt to increase this nominal rate for the extension of local self-government arouses general opposition. Municipal towns, where the growing needs of civilisation are more clearly recognised, will usually consent to a slight increase of taxation—provided it is indirect; of the smaller towns (say with population from 2,000 to 5,000) a fair number would tax themselves (but very leniently) to provide increased education facilities and a very small proportion for sanitary improvements. Of the remaining villages or communes, it may be said with truth that they would prefer to go without local self-government beyond the simple form they already possess if it involves even a slight increase of local taxation; while the funds raised by district boards for local purposes, even when supplemented by Government contributions, are so small that it is difficult to see how any appreciable portion of them can be put at the disposal of the village bodies.

#### *More responsible Employment of Indians under Government.*

14. (a) The general principle enunciated in clause (a) of the formula will be readily accepted, *viz.*, “that it is essential to the progress of India towards the goal which we contemplate that Indians should be admitted in steadily increasing proportion to the higher grades of the various services and departments and to more responsible posts in the administration generally”. But the following statement that it “is *only* by a consistent pursuit of the policy that any large body of Indians can eventually be qualified to take their proper part in a sound scheme of self-government” appears to me a very disputable proposition.

It is open to the interpretation that, as Government recognises that admission of Indians to higher office under Government is the *only* means of training them for self-government, Government if true to its pledges to endow India with self-government must at once open that door as widely as possible regardless of other considerations of policy and good government. It is clearly

inexpedient to commit ourselves to a formula which could be interpreted in a sense which we or our successors could not give effect to. I should be inclined to omit this sentence altogether.

The statement of policy in the first sentence of clause (a) appears quite broad enough and it links on naturally enough with clause (b).

(b) The officers I have consulted are unanimous in criticising the second sentence of clause (b) ("An important factor in the case must clearly be the circumstances and considerations arising out of the war and the loyal support which India has rendered to the Empire during that period of crisis") as likely to suggest that the proposed increase of Indians in the public services is the price to be paid for India's loyalty—a suggestion which loyal Indian opinion would at once repudiate.

To meet this criticism, which appears to me reasonable, I venture to suggest something to this effect for the second sentence, "An important consideration in weighing those recommendations is the fact that the war has proved India's appreciation of, and unwavering attachment to, British Rule, and has strengthened her claim to our trust and confidence".

(c) The first sentence of clause (c) has been criticised by Sir D. Johnstone and other officers as laying insufficient emphasis on the fact that competency is an indispensable qualification for appointment to the public service. For the first few lines, *viz.*,—"The public interests no doubt require that the public services shall be filled by competent men, but in pursuing this object we must have regard \* \* \* not merely to considerations of departmental efficiency, but to the training of Indians to administer their own affairs." The following is suggested—"The public interests no doubt demand that the public services shall be filled by competent men—a rule which should never be departed from. Subject to that condition we must have regard \* \* \* not *solely* to considerations of departmental efficiency, but also to the training of Indians to administer their own affairs." I venture to think the alterations are justified, and the substitution of 'solely' for 'merely' is obviously desirable, as the original wording unduly belittles the importance of efficiency.

In the second sentence of the clause, for similar reasons, for the words "the guiding principle" I would substitute "one of the guiding principles"; for though the Indianisation of the services is an important object, it is not the *only* object of our administration.

In the fourth sentence I think "physical fitness" would perhaps read better than "physical capacity", and in the last sentence "an undue predominance" better than "too large predominance". This sentence generally is a most opportune and valuable recognition of the fact that intellectual qualifications, combined with physical fitness, should not be the sole test for admission to the public service,

*Legislative Councils—Provincial and Imperial.*

15. The two Memoranda (B and C) are at one in recognising the advantages of—

- (1) larger constituencies with direct for the present indirect election ;
- (2) as a result of (1), a better system of representation, especially in the case of the important landed interests which admittedly is now overshadowed by the professional or lawyer element.

With both of these proposals I am in agreement, and I also favour the suggestions to give members generally more freedom of interpellation, closer control over the budget, and to allow official members freedom of voting in matters which Government does not regard as questions "of confidence".

In Memorandum C it is argued that the present system of representation of "Classes and Interests" has been found wanting, that to it is due the preponderance of the lawyer element; and it is proposed to substitute for it a system of general representation by territorial units, such as the district, each constituency to have at least 3 000 voters; Mahomedans, Sikhs or other important communities so scattered as to be unable to obtain adequate representation in ordinary constituencies to be provided for by proportional representation based on population; but the members of these special constituencies to be debarred from voting in the ordinary constituencies. The proposal is specious; and if we were working on a clean slate and framing a representative system for a Western State or province, where the people in the words of the primary formula are in "possession of a more or less common inheritance of political traditions, social customs and religious beliefs", it would have much to recommend it.

But we are dealing here with India and the provinces of India, and have laid it down at the outset that we are not aiming at the unsuitable ideals of Colonial self-government, but at a form of self-government which takes into account India's special circumstances and traditions.

16. Is it necessary to argue that the proposal radically conflicts with this principle and that the system of general electorates based on territorial grouping is absolutely foreign to Indian traditions? In so far as it exists in municipal towns, where modern ideas are more prevalent, it is the creation of our Government and so far from becoming more popular there are constant demands to substitute for it a separate representation of classes and interests; but in the rural areas, whose interests it is most important to safeguard, it has never become firmly established, and in many places is decidedly unpopular.

Thus last year 185 vacancies in the district boards of the Punjab had to be filled by election. For 29 no candidates offered and the posts had to be filled by nomination; for 120 seats only one candidate (generally the

sitting member) presented himself in each case and was elected automatically. Only 36 seats or less than one-fifth of the whole were contested by 79 candidates or an average of just over 2 per seat. This apathy is the more remarkable in view of the near approach of the elections to the Legislative Council for which members of district boards select no less than 5 of the 11 elected members. On the other hand, in the municipalities where interest in local matters is naturally greater and is often stimulated by faction or sectarian feeling 46 per cent. of the vacant seats were contested, and except in Rohtak where all the candidates withdrew as a protest against the high price demanded for votes, the contests were keen and the proportion of voters who went to the poll was high. Those figures are to my mind more convincing than any amount of abstract reasoning. They show at least for the Punjab (and I fancy conditions are very similar if less marked in the rest of Northern India, whatever they may be in the South) that the elective system outside the towns—where the possession of a vote is as often valued for its money worth as for other reasons—is foreign to the traditions of the people. They further go to show that, given the mixed territorial constituency of Appendix C, the rural interests will be dominated by the more easily mobilised urban voters and by those who manipulate them.

17. The territorial constituency will inevitably be captured by the political cliques at the district head-quarters, the Bar Association, the Congress, or the Muslim League, perhaps now and then by a syndicate or combination of men with long purses, as the case may be, who control the political machinery just as in Ireland, where a small body of professional politicians possessing the machinery of the Land League or the National League controlled and still controls the elections. The rural voter if he comes to the poll at all, and in a general constituency he will hesitate to do so, will be as easily mystified and misled in regard to the issues as the ignorant *maujiks* who were induced by the Russian wire-pullers to parade the streets of Petrograd clamouring for a constitution (Constitutzia) in the belief that they were applauding the worthy spouse of the popular Grand Duke Constantine!

If the suggested general electorate were to secure one of the Congress ideals, *viz*, "to make the Legislative Council truly and adequately representative of all sections of the people"—which is what Memorandum C also hopes from it—I should be inclined to favour it. But I am firmly convinced that a system which is utterly foreign to the popular traditions and sentiments cannot produce results "truly and adequately representative of all sections of the people", and I therefore regard the proposal not only as unsuitable to Indian conditions, but as dangerous to the steady and healthy political development on Indian lines which is accepted as our goal.

18. In the first place, urban and rural interests are often so sharply divided, at least in the Punjab, that no representative can adequately voice both. If, as would usually happen, he owed his seat to the support of the urban

professional, money-lending, and trading elements, he would be hostile to the agricultural interests which rally round the Land Alienation and similar Acts for the protection of the landowners, large and small; on the other hand, if he should happen to represent the landowners, the urban interests will complain that they are ignored or injured. In the next place, if elected for a district unit as proposed, he will be tempted to pose as the representative of the people, in contrast and often in opposition to the official head of the district, and to use his political power in the council and elsewhere to influence overtly or covertly the district administration which obviously should remain unaffected by political parties.

This is no imaginary picture. We have a notable example of it in the relations between the elected Deputy and the official Prefect in almost every French Department, the organisation of which closely resembles that of our Indian district; and most thinking Frenchmen deplore the evil results of the pressure which the Deputy, pursuing purely party aims, exercises on the official who should in theory at least administer for the good of all without fear, favour or affection. One frequent result of the system in France is to put the official patronage at the disposal of the Masonic Lodges, for which we can find ready Indian counterparts; another is that the administration readily bows to popular clamour—often manufactured—however harmful the object it demands. The throwing open of the forests along the Mediterranean Coast to all and sundry, including the goat, and their speedy extinction—to the ultimate loss of the people—are well-known results in France and probably the same causes have produced similar results in Italy.

This undesirable and underhand pressure of political cliques or groups on the district administration, I believe, already exists in some parts of India; the calling into existence of a “tribune of the people” in each district or group of districts will enormously stimulate it, and the evil will grow as more and more Indians attain to higher places in the administration, as they are not in such a strong position to resist such influences as European officers.

19. I am therefore in substantial agreement with the arguments in the Memorandum B that the territorial basis of election would be a dangerous innovation contrary to Indian traditions, to the repeated pronouncements of the Government of India and the Secretary of State, and not calculated to achieve the objects which those who advocate it have in view. It follows that I favour the retention in principle of the accepted system of representation of “Classes and Interests”, but I would modify these where necessary for each province in the light of experience, and not only increase the existing constituencies which are admittedly too small in many cases, but also admit the principle of direct election.

20. I do not, however, support the proposal in Memorandum B to abolish the district board constituencies. Those, if properly worked, should provide



useful representatives of the landed interest, and it is not improbable that it is the amalgamation of district boards and municipalities for voting purposes in the United Provinces and Madras that has led (see also paragraph 17 above) to the preponderance of the lawyer element among the men elected. In the recent Punjab elections all four municipal electorates returned lawyers, while four out of the five district board constituencies returned landowners; and I believe, that if the two bodies elected jointly, not more than one or two landowners would have been returned.

The Punjab is a country of peasant proprietors and the necessity of separate representation for the big landowners, though the question has at various times been considered, has not yet been established. If found necessary hereafter, it can be provided for by nomination, and the Punjab Chiefs' Association which is now asked to suggest names for the representation of the Punjab landowners in the Imperial Council would of course be referred to.

21. On the other hand, to secure better representation of "Classes and Interests", I should be inclined to propose separate electoral representation of the important Sikh minority.

Numerically the Sikhs form about one-eighth of the population; politically their importance, as former rulers of the Punjab, as owning the richest tracts in the Central Punjab and paying perhaps one-fourth of the land and irrigation revenue and as furnishing one-third of the troops raised in the Punjab and over one-sixth of the total Indian army, is considerably greater than mere numbers would indicate.

Hitherto they have (owing mainly to their being dispersed over many districts) only once succeeded in returning a Sikh to the Provincial Council by election, and at the recent election among 11 elected Members there was not a single Sikh. This defect has hitherto been redressed by nomination; but the Sikhs, though much divided among themselves, are a strongly marked and democratic community; since 1912 they have been agitating for separate minority representation; and it is desirable that they should be allowed to select their own representatives. I would therefore propose for them 2 out of the 14 seats which I propose to throw open to election.

There is a historical distinction between the Sikhs North and South of the Sutlej, and I would give each group one representative, the franchise being determined later after due enquiry. The Sikhs being pre-eminently landowners, it is probable that their separate representation would also strengthen that of the landowners.

22. Agreeing with the views of both Memoranda as to the importance of adequate representation of commerce and industry, I would in addition to the existing representative (hitherto a European) of the Punjab Chamber

of Commerce—a body which is chiefly interested in the import of piece-goods—give a separate representation to local commerce and industry. A suitable constituency could be formed on the analogy of those for the millowning and planting interests of other provinces.

23. The present “Classes and Interests” and the number of their representatives are—

District boards, <i>i. e.</i> , rural interests	...	...	5
Municipalities, <i>i. e.</i> , urban interests	...	...	4
Punjab Chamber of Commerce	...	...	1
University	...	...	1
			—
	TOTAL	...	11

and while retaining these I would add—

Sikhs	...	...	2
Local commerce and industry	...	...	1
			—
	TOTAL	...	14
			—

An extension of the existing constituencies has already been accepted in principle. The details cannot be worked out at this stage, but I may indicate the general lines which seem suitable.

At present 840 non-official members of 28 district boards elect five members (the constituencies varying from 118 to 238), and 422 non-official members of 38 municipalities and cantonment committees (with a population exceeding 15,000) elect four members in four separate groups.

There is obviously reason for improvement here, though it may be noted that in the Punjab at least the paucity of the electorate has not been made a ground of attack, and it might be argued that a large electorate is not essential where the elections are intended to give representatives of “Classes and Interests.”

24. I would not deprive the existing members of their privilege—to do so would create resentment—but I would include other classes of voters. To the rural constituencies I would add rural notables, such as Zaildars, Ilaqadars, Inamdars, as well as Honorary Magistrates and Sub-Registrars living and working in rural areas. I should also be inclined to add land-owners and jagirdars who pay, or have assignments of, land revenue of or above Rs. 250 per annum—which may be taken in the Punjab to represent an income of Rs. 1,000 per annum.

For the municipalities I should first consider the inclusion of municipal towns with a population below 15,000, which have now no vote. I would leave to non-official municipal members the right of voting as at present, and

would add to them other voters paying income-tax on incomes of (say) Rs. 2,000 or above, Honorary Magistrates and Sub-Registrars living in towns. At present educational qualifications alone give no right even to the municipal franchise, but it has been suggested that the possession of a degree of a recognised university should give a title to vote, and I see no objection to this at least in the towns. Government servants on a salary of above Rs. 150 per mensem and pensioners drawing Rs. 75 per mensem or more might also be allowed to vote in the urban constituencies where they reside.

The rural interests are so distinct that it would be better to limit the vote there strictly to the classes already mentioned. But all these are matters of detail which can be worked out at leisure once the general principles are authoritatively defined. For the university the franchise might include not only the Senate as at present, but also all M. A's as in the case of Oxford and Cambridge. To exclude "carpet-baggers" and secure a modicum of that local knowledge which is essential in a system of representation by "Classes and Interests" it seems essential that residence in the electoral area and the possession of a vote in that area should be conditions of candidature.

25. I now come to the crucial question whether there should or should not be a majority of elected members. I need not discuss the obvious arguments on both sides. I am in general agreement with the views expressed in Memorandum B and with the conclusions in paragraph 10 thereof. While I favour the increase of the elective element in the Provincial Councils, to secure better representation of classes and interests, I do not think that present circumstances warrant an elective majority in the Councils generally.

I admit that the maintenance of the representation by "Classes and Interests" is a useful safeguard against the dangers that would attend an elective majority constituted as suggested in Memorandum C. But it is not difficult to foresee conditions—as indicated in paragraph 9 of Memorandum B—in which these safeguards would disappear, and a factious—as opposed to a justifiable—combination might paralyse the Executive Government. Log-rolling is a well-known development of politics, which Indian politicians will not be slow to adopt, and we have had a recent instance in a province of Northern India of a combination to attack the land revenue settlement of a particular district—though the urban members who joined the landowners in the combination probably cared little and knew less about the policy pursued. Similar combinations would probably be not infrequent where any question of increased taxation of any one class arises; but the most probable and dangerous form would arise should one or more provinces be swept by a political agitation similar to those of 1897 or 1907, when men ordinarily reasonable and moderate are apt to lose their heads or be carried off their feet. While I foresee less risk of such combinations in my own province than elsewhere, I am convinced that the political development of the country as a whole

does not justify the grant of elective majorities in the Provincial Councils. The so-called boon might well prove a double-edged weapon in the hands of inexperienced politicians, and if given at all should be held up till in the words of the King-Emperor's Proclamation of 1908 "education spreads, experience ripens, and the lessons of responsibility are well-learned". That I believe to be the view of the great body of moderate and conservative Indian opinion.

26. The various other measures proposed by Government, *viz.*, the extension of local self-government, the wider opening of the higher posts in the public services to Indians, the broadening of the electorates to secure a better representation of classes and interests, and a reasonable increase in the proportion of elected members—all of these will promote progress towards the goal of self-government suitable to India's tradition and circumstances. It would surely be wise to await the result of these measures before taking a leap into the unknown, and introducing a measure which is foreign to Indian ideas, and while based on Western political ideas, cannot be followed out as in the West to its logical conclusion, because admittedly a hostile majority in the Council cannot turn out the Government or be allowed to carry out the policy it advocates.

27. Perhaps our English political history has given us an undue contempt for logical conclusions, but it is difficult to imagine any disinterested political thinker outside the British Empire regarding an elective majority at the present stage of Indian development and in the conditions governing the case, otherwise than with amused astonishment or friendly concern. He would be quick to observe that here we are without the safeguard provided by the second Chamber in nearly all countries with representative institutions, though in India it is more than anywhere necessary to take into account the great mass of conservative opinion. His misgivings would not be removed by reference to the safeguards—complete or partial veto of the Governor on legislation, penal dissolution, &c.,—suggested in Memorandum C. These would in the majority of cases stimulate rather than soothe opposition; they would be likely to galvanise all the political machinery, which in India is so easy to manipulate, into action against the Government; and one does not wish to contemplate the political deadlock and the loss of Government prestige that would have to be faced should the factious majority after a penal dissolution return with a renewed mandate from the constituencies.

It is to my mind consistent neither with our desire to promote healthy political progress on Indian lines, nor with our duty to secure good government on lines accepted by them to all our Indian fellow-subjects, to risk involving the country in the dangerous and profitless political turmoil which even in the West is regarded at the best as a necessary evil. Anyhow ordinary prudence should counsel us to build on experience and not proceed too fast.

28. And here I may be allowed to point out that the traditional British habit of belittling our achievements is apt to blind not only ourselves but the advanced Indian politicians to the advance made within the last 20 years in

the matter of the Legislative Councils. Take the case of the Punjab. The first Legislative Council was constituted in 1897 and consisted of 9 nominated Members, of whom 5 were British officials and 4 were non-officials, *viz.*, 2 Mahomedans, 1 Sikh and 1 Hindu. By the reform scheme of 1909, a Council of 24 Members was established, of whom 19 (including not more than 10 officials) were nominated and 5 were elected by—

Municipal and Cantonment Committees	...	...	3
University	...	...	1
Chamber of Commerce	...	...	1

In 1910 on the proposal of the Local Government, 3 of the nominated seats were thrown up to election by district boards, thus reducing the number of nominated members to 16 and raising the number elected to 8.

In the present year again at the instance of the Local Government the number of Members have been raised by 24 to 28, 3 of the new seats being given to the district boards (2) and municipalities (1), and one being reserved for nomination. As already indicated, I am prepared, while retaining the statutory limit of 30 members, to strengthen further the elective element, but not yet to propose an elective majority. The present and proposed constitution of the Council are shown below. The latter has the support of the experienced officers I have consulted, but Mr. Maynard (Financial Commissioner) would go further and concede an elective majority of 16 members, cutting out the separate Sikh representatives, and increasing the urban and rural constituencies by two each.

<i>Present.</i>				<i>Proposed.</i>			
<i>Nominated—</i>							
(a) Officials not exceeding	11			Officials not exceeding	11		
(b) Non-officials not less than	6			Non-officials not less than	5		
(c) Experts	...	...	2				
							16
Total Nominated	...	19					
<i>Elected—</i>							
(d) Rural constituencies	...	5		Rural constituencies	...	5	
(e) Municipal groups	...	4		Municipal groups	...	4	
(f) University	...	1		University	...	1	
(g) Chamber of Commerce	...	1		Chamber of Commerce	...	1	
(h) Sikhs	...	<i>Nil</i>		Sikhs	...	2	
(i) local commerce and industry.	...	<i>Nil</i>		Local commerce and industry.	...	1	
Total elected	...	11			...	14	
GRAND TOTAL	...	30				30	

29. The reasons for the addition of three elected Members [(h) and (i)] have already been stated. The two expert Members have never yet been found necessary in the Punjab Council, and I would utilise those two seats and one of those filled by nomination to provide the three new elected seats.

Seeing that the Council system has been at work for less than 20 years in the Punjab, I think the extension now proposed is as far as it would be safe to go. It provides for adequate electoral representation of the most important interests and retains a bare majority of nominated Members. The statutory limit of the Punjab Council is 30 Members and there is no present need to increase that number. For the despatch of business and the due representation of the various important departments of Government it will be essential to have 10 or 11 nominated officials, and to redress the inequalities which have hitherto so often attended the Punjab Council elections and secure now and then men of influence, talent or special business capacity who object to, or would not succeed in, the electoral test, it is desirable to have five or six seats filled by nomination.

If we throw open the remaining seats 14 out of 30—of which 13 will almost invariably be filled by Indians—to election, we shall, I think, be going as far as the past history and present conditions of the province justify. Indeed further than I should be prepared to go were it not for the confidence I have in the practical commonsense and solid loyalty of the Punjabi, who if more material and less 'spiritual' than other Indian races, is much less prone to follow the vague political ideas that find favour in other parts of India and prides himself on the prominent part he has played and is playing in the consolidation and defence not only of India, but of the Empire generally. If, however, greater political concessions are given in other provinces than here, the *amour propre* of the Punjabi or of those who profess to represent him will naturally ask why the province in spite of its greater services has received less adequate recognition than its neighbours. In fact, the final argument against the wisdom of conceding elected majorities in any province, even where there is little risk of a factious combination among the majority, is that the politicians of other provinces will at once raise a clamour, which it will be difficult to resist, for similar treatment, and the next object of attack will be the official majority in the Imperial Legislative Council, which under the proposed scheme of elective majorities remains as the final constitutional bulwark of British Rule. By retaining a Government majority in the Imperial Council we recognise that the wisdom of the legislature is not necessarily increased by having an elected majority, while the risks undoubtedly are, and I do not see why in deference to a demand which proceeds only from a limited section of the people, we should depart from that salutary principle in the case of the Provincial Councils.

SIMLA;

The 24th August 1916.

M. F. O'DWYER,

Lieut.-Governor, Punjab.

No. 14.

FROM H. E. THE RIGHT HON<sup>BLE</sup> LORD PENTLAND, G. C. I. E., Governor of  
Madras.

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*Govt. House, Ootacamund, August 26th, 1916.*

[Private.]

MY DEAR CHELMSFORD,

I must again express my regret that I am only now able, by tomorrow's post, to send to you the enclosed note in reply to your 'very secret' letter of July 20th. I trust that you may pardon the delay which is due to the causes already mentioned to you. I have consulted my Members of Council who have furnished me with rough notes of their views mainly upon the reform of Provincial Councils. These notes were written merely for my personal and confidential information, and not for any wider purpose or for embodiment in any permanent form; but I shall be happy to send them for your private perusal if you would care to see them?

With all kind regards,

I am, yours very sincerely,  
(Sd.) PENTLAND.

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[*SECRET.*]

NOTE BY LORD PENTLAND.

(1) It seems to me that assent to the proposition that the present moment calls for the promulgation of a definite policy of internal political reform for India upon the lines of these notes depends partly only upon the results of their examination, partly upon considerations which are beyond their scope. In the meantime, therefore, I express no opinion upon the point, agreeing of course that future policy for India must be specially considered in connection with the Imperial issues which may claim public attention at the close of the war.

In the domain of self-government of towns and rural areas, it is proposed to press Local Governments to establish a low franchise and, on the assumption that this will produce a true representation of all classes, to place municipalities and district boards under the control of substantial elected non-official majorities; at the same time increasing slightly and subject to qualifications their financial and administrative powers. This is popular control; but popular control which is nominal rather than real, for in many particulars it is subject not merely to fixed statutory limits, but to the veto, check, regulation,

rule, or precaution of the Local Government. It is doubtful whether the lowered franchise will at present produce or tend to produce the desired results, especially in rural areas, against the all-pervading influence and superior powers of organisation of the educated professional class. Their demand for power and responsible control of local affairs will not be satisfied by these changes, which seem likely rather to produce friction, to shake confidence, to weaken administration, and to delay progress. Provincial Governments may, for the present I suggest, be left to encourage and guide the gradual natural development of self-government in towns and rural areas according to local conditions and upon the lines so recently suggested by the Government of India's Self-government Resolution of last year.

The belief here is, I may perhaps add, that at the time of the Decentralisation Commission's enquiry the freedom enjoyed by local authorities, including municipalities in this Presidency, was in some respects considerably greater than in other provinces. Since then substantial progress has been made in the examination of existing restrictions and in the abolition of those which are unnecessary. An important experiment in the development of *panchayats* has been begun. All our existing Local Government legislation has been closely examined, with a view to its complete revision. The Bill containing our proposals for Madras city is now with the Government of India; the Bills in regard to district boards and municipalities will follow in due course, and will of course be based upon a thorough examination of the working of the existing Acts, the representations of the local bodies concerned, the recommendations of the Decentralisation Commission and the Government of India's Self-government Resolution of 1915; and now the considerations presented in these notes.

(2) With the policy of more responsible employment of Indians under the Government I am in full sympathy. As the publication of the Public Services Commission's report will give full opportunity to consider the nature and extent of the advance which may wisely be made in this Presidency, I reserve for the present all observations upon those points. I would venture, however, to draw attention to some general considerations suggested by passages in your letter. In the first place it is apparently anticipated that, for the present, no limit need be set to the substitution of Indian agency for the European element in the higher grades and more responsible posts under the Government. If the gradual reduction of our authority and of the power to enforce it, and if the eventual transfer to the people of this country of all responsibility for their own future were the accepted policy of the Government of India, nothing could be urged against this assumption. According to the formula now presented, the more responsible employment of Indians under the Government must, however, be subject to the maintenance of British supremacy. It would be difficult to say now to what extent the European element could be withdrawn,



and that supremacy still be securely maintained. For the preservation of internal order alone, a strong and efficient European element seems likely to be essential for a long time to come; and if we are to remain responsible for India, it can only be on the condition that British ideals continue to inspire every branch of the administration. Any alteration in the agency employed must not be such as to restrict the free play of those ameliorating influences, the extension of which even now seems to many disappointingly slow; and the growing Indian element in the services must not impair the strength and spirit of British rule.

It is further stated that administrative efficiency must be subordinated to political training. Here again there seem to be limits beyond which this principle cannot safely be pressed. Under the widest development of political rights which can at present be foreseen, the mass of the population of this Continent or *quasi*-Continent of India will remain without a voice in the administration; its deterioration would bring to them no compensations. In work for the development of the country, its peoples, and natural resources, this Government is continually hampered by the inadequacy of its establishments, European and Indian; and the additions to the cadres necessary to supply these deficiencies seem likely of themselves to afford ample opportunities for some time to come, apart from any additions to the European element, to the best Indian talent which this Presidency can provide.

I offer these general comments now merely because I am reluctant to appear to acquiesce in postulates which seem acceptable only with important qualifications.

(3) In the domain of the Provincial Legislative Councils, note B suggests a slight increase of the elected Members, while note C would give a substantial majority of elected Members. These notes also propose one or other of two methods of re-distributing the constituencies, lowering the franchise in each case, in order to reduce the present predominance of the educated class or of its political section by the wider and more varied representation which it is hoped by these means to secure. This may be held to be a somewhat unfortunate and slender basis for so early an amendment of the Morley-Minto reforms, and as likely to provoke prematurely the larger and possibly inconvenient issue of their general revision. The demand of the political educated class is for effective control over the Executive Government and will not be satisfied by either of these proposals, which, though they will in differing degree increase the present power of non-official criticism and opposition, will not give any real control and will be represented as worthless. On the other hand, as these papers admit, the changes proposed in note C, while they will require time to operate and are unlikely to succeed in their aim at first, will probably impede legislation and administration in the meantime, thus emphasizing the subordination of the Provincial Government and Legislative Council to

the control of the Government of India and the Secretary of State, tending to check the confidence of these authorities and the devolution by them of further powers to Provincial Legislative Councils and to delay reforms required by advancing administrative and social conditions. It seems wholly doubtful whether this plan C will succeed in its purpose within any reasonable limit of time. In any event, and certainly if it succeeds, it will be resented by the educated class; while its failure will leave them stronger than ever politically, for it will have endowed them with greater representative authority. Provincial Legislative Councils are the outworks of the Imperial Legislative Council and the Government of India, and to place these Councils under the control of substantial elected majorities is of course an irrevocable step with inevitable consequences.

Two suggestions remain to be noticed. The opinion that it is too soon to consider important changes in the Morley-Minto scheme is characterised as *ultra-conservative*. And it is suggested that a policy of inaction in regard to the amendment of these reforms would almost certainly be overruled from home. At the same time these papers admit that further experience of the working of the Morley-Minto Act would, under ordinary circumstances, be desirable, but urge that the war and its consequences render this impracticable. Madras experience, which is perhaps common to the rest of India, is that the existing powers of the Provincial Legislative Council under that Act, far from having been tested or exhausted, have been only imperfectly explored by its Members. For some of the changes, which may be required by these proposals now under consideration, Parliamentary sanction may be required, such, for instance, as an increase of the statutory numbers of Members of Provincial Legislative Councils. Experience of the working of existing legislation being the common Parliamentary basis and justification for its amendment, and the pressure upon the time of Parliament being great, it may be well to bear in mind the possibility that the Government of the day may not unreasonably take the view that the case for amending this Act is not at present strong enough to submit to Parliament.

The chief obstacle at present to the development and popularity and to the representative character of local authorities of towns and rural areas seems to lie in their limited resources and powers not in their constitutions. The subject-matter of their work is consequently not sufficiently interesting or important to non-officials of superior social position, zemindars, landowners, merchants, professional men or others, and to their welfare to induce them in the first place to stand for election, or secondly, to make the necessary sacrifice of time, money, or it may be dignity, involving perhaps considerable journeys and absences from home or business, in order to attend meetings where, as a rule, the business to be transacted is almost wholly of a routine character, and offers no scope for personal initiative or effort. To alter

the constitution of these authorities will not remove this obstacle, which is due to the limitations of their powers and resources. These again are due largely to the limits placed upon the resources and powers of the Provincial Government. The true remedy is to enlarge them.

Again, non-official opposition and criticism in the Provincial Legislative Council, much of which is in this respect reasonable, is mainly founded upon, or directed against, the limitations of their resources and powers under which the Provincial Government and Legislative Council discharge their duties. The plain remedy is a frank endeavour to enlarge those resources and powers. Yet this course finds no place in these papers. Note B does not mention it; note C mentions it only to dismiss it without discussion, on the ground "that present circumstances demand some radical reform, and that the practical direction of immediate advance is to enlarge the constituencies and the proportion of elected Members, postponing further material development of the powers of the Councils until the working of these reforms has been tested and definite progress has been made in the further Indianisation of the higher administration", that is to say, for many years to come. I cannot but fear that if this is the outlook and the possible result of these proposals, they are hardly to be regarded as substantial instalments of reform in the sphere of work of Provincial Legislative Councils.

While there may be considerations unknown to me which might modify these views, it seems to me, as I have indicated in these observations, unnecessary and impolitic to re-open now the question of the constitution of Provincial Legislation Councils; and, replying to your two specific questions, I would not now give an elected majority, or alter the present constitution or franchise. I would for the present reject both the schemes under consideration. At the same time I recognise the high importance of developing self-government generally in the interests of better administration and of political education, and also as multiplying for all sections and classes the opportunities of work for the common welfare. Accordingly I would urge, as a definite policy to meet present needs and demands, the development of self government by giving larger resources and larger powers, financial and administrative, to Provincial Governments and Legislative Councils, and consequently through their agency to the local authorities of towns and rural areas. While the schemes contained in these papers seem to me likely, by concentrating public attention upon the redistribution of constituencies, the limits of the franchise, and elected majorities, to emphasise unduly the distinctions which may be drawn between official and non-official Members of the same body and to accentuate questions of caste predominance, and so to arrest the growth of political interest of a more varied and healthy nature, the alternative course which I propose will, I believe, tend to promote the greater dignity and usefulness of the Provincial Legislative Council and the lesser local authorities, to

make them more truly representative and trustworthy in information and judgment, to overcome the existing reluctance of the influential and wealthy to serve on public bodies generally, and to encourage mutual understanding and public spirit.

In advocating this alternative, or substitute, as it may be regarded, I am not unmindful that many other important Indian questions press for consideration. There are the isolated subjects mentioned in your letter; these are questions of external defence and military policy, of internal, fiscal and railway policy, and questions concerning Native States; and overshadowing all others, the care and development of India's natural resources and of her immense and growing population. In the consideration of many of these problems the Provincial Legislative Councils will be called upon to share; all the more important does it seem to fit them gradually, as I have ventured to urge, for greater responsibilities.

And if signal recognition be required of India's present services to the Empire, a fitting opportunity might be sought by His Majesty's advisers of according to India the more liberal financial treatment regarded by Indian opinion as unjustly withheld, and long ago recommended as equitable by high Parliamentary and financial authority.

PENTLAND.

26th August 1916.

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No. 15.

### CONCLUSIONS IN COUNCIL AS REGARDS PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS, 31st AUGUST 1916.

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1. There should be a majority of elected members; each Local Government to consider what the size of this majority should be in its Province. If a Local Government considers that, in present circumstances, an elected majority is undesirable in its Province, it must demonstrate this clearly.

2. There should be a wide extension of the franchise in the various Provinces adapted to local circumstances.

3. Certain Members consider that the territorial system is better than one of "class" constituencies, but the general conclusion was that Local Governments should be allowed discretion in this matter. Sir Reginald Craddock, however, holds that it is undesirable to have a territorial system, even in a Province in which the Local Government may be disposed that way. Sir Sankaran Nair, on the other hand, considers that there should be territorial constituencies if we adopt the conclusion that the Councils are not to have larger powers.

4. There should be no change in the *powers* of the Council (Sir Sankaran Nair would dissent from this unless territorial constituencies are generally adopted), but the budget proposal in paragraph 6 of memorandum C should be accepted.

5. It was generally agreed that, where Mahomedans have special constituencies marked off for them, they should not also vote in the general constituencies, and that the franchise conditions should be the same for Mahomedans and for others.

The question whether we are definitely bound by Lord Morley's promise of 1909, quoted by Sir James Meston, that Mahomedans should have larger proportionate representation than their numbers would warrant to be further examined.

The question whether special proportionate representation is to be given to others than Mahomedans, where special circumstances would seem to warrant this, was not definitely discussed.

6. The proposal for a partial veto on legislation by the Head of the Province to be dropped. But it may be considered whether he should not be able to return a Bill to the Legislative Council saying that he cannot accept such and such clauses, but will pass the rest if they will consent to omit these.

7. The power of special dissolution within a Council's ordinary term of duration to be reserved for further discussion. Mr. Lowndes will see if there is any precedent in the Crown Colonies.

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No. 16.

[*SECRET.*]

### NOTE *RE* MAHOMEDANS.

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At our last Council meeting last Thursday, the question about Mahomedan representation was left undecided.

In 1913 when the Hon'ble Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya gave notice of a Resolution for reforming the constitution of the Legislative Councils, the subject was examined in the Home Department, Proceedings 240 of April 1913, of which each Member has a copy.

2. On page 8 of the notes will be found a statement which showed for the first Councils after the reforms, the proportion of Mahomedans in each province, the proportion of separate Mahomedan seats to total non-official seats, and the total number of Mahomedans who actually obtained seats on the Councils. It will be observed that where Mahomedans were in a minority they obtained representation equal to or larger than their numerical proportion,

Where they were in a majority, their seats did not come up to their proportioned share.

We can of course have similar information collected for the second and third Councils, but as the same census figures still hold good and the Mahomedan seats are the same, this table is sufficient for immediate present needs.

3. Paragraph 8 of Mr. Wheeler's note contains relevant extracts relating to Mahomedans. Generally it may be summed up that Lord Morley objected to plural voting, but ultimately and with some reluctance accepted the argument that, as Lord Minto had promised something more than exact representation in strict numerical proportion, any extra seats that Mahomedans might secure on the general electorates would give that extra degree of representation which was foreshadowed.

We are still proposing to give Mahomedans their strict numerical representation on the main basic electorates, but on a common franchise with their Hindu brethren, instead of on a special franchise of their own.

They will also be eligible for election in all special electorates which may be devised, *e. g.*, Universities or Indian commerce. Any plural voting that revised Regulations allow will be common to all classes and not special to Mahomedans. Moreover, Lord Minto's pledge did not necessarily mean election, he meant that the constitution of Councils would be framed so that on the actual Councils as complete Mahomedans would have seats whether by election or nomination in numbers sufficient to represent their numerical proportion and generally with a little to spare.

4. There is, however, one feature to which I must draw attention. Ordinarily speaking one might suppose that in provinces where Mahomedans constituted a large or substantial majority of the population, this fact should be reflected in the elections, and that no special representation would be required for them; indeed that if it were required for anybody it would be for Hindus. But as a matter of fact this can never be safely predicated. Mahomedans are poor in worldly goods, and backward in education, so that though Mahomedans might be in a majority in the total population, they might still be in a very small minority in any electoral roll which did not go down to manhood suffrage.

5. Special electorates will therefore be necessary in all places where Mahomedan voters are not in a majority corresponding to their proportion of the total population. But if we were to accede to the Local Governments who wish to preserve the special electorates for Mahomedans with liberty to them to stand for, and vote on, the general electorates, there is always risk of their over-representation in places where Mahomedans have obtained some predominance as landholders or in commerce, *e. g.*, Sind, Bombay city, and possibly parts of Oudh and the Punjab.

R. H. C[RADDOCK],—5-9-16,

No. 16a.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR WILLIAM MEYER, K. C. S. I., K. C. I. E., Member of the  
Viceroy's Council.

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*Simla, September 9th, 1916.*

MY DEAR MAFFEY,

His Excellency asked me to take notes of our further discussions in Council yesterday on the subject of Provincial Legislative Councils and to submit a draft to him. This I now do in the paper marked A herewith sent. But as there are references to, and modifications of, the conclusions recorded at the meeting of 31st August, I have thought that it would be convenient to bring the conclusions of both meetings together, as in the paper marked B, which I also submit for His Excellency's approval. I have shown both drafts to Craddock and he concurs in them.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) W. S. MEYER.

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A

*Conclusions in Council as regards Provincial Legislative Councils (continued),  
8th September 1916.*

1. *Paragraph 3 of last week's conclusions.*—It was decided to redraft the first sentence of this paragraph as follows:—

“Certain Members consider that a system based primarily on territorial units is better than one of purely ‘class’ constituencies, but the general conclusion was that Local Governments should be allowed discretion in this matter.”

2. *Paragraph 5, ibid second clause.*—It was decided that all that we are really bound to by Lord Morley's promise here referred to is that, where Mahomedans are in a minority in a province, their representation on the Legislative Council should be somewhat higher than the number which a strictly numerical proportion would give them. But it is not necessary, in assigning special constituencies, to go appreciably beyond the numerical proportion in the matter of seats. The balance can be made up by nomination, and Local Governments should be instructed accordingly.

Where Mahomedans are in a majority in a province, they do not need special protection, but the fact that they are, or are not, in a majority must be determined by the electoral rolls and not by the census statistics.

Sir Sankaran Nair, however, would give the Mahomedans in every province elective seats in exact proportion to their census numbers and would allow them special franchises, if necessary, but he is not prepared to give them any representation beyond what their numbers warrant.

3. *Third clause of paragraph 5, ibid.*—It was decided, as a general principle, that it is undesirable to extend the proportional representation system to classes other than Mahomedans; but that if a Local Government pressed for this for special reasons—as for instance, the Punjab Government might well do in respect of Sikhs—it might be allowed. In such a case the community thus singled out should be treated in exactly the same way as Mahomedans.

4. *Paragraph 6, ibid.*—The proposal that the Head of a Province should be enabled to return a Bill to the Legislative Council saying that he cannot accept such and such clauses, but will pass the rest if they will consent to omit these, was accepted, and it was decided that similar power should be given to the Governor-General at a later stage when a Provincial Bill comes up to him for acceptance.

5. *Paragraph 7, ibid.*—It was decided that a Local Government should have power to dissolve a Legislative Council within the Council's ordinary term of duration. There are precedents for this in Malta, Jamaica, and the Barbados, Bahamas and Bermudas Islands.

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## B

### *Conclusions in Council as regards Provincial Legislative Councils, 31st August and 8th September 1916.*

1. There should be a majority of elected Members; each Local Government to consider what the size of this majority should be in its Province. If a Local Government considers that, in present circumstances, an elected majority is undesirable in its Province, it must demonstrate this clearly.

2. There should be a wide extension of the franchise in the various Provinces adapted to local circumstances.

3. Certain Members consider that a system based primarily on territorial units is better than one of purely 'class' constituencies, but the general conclusion was that Local Governments should be allowed discretion in this matter. Sir Reginald Craddock, however, holds that it is undesirable to have a territorial system, even in a Province in which the Local Government may be disposed that way. Sir Sankaran Nair, on the other hand, considers that there should be territorial constituencies if we adopt the conclusion that the Councils are not to have larger powers.



4. There should be no change in the *powers* of the Councils (Sir Sankaran Nair would dissent from this unless territorial constituencies are generally adopted), but the budget proposal in paragraph 6 of memorandum C should be accepted.

5. It was generally agreed that, where Mahomedans have special constituencies marked off for them, they should not also vote in the general constituencies, and that the franchise conditions should be the same for Mahomedans and for others.

The question whether we are definitely bound by Lord Morley's promise of 1909, quoted by Sir James Meston, that Mahomedans should have larger proportionate representation than their numbers would warrant was considered, and it was decided that all that we are really bound to by Lord Morley's promise is that, where Mahomedans are in a minority in a province, their representation on the Legislative Council should be somewhat higher than the number which a strictly numerical proportion would give them. But it is not necessary, in assigning special constituencies, to go appreciably beyond the numerical proportion in the matter of seats. The balance can be made up by nomination, and Local Governments should be instructed accordingly.

Where Mahomedans are in a majority in a Province they do not need special protection, but the fact that they are or are not in a majority must be determined by the electoral rolls, and not by the census statistics.

Sir Sankaran Nair, however, would give the Mahomedans in every province elective seats in exact proportion to their census numbers, and would allow them special franchises, if necessary, but he is not prepared to give them any representation beyond what their numbers warrant.

6. It was decided, as a general principle, that it is undesirable to extend the proportional representation system to classes other than Mahomedans; but that if a Local Government pressed for this for special reasons—as for instance the Punjab Government might well do in respect of Sikhs—it might be allowed. In such a case the community thus singled out should be treated in exactly the same way as Mahomedans.

7. The proposal for a partial veto on legislation by the Head of the Province is dropped. But it was decided that he should be able to return a Bill to the Legislative Council saying that he cannot accept such and such clauses, but will pass the rest if they will consent to omit these. Similar power should be given to the Governor-General at a later stage when a Provincial Bill comes up to him for acceptance.

8. It was decided that a Local Government should have power to dissolve a Legislative Council within the Council's ordinary term of duration. There are precedents for this in Malta, Jamaica, and the Barbados, Bahamas and Bermudas Islands.

A NOTE REGARDING A FORMULA.

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For some time past I have been considering over our formulæ and the criticisms received on them. We had never quite decided whether these formulæ were framed for our own guidance or for public announcement. Some of our critics wished us to add qualifications, others wished us to take them away. Others again doubted the wisdom of any formulæ at all.

2 Personally I am of opinion that there is no special advantage in our having any formulæ at all unless they are to form the subject of an announcement. If they merely remain testamentary dispositions to our successors, those successors will not be bound by them. All that they will be bound by are the practical reforms which we actually put into the effect in our time. Now if we look to these, so far as the three roads are concerned, we may no doubt on the local self-government road issue early orders. There is nothing in our local self-government note which might not under ordinary circumstances issue tomorrow as a resolution.

Under the road of larger employment of Indians, there is a great deal of work to be done; not only have the two Reports of the Commission and the Notes of Dissent to be threshed out with Local Governments, and a multitude of opinions, official and non-official, to be considered, but we have to work out with the authorities in England the rules for the various services, and legislation as regards the Indian Civil Service will probably be necessary. On mature consideration I certainly do not think that any formula that we can devise at this stage can meet the case, or that we are right in giving any indication in our formula as to whether we intend to go as far as or further than the Commission's recommendations. It may be that we shall go further than the Report in some things, and not so far in others. Here again if we attempt a formula we should only be embarrassed by putting in qualifications or perhaps by having to leave them out.

Finally on the Legislative Council road, we could certainly not at this stage put anything definite into a formula. For even if the Secretary of State approves generally our proposals regarding the franchise and increases in the elective element, the whole question has still to be examined so closely in detail, and we have to pay so much regard to local opinion as well as to the criticisms of the India Office and in the House of Lords to any scheme which we may, after consultation with Local Governments, send up, that any definite formula that we could devise on this road might be infringed at the very outset.

3. Therefore I invite my colleagues to agree—

(i) That a public pronouncement of some kind is advisable.

- (ii) That we should bring our intentions within a single formula.
- (iii) That that formula should be qualified as little as possible, and therefore should be expressed in the broadest general terms.

I have ventured, as some may think rather rashly, to put forward such a formula for consideration, and I will make below some explanatory comments upon it.

4. In the first place, the expression "self-government" is omitted altogether except in connection with the local self-government road. I have also kept free from the ambiguous expression "provincial autonomy" because it may mean "bureaucratic provincial autonomy" or "provincial autonomy under popular control", or something at a stage between these two.

Though I have myself been the Head of a Government, I do not believe in excessive provincial autonomy and in too great a withdrawal of the guidance of the Government of India. But I will not enlarge upon this point now, but will merely explain why I shun the term "self-government".

"Self-government" or "swaraj" may mean so many things. It may mean "self-government" as distinct from foreign domination, *i.e.*, merely a "swadeshi Government" such as that of the Nizam, in fact the conversion of India into tributary States, which was rather a favourite dream of my Hon'ble Colleague Sir William Meyer. It may mean merely the substitution of an Indian bureaucracy for a British bureaucracy by the process of manning the services by Indians instead of by Europeans. It may mean Government by an oligarchy of lawyer-politicians which is what some of our Congress party are really aiming at, though they would not confess it. It may mean an adhesion to Annie Besant's Home Rule, or the Colonial "swaraj" of the Congress. Lastly, it may mean the only form of self-government that we ourselves really contemplate, which the Congress professes to contemplate, and which is the only form of self-government in favour of which the British Government could really rightly and properly abdicate its powers, namely, "the government of the people, by the people, for the people".

5. My proposed formula therefore contemplates not a goal, but a self-appointed task, that of training the people for this last kind of self-government, which I describe not as "self-government", but as "representative government".

The formula then indicates why the task must be a long and laborious one, in which the three essentials are the improvement and diffusion of education, the softening of racial and religious differences, and, what is very important, the acquisition of political experience. This last term was used by His Majesty to the Indian officers of the Indian Army, when he was bidding them farewell.

6. The formula then goes on to indicate in broad and concise terminology the lines of advance, and ends with a peroration giving merely a glimpse of a

goal of "India one nation", a goal which can only be reached not by a decree or grant of Government but by evolution. The goal of "India one nation" appeals even to the extremists, but the formula makes it very distant and shows that it can only be reached by peaceful evolution. After that the formula becomes silent, for we cannot prognosticate further. When India has become one nation with a representative Government, it will then be for her to decide whether she shall continue as a self-governing member of the Empire, or stand entirely on her own feet. But I think that the formula as it stands involves no abdication, but indicates a clear and steady progress *under British guidance*. It therefore leaves out words like "control 'and' supremacy" which appear to stink in the nostrils of some of our critics. It also shows that political progress, though important, is not the one thing needful, that there are other and equally important fields of progress, the diffusion of education, the development of agriculture and commerce, the arts and industries.

I hope that my colleagues will not find this formula either ultra-radical or ultra-conservative, and I shall be very sorry if it does not survive their criticisms.

R. H. C[RADDOCK],—12-9-16.

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### DRAFT FORMULA.

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The task before the British Government in India is to train the people of British India, so that they may ultimately be endowed with such form of representative Government as may prove most suitable to their special circumstances and traditions. But the rate of progress attained in the evolution of representative institutions must depend upon the improvement and wide diffusion of education, the softening of racial and religious differences, and the acquisition of political experience.

This training has already been in progress, but the time has come for an acceleration of the advance—

- (i) by the committal of more responsible functions to local bodies and by the development of urban and rural self-government;
- (ii) by increasing the opportunities for Indians to enter the public services and to qualify themselves both for the higher offices and generally to take a more important part in the administration of the country;
- (iii) by enlarging the present franchise for the Legislative Councils, and by increasing from time to time the elective element in their constitution.

It is by India's steady progress along these several roads, simultaneously with the diffusion of education and the development of her agriculture, her commerce, her arts and her industries, that, under the guidance of the British Government, the political destiny of India may best be shaped, so that in time to come a stable union of her races, her Provinces, and her States in one Indian nation may most safely and harmoniously be evolved.

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## No. 18.

(Confidential.)

NOTES BY SIR C. SANKARAN NAIR, Kt, C. I. E.

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### MUNICIPALITIES.

I accept with one exception the following draft written by Sir William Meyer after discussion with me :—

“As regards the general principles which should be observed in the development of local self-government, we would draw attention to a memorandum which was sent by His Excellency the Viceroy to Heads of Provinces and which forms enclosure of this despatch. The main principles set forth in that memorandum have met with general acceptance and we now recommend them for adoption. We fully recognise, however, that it will not be possible to make them of absolutely uniform application and we would therefore reserve to the Local Governments the power, for reasons stated, to exempt any local bodies from the operation of the principles in question.”

In paragraph 4 of (A) we have stated that, “as regards the special representation of minorities where this is necessary, we should prefer when it is possible that this should be by some system of communal or proportional representation rather than by nomination”. I do not think there is any case where it is not possible to devise an electorate for the representation of minorities. Taking the case of Native Christians no more difficulty need be anticipated in their case than what has been experienced in the case of Mahomedans. I should prefer, therefore, that we should say that “the special representation of minorities, where it is necessary, should be by some system of communal or proportional representation”. If any Local Government considers that this rule cannot be applied we have left it open to them in the proposed draft to dispense with the operation of this rule for reasons stated.

C. S. N[AIR],—12-9-16.

### DISTRICT BOARDS.

I think the same principles that we have applied to Municipalities should be applied to the District Boards, and that paragraph 8 of A should be modified accordingly. The following are the opinions which have been received by us :—

*Sir Archdale Earle.*—

“I also venture to think strongly that by far the most important question of all is that of the election of non-official chairman for rural boards, and that unless some more definite pronouncement can be made on this subject than that indicated in

paragraph 8 of the Memorandum, it would be better to drop the question of an advance under the head of local self-government, for I feel sure that, unless a very decided step in advance is made in that direction, it will not be recognised by the public that any material advance at all has been made. This is obviously not the result which we wish to see."..... ..

"I feel strongly that a pronouncement to the effect that the provinces would be urged to start, wherever possible, the experiment of non-official, and preferably elected presidents or chairmen, would fall flat. The question of non-official chairmen for rural boards is, as is well known, regarded by the Indian public as one of vital importance, and I fear that a pronouncement merely in the terms indicated would meet with much the same reception as the Government of India's Local Self-Government Resolution of April 1915, that is to say, be regarded as a lukewarm pronouncement. It would be urged that the proposal to appoint non-officials as chairmen of rural boards was made by Lord Ripon's Government, that this question has been under discussion in the press for 30 years or more, and that a much more definite step in advance is called for at the present time. I would, therefore, very strongly urge that Local Governments should be asked to make the experiment referred to, as soon as the state of the finances permitted, up to 25 per cent. of the total number of posts already given to non-officials. I would further urge that, in the pronouncement to be made, it should be stated that the question of making over additional posts to non-officials would be reviewed at the end of a period of, say, 3 years. I venture to think that a pronouncement on the above lines, and nothing less, would be received as evidence of a genuine desire to make a definite advance. I lay the greatest stress on this as being the main question, and the only one on which Indian opinion is likely to be seriously stirred."

*Sir James Meeson.—*

"We are almost ready to extend the same privilege to rural boards. Official opinion is more doubtful about this than about the emancipation of urban bodies; but the conclusive argument to my mind for handing over district and sub-district boards to non-official control is the prime importance of employing and interesting the landed gentry in work for which they are specially qualified. If a large land-owner can be induced to become chairman of a district board, it gives him useful and engrossing duties, and associates him in the practical business of government to a degree which would otherwise be all but impossible."

In advocating the election by district and local boards of their own non-official chairmen he referred to the opinion which he had submitted to Lord Hardinge which is in the following words:—"A kindred measure, which seems to me of almost equal importance, is that district boards should elect their own non-official chairmen; at present they invariably appoint their District Magistrates. To this I anticipate great opposition. The keen District Officer is attached to his work with the district board. That body is his agency for managing the rural affairs of his district, its roads, schools, dispensaries and the like; and he will strongly resent being dissociated from it. But in existing circumstances the district board has little or no vitality as an organ of local self government. Its work is efficiently done, as it is practically in the hands of the Magistrate; but it does not evoke the interest that we should like the landed magnate to take in his own parochial affairs. He attends the board, gives his advice if it is asked

for; and departs with a shrug of his shoulders if it is not taken. This is not what the district board was meant to be; it was designed as an executive and not a mere advisory body; and I think we should get back to that idea. Various nostrums have been tried to make the work of the boards more real, but without effect. The only remaining remedy is to give them more independence and responsibility, and the first step in this direction is to let them elect their own chairmen from among their own members. Before this takes effect, we must enlarge the electorates and revise them so as to secure that genuine rural interests dominate; a process which will take a little time and is complicated by the Mahomedan demand for separate representation. This need not, however, delay the acceptance of the principle of non-official chairmen for district and local boards."

*Sir Harcourt Butler.*—

"We have no district or local boards in Burma."

*Sir Benjamin Robertson.*—

"Non-official presidents of municipalities and district boards are of common occurrence."

*Lord Pentland.*—

He states that a Bill in regard to district boards is under consideration. The representations of the local bodies, the recommendations of the Decentralisation Commission, the Government of India's Self-Government Resolution of 1915, and the considerations presented in these notes will be considered. He also suggests Provincial Governments may for the present be left to encourage and guide the gradual natural development of self-government in towns and rural areas according to local conditions and upon the lines so recently suggested by the Government of India's Self-Government Resolution of last year.

*Sir George Roos-Keppel.*—

"With reference to paragraphs 7 and 8, I think that it is necessary for the Deputy Commissioner to remain chairman of the district board or, if the district board is abolished, as I have suggested above, that sub-divisional officers should preside over sub-division or tahsil boards, though I do not think that there would be any practical objection to having the post of chairman open to election, officials being eligible, as I am convinced that the result would be the same as now, rural Pathans being much too jealous of one another to select one of their number as chairman."

*Lord Carmichael.*—

"The president should be a non-official elected by the board..... It might, I think, be well, and it would certainly be economical, from the point of view of the boards, to retain the District Officer as head of the Executive in the first instance."

*Sir Michael O'Dwyer.*—

"In regard to rural boards the advance in the Punjab must be more cautious. The rural masses are still as a rule apathetic, and their interest is mainly aroused

when any proposal is on foot to increase taxation; interest in elections is of the most languid kind (see paragraph 16 below) and the rural boards generally for some time to come need official guidance and control. Still the experiment of a non-official chairman has been tried in one or two advanced districts in the past, and I am prepared to repeat it after due enquiry and consultation with local officers and local opinion."

*Lord Willingdon.*—

"As to paragraphs 7 and 8, my Government have for some time been engaged in a careful consideration of these questions. We have practically decided to nominate non-official chairmen to a certain number of local boards and are working out a scheme for securing for each board an executive officer and administrative staff."

*Sir Edward Gait.*—

"We fully accept most of what is said on this subject on the understanding that time will be allowed, where necessary, in working up to the desired standard."

*The Hon'ble Mr. W. M. Hailey.*—

"The problem is of far greater difficulty with district boards, owing not only to the large areas controlled by them, as stated in the Memorandum, but to the fact that there is seldom any real community of interests between different parts of a district, and there are nearly always traditional animosities between the landowners who constitute the majority of the boards. Given, however, the presence of an executive officer, and a reservation of certain functions to the central authority (*e.g.*, through communications and famine), I see no reason why the principle of non-official chairmen should not be gradually introduced."

With these opinions before us I do not think we shall be justified in saying that "the provinces might well be urged to start, wherever possible, the experiment of non-official, and preferably elected, presidents or chairmen". The backward provinces should not be allowed to set the standard. We have directed that wherever a non-official chairman is elected the ordinary official work should be largely in the hands of a special executive officer whose appointment should require the approval of Government. I do not think that in any province it would be difficult to get competent officers to do this executive work, and I recommend that we adopt for the district and local boards the same rule that we should adopt in the case of the district municipalities and omitting section 8, say, accordingly that the main principles set forth in the Memorandum be recommended for adoption, reserving however to the Local Governments the power, for reasons stated, to exempt any local bodies from the operation of the principles in question.

C. S. N[AIR],—12-9-16.

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### No. 19.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR WILLIAM MEYER, K. C. S. I., K. C. I. E., Member of the Viceroy's Council.

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*Simla, September 16th, 1916.*

MY DEAR MAFFEY,

His Excellency asked me to take down the further conclusions arrived at in Council yesterday on matters connected with the future "governance" of



India. I now submit a draft which I have shown to Sir Reginald Craddock, who considers it quite accurate.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) W. S. MEYER.

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### CONCLUSIONS IN COUNCIL, 15TH SEPTEMBER 1916.

It was decided that the general despatch to the Secretary of State should contain a paragraph to the following effect in regard to local self-government :—

“As regards the general principles which should be observed in the development of local

This is Memorandum A accompanying His self-government, we would draw attention to a Excellency's letter of 20th July 1916 to the Heads memorandum which was sent by His Excellency of Provinces. the Viceroy to Heads of Provinces and which

forms enclosure of this despatch. The main principles set forth in that memorandum have met with general acceptance, and we now recommend them for adoption. We fully recognise, however, that it will not be possible to make them of absolutely uniform application and we would therefore reserve to the Local Governments the power, for reasons stated, to exempt any local bodies from the operation of the principles in question.”

2. It was further decided with reference to the concluding clause of the second sentence of paragraph 8 of the memorandum in question, which runs thus—

“but the provinces might well be urged to start, wherever possible, the experiment of non-official, and preferably elected, presidents or chairmen”, that the following side note should be inserted in the copy to be sent to the Secretary of State :—

“This passage might have been better worded thus—‘but the provinces might well be urged to appoint, wherever possible, non-official, and preferably elected, presidents or chairmen.’”

3. As regards the “goal” formula, it was decided that it was desirable to make a public announcement of our policy and its ultimate objects.

4. A minute by Sir Reginald Craddock, proposing an amended formula, which had for its object the substitution of “representative-government” for “self-government” as the ultimate goal was then discussed and it was generally felt that we should adhere to the “self-government” wording as set forth on page 3 of His Excellency's letter of 20th July 1916 to the Heads of Local Governments. It was held, however, that it would be desirable to expand this formula so as to include, as suggested by Sir Reginald Craddock, the specific roads on which we think an advance might be immediately made; and it was decided that a Sub-Committee consisting of Sir Reginald Craddock, Sir William Meyer and Mr. Lowndes should meet later on and consider the exact wording of the formula as thus expanded.

No. 20.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR ELLIOT COLVIN, K. C. S. I., Agent to the Govr.-Genl.,  
Rajputana, and Chief Commr., Ajmer-Merwara.

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*Mount Abu, September 21st, 1916.*

[ Confidential. ]

MY DEAR MAFFEY,

I have been thinking a good deal of late about political developments in India after the war, and I have ventured to put some of my ideas into writing. I enclose two copies of my note, and should be very glad if you would read it, and would also submit a copy for His Excellency's perusal, when he has leisure.

I daresay my views will not be acceptable in view of the line of advance which has already been adopted, but at any rate they represent my honest convictions after 34 years in India.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) E. G. COLVIN.

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(*Confidential.*)

#### NOTE BY THE HON'BLE SIR ELLIOT COLVIN, K. C. S. I.

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Every thoughtful man, who has any responsible part or lot in India, must spend some of his leisure moments in pondering over the problems that will arise in that continent, after the war is over. The commercial problems are likely to receive the attention of the Industrial Commission, recently appointed, and the Government of India are no doubt now busy with the political problems.

2. The following notes are the result of some cogitation by an officer, who in a somewhat isolated environment has few hours of leisure and fewer opportunities of discussion with men "in the know". This is his apology for any crudities of form or substance which may be detected in the proposals he ventures to put forward. They are concerned only with the political problems of the future.

3. The first and most obvious comment on the whole subject is that not only will India expect much, after the war, but she will deserve much, always supposing of course that the loyal attitude she has adopted hitherto is maintained intact to the end, as we have every reason to hope and expect that it will

be. She will have shown her right to be trusted, and should receive the fullest measure of trust and confidence that prudence will permit. There should be no talk of "boons" or "concessions", but a frank straightforward policy, conceived in the light of the new "angle of vision" induced by the war, arrived at after discussion with the leading Indians who loyally and genuinely believe in the British connection, and based on recognition of mutual interests and mutual good-will. And what should be the purport of that policy? It seems to be fairly obvious from numerous promises and changes in the past, from the Proclamation of Queen Victoria to the wider field given to Indians in the time of Lord Ripon; from the reforms of Lord Morley to the King's last message of "Hope" to the people of India as he left their shores after the great Durbar early in 1912. The last and perhaps most striking proof of an objective was given when the Government of Lord Hardinge, just at the close of his Viceroyalty, accepted a motion suggesting that an India representative should sit on the Imperial Council after the war. All these steps, taken with the high standards of education which we have fostered and encouraged among the Indians, ever since the days of Lord Macaulay, seem to demonstrate that the British policy is that Indians, as time goes on, shall have a greater and increasing share in directing their own destinies. Any further declaration of policy really seems superfluous. Yet it has been asked for, and the request seems real and genuine enough. Sir Satyendra P. Sinha, presiding at the Indian Congress at Bombay in December 1915, asked for a declaration of policy as regards the future of India, and appealed in eloquent language to the British nation to declare "their ungrudging approval of the goal to which the Congress aspires and their inflexible resolution to equip India for her journey to that goal, and to furnish escort on the long and weary road". That goal he declared to be autonomy within the Empire.

Sir S. P. Sinha has no desire, I believe, to sever the British connection; and subject to the maintenance of that connection and of a strong element of British officers in the administration meanwhile, there would not appear to be any objection to a declaration that British policy has for its objective, in the long still far distant future, the formation of India into a self-governing dependency. It is of course doubtful whether Sir S. P. Sinha, in claiming as the goal of Congress autonomy within the British Empire, was in fact representing with accuracy the views of all members of that body, or even of a majority of them. But, if the British Government were once to define its objective, it is practically certain that many leaders of public opinion in India would accept the policy finally, and the goats would be separated from the sheep. Thereafter, the Congress, unless it were captured by the pure seditionists, would become a loyal body registering progress along the appointed path. It would doubtless suffer from fits of impatience, but the sensible men

among Indian leaders are well aware that the country is far yet from being ripe for autonomy, and with their help, the impatience could be softened and controlled.

Autonomy within the Empire is a fairly vague expression. But the evolution of Indian Government into some form of administration similar to that in the self-governing Colonies appears to be the only legitimate conclusion to the hopes which we have held out to Indians from time to time in the past; and there is no reason to shrink from that conclusion. The only argument worthy of notice, which has been used against such a declaration by the British Government, is that the present generation cannot bind posterity, and that our children must be left a free hand to deal with the matter. But to say that posterity must not be bound is to say that treaties must not be concluded, and it seems more than probable that our children will be grateful rather than resentful over the fact that their forebears have taken a decided line. So far as the Englishmen of the present day and of the immediate future, whose lot is cast in India, are concerned, they would in many cases be glad themselves to be relieved of existing doubts and uncertainties. Many English officials who hold back at present for want of a lead from Government, would throw themselves with enthusiasm and devotion into the forwarding of a well-defined policy on safe and reasonable lines; and these are the men who will be wanted in India of the future. For them, too, some such declaration of policy is necessary. Englishmen coming out to take part in the administration of India in the future would come with the knowledge that their primary duty would be, not to govern, but to help Indians to govern. They would be instructed that their objective should be not success in administrative work, but success in teaching administration to Indians. This would be the great departure, the new "angle of vision".

4. Simultaneously however with the announcement of a policy, there should be a clear and emphatic indication that the Government, while willing and indeed anxious to advance this policy in every manner compatible with sense and reason, do not intend to be rushed or to make dangerous or precipitate concessions. In the reforms which have been introduced into India in the last 20 years there has been too much of the democratic spirit. The combination of a weak Viceroy and a masterful Secretary of State, neither of whom understood the conditions in India, nor accepted advice from their Councils, has led us into a position of danger, from which it is impossible now to recede. It has been the most notorious case on record of putting new wine into old bottles. India is far from being ready for democratic rule, and it is to be feared that the efforts which have been made to introduce the shadow of popular institutions will result not only in our missing the substance, but in our finding ourselves irremediably committed to a premature and spurious system,—a false caricature of popular government. The great mass of the

people in India are not yet educated enough or intelligent enough to exercise the right of franchise. It is as unfair to them as it is wrong in principle to give a real effective vote to the educated few ; no minority should be enabled to occupy a predominant and commanding position, leaving the masses impotent and unrepresented. If it be urged in reply that the Legislative Councils have no real power, no real effective influence, then it would seem that the whole scheme is something of a sham and had better not be encouraged. It is to be feared that Legislative Councils in India have now come to stay, but it is not advisable that progress should continue along that line. Otherwise, the orderly development of popular institutions in India will be rendered impossible, and the Government will find the machine racing beyond control. Legislative Councils, as constituted at present, have not done any great harm, and are probably not capable of doing any great harm. But a step or two further would make them a menace to Government control. The present writer cannot too emphatically express his opinion that there should be no further developments along this line for a very great number of years.

5. What then is to be offered in recognition of India's part in the war ? Obviously, it will be no satisfaction to Indians to fix a distant goal and to slacken the pace of progress towards it. Yet some outward and visible sign of Britain's good faith in this matter is needed. To answer this question, let us consider the facts squarely and honestly. The first fact is that no one in his senses, not even the most extreme member of the Congress party, asserts that India could be safely handed over to a purely Indian management tomorrow. Sir S. P. Sinha, in his speech already alluded to, admitted that the day was still very far distant for such a consummation ; the most advanced programme of the Congress men provides for only half of the Governor-General's Executive Council and "not less than half" of Provincial Executive Councils to be Indians.\* Thus, it may be taken as a fact that a large admixture of Englishmen in the executive bodies is, for the present at any rate, an admitted necessity of the situation. There are three reasons for this, the first two of which will be admitted readily by all Indians. The most important however is the third reason, which nearly every Indian knows in his heart to be true, though *amour propre* naturally prohibits its admission. The reasons are—

- (1) That owing to the bureaucratic nature of the British administration in India, the process of handing over to Indians could not be prompt and immediate ; it must, in fact, be gradual.
- (2) There is not as yet sufficient cohesion in India for it to stand by itself ; the great division of the population into Hindu and Mahomedan being a special stumbling block in this connection.

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\* Incidentally, it may be noticed, as a remarkable and significant fact, that no similar provision is made in respect of Legislative Councils, which however are to be empowered to override the Executive.

- (3) That Indians, as a whole, though often possessed of quick wits and active brains, have not yet acquired the strength of character needed for high responsible rule.

It is probably unnecessary to labour this last point. With those whose lot is cast in India, whether in official or in commercial life, it is a matter of daily demonstration and experience. Placed among an environment of Native life, the young Englishman will take the lead, not because he is one of the ruling race, but simply because he knows how to command, and how to win the confidence and trust of those about him. With Indians this gift is as rare as it is common among our own race. Experiments have been made in the past to select the best educated and best bred Indians and to put responsibility on their shoulders. It has almost invariably ended in failure. The Statutory Civil Service of Bengal was one instance out of many. The flabbiness of the great majority of Indian municipal bodies and their ineffectiveness, owing to internal dissension, points the same moral. And the root of the matter in every case is that, taken as a whole, Indians are deficient in character. The hope that character will be forthcoming, when they are collected in considerable numbers as in a Legislative Council, is deceptive, just as it would be futile to hope that, by piling up invertebrates, one might produce a backbone.

6. The problem then is as follows. It is admittedly desirable to direct India along a route which will bring her eventually to the harbour of self-government; she is not ready to enter that harbour yet, because the masses are steeped in ignorance and the majority of her potential statesmen are wanting in character. Progress along the route of representative institutions gives no promise of success. What then is the line on which her progress, which we all desire to see, should be encouraged?

The answer to this question is also suggested by the same set of considerations. It should be the line on which the largest number will be provided with the best training available in the particular direction in which they evince weakness. No better training can be found than actual experience, no better instruction than a strong sense of responsibility. This leads to the conclusion that there should be a great increase in the number of executive appointments to be thrown open to Indians, but that this should be coupled with the provision of adequate safeguards to meet the peculiar weakness to which they are liable.

The solution of this difficulty which has suggested itself to the present writer, as a result of these reflections is that, on the conclusion of the war, it should be announced that the Government of India intend to reserve for Indians, gradually as permanent vacancies arose, half the appointments in all departments, including the Civil Service, up to, and inclusive of, the grade of District Magistrate and Collector and of corresponding ranks in other branches of the Service. Indian officers should only enter the services like their English

confrères, at the bottom; and the reform would thus occupy about a generation before it came completely into effect. Simultaneously with this, Government should introduce a system of linked districts placing a British officer in charge of one and an Indian officer in charge of the other, and dividing the appointments in other departments between British and Indian officers equally. It should be understood that the officers in the one district should be at liberty to meet and discuss plans freely with their confrères in the linked district, and also to refer to them in cases of difficulty or doubt. The result of an arrangement of this kind would inevitably be that the Indian officers—certainly the great majority of them—would find guidance and support from the British officers of the linked district. And it would be to the personal interest of the latter to give their help and support freely, since they would have been taught from the earliest days of their career that their success and promotion would depend upon it.

7. As regards higher appointments, it is not suggested that these should be entirely reserved for Englishmen. On the contrary, the policy here advocated is one of gradual self-effacement for English officials, and where an Indian is found with the necessary character and other qualifications, there should be no impediment whatever to his promotion to higher rank.

Moreover, there are obvious developments of the policy, regarding which present announcements should of course be silent, but which will nevertheless be easily discernible to the acute eyes of Indians. For instance, it is obvious that after a time—it may very well be several generations—the proportion of half and half may again be changed in favour of Indians. Ultimately a large majority of the executive appointments in the country may be held by Indians, perhaps as many as three-quarters, and by that time the country might almost be ripe for a revival of the effort to endow her with representative institutions.

Another possible development is the rise of a qualified Indian to the highest position in a Local Government. The Governors of the larger provinces, such as Bengal and Bombay, must continue to be sent out from England, as in the case of the Colonies. This is necessary, both on grounds of precedent elsewhere, and because British interests in the larger cities, such as Calcutta and Bombay, are so powerful. And possibly some of the other provinces should, for the same reason, be raised to the status of Governorships. But elsewhere the only legitimate conclusion of our policy in the past, and of that now proposed, is to admit such a claim if established. The office of Chief Commissioner or Lieutenant-Governor of a province cannot ultimately be refused to an Indian, who has shown himself to be qualified for it. There is no real reason to shrink from this conclusion, though it will be undoubtedly most unpopular with the British merchant and trading classes in India. On the other hand, it will be, when it comes, the most striking proof of the genuineness of our assurances and will deprive the Indian patriot

reformer of his last remaining ground of complaint. It will probably be very many years before this crowning success for Indians is attained, and whenever it does come, it should be coupled, in the interests of the home country and of Englishmen in India, with the condition that a majority of the Executive Council in the province concerned should be British officers. This is justified, because Indians must not be led or allowed to suppose that the reforms which are being undertaken in their interests connote the disappearance of the Englishman from India. Britishers have become a part of India during the last two centuries, and their work and brains for several generations have made the country what it now is—a rich, prosperous and well-ordered continent; their enterprise has placed in their hands most of its foreign trade; their capital is deeply sunk in its commerce. These Englishmen are entitled to protection and representation; and if Mahomedan minorities are allowed favourable conditions in the representation of the country, the British minority will be entitled to vastly more favoured treatment, when representative institutions are finally made effective in the country. This is a point which, in the changes of the new departure, should never be lost sight of.

8. There are two further considerations arising out of the policy proposed. Firstly, the Educational Department should be an exception to the general rule about relinquishment of half the appointments to Indians. This will become the most important department under the new angle of vision. It is important that the training of character rather than the acquisition of surface learning should be in future its main objective. England should give freely of its best for this department, and the emoluments offered should be only less, and not much less, than those of the Civil Service. The employment of English teachers is found by actual experience to be essential to, and most effective in the formation of character among Indian boys. The Government of India should not hesitate to enhance its expenditure on education to any extent that may be necessary to secure the best professors from England; and these should go through a special course of study and training, which should include a thorough knowledge of Sanskrit or Persian, before entering on their careers in India.

Also the emoluments of British officers of the Civil Service and other departments should be increased. Apart from the fact that the expenses of living in India are increasing rapidly, the conditions of existence will be less attractive for Europeans than before; they are to be instructors rather than administrators, and their opportunities of enjoying the society of their own countrymen will be reduced. Something must be done to render the service sufficiently attractive to secure the best men, for we need the best. The extra expense could be met by reducing the emoluments of the appointments to be reserved for Indians. The latter quite understand that Englishmen are saddled with many expenses which they escape, *e. g.*, sending their wives and



families to England or to the hills, and they do not really resent this discrimination in emoluments.

Incidentally, the proposals made above would open the way to meeting without objection one of the demands so warmly pressed by the party of reform in India, *viz.*, the institution of simultaneous examinations in England and in India. When half the appointments up to the District Magistrate's grade were available for Indians, there could be no objection to the candidates for this moiety of the appointments being examined in India. The whole examination might indeed be on quite different lines from the examination in England.

9. It seems possible, moreover, that many of the difficulties which surround the military problem in India might be solved and disintegrated by the adoption of a policy similar to that suggested above; but in the military world the need of British leading and British stiffening has been so patent in the past and so frankly admitted that the problem is rendered much simpler. The only experiment which has hitherto been attempted in the direction of purely Indian regiments of any military value has been the experiment of Imperial Service Troops; in order to secure for these a minimum of efficiency, it was found necessary to appoint a small number of British officers, whose duty was nominally to inspect, but whose actual functions, as most people know, are really those of command and organisation. Even so, most military authorities hold the view that these Imperial Service Troops would be of little use in active service, and certainly, whenever they are ordered on service, the authorities at once resort to the expedient of adding several officers to the British Inspecting Staff of each regiment. The motive is the same as that alluded to above in regard to giving responsible civil posts to Indians. And it is certain that a great deal of water must run under the bridges before we shall witness the spectacle of a highly efficient regiment led by Indian officers only. Nevertheless, that is no reason why we should despair of that objective, and the method of attaining it seems to be not very dissimilar from that suggested in the case of the civil administration. The first point to be seized is that no experiments should be made with the existing Indian Army. It is more prudent to leave that, as it is constituted at present. The present war has demonstrated that there is plenty of room for an increase in the Indian Army, and the new constitution about to be suggested might be introduced in the new regiments to be added to its strength. In explanation of this remark, I would point to the enormous numbers which belligerent powers are obliged to employ in modern warfare; and, secondly, the domination of the artillery arm. Provided the entire array of modern guns is in British hands, adequately guarded by British troops, there can no longer be any object in maintaining the old proportion between British and Indian troops in India. This proportion, which I believe stands at present at one to three, might safely be raised, under these conditions, to the proportion of one to four; in other words, the strength

of the Indian Army might safely be increased by 33 per cent. It is not advocated that this increase should be made at once, but a beginning should be made without delay. And in the new regiments, which will at first be officered by Englishmen, it should be understood that the subalterns joining will be first an Indian, then an Englishman. And the English officers should be warned that their success will depend largely on the ability they display not only as good regimental officers themselves, but also in helping and training their Indian brother officers to be the same. It may be said by some that the two classes of officers will never mix; but any one who has witnessed the extraordinarily happy relations that exist between British and Indian officers of the same regiment in India at present or the confidence which the Inspecting Officers of the Imperial Service Troops have, as a general rule, inspired in the Indian officers of those regiments, will be in a position to assess this argument at its true value. Incidentally, it will be seen of course that these proposals solve the burning question of military commissions for Indians; and it may be safely prophesied that the new regiments will be from the first of a quality greatly superior to the best Imperial Service Troops, since there will be a larger proportion of British officers constantly with them, and since the Indian officers will be better educated and better trained for the military career than those in Imperial Service Troops.

10. The preceding paragraphs deal with the changes to be made, by direct methods, under the new "angle of vision" in India. It remains to be considered whether there is any way, direct or indirect, by which the enlightenment of the masses could be accelerated. Probably no more effective instrument for this purpose could be designed than the cautious and well-considered legislation which has been introduced by Government in the last 15 years in order to give the country the benefits of agricultural co-operation. But during the long period before the slow maturing of this great reform, the agricultural population in many parts of India, and especially in tracts which are liable to famine, have fallen very deeply into the hands of the money-lender. This result is partly due to the improvidence of the people and to their peculiar social traditions, which frequently burden them with expenditure entirely disproportionate to their income; but it is also due in part to the high rate of assessment which for centuries has been customary in this country. It is true of course that India is primarily an agricultural country, and that naturally the land is and always has been the chief source of Government revenue. The powers that have been, whether Moghul, Maltratta or British, have imposed heavy taxation on the land, and although it is true that our assessments have been imposed with far more care for first principles and far more consideration for the individual than those of any Government that has preceded us, nevertheless the fact remains that we have based our assessments to a large extent on the high standards

that have been current and to which the people have been accustomed in the time of our predecessors.\* The theory now is that after making every reasonable allowance for the costs of cultivation, Government is entitled to half the balance of the produce. This is known as the "half net assets" standard, and it means a rate of taxation on land, which in any other country would be regarded as excessive. The British settlement officers have perpetually whittled it down, and our actual assessments at the present day probably represent considerably less than half net assets. Nevertheless, the standard is still high. It must strike any foreigner travelling in India that the masses of the agricultural population have not made so much progress as might have been expected after 150 years of British rule. Mud-hut villages and obviously low, almost miserable, standards of comfort are much too much in evidence throughout the length and breadth of the country. This is due largely to the causes already mentioned, *viz.*, the improvidence and the extravagant social regulations of the people; but it is also due, in part, to the heavy taxation placed on the land. A great deal is being done now, through co-operative methods, to mitigate the evils arising from the former cause; but nothing has been done to lessen them, so far as they are due to the latter. The suggestion which is now made is that settlement officers should have discretion, and should indeed be instructed, to recommend that a lower proportion of the "net assets" should be treated as the maximum measure of assessment in tracts which were not as prosperous as they should be. One of the simplest and most direct test to apply for this purpose is the extent of land in the tract to be settled which has been sold or mortgaged to non-agriculturists. Where this is large, the institution of vigorous and healthy co-operative societies is a matter of great difficulty; and it is mainly in order to give the co-operative movement a fair chance that this reform is suggested. It would be, in fact, a kind of Government contribution to the co-operative movement.

11. It may be thought that this proposal will involve Government in an enormous loss of revenue, but the present writer holds the view that the loss would not be excessive, and that, whatever it be, the country could much more easily bear taxation in other directions. It will be said that the country has recently suffered a heavy blow in the loss of the greater part of its opium revenue, and that now another even more insidious attack is being made upon the main abiding source of its income. But the opium operations have demonstrated the resilience and elasticity of the Indian revenues, and the ease with which the exchequer has borne the shrinkage of its receipts from that source. The loss of income from the application, in selected tracts, of a lower standard of land assessment will be borne with greater ease.

Statistics show that in the decade between 1905 and 1915 the annual revenue from the land in India rose from 2,656 to 3,070 lakhs. Part of this

\* *Vide* Baden-Powell, Vol. I, Chap. V.  
p. 294, 310, &c.

four-crore increase was of course due to extended cultivation, and part of it was due to enhancement of taxation in places where the enhancement was fully justified. Let it be assumed for the purposes of a rough calculation that these two sources accounted for three-quarters of the increase, and that the remaining quarter was obtained by enhanced taxation in areas which could less easily bear it. If it be further assumed that these areas in the coming decade are found to be able to bear enhanced taxation at only half the rate which prevailed under the previous system, then we arrive at the conclusion that in the course of the decade the enhancement on these areas on the old cultivation will be checked, under the new instructions in regard to settlement, to the tune of half a quarter of four crores; *i. e.*, to half a crore per annum. Government will be obtaining each year from the land half a crore less than they would if the present system continued to apply; in other words, the annual loss which Government would be suffering after 10 years might be 50 lakhs.

It is suggested that this sum could very easily be made good by taking it off the land and putting it on water, supplied by Government. Irrigation charges are not really taxation, but realisation of the price of the most valuable commodity in India, water. And there is no reason why this commodity should be sold, as has been done in many instances, at a price far below its market value. Half net assests and other standards of land assessment have no application here, of course; they only apply where the land is owned and its irrigation arranged for by private proprietors. In the year 1914-15, direct receipts from irrigation in India amounted to Rs. 4,13,77,353. An increase of 10 per cent. in direct irrigation rates would therefore give an enhancement of 41 lakhs at once, and with the normal expansion of revenues from this source, which during the decade ending 1914-15 amounted to 114 lakhs, it would certainly give the required 50 lakhs per annum in 10 years' time. In other words, the 50 lakhs a year, which might after 10 years be the annual loss to Government under the proposals made in this note, would be more than made good in the same period by an increase of only 10 per cent. in the rates charged by Government for its water. These of course are only rough and ready calculations and further examination in detail would undoubtedly necessitate modifications, but they at any rate suffice to show that the burden of the loss involved could easily be met and might appropriately be transferred to shoulders which it is believed would be more capable of bearing them.

12. To sum up, the general proposals made in this note, in regard to the policy to be adopted after the war, are as follows:—

I.—That the British Government should declare that its objective for India is self-government on Colonial lines.

II.—That by degrees half the executive appointments in all civil departments should be reserved for Indians.

- III.—That a system of “linked districts” should be introduced, in order to secure co-operation between British and Indian officials.
  - IV.—That further progress along democratic lines of development such as the extension of the powers of Legislative Councils should for the present be discouraged.
  - V.—That any new regiments to be added to the Indian Army should be officered by Englishmen at first, but that these regiments should eventually be officered, to the extent of one-half, by Indians.
  - VI.—That the proportion between British and Indian troops in India may be raised, the artillery being maintained as a purely British arm, as at present, adequately guarded by British troops.
  - VII.—That the existing standards of calculation for the assessment of land-revenue be lowered, in tracts where the agricultural population is backward.
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## No. 21.

Extract from a letter from the Hon'ble Sir James Meston, K C. S. I., Lieut.-Governor of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 22nd September 1916.

3. Thinking again over the immense problem of political changes after the war, I could not help feeling that Your Excellency might care to see a presentation of the case against the line which the majority of your advisers, and possibly also the majority of the heads of provinces, have taken. I accordingly showed Your Excellency's letter and its enclosures to Mr. W. S. Marris, the ablest of the younger generation of Civilians in this province; and he has written me a letter in criticism of the opinion with which I furnished Your Excellency. It is so well put that I have printed Marris's letter and take the liberty of sending you a copy. When I can get a little breathing space, I propose to answer Marris and may perhaps mention the matter to you again, if you have not already too much literature on the subject.

4. The real fact is that it is easier to espouse liberal ideas when one is at a little distance from the problem than when one has to face its practical difficulties as part of one's daily task. In other words, the Civil Servant who knows the people and their weaknesses, the politicians and their insincerities, is much more apprehensive of the effects of radical reform than one, like yourself, who has lived in democratic countries and got over the fear of the results of unbridled democratic action. The plain truth also is that we are all too prone to take English constitutional models for India; and of course India itself is ready enough to follow suit, seeing that

English ideals provide the widest measure of liberty. A constitutional theory which is good enough for some of the Latin nations will meet the needs of India for many a generation to come, and it is probably in reality better suited to it until such time as the people know their own souls well enough to ask for something better.

5. I have fully realised all the difficulties that Marris foresees. Briefly speaking my reply to him is that we cannot stand still and that the people have, even at this stage, a clear right to a larger voice in the making of their own laws. Further more if we are only sufficiently courageous, I do not think that we need fear the passing of sovereignty. If Your Excellency's formula is followed in spirit, as well as in letter, the ultimate sovereignty will continue to reside in the British rule; and its manifestation would be in the unhesitating application by the British Ruler of his power of veto when he finds that popular legislation is doing impossible things. I will revert to the subject again however at more leisure; and meanwhile I remain with ulmost respect, &c.

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[ ENCLOSURE TO THE ABOVE LETTER. ]

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NAINI TAL,

*September 13th, 1916.*

DEAR SIR JAMES,

Thank you for letting me see these papers. I hope you will have patience to read the one or two things I want to say.

2. The formula, whatever may be said of it on close analysis, is a deliberate attempt to meet an obvious need. Like most political announcements it lends itself to various interpretations. But some declaration of our intentions is being commonly demanded; and this pronouncement is in the direction hoped for, while at the same time it emphasises a vital safeguard. Also it is carefully and weightily expressed. I would prefer to see such a declaration made by the Governor-General on behalf of the Government of India, rather than by the Viceroy as mouthpiece of the King. Also I hope that the Government of India will eventually not print "self-government" with capital letters; which tend to make what ought to be a business into a Cause. Further, I agree that the three main roads forward are those named in Lord Chelmsford's letter; and that there is no fourth.

3. I will not waste your time with mere theorising, or I should still urge the un wisdom of re-fashioning the upper story of a house, the very foundations

of which you intend simultaneously to re-lay. If we could do as we would, then I do myself believe that the true remedy would be to hark back, and thereafter to re-advance more slowly and patiently. But things being as they are, and having been already done as they have been, I think it is idle to expect contentment, if intelligent people are now simply told to play about for another ten years with *panchayats* and local boards. I would concede the utmost that is proposed in the sphere of local self-government. But we have also to give them larger scope in a bigger field than that.

4. In the search for this new field, I would lay more stress than the Government of India seem to do upon the public services. Personally I attach the greatest weight to the argument at the close of your paragraph 10. I am sure that the automatic admission of trained Indian public servants into the Councils is a sound and safe, though slow line of advance. Indeed, I submit that it is far the safest line of all. Only the presence in the executive of a strong element of trained Indians, versed in our ideas, cognisant of the difficulties of our administration, and habituated by official service to look at questions impartially can ultimately avail to secure our ideals of government against the attack of emotional or impatient amateurs. Between us and the best of them there is, let us admit it, an honest difference of views about government. The best hope of minimising this difference, and so of securing an eventual equilibrium which shall content India, while making it still possible for Englishmen to give their service to India, seems to me to lie in enlisting capable and practical Indians on our side. No enlargement of the powers of Council can ever do that. Men are made by responsibility. And (to anticipate what I come to later) real responsibility is exactly the one thing that we cannot give to Councils without incurring risks that as trustees we have no moral right to run. But we can and ought to give it freely in the public services where we have full control.

5. As the case stands, however, the gist of the whole discussion lies in the proposals about Councils. This is where we are really in the firing line, and this is the point on which I want to concentrate now. I know that much can be urged against the Duke memorandum on the ground of clumsiness and financial unworkability. I confess that I never entirely understood how in practice your Councils could for one set of purposes be parliamentary bodies with powers of taxation, while having no voice at all about taxation for other purposes—the ultimate taxable capacity of the country being limited; or, in other words, how you can really cut off one set of functions, and hand it over to be effectively dealt with by a body, which yet has no jurisdiction as regards the residuum. I think that their control of their assigned subjects must have been too cramped by financial fetters, for the scheme to have been satisfactory, or possibly enduring. But at all events, that project was of the nature of an experiment, the

failure of which would at worst be disappointing, but in no wise fatal. It was worked out in the hope of avoiding the dangers of irretrievable commitments. It did provide an answer to a problem to which I can find no answer at all in these papers.

6. You are prepared to take a big plunge. You believe that you can hand over legislative control (I take it, in a really effective manner—and in the Supreme, as well as in Provincial Councils), while still stoutly maintaining that we must die in the last ditch for our financial and executive control. Ungracious as it is to question the wisdom of a generous conception, I am afraid that I profoundly disbelieve in the practicability of yours. I doubt if such a position could be maintained for five years. Would you, in Malaviya's place, hoping what he hopes, and prepared as he will be to subordinate means to ends, ask for anything better than to be armed with the weapon of an effective legislative majority wherewith to coerce the executive? I think one can discern surely the line the politicians would take, and whither it would inevitably lead us.

7. In paragraph 15 you admit and discuss the prospects of perverse law-making. This, to my mind, is not the main peril; though I dare think you may perhaps underrate it. But it is not foolish or factious legislation that I should chiefly fear. For one thing, tactical advantages will be reversed, and the official Old Guard will make a better fight in attack than ever they can in defence; and they can probably be trusted to expose extreme follies or mischiefs with a clearness that will anyhow facilitate the use of the veto, troublesome as that must always be. I am therefore not frightened by a prospect of universal Permanent Settlements or a universal jury system. But what I do intensely fear is the utter paralysis of Government. I do not think you touch upon this. Every now and then the executive must get through—I will not say a Defence of India Act or a Press Act, but an amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code, a Tenancy Bill, possibly a Police Bill—some perfectly humdrum administrative reform which yet happens to hit vested interests or to jar on Indian sentimentality. Is it not clear what will happen? Bit by bit, modestly and tentatively at first, but with frequency increasing with confidence, the Government measures will be emasculated, or killed. Is this an unfair forecast? The test would be to take the Statute Book of the past five years and to ask how many of the measures standing on it would have been carried by an effective elected majority, and I am content to abide by the answer. But for default of this sort, there is no redress. A positively vicious measure you can, in the last resort and with trouble, veto. But you cannot supplement by notification or Ordinance a merely ineffective law. Nor can you use the power



of legislating by Ordinance to do the very thing which your established legislature has just declined to do. That would not be practical politics. No Government having just proclaimed its readiness to see all its laws shaped by an elected majority would in practice dare to use its emergency powers the moment it felt itself in a difficulty. What it would do would be to shrug its shoulders, to hope for the best, and to try to carry on with a futile or unworkable law. This would happen once, twice and again; but at last there would come a time when the narcotic word "compromise" would be uttered: and a baffled and impotent executive, weary of seeing its reforms defeated, would snatch at the illusive relief held out to it. You would get a bargain struck, doubtless of quite minor importance; an amendment of the law about searches or sanctions, for example, purchased at the price of more travelling scholarships or a new university. But that would be the beginning of the end. The politicians would perceive what a powerful weapon they wielded; and they would use it ruthlessly to get their resolutions carried out and their dispositions of expenditure adopted. The artificial nature of your proposed defences would be revealed. Rejected resolutions would be put forward again as Bills. The list of reserved subjects would be attacked. These partitions really mark the petty distance we have so far travelled from the days when Legislative Councils were small and in their infancy, and when Government alone initiated legislation. We set them up to emphasise a control that we retained even without them. But their flimsiness will be at once apparent, when the Councils have real power by legislation to affect the business of Government. Elsewhere the right of legislation has developed gradually from the right assumed by a politically sturdy people of refusing supply. Here you propose to let an elected Council frame a Bankruptcy or a Companies Act, while denying them the power to touch the salt tax or the excise duty. It is a false position; and I am sure it cannot be maintained. No doubt in the last resort the executive would turn at bay to save its vanishing powers. But it would fight then at hopeless disadvantage. At the last the choice would be between putting the clock back violently at the price of something very like revolution; and taking another leap forward, and still hoping blindly for the best. Once let it come to that and I should be afraid of what the choice would be.

8. You may think that these vaticinations signify either dislike to advance or failure to learn anything during the last fifteen years. I hope this is not so. But I have asked myself in vain what are the correcting factors that I have missed. I think there are only two to which you can refer me. One is the increasing sense of responsibility born of practical experience of public affairs. The other is the play of natural forces of difference to be expected from an enlarged electorate, and the admission to Council of men of independent

judgment. At the risk of prolonging this letter, I will refer to both briefly, but far enough to show, I hope, that I am not blind to either.

(1) You politicians, it may be said, may omit to oppose Government because, as wise and thoughtful men, they will see that Government is often right. I contend that they never can vividly see it, till they take the place of Government; till they become wholly responsible for the welfare of the State. That remedy worked in the Transvaal, as I always believed it would. Put men face to face with hard facts and even extremists will grow reasonable. Botha and Smuts are fighting for us for that reason. But *ex-hypothesi* you cannot do this yet in India, because you are going to maintain British ideals of government and to deny to Indians executive control. Your councillors are to go on criticising, but they are not to take our place or to shoulder our burdens. Talk is never going to be curbed by doing. Opposition in the House of Commons is often factious enough; but it is always restrained by the prospect of having to take on the job in turn—the one condition of things that you refuse to contemplate in India. I submit, therefore, that there is no solid hope, under the conditions predicated, of a rapid growth of sober and restraining responsibility.

(2) Further, your Chiefs, landowners and soldiers are to be called in to redress the balance, like an Old World redressing the balance of the New; and thus a natural cleavage of interest is to be set up. I do not want to go into electoral details; but I would suggest briefly that any system of election hopelessly handicaps the candidature of those who stand on the basis of dignity and wealth; that no electorate can be devised which will in working preclude the professional classes from competing successfully with the shy and proud country gentleman for votes; and that one of the most significant of Indian political developments is the caucus, which knows ways of putting on the screw from which the methods of even the rigid party organisations in England have much to learn. I cannot therefore look forward with any confidence to a balance of power by which a British executive will be durably maintained in legislative ascendancy by an alliance with country against town, zamindars against vakils, or Mahomedands against Hindus. But, even if that happened, I do not think that the position of the British Cabinet from 1910 to 1914 was of good augury for the consequences. And I would go further, and maintain, first, that any such alliance would be an unworthy abandonment of our traditional statesmanship; and, secondly, that if there is the least chance that the reed on which we think to lean is a broken one, then in the interests of those committed to our charge we have in duty no sort of right to lean on it.

9. To the best of my judgment, then, any strategic advantage that we give the political leaders, they will deliberately and cleverly use as a lever to

secure more. I do not think this wrong or unnatural in them. We should do exactly the same in their place. Whatever we give, they will want more. The Moslim League agenda with its proposal to make resolutions effective on a second passing points the way. They will work (and from their standpoint quite rightly) to the larger end. Therefore they will care nothing for immediate results, but all for the eventual prize, and they have extraordinary means for making all their members combine towards it.

10. I am most anxious not to overstate my case, and I admit freely that perhaps I personally rate the growth of responsibility in men like Chintamani and Malaviya too slow; or overrate the avidity or tension with which they will seize power. But, to wipe out errors of personal judgment, I submit also that the scheme is constitutionally unsound from the severe standpoint of political theory.

11. It seems to me that the Government of India's judicious formula conceals a fallacy, and that the real securing of "the supremacy of British rule" precludes any equally real form of self-government. Not that I think it wise or necessary to say this now to India. But the phrase is one that cannot possibly be applied to the Dominions, or even to a self-governing India that voluntarily elected to abide within the Empire; in the last analysis, therefore, there is an incompatibility. But, however that be, "the supremacy of British rule", which is a thing we know, is in the meantime laid down positively as the governing condition of advance. We are dealing not with the remote future, but an immediate present, and the question is how the condition affects that.

12. There is no question what British rule means. It means ultimately one thing, and that is the will of the British Parliament and of the electorate behind it. There alone sovereignty resides; the Government of India is a subordinate Government, resting on the directions which it receives from home. It cannot rest elsewhere until it acquires an independent basis of its own. This does not necessarily mean that it must become a parliamentary government on the Western model, though it is remarkable how inevitably we English turn to the one solution that has so far satisfied us. But it does surely mean that by changes in its nature and character the Government of India must become so identified with the wishes of the Indian people that it will be stably rooted in their acceptance of it. Then only will sovereignty have passed to India (though exactly where it will reside I cannot conjecture). But when that happens, it *will* pass. You cannot possibly have a popular Government in India still taking orders from England; because the root of authority will be in both cases similar, namely, the popular will, though not necessarily in both cases similarly formulated. For one free people cannot govern another.

13. Sovereignty, then, is *not* to pass with the present changes. You yourself repudiate any such idea. The Government of India is not to be a responsible, but is to be still a subordinate, Government. But it is yet to have a popular legislature. The concessions proposed are to be realities and not shams. The laws of the land, with certain reservations, are genuinely to be not the will of the executive, which means ultimately the will of the true sovereign power; but they are to be the will of an Indian electorate, a body beginning to reach out, and being encouraged to reach out, towards far-of sovereignty. The sovereign, through his deputies, is to administer laws which he has not made and of which he quite possibly disapproves, and his deputies are to manage without laws which the sovereign may think necessary. The sovereign, in fact, will, over a limited though important part of his sphere, have actually abdicated; sovereignty will be in dissolution. In actual results there will be two kings, one powerful but remote and bored; the other weak at first, but intensely keen and interested and in a position of great strategic advantage.

14. In other words, the activities of Government are to be not merely shared, but sundered. So far as I know, the whole of constitutional theory denies the possibility of this. I have not my books here, but I think that on this question the Durham Report delivered the final verdict. Government is one and not two things. You cannot dis-sever legislation from administration. The first depends upon the second, the second calls in the first to assist it for new and unusual needs. The legislature, if you like, is a temporary expansion of the executive, and not in India only but in all times and countries, from Edward I to Edward VII. Or, one might say, that legislation is a sort of Antaeus' return to earth on the part of the executive in order to gain strength for further endeavour. It follows that the two must be in harmony. Hence the practice in all adult legislatures of choosing the executive as the only means of avoiding fatal discord.

15. There is no example, to my knowledge, in history of the two powers having ever been successfully divided; their spheres of action defined by paper rules; and their vitality derived from wholly incongruous roots. German and the United States practices are clearly not to the point. The nearest approach to such a state of things as you appear to contemplate in paragraph 16 was, I think, the brief and explosive career of Colonial assemblies in the "representative government" days. We know what happened then, and how quickly and vehemently the legislature tore away power from the executive. Yet in Nova Scotia and elsewhere—except I suppose in Quebec and to a slight extent in the Transvaal—the

essay at Bombay was a failure, but since then her ideas have taken on and every day sees new adherents to the cause. The advocates of this policy were undoubtedly extremely annoyed, as Sir Thomas points out, by Lord Hardinge's valedictory speech, but I certainly do not understand that the Moderate party derived much comfort from it, nor have they accepted it as that announcement of British policy which Sinha asked for in his Presidential Address and to which Sir Thomas makes no allusion in his Memorandum.

"I appeal", he says, "to the British nation to declare their ungrudging approval of the goal to which we aspire and their inflexible resolution to equip India for her journey to that goal and to furnish her escort on the long and weary road. Such a declaration will be the most distinguished way of marking their appreciation of India's service and sacrifice, her loyalty and her devotion to the Empire. Such a declaration will touch the heart and appeal to the imagination of the people far more than any mere specific reforms. These latter may fall short of the high expectations raised by utterances of responsible English statesmen as to the future place of India in the Empire. But an authoritative declaration of policy as I suggest will, without causing undue disappointment, carry conviction to the minds of the people that the pace of administrative reforms will be reasonably accelerated and that henceforth it will be only a question of patient preparation. The most appropriate opportunity for such a declaration will be the moment when the victory of England and her Allies will establish for ever the triumph of free institutions over old-world doctrines of military absolutism."

We are, I think, agreed in Council with Sinha that an announcement will be imperative after the war, and you have heard to the same effect from Willingdon and Pentland, only they ask for it now, and Carmichael says the same to me.

What form then is the announcement to take? The formula which I sent you served its purpose so far as we were concerned in clearing our minds and enabling us to see where we stood both as individuals and as a Council. We did not regard the formula I sent you as a verbally inspired utterance, nor did we contemplate it as incapable of revision. It represented a stage in our discussions from which we advanced to further stages and we always contemplated inviting criticism upon it. Personally I have been glad to get those criticisms, and in view of Sir Thomas's minute I took pains to take Sinha into consultation and discussed the question with him at some length. Sinha convinced me that it was an unsatisfactory formula from the Indian point of

view, but he was emphatic with regard to the desirability of a pronouncement, reiterating the passage in his speech which I have quoted above. I asked him whether he did not regard Lord Hardinge's valedictory utterance as indicating the goal which he asked to be defined. He said he did not, and in saying this I believe him to be representing the moderate view. It is the Moderates who have been pressing on Willingdon the desirability of a pronouncement. If they regarded Hardinge's speech as Sir Thomas regards it, they would not ask for a further pronouncement.

With regard to the particular form of announcement, as I have said above, we are at the present moment engaged in writing our despatch and you will have our suggestions there, but, whatever its form, we are at one in believing some announcement to be necessary, especially when it is combined, as we shall propose, with some definite move forward.

I naturally hesitate to differ from one so experienced as Sir Thomas, but as I have already pointed out, I am putting forward the views of men with as wide an experience and with, what to my mind is even more important, a present knowledge of the political condition of this country.

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No. 23.

## PROPOSED REDRAFT OF GOAL FORMULA.

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The goal to which we look forward is the endowment of British India, as an integral part of the Empire, with self-government, but the rate of progress towards that goal must depend upon the improvement and wide diffusion of education, the softening of racial and religious differences and the acquisition of political experience.

The form of self-government to which she may eventually attain must be regulated by the special circumstances of India. They differ so widely from those of any other part of the Empire that we cannot altogether look for a model in those forms of self-government which already obtain in the Great

Dominions. In all parts of the Empire which now enjoy self-government, it has been the result, not of any sudden inspiration of theoretical statesmanship, but of a steady process of practical evolution, substantially facilitated by the possession of a more or less common inheritance of political traditions, social customs and religious beliefs.

British India has been built up on different lines and under different conditions and must work out by the same steady process of evolution a definite constitution of her own. In what exact form this may eventually be cast it is neither possible nor profitable for us to attempt now to determine, but we contemplate her gradual progress towards a larger and larger measure of control by her own people, the steady and conscious development of which will ultimately result in a form of self-government, differing perhaps in many ways from that enjoyed by other parts of the Empire, but evolved on lines which have taken into account India's past history, and the special circumstances and traditions of her component peoples and her political and administrative entities.

2. Our most anxious desire is to see a real and immediate advance made towards this goal, and in the belief that the time has now come when the rate of progress may be accelerated on definite lines, we propose :—

- (a) To develop urban and rural self-government in the direction of giving greater powers to the local boards and councils, and making these more predominantly non-official and elective in character, while at the same time extending the franchise in the wards or other constituencies by which the elected members are chosen.
- (b) To increase the proportion of Indians in the higher branches of the public service, and thereby to enable Indians to take a more important part in the administration of the country.
- (c) To pave the way for an ultimate enlargement of the constitutional powers of the Provincial Legislative Councils—(i) through an increase in the elected element; and (ii) through a material expansion of the constituencies by which the elected members are chosen, so as to bring about a state of things under which they will become more truly representative of the interests of the people as a whole.

Memorandum submitted by the undersigned elected Members  
of the Imperial Legislative Council with regard to the  
proposed reforms.

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There is no doubt that the termination of the war will see a great advance in the ideals of Government all over the civilised world, and especially in the British Empire, which entered into the struggle in defence of the liberties of weak and small nationalities and is pouring forth its richest blood and treasure in upholding the cause of justice and humanity in the international relations of the world. India has borne her part in this struggle and cannot remain unaffected by the new spirit of change for a better state of things. Expectations have been raised in this country and hopes held out that after the war the problems of Indian administration will be looked at from a new angle of vision. The people of India have good reason to be grateful to England for the great progress in her material resources and the widening of her intellectual and political outlook under British rule, and for the steady, if slow, advance in her national life commencing with the Charter Act of India of 1833. Up to 1909, the Government of India was conducted by a bureaucracy almost entirely non-Indian in its composition and not responsible to the people of India. The reforms of 1909 for the first time introduced an Indian element in the direction of affairs in the administration of India. This element was of a very limited character. The Indian people accepted it as an indication on the part of the Government of a desire to admit the Indians into the inner counsels of the Indian Empire. So far as the Legislative Councils are concerned, the numbers of non-official Members were merely enlarged with increased facilities for debate and interpellation. The Supreme Legislative Council retained an absolute official majority, and in the Provincial Legislative Councils, where a non-official majority was allowed, such a majority included nominated Members and the European representatives. In measures largely affecting the people, whether of legislation or taxation, by which Europeans were not directly affected, the European Members would naturally support the Government, and the nominated Members being nominees of Government would be inclined to take the same side. Past experience has shown that this has actually happened on various occasions. The non-official majorities, therefore, in the Provincial Councils have proved largely illusory and give no real power to the representatives of the people. The Legislative Councils, whether Supreme or Provincial, are at present nothing but advisory bodies without any power of effective control over the Government, Imperial or Provincial. The people or their representatives are practically as little associated with the real government of



the country as they were before the reforms, except for the introduction of the Indian Members in the Executive Councils, where again the nomination rests entirely with the Government, the people having no voice in the selection of the Indian Members.

The object which the Government had in view in introducing the reforms of 1909 was, as expressed by the Prime Minister in his speech in the House of Commons on the second reading of the Indian Councils Bill (April 1st, 1909), that "it was most desirable in the circumstances to give to the people of India the feeling that these Legislative Councils are not mere automatons the wires of which are pulled by the official hierarchy". This object, it is submitted, has not been attained. Apart from this question of the constitution of the Legislative and Executive Councils, the people labour under certain grave disabilities, which not only prevent utilisation, but also lead to wastage of what is best in them, and are positively derogatory to their sense of national self-respect. The Arms Act which excludes from its operation Europeans and Anglo-Indians and applies only to the pure Natives of the country, the disqualification of Indians for forming or joining volunteer corps, and their exclusion from the commissioned ranks of the army, are disabilities which are looked upon with an irritating sense of racial differentiation. It would be bad enough if these were mere disabilities. Restrictions and prohibitions regarding the possession and use of arms have tended to emasculate the civil population in India and expose them to serious danger. The position of Indians in India is practically this, that they have no real part or share in the direction of the government of the country, and are placed under very great and galling disabilities from which the other members of the British Empire are exempt, and which have reduced them to a state of utter helplessness. The existence, moreover, of the system of indentured emigration gives to the British Colonies and the outside world the impression that Indians, as a whole, are no better than indentured coolies, who are looked upon as very little, if at all, above the slave. The present state of things makes the Indians feel that, though theoretically they are equal subjects of the King, they hold a very inferior position in the British Empire. Other Asiatic races also hold the same, if not a worse, view about India and her status in the Empire. Humiliating as this position of inferiority is to the Indian mind, it is almost unbearable to the youth of India whose outlook is broadened by education and travel in foreign parts where they come in contact with other free races. In the face of these grievances and disabilities what has sustained the people is the hope and faith inspired by promises and assurances of fair and equal treatment which have been held out from time to time by our Sovereigns and British statesmen of high standing. In the crisis we are now going through, the Indian people have sunk domestic differences between themselves and the Government and have faithfully and loyally stood by the Empire. The Indian soldiers were eager to go to the battle-fields of Europe, not as mercenary troops,

but as free citizens of the British Empire which required their services, and her civilian population was animated by one desire, namely, to stand by England in the hour of her need. Peace and tranquillity reigned throughout India when she was practically denuded of British and Indian troops. The Prime Minister of England, while voicing the sentiments of the English people in regard to India's part in this great war, spoke of Indians as "the joint and equal custodians of one common interest and future". India does not claim any reward for her loyalty, but she has a right to expect that the want of confidence on the part of Government to which she not unnaturally ascribes her present state should now be a thing of the past, and that she should no longer occupy a position of subordination, but one of comradeship. This would assure the Indian people that England is ready and willing to help them to attain self-government under the ægis of the British Crown, and thus discharge the noble mission which she has undertaken and to which she has so often given voluntary expression through her rulers and statesmen. What is wanted is not merely good government or efficient administration, but government that is acceptable to the people, because it is responsible to them. This is what, India understands, would constitute the changed angle of vision.

If after the termination of the war the position of India practically remains what it was before and there is no material change in it, it will undoubtedly cause bitter disappointment and great discontent in the country, and the beneficent effects of participation in common danger, overcome by common effort, will soon disappear, leaving no record behind save the painful memory of unrealised expectations. We feel sure that the Government is also alive to the situation and is contemplating measures of reform in the administration of the country. We feel that we should avail ourselves of this opportunity to respectfully offer to Government our humble suggestions as to the lines on which these reforms should proceed. They must in our opinion go to the root of the matter. They must give to the people real and effective participation in the government of the country, and also remove those irritating disabilities as regards the possession of arms and a military career, which indicate want of confidence in the people and place them in a position of inferiority and helplessness. Under the first head we would take the liberty to suggest the following measures for consideration and adoption:—

(1) In all the Executive Councils, Provincial and Imperial, half the number of Members should be Indians; the European element in the Executive Councils should, as far as possible, be nominated from the ranks of men trained and educated in the public life of England, so that India may have the benefit of a wider outlook and larger experience of the outside world. It is not absolutely essential that the Members of the Executive Councils, Indians or Europeans, should have experience of actual administration, for as in the case of the Ministers in England, the assistance of the permanent officials of the

departments is always available to them. As regards Indians, we venture to say that a sufficient number of qualified Indians, who can worthily fill the office of Members of the Executive Councils and hold portfolios, is always available. Our short experience in this direction has shown how Indians like Sir S. P. Sinha, Sir Syed Ali Imam, the late Mr. Krishnaswami Iyer, Sir Shams-ul-Huda and Sir Sankaran Nair, have maintained a high level in the discharge of their duties. Moreover, it is well known that the Native States, where Indians have opportunities, have produced renowned administrators like Sir Salar Jang, Sir T. Madhava Rao, Sir Seshadri Iyer, Dewan Bahadur Raghunath Rao, not to mention the present administrators in the various Native States of India. The statutory obligation now existing that three of the Members of the Supreme Executive Council shall be selected from the public services in India and similar provisions with regard to Provincial Councils should be removed. The elected representatives of the people should have a voice in the selection of the Indian Members of the Executive Councils and for that purpose a principle of election should be adopted.

(2) All the Legislative Councils in India should have a substantial majority of elected representatives. These representatives, we feel sure, will watch and safeguard the interests of the masses and the agricultural population with whom they are in closer touch than any European officer, however sympathetic, can possibly be. The proceedings of the various Legislative Councils and the Indian National Congress and the Moslem League bear ample testimony to the solicitude of the educated Indians for the welfare of the masses and their acquaintance with their wants and wishes. The franchise should be broadened and extended directly to the people; Mahomedans or Hindus, wherever they are in a minority, being given proper and adequate representation having regard to their numerical strength and position.

(3) The total number of the Members of the Supreme Council should be not less than 150, and of the Provincial Councils not less than 100 for the major provinces, and not less than 60 to 75 for the minor provinces.

(4) The budget should be passed in the shape of money bills, fiscal autonomy being conceded to India.

(5) The Imperial Legislative Council should have power to legislate on all matters and to discuss and pass resolutions relating to all matters of Indian administration, and the Provincial Councils should have similar powers with regard to provincial administration, save and except that the direction of military affairs, of foreign relations, declarations of war, the making of peace, and the entering into treaties, other than commercial, should be vested in the Government of India. As a safeguard, the Governor-General in Council or the Governor in Council, as the case may be, should have the right of veto, but subject to certain conditions and limitations.

(6) The Council of the Secretary of State should be abolished. The Secretary of State should, as far as possible, hold in relation to the Government of India a position similar to that which the Secretary of State for the Colonies holds in relation to the Colonies. The Secretary of State should be assisted by two permanent Under Secretaries, one of whom should be an Indian. The salaries of the Secretary and the Under Secretaries should be placed on the British estimates.

(7) In any scheme of Imperial Federation, India should be given through her chosen representatives a place similar to that of the self-governing Dominions.

(8) The provincial governments should be made autonomous as stated in the Government of India's despatch, dated August 25th, 1911.

(9) The United Provinces as well as the other major Provinces should have a Governor, brought from the United Kingdom, with an Executive Council.

(10) A full measure of local self-government should be immediately granted.

(11) The right to carry arms should be granted to Indians on the same conditions as to Europeans.

(12) Indians should be allowed to enlist as volunteers and units of a territorial army to be established in India.

(13) Commissions in the Army should be given to Indian youths under conditions similar to those applicable to Europeans.

(Signed) MANINDRA CHANDRA NANDI,  
of Kasimbazar.

„ D. E. WACHA.  
„ BHUPENDRANATH BASU.  
„ BISHUN DUTTA SHUKUL.  
„ MADAN MOHAN MALAVIYA.  
„ K. V. RANGASWAMI AYYANGAR.  
„ MAZHARUL HAQUE.  
„ V. S. SRINIVASRAV.  
„ TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU.  
„ IBRAHIM RAHIMTOOLA.  
„ B. WARASIMHESWARA SARMA.  
„ MIR ASAD ALI.  
„ KAMINI KUMAR CHANDA.  
„ KRISHNA SAHAY.  
„ R. N. BHANJA DEO of Kanika.  
„ M. B. DADABHOY.  
„ SITA NATH ROY.  
„ MOHAMED ALI MOHAMAD.  
„ M. A. JINNAH.

No. 25.

FROM THE HON'BLE NAWAB ZULFIKAR ALI KHAN, c. s. i., of Maler Kotla.

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*Simla, September 30th, 1916.*

[Confidential.]

DEAR MR. MAFFEY,

You may perhaps have heard that the elected Members of the Imperial Legislative Council held a meeting in Simla to discuss and frame a scheme of reforms to be presented to His Excellency the Viceroy. This meeting was arranged by some of the Hindu and Moslem Members who are confirmed nationalists. From this meeting the nominated Members of the Council were severely excluded. I have heard that the Memorandum drawn up is practically on the same lines as the proposals put forward by the Moslem League and the Congress Committee. I have a copy of these proposals, and I can say without hesitation that they are of a very radical nature. These people do not seem to possess any political wisdom, for they fail to see that a self-respecting and responsible Government cannot but look upon these proposals as preposterous. The Government may be prepared to consider a sensible and practical scheme of reforms, but it can never consent to cut the ground from under its own feet.

Every step forward depends upon the moral, material and intellectual progress of a people, and there is no denying the fact that the people of this country have not yet reached that stage in their evolution when they can be safely entrusted with the full control of the destinies of a country whose complicated problems due to diversity of race and religion and moral stagnation puzzle even the British rulers who stand pre-eminent in their reputation for brilliant traditions of successful colonisation. Can it then be conceived that a few educated Indians whose inaptitude for public spirit is so well known and whose capacity for handling administrative questions is so limited and undeveloped can manage these affairs without detriment to the best interests of their own country? And can the British Government see unconcerned the destruction of a magnificent edifice erected after a century and a half's incessant labour and untiring vigilance?

The reforms proposed by these noisy nationalists are calculated to leave no controlling power in the hands of the British officials, who alone can keep the balance of power in India and dispense equal justice and preserve peace and security in the land and guide and train the Indians along progressive lines. Eliminate this controlling agency and you will have inconceivable confusion, intrigue and anarchy. People have short memories; they have forgotten the reign of terror which prevailed before the British took upon

themselves the task of administering the country. Any weakening of the British hold would mean the restoration of old and hated conditions in India. No sensible and patriotic Indian would ever contemplate such times without agony, and if he can help it he would prevent the accomplishment of such an evil design.

I think at this stage it is not necessary for me to enter into a detailed discussion of the reform scheme; but if Government so desire, I would be glad to submit my opinion on the different items separately. I have said above that the nominated Members were rigidly excluded from the deliberations of the elected Members; this in my opinion is an insult to the responsible authorities in India who have nominated these Members; and also to the communities and classes which are represented by these Members. It would in my humble opinion be highly impolitic if the Government countenances such insolent behaviour on the part of the extremists. We, who are moderates and wish to work with Government in a spirit of friendly co-operation and common loyalty to the Crown, need Government's support. I know several elected Members who agree with me in these views. The nominated Members of course are unanimous in their opinion on this matter.

I venture to say that any encouragement given on this occasion by Government to these extremists will embolden them in the prosecution of their fantastic and visionary ideas, and the spirit of defiance in them will manifest itself in full vigour in future.

I shall be obliged if you will kindly lay this letter before His Excellency the Viceroy.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) ZULFIKAR ALI KHAN.

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No. 26.

TO THE HON'BLE NAWAB ZULFIKAR ALI KHAN, c. s. i., of Maler Kotla.

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*Viceregal Lodge, Simla, October 3rd, 1916.*

DEAR NAWAB SAHIB,

I received your letter, dated 30th September, and in accordance with your wishes laid it before the Viceroy. I am sure His Excellency appreciated the

point of view which you expressed so forcibly, and I do not think that at this stage it is necessary for me to say any more.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd,) J. L. MAFFEY.

No. 27.

Extract from a letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to the Hon'ble Sir James Meston, K. C. S. I., Lieut-Governor of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, dated the 14th/15th October 1916.

I circulated Mr. Marris's letter and it is placed with the rest of the literature on the subject of the Goal. I very much agree with your view that we cannot stand still, and that, broadly speaking, seems to me the answer to Mr. Marris. If we are to find a counterpoise to our political proposals, it must be found, I think, in a very extended scheme of education, and we shall speak very frankly with regard to that in our despatch.

No. 28.

To THE HON'BLE SIR GEORGE BARNES, K. C. B., Member of the Viceroy's Council.

*Viceroy's Camp, October 20th, 1916.*

MY DEAR SIR GEORGE,

I wonder if you could approach Sir Reginald and talk the matter over of the territorial basis of franchise. I don't think he quite realises that the draft in the despatch was neutral in colour, but that his dissenting minute has thrown it up by the dark background which he has painted in. I feel sure that he is so reasonable that he will be willing to tone down his minute to a considerable extent rather than imperil the whole despatch. We cannot of course object to it in the same way that we object to that of Sankaran Nair; but I think we can fairly say that he has brought into excessive prominence a point which we had been careful to tone down almost to insignificant dimensions. I am sorry to trouble you over this matter, but I feel sure that the whole Council were very much disappointed this morning at what seemed to be the collapse of six months' work. I have written to Lowndes with regard to

Sankaran Nair. . Perhaps you would ask him to show you my letter, and, if you can add your influence to his, I feel sure that it will be most invaluable.

Yours very sincerely,  
(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.

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No. 29.

TO THE HON'BLE MR. G. R. LOWNDES, BAR.-AT-LAW, Member of the Viceroy's Council.

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*Viceregal Lodge, Simla, October 20th, 1916.*

MY DEAR LOWNDES,

I am writing to ask if you can approach Sankaran Nair and get him to modify his attitude. I have no intention of suggesting that he should withdraw any of his concrete proposals for an advance, but it must be clearly understood that I absolutely decline to forward a despatch to which such a dissenting minute as his is attached. I think perhaps with patience he may be persuaded to modify his attitude, and I think the tone of his minute is largely due to unskillful workmanship. Perhaps you might yourself find time to draw up a draft minute for him. I don't altogether despair, and I was glad that time did not admit this morning of our doing more than showing our disapproval as a Council. Above all things we must have patience. He is slow in the up-take, but I believe—though my belief has been sadly shaken of late—he is really sound at bottom. Will you kindly let me know how your negotiations proceed?

Very sincerely yours,  
(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.

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No. 30.

FROM THE HON'BLE MR. C. H. A. HILL, C. S. I., C. I. E., Member of the Viceroy's Council.

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*Simla, October 20th, 1916.*

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

In conversation the other day we discussed the question whether the omission to develop the provincial autonomy idea did not largely detract from the value of our reform despatch.



As Your Excellency is aware, the provincial autonomy idea, as interpreted by the framers of the despatch of August 1911, was somewhat different from what was understood by that term by Gokhale and other politicians. The latter unquestionably read into the despatch an intention to liberate provincial administrations to a very large extent from the control, financial and fiscal, at present exercised by the Government of India; but they proposed that that control, at present exercised ultimately by the Secretary of State and the House of Commons, should be replaced by the control of popularly elected Legislative Councils.

My own view, for what it is worth, is that the executive administrations in India can hardly expect to secure materially greater emancipation from control exercised in England unless we can show that some other control is substituted for it, and, to this extent, Gokhale's idea was a perfectly sound one. It seems to me unlikely that Parliament, or the Secretary of State, will consent very largely to abate their powers in such matters unless the character of the bureaucratic Governments of India is materially modified.

As Your Excellency will remember I personally was desirous of suggesting certain measures leading in the direction of greater constitutional powers to the Legislative Councils, and, in particular, threw out the suggestion that the budget should be fully debated in the Legislative Councils, which should have the power of modifying all new appropriations. In other words, that, save in respect of services and provisions which had received the sanction, or had been made under the direct orders, of the Government of India or the Secretary of State, the Legislative Councils should have power to vote supplies or to refuse to vote supplies.

It will be clear from the preceding paragraph that, among other reasons for suggesting this, one was that it afforded some basis upon which we could hereafter rest a claim for partial emancipation from control and thus take a step, however small, in the direction of provincial autonomy as it was understood by Gokhale. This proposal found a place in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6, and paragraph 31 of the Appendix of the Memorandum which I sent to Your Excellency last May when we first began to discuss possible reforms. I attach copy\* for facility of reference.

Since we spoke on the subject, I have had a long talk with Sinha, who, as you know, is probably the most far-seeing as well as the most reasonable of Indian moderate politicians. He, as did Gokhale, laid great stress on the view that it was important, if possible, to give some reality of *power*, however circumscribed and safeguarded, to the Legislative Councils when enlarged and made more really representative. He corroborated the view, which I have suggested, that the chief source of disappointment in the reforms of 1909 was that the Councils, as then re-organised, were still kept

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\* Not printed.

in the position of purely advisory bodies and that, although they could make their influence felt indirectly, they had no direct statutory power to insist on the acceptance of their view in any matter. Of course, the enlargement of the elective element will very greatly enhance their powers of influence. But I still think that it is worth the while of the authorities at home to consider whether something more cannot be conceded. For the sake of presenting, as far as possible, a unanimous front, I have suppressed the expression of my own views on this matter in the despatch, as I hold it to be all-important that we should, at all events, secure what is there recommended. And anything short of that will occasion the very gravest disappointment on the part of the moderate politicians whose good will it is all-important that we should secure. The only direct power of influence which we there recommend for immediate adoption is the association of elected representatives with the Finance Member of Council in the preparation of the provincial budgets. In one sense, that recommendation is a more radical one than what I am convinced the politicians themselves would prefer, namely, that the budget, when prepared, should be submitted to the Council and debated there. They would prefer this, even though the resolutions on the various heads were not binding upon the Executive Government; and the reason why I think this would be the preferable course is that under our recommendations the two or three elected representatives, selected by their fellows to collaborate in the preparation of the budget, will be given an altogether undesirable prominence, as well as opportunities for access to official documents and records which might in certain circumstances prove embarrassing to us as well as undesirable on other public grounds. If, in addition to having the budget debated, the Council were empowered to determine the provisions relating to the unallotted heads and also perhaps, as I have suggested above in this letter, appropriations for services regarding which the Government of India or the Secretary of State had not passed orders, then I believe that we should purchase complete satisfaction at a by no means inordinate price.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd.) CLAUDE H. HILL.

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No. 31.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR REGINALD CRADDOCK, K. C. S. I., Member of the  
Viceroy's Council.

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*Simla, October 21st, 1916.*

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I am very sorry to intrude on you just as you are having a little change and rest in the jungles, but like all of us, I am deeply concerned with the

unsatisfactory state of the work on which we have spent so much time and trouble since the beginning of your Viceroyalty.

I particularly feel on this subject because I personally made a very special effort to get the despatch drafted and approved in a minimum of time. The process of writing it was an exhausting one, but I was thoroughly rewarded by the kind approval that it met with from Your Excellency and my Colleagues. None the less, however, do I feel the disappointment at its present, though I hope temporary, fate.

Yesterday afternoon I went and saw Sir Sankaran and discussed with him the whole question of his Minute. He has promised to think over the matter by Monday when I shall present to him the draft of a Minute which I think he might send in, and which would not interfere with the tenor of the despatch. I will suggest to him that he should withdraw his Minute as a Minute and turn Part I of it into a note in explanation of the course that he has followed. That note I should recommend to Your Excellency, with Sir Sankaran's consent, should be sent privately to the Secretary of State. This will serve two purposes, first, it will enable Sir Sankaran to feel that he has unburdened his mind of the farrago of mis-statements and fallacies which apparently it contains; and, secondly, it will be an enlightening document to the Secretary of State of the difficulties that result from the inclusion of a Sein Feiner in an Unionist Cabinet. For, if you read Sir Sankaran's Minute and think over it a little, you will see that it is an indictment of British rule in India, about which the author, although he does not actually state the precise extent of his belief, yet leaves it to be clearly understood that if he does not believe it all, at least nine-tenths of it is more or less true, or founded on a substantial basis of fact. I told him in the frankest way, but in the most friendly manner, that if he was so out of sympathy with the whole system of Government as his Minute showed, he clearly ought not to have entered the Executive Council or to continue in it.

To write a Minute on his behalf is not a joy to me and involves a good deal of trouble when I have still arrears to make up with my own work. But I would rather do this than see the labour of many months jeopardised. It is, as you know, exceedingly difficult to get at the workings of Sir Sankaran's mind. He tells me, for instance, that if you were to rule out the whole of his Minute as irrelevant (which most of it is), he would feel quite satisfied. This, as I have pointed out to him, is an impossible course. He is a Member of the Government and as such entitled to his views, and if it were to get abroad, as it assuredly would in time, that the expression of his views had been stifled or suppressed by pressure placed upon him, either by yourself or by any of his Colleagues, the results might be exceedingly awkward.

Sir Sankaran also has at the back of his mind a sort of feeling that he would be lacking in his duty to the class to which he belongs, and to the opinions which he himself voiced some years ago as President of the National Congress, if he refrains from stating their point of view.

The course which I have recommended to Your Excellency seems to me to meet all the possible objections. His views, extravagant as they may be, will reach the Secretary of State. At the same time if the despatch is ever published, he will stand before his countrymen as having done what he could to further what he believes to be their interests. Those are the lines on which I propose to tackle him and unless I hear to the contrary from Your Excellency, I will carry out those plans.

I now turn to the other matter. I think I can find a wording for the paragraph about territorial units and an elected majority, which will meet all concerned, not excepting Sir George Barnes and yourself. I will attempt this and will send it to you with a final version of the despatch. If I can carry all these things through, the final version can after all be dealt with before we all disperse, and can be sent for your signature.

We shall probably have a good deal of business of various kinds to transact during the few days that you are at Delhi, and I am sure that it would be a great relief to Your Excellency and to us all if this contentious matter was not left over for settlement. I hope that the course that I am recommending on both these matters will meet with your hearty approval. As Your Excellency knows, although I found it necessary to differ on two points from the majority, I have tried my level best throughout to secure harmony and weight to the general recommendations of the despatch.

I should be very grateful if Your Excellency could find time on receipt of this to write me a line expressing your approval or disapproval of the course proposed.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd.) R. H. CRADDOCK.

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No. 32.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR GEORGE BARNES, K. C. B., Member of the Viceroy's Council.

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*Simla, October 21st, 1916.*

DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I feel sure that Craddock will do his best. I have talked to him and he says that he will modify his minute, but adds that he must make his own position clear. At the worst, a few words added in the despatch itself would right matters.

Sankaran Nair is a more difficult proposition. After Council yesterday I saw that he was lingering when the others were going away, so I lingered too on the chance that he wanted to unburden his soul. We walked away together and he asked me what I thought of what he had written. I told him that I had not read a word of his minute, as it had only reached me during Council. Eventually he asked me to advise him, and I told him that I would of course do my best to help him. I have since read his minute and it seems to me that he cannot remain a Member of a Government and at the same time attack it. This I will explain to him and let you know how I progress. I do not feel sure that the work is his own—I have taken steps to find out. If it is not his own, the difficulties will be greater.

Hill saw me talking with Sankaran Nair and yesterday afternoon offered to help, but I told him that I thought that I had better see Sankaran Nair alone. I think that Hill is probably at a disadvantage as compared to Lowndes or to me, inasmuch as he is a member of the I. C. S.

I have just communicated with Lowndes as to the best plan to adopt. He thinks that he had better take no step until I have had my talk with Sankaran Nair. He thinks, as I do, that it is a matter of importance that Sankaran Nair has made the advance to me and has asked for advice. He feels also that his efforts hitherto have not been successful judged by the results, and is not anxious to take the initiative again.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd.) G. S. BARNES.

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No. 33.

To THE HON'BLE SIR GEORGE BARNES, K. C. B., Member of the Viceroy's Council.

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*Viceroy's Camp, October 22nd, 1916.*

MY DEAR BARNES,

Thank you for your effort. We must keep S. N. if we can, as his resignation would make a very bad impression; and I have hopes that, as we are not asking him to do more than eliminate that, which he himself professes to repudiate, from his minute, he may fall in with our wishes.

Very sincerely yours,  
(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.

No. 34.

TO THE HON'BLE SIR REGINALD CRADDOCK, K. C. S. I., Member of the  
Viceroy's Council.

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*Viceroy's Camp, October 22nd, 1916.*

MY DEAR SIR REGINALD,

Please don't apologise for writing. I am indeed greatly indebted to you.

I wrote to Barnes and Lowndes from my train on Friday night on the subject of S. N., as I thought, from the fact that they were not I. C. S., that their intervention might be more acceptable to him, but I shall be eternally grateful to you if you can settle the matter.

Of course I am quite ready to send S. N.'s collection of Extremist mis-statements to the Secretary of State. My objection to them was the possibility of their being published with the imprimatur of being attached to a Government despatch.

I cannot rule out his minute or any portion of it, but I can say that I will not forward a despatch to which it is attached as a dissenting minute and I am sure he is too public-spirited to wish all our work of the last six months to go overboard.

I am grateful to you also for your suggested action on the other point. I could not object to your minute, but it set forth, by its strength of colour, in bold relief what had previously been a neutral grey.

I can assure you that I thoroughly approve of your proposed action; and if you succeed, you will earn the gratitude of us all.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.

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No. 35.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR GEORGE BARNES, K. C. B., Member of the Viceroy's  
Council.

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*Simla, October 24th, 1916.*

DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I spent a long time yesterday afternoon with S. N. He at first took the line that he did not care whether our work of the past six months was wasted or not, and that he had not the slightest wish that the despatch should go.

Then he changed and discussed his dissenting minute on the basis that he wished to amend it. I told him that no one wished to crush out his views, but that, for his own credit and the credit of his cause, they ought to be expressed in a reasonable way. He told me that he realised that he had expressed his views in a "sledge hammer way", and that, as a matter of fact, he had already redrafted his minute. I told him that Craddock had been trying to put his views into official form, and that I had read Craddock's draft. He urged that Craddock could not make a convincing draft out of a case in which he did not believe. I told him that Craddock's draft was a great deal more convincing to the reader than his, at which he seemed much amused. He is very easily touched by any reference to his life as a barrister. He agreed that abuse of your opponent in Court might be useful before a petty jury, but was out of place in a dignified official document. Altogether he left me in a very good temper and said that he would read Craddock's effort on his behalf.

Today he has seen Craddock and has expressed himself much pleased with what Craddock has written, but says that he can come to no decision until he has slept upon it—which I am afraid may mean until he has shown the document to somebody else. Altogether I think that things are going quite well, but he is most difficult to talk to because he has a very inconsequent mind.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd.) G. S. BARNES.

*P. S.*—Craddock will write tomorrow.

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No. 36.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. C.-4, Camp, 24th October 1916.

*Private.* A Memorandum of demands has been sent in by a number of the elected Members of my Council which, among others, includes the following:—

- (a) That half Members of all Executive Councils should be elected Indians and none of these appointments should be reserved for Civilians.
- (b) That all Legislative Councils, including Imperial, should have substantial majority of elected representatives.
- (c) That Budget should be passed in shape of Money Bills, fiscal autonomy being conceded to India.

(d) That Imperial Legislative Council should have power to legislate on all matters without restriction, and that Governor-General's power of veto should be limited.

(e) That Council of Secretary of State should be abolished.

It has been reported in the press that this Memorandum follows the lines of a note or despatch which Lord Hardinge sent home.

His name carries very great weight in India and a denial of this statement is in our opinion important. It is therefore desired by us to issue a communiqué, including the following words:—

“ Lord Hardinge further authorised them to say that many of these demands bear no resemblance to any private views he may have expressed by note or otherwise.”

We shall be glad if you will kindly obtain Lord Hardinge's assent very urgently.

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No. 37.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR REGINALD CRADDOCK, K. C. S. I., Member of the  
Viceroy's Council.

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*Simla, October 25th, 1916.*

[ Private. ]

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

Very many thanks for your letter. When I approached S. N. on the subject I was not aware that you had written to Sir George Barnes and to Lowndes on the subject. I learned this later. Lowndes was not very anxious to intervene, as he had already tried his hand with S. N. before the Minute was written at all. Barnes and I agreed to act jointly in the matter. Barnes had a long talk with him on Monday and suggested that they should both come over to me, but S. N. said he would prefer to see me alone and would do so the next day. I had a long talk with him yesterday and at last induced him to say that he would make up his mind today. I shall see him later today and I am hopeful that he will be reasonable. He asked for two or three days to consider the matter. I offered him two hours. We compromised on one night to sleep over it. He was profuse in his thanks at the end of the interview. There is always a risk of him that Providence might harden his heart like Pharaoh's in the interval, but I have not exhausted all my plagues yet, and I still have some arguments to bring him round with if he has gone back today. I had drafted a complete Minute for him, giving him full scope for all his suggestions.



This I read out to him solemnly, and he took away a copy of it at the end of the interview. He suggested to me that if I withdrew my Minute he would withdraw his. This I stoutly refused to do, explaining to him that I was not asking him to withdraw a Minute at all, but merely to put it in the shape in which it was most likely to receive consideration. Although he shares the prejudice of some of his countrymen against the Indian Civil Service, yet this prejudice does not extend to individuals, and in my time I have had to deal in various capacities with every kind of man and have settled many bitter disputes, so I am hopeful of success in this case also. It is possible that he will show my draft to some of his political friends in the interval, but if they are wise they will advise him to accept it as being much more likely to further his case than his own production. I just threw out the suggestion of his own original Minute being turned into a note. I did not attempt to press it upon him, but merely to let it sink in, in case it should help me later.

To turn to another subject. In regard to the wording of paragraph 48, everybody has accepted it, and in the revised proof which I hope to post to Your Excellency today I will mark the passage and should be very grateful for a wire from Maffey as to your approval of it, so that there may be no delay in getting on with the printing. As you will see, I have added an appendix to the despatch containing extracts from Memorandum C. I am perfectly willing that these should appear in the papers in this way, so that the despatch itself may be free from arguments in favour of the territorial system which Sir George Barnes, and I gather Your Excellency also, would not agree to subscribe to.

I now come to my own Minute. Barnes showed me your letter to him on the subject and I was rather disturbed over it. Barnes thinks that all you meant was that I should not in my Minute overstate the views of my colleagues. I have revised my Minute so as to avoid any imputation to them of opinions which they have not expressed in the despatch, but I do not feel quite satisfied in my mind that Your Excellency meant, by "toning down", only the presentation of your own case. I cannot help feeling that your letter to Barnes meant something more. In case that should be your meaning, I should like to state my case for my Minute as follows:—

There is a certain measure which no less than four Members of the Council have warmly commended, *vide* their Memorandum C. Three of these, under the influence of adverse opinions received from the most experienced administrators in the country, so far recede from their attitude as to consent to a rather lukewarm suggestion that there is something to be said for this system, but that they will leave it to Local Governments to adopt or not as they please. The fourth, S. N., wishes to maintain his preference for that system.

I, on my side, have consistently, as I am sure you will bear me out, opposed this measure without any weakening. I regard it as folly; I see in it the thin end of a wedge which will drive us into large Councils filled with

hostile majorities. I have lived 32 years in this country. I have lived among the people as none of my colleagues have. I have administered a large province, and I have behind me the opinions of men like O'Dwyer, Meston, Gait, Robertson, as well as a Radical English statesman like Lord Pentland. On the other side are Carmichael and Willingdon, neither of whom knows the country. Lyon whose fantastic nationalist ideas put him out of Court (to a partial extent only); Beatson Bell whose production would not do credit to a schoolboy; and lastly Hailey, a clever man, but whose whole note contradicts his *non sequitur* conclusion, and who is only nominally the Head of a Government. In his own province he would be a Deputy Commissioner and his charge consists of Delhi city and one tahsil. If weight were attached to his opinion it should clearly be attached to hundreds of other officers of his own service and experience.

Whether I am right or whether I am wrong is irrelevant, but holding, as I do, that this particular course is absolutely disastrous, can I be expected to water down my objections and state them in a way that will stand no chance of carrying conviction? I would ask Your Excellency to remember that there is a great deal more than our despatch to be considered. Before Hill, Meyer, and Lowndes started this unfortunate idea, the political agitators had never realised quite the territorial system, and what an advantage it would be to them. Their cry was "add to us a special electorate for the professional middle classes". But the circulation of these papers has led to talk with people about the territorial system. The Home Rulers were hovering round an idea of Councils from the bottom to the top of concentric circles, the village *punchayats* electing to the local board, the local board to the district council, the district council to the Provincial Council, the Provincial Council to the Imperial Council, and the Imperial Council to the Secretary of State's Council. But the talk about the relative merits of the class system or the territorial system has put them on to the new tack. They have greedily clutched at it, and the latest Provincial Conference proceedings that I have received, which significantly enough comes from the Bombay side, put the territorial system in the forefront of their proposals. It will now be one of their chief political planks, deputations will go home to England after the war to interview M. P.s. Can it be wondered at that I, believing this system to be fraught with danger, should be determined to do all I can to defeat it? I have failed to convince my colleagues who come from England, and I must put forward even greater efforts to convince the Home Government.

I am sure that Your Excellency will see that my Minute must go far beyond any phrase in the despatch. Suppose, for example, that I withdrew my dissent altogether, how would the matter stand? It would be like this.

The Indian Member of Council warmly supports territorial constituencies, the rest of the Government of India are not actually opposed to the system, in

fact, most of them think it *primá facie* the more suitable. The Congress and every political party will now press it upon the Secretary of State, for they know that it will be the method best calculated to benefit their own class, and to fill the Councils with their champions. What is likely to happen? What else, but that the Secretary of State will accept it? Perhaps it will only be to the partial extent recommended in the despatch. But what follows next? Lord Willingdon will jump at the liberty given him. His Indian colleague will support him; even if his other colleagues hold out, it will soon become public property that the enlightened Governor from England is a warm supporter of the system and it is opposed only by the "prejudiced bureaucrats" of his Council. Who is likely to carry the day? In any case Lord Willingdon will have the casting vote. It then comes up to the Government of India. They cannot go back on their despatch even if they would, and Bombay gets the system. How is the claim to be resisted if the other Governments stand out? Bombay city may be *sui generis*, and Bombay city could be distinguished logically from other places, but there is nothing to distinguish the Presidency outside Bombay itself from hundreds of other districts in India. What possible arguments can you point to when political agitation concentrates upon this question? Is there any man who can say that a case could be made out for giving to Poona and Ahmedabad a system which you deny to Lahore and Cawnpore? Districts like Satara, Nasik or Sholapur could not be held suitable for this system, and districts like Allahabad, Patna and Nagpur be held unsuitable.

If I were to withdraw my dissent I should be untrue to my trust and I should never forgive myself. But if I dissent at all, what object is served by putting up a feeble case merely indicating my personal disapproval. After all, how does my dissent weaken the despatch as a whole? I agree to all the proposals, I agree to an elected majority though not a large one, I agree to a liberal extension of the franchise, I agree to an additional Indian Member on Provincial Executive Councils, and I join in the hearty hope that the United Provinces will get its Council soon. All I say is, do not alter the constitution of the electorates on the class system, and go in for large elected majorities until you can feel certain that the balance of power between class representation will be secured. Is there anything unreasonable in this?

I hope very much that Your Excellency had no such idea in your mind that I should water down my Minute beyond correcting any overstatement of the attitude of my colleagues. If so, this long screed will be inflicted upon you for nothing. But if you had in your mind a suggestion that I should content myself with a brief statement of disapproval, merely remarking that I thought it unwise and without arguing the points from the beginning, I hope Your Excellency will pay due regard to the considerations which I have urged in this letter. It is not a case of mere apprehension, it is to my mind an absolute

certainly that if the changes proposed are extended to one Government, they cannot be refused to others. It will be quite illogical and unreasonable to refuse them merely because this or that Governor or Lieutenant-Governor did not like them. The matter is one to my mind of such great importance that I must fight it to the last. The original note that Hill showed me that he had prepared for Lord Willingdon contained a statement that he would like to propose two Members for each district. He did not do so, because he was doubtful whether many districts could produce a suitable man to sit in a Council. Can you imagine any confession more damaging to the case he is supporting? No one would have ever thought of departing from the class and interest system before, and if Meyer had not accepted it, I imagine that it would have dropped at the very beginning. But Meyer's contact with things in the country is old and dim, for he told me the other day in support of his acquaintance with Finance that for the last 20 years he had been in Financial Secretariat. Lowndes' acquaintance with India is practically confined to Bombay. The whole of the agitation, as it will be, has been entirely set on foot by the unhappy happy thoughts of two or three men.

Yours very sincerely,  
(Sd.) R. H. CRADDOCK.

*P. S.*—I enclose with this the note with which I received back my draft prepared for S. N. For curtness after all the trouble I took it really takes the cake. But I am not discouraged. I bearded him again when he came to office, and he is now going to show me his own toned down Minute tomorrow and invite suggestions. He still wants to state the Congress grievances, but is prepared to put in as strong an expression as I like of his rejection of them. Except for the time lost, and the rudeness (unintentional) with which I have to put up I find the game interesting. I still hope for success.

R. H. C.

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No. 58.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Tel. P., No. 1858, 26th October 1916, 7-30 p. m. (Recd. 27th, 2 p. m.)

*Private.* Legislative Council Memorandum. Please see your private telegram of the 24th instant. Following is from Lucas for Maffey :—Lord Hardinge wishes to alter slightly wording of paragraph about his views, and final reply to telegram quoted above must await Lord Chamberlain's return on Monday from temporary absence. In the meantime it would be helpful if you would

telegraph a précis of the remainder of proposed communiqué if there is any other poignant substance in it. Possibly it contains nothing but necessary introductory clause to words quoted. It would be helpful to know this if my assumption is correct.

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No. 39.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR REGINALD CRADDOCK, K. C. S. I., Member of the  
Viceroy's Council.

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*Simla, October 26th, 1916.*

MY DEAR LOED CHELMSFORD,

I am, I am afraid, peppering Your Excellency with daily letters.

I am now enclosing a revised proof of the despatch as we passed it in Council. I have marked in red pencil the passages in paragraph 48, one under head (3) and the other at the end of the paragraph. All my Colleagues have accepted those passages and I hope Your Excellency will be able to accept them likewise.

I could only add a hurried postscript to my letter yesterday regarding S. N.'s attitude. I am expecting his new version of his Minute today, and he promised me yesterday that he would include in it any expression, however strongly I may put it, of his personal disclaimer regarding the grievances to which he wished to draw attention. He thinks that we have not in our despatch laid sufficient stress on grievances of this nature which are voiced by the Congress, and that their existence has a bearing on the case for our political advance, and requires us to go further than the despatch contemplates. I hope to see today what his toning down, as he calls it, has effected.

I took some pains and trouble over drafting a Minute for him which I think put his case more reasonably than he is likely to put it himself, but I can quite understand his preference for using his own language and I shall see what I can do with him today. The difficulty is that when you persuade him is to a fit of reasonableness one day, by the next he has, whether after consultation with outside influence or not I cannot say, changed his mind, and one has to begin the whole process over again. In the course of conversation he will make a number of statements of the most satisfactory nature, but by the next day he has apparently forgotten them all and you cannot hold him to them. All the same I think he means well, he knows hazily what it is he wants to express, but has some difficulty in formulating his own ideas.

Hill approached me yesterday as to whether he could be of any assistance. I said that I thought at this juncture it was better not to have too many people

buzzing about S N. He has already had a bee in the shape of Sir George Barnes and a wasp in myself. I said to Hill that if I as his principal antagonist failed to get him round, I would be very glad if Hill as his nearest supporter took him on, but that I would sooner await events for the present.

The whole thing is very unfortunate. It interferes with my own work and the days are passing by. I am myself leaving on the 31st and the rest of us are dispersing very shortly, but if we succeed in bringing S N. round to something tolerable, I shall not feel that my time and trouble have been thrown away. I have not for a moment lost my temper with him, though I must secretly admit that he is very aggravating and tries one's patience sorely. I will report progress again later on.

As regards my own Minute, I have done my best to make it contain a correct appreciation of the opinions expressed in the despatch. I have sent it as corrected to Sir George Barnes for his criticism on this point, and when I receive it back from him I will forward it to Your Excellency, and I hope that it will meet your views.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd.) R. H. CRADDOCK.

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No. 40.

Private Secy. to Viceroy to the Hon'ble Sir R. Craddock, Simla.

Telegram, Viceroy's Camp, 27th October 1916.

Viceroy approves draft despatch.

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No. 41.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR REGINALD CRADDOCK, K. C. S. I., Member of the  
Viceroy's Council.

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*Simla, October 27th, 1916.*

[ Private. ]

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I think even with all your other preoccupations you will prefer me to keep you up to date with the progress of discussions with S. N.

Yesterday was a Hindu holiday so S. N. did not come to office, but I managed to extract from him with some difficulty a revised version of his Minute. It is obvious to me that further verbal discussion with him is useless.

He will at the end of it appear to be giving in, but on the next day he will be back on his old positions. In the course of discussion he has really let the cat out of the bag. He says what is the hurry about the despatch? The elections my result in a new Secretary of State, Holderness will retire before long, until the war is over nobody is going to consider the proposals. He is also very frightened of my Minute which he says destroys his case. I have no doubt whatever that his advisers behind the scene are urging him to stick to his guns, in the hope that by doing so the consideration of the despatch will be put off until November, that the few days then available will not permit of its disposal, and that it will stand over indefinitely, be pushed aside in the pressure of the Legislative business after your return from your long tour, and that when it is eventually submitted it will be without my Minute, as I shall have left the Government of India. That I think is the position for which he is working, and I do not think that his desire should be gratified.

I have therefore resolved to put the case to him in the shape of a letter containing the gist of our discussions. If he is moved by the arguments and withdraws his Minute or turns it into a note well and good. He will give me the trouble of drafting his case for him and I will not grudge that. If, on the other hand, he sticks to his guns and insists on the despatch being accompanied by his Minute, then I would advise Your Excellency most earnestly to let it go on with his Minute and with the addition of a small paragraph at the end of our despatch which I shall prepare for your consideration.

I imagine that, when you said that you would not forward the despatch, you were frightening S. N. Whether we send the despatch now or not, we must send one some time. We shall receive memorials from the Congress and Moslem League and we cannot postpone the question. We shall be playing the agitators' game by doing so. On the other hand, if we put a small paragraph at the end of the despatch and add as Appendix IV to the despatch Sinha's speech at the last National Congress, we shall absolutely spike S. N.'s guns. No one at home is going to hold that S. N. commands more authority among Indians than Sir S. P. Sinha, and I think that our despatch represents exactly what Sir S. P. Sinha advocated when he was speaking not as an official, but as President of the National Congress and addressing an audience which contained a very large proportion of extremists. We do not at all need a long paragraph to put matters in the right light, and the only person discredited, if S. N. sends his Minute, will be S. N. himself. It remains to be seen what reply S. N. sends to me, but I hope you will approve the course that I have adopted.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd.) R. H. CRADDOCK.

P. S.—Sir George Barnes thoroughly agrees in these recommendations.

[ENCLOSURE TO THE FOREGOING LETTER.]

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TO THE HON'BLE SIR C. SANKARAN NAIR, *Kt.*, C. I. E., Member of the  
Viceroy's Council.

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*Simla, October 27th, 1916.*

MY DEAR SIR SANKARAN,

Many thanks for sending me the revised edition of your Minute. I am afraid that it is still open to the disadvantages that attached to the earlier edition. I think it well to summarise to you the general gist of our discussions and to put before you certain considerations.

2. The despatch rests upon the foundation of a strong conviction in India's loyalty, and of her firm belief in the justice of British rule, and in the good intentions of the British Government and of its officers towards her. It dwells upon her support to the Empire during the war, and discounts the effect that might otherwise attach to sinister movements like the Ghadar conspiracies, Bengal anarchy, Pan-Islamism, and extreme agitation of all kinds. But it recognises that the country is progressing, that educated Indians seek an outlet for their energies, and desire to take a greater part in the administration of the country and generally to assist in shaping the policy of the Government. The desire of the despatch is to meet the reasonable aspirations of great Indians like Sir S. P. Sinha, and it accordingly proclaims a goal for the first time in India's history, and states the steps in advance that are considered wise. It contemplates elected majorities in the Provincial Councils, and a large extension of the franchise, but it adopts a neutral and permissive attitude towards the size of those elected majorities, and towards the adoption of electorates on the territorial system, and leaves these two matters to Local Governments. Only as to this neutral attitude do you and I differ from the rest. I want to have elected majorities on the present system of electorates, though with an enlarged franchise, but without any immediate material expansion of the Councils. You are not disposed to insist upon very large Councils, but you wish to insist upon the adoption of territorial electorates. You also desire to go further and to remodel the Imperial Legislative Council, to give larger powers to the Provincial Councils and, as anybody reading your Minute would conclude, to confer what is almost self-government in the immediate future.

I have every right to give my reasons for being a little more cautious than the rest of my colleagues. You have every right to state your view that your colleagues ought to be bolder. Both these views represent, each in their own way, legitimate and reasonable differences, and temperate and reasonable



statements of our views from both of us will not imperil the general harmony of the despatch. In fact, by balancing each other they may possibly encourage the authorities in England to adopt the middle course which His Excellency and four of our colleagues recommend.

My Minute may be expressed in forcible language, but it is strictly confined to the reasons which have led me to hold my opinion, and these reasons have no bearing upon anything else in the despatch, they do not alter in any way the picture drawn of India's loyalty, nor do they weaken its other numerous proposals.

3. Now you are perfectly entitled to give your reasons for the views that you hold. You think that it is safe to go further. I ventured to draft for your consideration a statement of each of your principal requests, and the reasons that led you to make them. You admitted to me that this draft accurately stated your views, and that you took no exception to the way in which the case was put. I quite recognise that you may have a very natural preference for expressing yourself in your own words, and I only drafted for your consideration a rough statement of your case in a form that I honestly believed represented your views and would give them the best chance of an attentive consideration. But our last discussion on Wednesday has made it clear to me that you want to base your case not merely on the merits and capacities of your countrymen, but on the grievances from which the people at large suffer, and the necessity of removing these grievances. Also you believe that it is only by granting an immediate measure of self-government that this discontent stands any chance of being allayed. I am quite willing to draft a paragraph containing even that point of view in a form which would not be provocative (in fact, I enclose such a specimen paragraph with this letter), but I cannot undertake to express all the arguments and illustrations which you give in support of your views.

4. I have in conversation tried to point out to you that your Minute would, in my honest opinion, prejudice not only the additional reforms that you ask for, but might even jeopardise those which are recommended in the despatch; and I should like to put to you the considerations on which I base that opinion—

(i) Your Minute gives as the justification for the reforms not the loyalty of India and her peaceful progress, but the almost universal discontent of the people. In fact, the Minute goes far to corroborate the German view that India is seething with discontent, and deduces therefrom that unless we put much larger powers into the hands of the Legislative Councils, we shall be faced with something worse. Now there is something minatory in this presentment of the case. Englishmen do not like to be threatened, it puts their backs up. Your Minute of course contradicts the whole presentment of the despatch in which it is contended that general discontent is confined to a very small

section of the community, and to the immature who are beguiled by extremists. The two presentments of the case are therefore mutually destructive.

(ii) Your own attitude, as shown in the Minute, becomes rather equivocal. The first two pages of your Minute state your own views, though it is not quite clear to me whether by "the people" you mean the educated few or the ignorant many. At the bottom of page 2 you proceed to a recital of eight specific grievances, and you preface that recital by saying—"I do not assert, and it is not necessary for me to do so, that the grievances in connection with the matter are not exaggerated or even groundless", but you go on to say that all leading Indian politicians, past and present, affirm their reality, and that the people throughout the country believe in them. You yourself have been a President of the National Congress, and although at this moment you have accepted office under the Government of India and are therefore an official, you cannot exclude yourself from the category of past Indian politicians. This is an equivocal attitude if you will forgive my saying so. All that it amounts to is this, that, granted for the sake of argument that these grievances are groundless, they yet are felt; but you leave it entirely open to your readers to infer either that you do believe them or that you do not believe them. I understand your reticence on this point, because if you said that you believed the grievances to be groundless, or at least grossly exaggerated, you could hardly ask the British Government to go beyond the recommendations of the majority of the Council and give wide powers merely for the sake of grievances which are groundless, and which therefore cannot be removed. One cannot remove non-existing grievances. Obviously the fact that you state all these long string of grievances, and that you base your own case for further reforms upon them, must lead your readers to draw the other inference from your Minute, and to hold that you believe about 9/10ths of them to be true, or you would not make them the ground for more drastic reforms.

(iii) Apart from any analysis of the form of words you have adopted, the whole of political India would, if these papers should be published, conveniently ignore this little sentence of your's buried away in some 15 pages of print, which moreover commits you neither to belief nor to disbelief. They would take your presentment of the case as a direct encouragement to agitate hard until they were given self-government, relying on the responsible statement of a Member of the Governor-General's Council. Do you really wish this? I regard you as honestly desiring to express the faith that is in you, but if you will pardon candid advice from a friend, I think that all that you will gain from your Minute will be the ephemeral applause of the extremist press, as a champion who defied his colleagues in the Government of India. Do you really think it worth it?

(iv) Except for a warm acknowledgment that we have not allowed Bengal anarchy to stand in the way of reform (and I am afraid that your

presentment of the case goes a long way to show that we may be wrong in doing so), there is not a single word in the whole Minute which acknowledges that your colleagues are inspired by a genuine desire to treat India with generosity, and have done their level best to put proposals forward to remove genuine grievances, to improve the status of India and to give India a goal; there is even not a single word which shows that British rule has conferred any benefits at all on India. I put it to you whether you would be best serving your countrymen in this way. I cannot help feeling that your long training as a lawyer has caused you to adopt the roll of an advocate whose duty is to lay emphasis on every point that he thinks will favour his client, and to ignore and belittle every point that may tell in favour of the opposite party. This no doubt may be the correct attitude for an advocate before a court, but I do not think that as a Member of the Governor-General's Council it is either the correct or the most advantageous attitude for you to adopt.

5. I doubt whether there is any advantage in our discussing the matter further, but I should like now to put before you certain alternatives. They are entirely for your own consideration, and you must use your own judgment and discretion in regard to them. These alternatives are:—

(1) That you should withdraw your Minute altogether, in which case I shall be most happy to help you in putting your case for the additional reforms that you ask for, to the very best of my ability, and with my best endeavour to be strictly fair to you in every way.

(2) If you do not like to withdraw your Minute altogether, I suggest for your consideration that you should put it in the form of a note which will explain to His Excellency and your colleagues the grave dangers that you believe to be involved in withholding the further reforms which you advocate. In that case, I should be prepared to recommend to His Excellency that your note should be sent privately and confidentially for the information of the Secretary of State. Also I would put to you the same offer as in (i) above of helping you in the preparation of a revised Minute.

(3) If neither of these two courses is welcome to you, and you prefer after considering all that is put in this letter, to maintain your Minute, I shall then recommend to His Excellency that the despatch should go forward, and with your Minute exactly as you have put it, and that no alterations suggested by any of us should be made in that Minute. But, in that case, I should ask His Excellency and my colleagues to attach to the end of the despatch a paragraph which will explain to the Secretary of State why we consider that these alleged grievances are irrelevant to the present issue and on what basis our opinions are founded.

6. I am bound to keep the Viceroy informed of the result of discussions that I have had with you with his full consent, and I am therefore sending His Excellency a copy of this letter. You mentioned to me that you

thought there was no great hurry about the despatch, and that you understood that His Excellency had postponed its further consideration till we all meet in Delhi towards the end of November. It is quite true that at the last meeting of Council, when confronted with your Minute, it was impossible for His Excellency to do otherwise, but I am representing correctly the views both of His Excellency and of all my colleagues when I say that it was a most grievous disappointment to all of us, when we thought we had got the whole matter settled, to find the case held up for reasons that this letter makes plain to you, and I have His Excellency's full authority for saying it that the sooner the matter is settled and the despatch sent on its way the better will he be pleased. Please accept my assurance that I am inspired in this matter by the friendliest of feelings, and that I will not for a moment press on you any one of these alternatives, but I should be glad of a very early answer.

I am leaving on tour in three days' time, and if you should adopt either of the two former alternatives, I should like to give the assistance that I have offered before I leave.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) R. H. CRADDOCK.

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In framing the proposals contained in the despatch, I do not feel that my Hon'ble Colleagues sufficiently recognise the weight that must attach to various grievances that are felt by the people and voiced by the National Congress and other political associations. It is far from my intention to endorse these alleged grievances or to assert that they are well founded. In the first place, they suffer from over-generalisation, individual instances of grievance are multiplied and magnified as if they were the universal rule. In the second place, many of them are doubtless unavoidable under any system of Government. But however slight the foundation of fact on which they rest, or the grain of truth which they contain, they are felt as grievances, and their existence is believed in by a large number of people and voiced in many assemblies and in the columns of the press. Many of the educated leaders believe them and try to impress on the people that, if the popular voice had more play in determining the policy of the Government, these grievances would be redressed. The grievances may be wholly imaginary, or grossly exaggerated, but the feeling that they exist is a feeling to be reckoned with, and I do not myself think that that feeling will have received sufficient recognition if the progress now to be made goes no further than the recommendations of the despatch. It is for this reason that I feel obliged to differ from my colleagues and to state my opinion that the reforms advocated will not suffice to satisfy legitimate aspirations and remove all cause for discontent.

No. 42.

TO THE HON'BLE SIR REGINALD CRADDOCK, K. C. S. I., Member of the  
Viceroy's Council.

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*Viceroy's Camp, October 27th, 1916.*

DEAR SIR REGINALD,

Thank you so much for all the trouble you have taken. I telegraphed my approval tonight of the amendment. Please don't mistake my attitude to your minute. All that I meant was that you put your point so strongly that it threw up into vivid relief the rather colourless advocacy, in the despatch, of the territorial basis of franchise. Your amendments, however, now put that right and we shall not have, I hope, any more dissenting minutes.

I hope Sankaran Nair will get his completed quickly, so that we may get our despatch off. I am afraid we have a difficult four years of him before us.

Very sincerely yours,  
(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.

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No. 43.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. C-8, Viceroy's Camp, 28th October 1916.

*Private.* Legislative Council Memorandum. Your private telegram of 26th instant. The following is for Lucas from Maffey. A summary of the commencement of the communiqué is as follows:—

*Begins.* In view of impression created by statements in the Press that Memorandum follows the lines of a note or despatch forwarded by Lord Hardinge to Secretary of State, the Government of India think right to say that no despatch of this character was sent by Lord Hardinge's Government and they are further authorised by Lord Hardinge to say..... *Ends.*

Here follow words already telegraphed with addition at end of words "to Secretary of State or Premier".

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No. 44.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR REGINALD CRADDOCK, K. C. S. I., Member of the  
Viceroy's Council.

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*Simla, October 28th, 1916.*

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I send you a copy of the reply which I have just received from Sir Sankaran Nair to the letter of which I sent you a copy by this morning's post.

You will see that my efforts have not met with success, any more than those of Sir George Barnes and Mr. Lowndes.

I showed my letter to Sir Sankaran, to Sir James DuBoulay before I sent it, whose great experience as Private Secretary to Lord Hardinge made him a very trustworthy critic who would point out to me any expressions which appeared not to be justified. Sir James DuBoulay had read the proof of S. N.'s revised Minute as well as the despatch and my Minute of Dissent, and he informed me that he could suggest no change whatever in my letter.

I had not the draft of my letter with me when I spoke to Sir George Barnes, but I explained the purport to him and he entirely agreed that it was a wise thing to address him in the manner that I explained. I doubt whether the letter which S. N. has now written to me, a copy of which I have enclosed, is his own composition. It does not read to me like it, and I do not believe that the wording is his.

In regard to his rejection of all the three alternatives mentioned in my letter, he appears to have overlooked that so far as he is concerned, he has accepted the third, and that the latter part of the third alternative is not his to determine. I am sorry that I have had no success, but I feel sure that contrary pressure is being put upon him, and that his mind is so suspicious and credulous that he is firmly convinced that he is only doing his duty. I can assure you that my failure has not been due to any want of trying.

In these circumstances, I enclose for Your Excellency's provisional approval a draft of the paragraph which I think should be added to our despatch and which I hope does not contain anything which cannot be said about a man who, however obstinate and perverse we may regard him, is still a colleague of ours. There is nothing in the draft paragraph which can be said to impugn his sincerity. We are bound to repudiate forcibly the picture of the situation which he draws. I have asked for Your Excellency's provisional approval only because as indicated in his postscript he is still touching up his Minute with minor alterations. I do not suppose that these will in any way affect the argument of the proposed new paragraph.

I am starting on tour on the 31st and shall spend the 1st and 2nd in Delhi, and in case Your Excellency has any time to spare, which I am afraid will be rather doubtful, I could come to see you then. I shall wait till I learn Your Excellency's views before circulating the draft paragraph to my colleagues.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd.) R. H. CRADDOCK.

opinion above mentioned, and I am in favour of the extension of the powers of these legislative bodies as well as of the revision of their constituencies. I do not myself think that there is anything in the history of the Councils to indicate that they are likely to embarrass the Government, but if such a tendency should hereafter disclose itself, then there is always the power of veto residing in the Head of the Province to prevent untoward consequences arising from my injudicious action by the Councils. I would therefore recommend that, subject to that veto, resolutions carried by a majority should receive the same weight as attaches to resolutions carried in the British Parliament. As matters of Imperial importance are necessarily excluded from the purview of these Councils, I do not myself see that there is any serious risk of embarrassment to Government by the adoption of the course that I recommend.

5. To turn now to Provincial Executive Councils, the recommendation that the Councils of the Heads of the Provinces should contain an equal number of Europeans and Indians has my warm concurrence, and I feel sure that the proposal will be most gratefully received by Indians as holding out to them better prospects of introducing their own points of view into the policy of the administration than they have hitherto enjoyed. This would, however, leave to the Head of the Province the sole responsibility of deciding all questions upon which his European and Indian colleagues were at variance; and I think that in these circumstances Indians generally would feel more confidence in the impartiality of an arbitrator, who was drawn from the ranks of English public life, than of one who had spent his life in India as a member of the Indian Civil Service. If the former took the side of his European colleagues it would be felt that his decision was at any rate not coloured by any prejudice favouring the service to which he belonged, or resulting from the training that he had received. Cases in which the former might overrule his Indian colleagues would thus not give rise to the distrust and suspicion which a similar decision by the latter might often occasion. I do not wish to suggest that a Lieutenant-Governor is necessarily influenced by his previous training, or has no desire to be other than impartial, but the same decision, formed on the same grounds, would carry with it a greater sense of impartiality if the authority deciding were a Governor from England than if he were a Lieutenant-Governor drawn from the Indian Civil Service. It is for this reason that I feel a strong preference for a system of provinces administered by Governors from England over a system of Government by Lieutenant-Governors and I should like the system of Governors in Council extended to all important provinces in India.

6. The despatch deliberately excludes the Imperial Councils, Executive and Legislative, from the scope of the present reforms. I do not wish to ignore the important differences which exist between the business before the

Imperial Council, and that transacted in the Provincial Councils, but I think that there would be something wanting from our reform proposals, if these Councils were left entirely as they are.

7. In respect to the Imperial Legislative Council, I should like to see one half of its strength composed of elected Members, and as this half would include representatives of European interests, the Executive Government need not be exposed to the risk of defeat except in the rare case of a solid non-official combination against it. With the very varied representation that must find a place upon the Imperial Council this contingency must be regarded as remote; but if it did occur, it would certainly afford very strong ground for the belief that the Government was in itself in error. If the Indian element on the Imperial Council can be strengthened in the way that I have suggested, their solid vote in favour of any proposed action would not only give that element more weight than it enjoys at present in determining the financial and administrative policy of Government, but also more influence in the eyes of the British public, if it expressed its disapproval of the policy followed by the Secretary of State.

8. In regard to the Imperial Legislative Council, I should of course like to see the same model adopted as that recommended for the Provincial Executive Councils, by which the Viceroy, like the Governors of Provinces, should have an equal number of European and Indian colleagues, but again I recognise that the interests committed to the Imperial Council as emphasised in the despatch, may often be so vast and so complex that it would be premature for me to press for so important a change in its constitution at a time when the admission of Indians at all to the inner counsels of the Supreme Government is itself of so recent a date. In these circumstances I should be content that the reform scheme should merely provide for the inclusion in that Council of a second Indian Member, and I would not insist upon room being found for him on its present strength, but would be satisfied by the addition of another seat so as to permit of his inclusion.

While I desire to acknowledge the courtesy and fairness with which I have always been treated by my colleagues, I feel that the responsibility of representing the Indian view over so large a country, and in respect of so many creeds and communities, is more than can be discharged by one man in a Cabinet of eight Members.

These are the directions in which I advocate still further reforms, in addition to those recommended in the despatch.

Even from my comparatively short experience of the Government of India I feel that, in the consideration of the hundred and one cases that come before the Members and Secretaries in the course of their daily work, there is greatly lacking a due information of the Indian points of view. I am not so concerned that this information should be obtained by means of a larger



numbers of Indians if holding charge of the Government Imperial Departments, as I am to say that the Indian view finds an opportunity for expression at some stage of the case. This might be secured either by the addition of Indian advisers to the Council without portfolios, or by the admission to the ranks of the Secretariat or more Indians in such capacities as Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under or Assistant Secretary. But whatever method may be found best to secure the desired object, that it should be secured is in my opinion the main consideration.

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TO THE HON'BLE SIR REGINALD CRADDOCK, K. C. S. I., Member of the Viceroy's Council.

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*Simla, October 28th, 1916.*

[Private & Personal.]

MY DEAR SIR REGINALD,

Thanks for your letter, dated the 20th October 1916. I agree with you in thinking that there is no advantage in discussing the matter further. Indeed I wrote to you to that effect, as you will remember, on the 25th instant.

It is therefore unnecessary for me to refer to the various matters mentioned in your letter, including those which passed between us, as you say, in our conversation. I would add, however, that our recollections of the latter are not quite the same.

Many of the omissions in my Minute to which you refer would, in my opinion, be out of place in a Minute of Dissent. Moreover, though I have written a Minute of Dissent, I am at the same time affixing my signature to the main despatch, which precludes me from making separately any such acknowledgments as those to which you refer in your letter. Even if my Minute should, as you indicate, jeopardise the reforms recommended in the despatch, I should deem it my duty to write it.

I regret that I am unable to accept any of the alternatives mentioned in your letter. I am extremely sorry for the disappointment that I may have caused to you and my other colleagues, but I am sure that you will accept my assurance that it is only my sense of duty—mistaken, no doubt, in your opinion—that makes me take up this attitude.

Do I understand you to say that His Excellency has decided that the matter need not wait till the 24th November, and that the despatch should go before that date?

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) C. SANKARAN NAIR.

P. S.—I have made a few minor alterations in my Minute, copies of which will be despatched, as soon as printed, to you and my other colleagues.

TO THE HON'BLE SIR C. SANKARAN NAIR, Kt., C. I. E., Member of the Viceroy's Council.

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*Simla, October 28th, 1916.*

DEAR SIR SANKARAN,

It is always well to know exactly how one stands, and I am glad to know your decision. I shall lose no time in communicating it to the Viceroy.

I did not indicate in my previous letter any decision of the Viceroy, but I had his authority for saying that the sooner the matter of the despatch was arranged the better.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) R. H. CRADDOCK.

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#### DRAFT PARAGRAPH.

In ordinary circumstances we should have ended here, and should not have wished to make any comment upon the further recommendations that the Hon'ble Sir Sankaran Nair desires to put forward, leaving it to you to consider them on their merits. But we think that you will agree with us that his treatment of the subject is such that we cannot pass it over in complete silence. We regret that our Honourable Colleague should have found it necessary to attach to this despatch a Minute which so much partakes of the nature of a manifesto, and to constitute himself the mouthpiece of the many and varied alleged grievances which are paraded by the extreme organs of the Home Rule League, and come to your notice in other ways. If our colleague's views are correct, then the picture of India that we have presented to you in this despatch becomes wholly imaginary, and the entire foundation of our proposals is completely shattered. We need hardly say that we stand by all that we have said in this despatch, and are not in any way shaken in our belief by the pessimistic forebodings in which our colleague indulges. We will not pretend that the administration of this country is free from imperfections, and it is not only in India that individual cases of hardship are inseparable from the operations of fiscal or forest laws, the administration of the police, of law and justice, and the assessment and collection of taxes. It is the constant desire of ourselves and our officers to do all in reason to improve the administration, and we are always ready to seek the co-operation of non-officials when that is forthcoming in any practical form. But, had such cases of hardship been really grievous and widespread, no belief in British justice could ever have established itself over the length and breadth of this land, and we must firmly repudiate any suggestion either that the people at large are groaning under an intolerable burden of unredressed grievances to which the Government and its officers give no heed, or that the transfer of

more power to enlarged legislative bodies will provide the solution for all problems and usher in that millennium which extremist orators are so fond of predicting if only the government of the country were handed over to their care. Our proposals are not intended to satisfy the extravagant ambitions of the extremists. Just as we have not allowed these to deter us from recommending the reforms that we consider ripe and prudent, so also we shall not be driven by them into proposing constitutional changes which we consider unwise and premature. It is to the many loyal, moderate and thoughtful Indians that we appeal. It is our belief that, with this class, our recommendations will command warm approval, and in support of this belief we include for convenient reference (as Appendix IV to this despatch), a copy of the Presidential address delivered by Sir S. P. Sinha at the last sessions of the National Congress at Bombay, to which we have previously alluded. Sir S. P. Sinha was at that time speaking with entire freedom from any official trammels, and his audience included many men of extreme views. There is, therefore, no reason for us to suppose that he found it necessary to understate the requirements of the situation as they presented themselves to him and to enlightened men of the moderate school to which he belongs. As we are unable to convince our Honourable Colleague of the correctness of our views, we must agree to differ from him, but we express our earnest hope that the gloomy phantoms (as we believe them to be), which he has conjured up, will not be allowed to prejudice at least any of the recommendations that we have placed before you, after such long and such anxious deliberation.

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No. 45.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Tel. P., No. 1872, 30th October 1916, 10-45 p. m. (Recd. 31st, 7-15 a. m.)

*Clear the line. Private.* Legislative Council Memorandum. Please refer to your private telegrams of the 24th and 28th October. Lord Hardinge a little demurs to the proposed wording of *dementi* so far as it refers to him. He thinks, in the first place, that it is a mistake in principle that a statement as to views of an *ex*-Viceroy should be published explicitly on the authority of that official. He would, for this reason, like the words "they are further authorised by Lord Hardinge to say" to be omitted from anything you may publish. It is also pointed out by him that he has not seen the full text of the Legislative Council Memorandum, that his notes on reforms, copy of which is in the hands of Ali Imam, for example, would certainly be said loosely to "bear some resemblance" in general tendency if not in detail to some of the present demands. The considerations specified above combine to make him

desire a more guarded wording. I therefore suggest, and Lord Hardinge concurs, that the communiqué should conclude with the following words:—

*Begins.* The Secretary of State authorises the Government of India to say that no despatch of this character was sent by Lord Hardinge's Government, and that these demands do not correspond with the views expressed by him privately by note or otherwise to the Secretary of State. *Ends.*

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No. 46.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR REGINALD CRADDOCK, K. C. S. I., Member of the  
Viceroy's Council,

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*November 1st, 1916.*

[Private.]

MY DEAR MAFFEY,

Just now on the telephone you told me that His Excellency was rather doubtful whether Sir S. N. could be expected to sign the despatch if we added a paragraph criticising his Minute. I replied that he differed so radically from us that it really did not matter much; but I have since recollected that in his latest version of his Minute, and again in correspondence with me he has affirmed his intention of signing the despatch. In that case the best way, I think, will be for us to attach a *postscript* after the signatures, which will be signed by us, and not by him.

We cannot possibly let the despatch go without any comment upon his Minute, and we can hardly expect him to sign the new paragraph. I do not suppose there is any exact precedence for this, but there is no exact precedent for the despatch itself, or for a dissenting Minute of this nature, and we could provide a precedent for dealing with unusual circumstances.

His latest version is still to come, but he was, he says, only making "minor alterations", so I do not expect any such changes as will require us also to change the action which we recommend. His Excellency is very anxious to get this thing off and done with, and so are we all.

I should very much like it if you can get His Excellency's authority to wire to him as follows:—

"Viceroy desires you to send in the final addition of your Minute of Dissent to himself and to your colleagues as soon as you can, as he is anxious to dispose of the despatch at the earliest date possible."

He has clearly shown me that he does not believe that I was really voicing His Excellency's wishes, and harped upon the fact that His Excellency

had himself said that it would be taken up at Delhi and urged that there was no hurry at all in the matter.

Sir Charles Monro may not like to affix his name to the remarks that we have made about the Indian Army, volunteering, &c. Others of our colleagues may see a new light; the changes and chances of this mortal life might cause a change in *personnel* if the despatch gets hung up.

Sir S. N. requires a spur from His Excellency, or oriental procrastination may succeed in hanging up the work. If it is much delayed a great many of the expressions will require some change.

If I can only get his Minute I can finish my paragraph or postscript, and instruct DuBoulay to push the printing through. For example, his previous version of the Minute he sent to Press without any instruction even to regard it as urgent. But I got him to send for his Registrar and ask him in my presence to tell the Press it was wanted *immediately*. If His Excellency will agree to remind him, we may get along.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) R. H. CRADDOCK.

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No. 47.

Extracts from a letter from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 1st November 1916.

5. I now return to your letter of the 23rd September. The first subject with which you deal in that letter is the Memorandum prepared for me by Sir Thomas Holderness, which I forwarded to you, dealing with your papers as to the goal of Indian policy. I beg you to dismiss from your mind any idea that Holderness wrote as a superior person with an implied reproof to an inexperienced Viceroy. That is not at all his attitude. I consider myself in nothing more fortunate than in having found such a man as he established as Permanent Under Secretary in these anxious times, and in having secured his assent to postpone the retirement which he has so richly earned. He is not merely a man of great experience and of a singularly clear judgment, but one of the most open-minded and sympathetic permanent officials that it has ever been my good fortune to meet. I can assure you—and I beg you to accept it from me, since you cannot test it yourself—that in any suggestion which he may offer, his one desire will be to help those whose heavy responsibilities he is the first to recognise, and that he is the last man in the world to feel anything but the greatest respect for any suggestion which comes from you.

You must remember that the enclosures to my letters—like the letters themselves—are unofficial and informal documents. They are often written with no idea that you will ever see them, and they are expressed in language which, whilst perfectly proper as between the officials of my Department and myself, is not that which we should use in any public Despatch, or in which the same officials would write if they were conscious that they were writing for your eye. I send these papers out to you in this form because I think they are often much more informing and much more helpful than a formal Despatch, and because they enable me to communicate to you without prejudice to the ultimate decision, the thoughts which pass through my mind and the difficulties which occur to me. In this particular case, neither Holderness nor I were quite certain of the exact use you intended to make of the formula, but I thought it worth while to draw your attention to some of the difficulties to which it might give rise. I feel sure that, if I had urged in my own person the arguments which Sir Thomas Holderness used, you would not have been offended with me for doing so, and I must take blame if there was anything in the language of the Memo. prepared for me and *not* intended for you which made it unsuitable for communication to you. But I hope that you will not scan such documents too critically, but will allow me to send them to you freely without fear of their giving rise to any misapprehension.

I was myself under the impression that you did not intend to make any public announcement of the goal of your policy. I see that I was mistaken; but I entirely agree with you that I had better reserve all further expression of opinion on the subject until I receive your Despatch.

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10. Thank you for sending me the Memorial presented by the majority of the elected Members of Council. In this connection let me say that I hope that the form of communiqué in reference to Lord Hardinge's proposals which, after consultation with him, I suggested in my telegram, will meet your wishes. He was very reluctant—and I think for good reasons—to be himself called upon for a *démenti*. On the other hand, only two people could know exactly what he had said to me, namely, he and I; and I thought, therefore, that it was best that the *démenti* should be made on the authority of the Secretary of State instead of on that of your Government.

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No. 48.

Private Secy. to Viceroy to Hon'ble Sir Sankaran Nair, Simla.

Telegram, 2nd November 1916.

Viceroy desires you to send in final edition of your Minute to himself and to your colleagues as soon as you can, as he is anxious to dispose of despatch at earliest date possible. Kindly telegraph when it may be expected.

No. 49.

Hon'ble Sir Sankaran Nair to Private Secy. to Viceroy.

Telegram, Simla, 2nd November 1916.

Two copies of my Minute have been sent to you yesterday and a copy to each of my colleagues also yesterday.

No. 50.

Communiqué from the Government of India, Home Department, dated Simla, the 2nd November 1916.

In view of the erroneous impression likely to be created by the statements made in certain organs of the Press that the demands formulated in a Memorandum submitted to the Viceroy by a number of elected Members of the Imperial Council follow the lines of a note or despatch of the same subject forwarded to the Secretary of State by Lord Hardinge, Secretary of State authorises the Government of India to say that no despatch of this character was sent by Lord Hardinge's Government, and that these demands do not correspond with the views expressed by him privately by note or otherwise to the Secretary of State.

No. 51.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR REGINALD CRADDOCK, K. C. S. I., Member of the Viceroy's Council.

*Allahabad, November 14th, 1916.*

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I have just received the final proof of the despatch and its appendices which I asked DuBoulay to circulate at the same time to all my colleagues. I have kept back, however, Sir Sankaran's copy until I have had time to hear from my colleagues whether they wish to suggest changes or criticisms in the postscript at the end of the despatch. I should be very glad if I could receive from Your Excellency any changes which you would like made in the postscript. After the postscript has been agreed upon, I will send Sir Sankaran his copy. I did not like to send it to him with the draft postscript until it had received the imprimatur of yourself and my colleagues. If it is generally approved, nothing further remains but to circulate the actual copy upon which we have to write our signatures.

I also wrote to the Commander-in-Chief on the subject, as I think that he must sign the despatch. I informed him that I had been over the portions connected with the Army with General Bingley, and I also informed him roughly what the attitude of his predecessor, Sir Beauchamp Duff, had been, and I said I hoped that he would see his way to signing the despatch. I told him that Sir Beauchamp Duff was against elected majorities and the territorial system, but that it would be hardly possible for him as a new arrival in the country to strike out any line for himself. If he was for any reason unwilling to sign the despatch, I suggested to him the possibility of attaching to it the smallest possible note to the effect that, as a new comer to the Council and to country, he was unable to express any final opinion on the recommendations. I hope that he will sign the despatch without raising any difficulty.

I have spent a few days in Ranchi, a few in Calcutta, and I am now in Allahabad. I expect to be back again in Delhi by Thursday morning. I hope you have been having a good time on tour.

Yours very sincerely,  
(Sd.) R. H. CRADDOCK.

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No. 52.

TO THE HON'BLE SIR REGINALD CRADDOCK, K. C. S. I., Member of the Viceroy's Council.

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*Viceroy's Camp, November 17th, 1916.*

DEAR SIR REGINALD,

I have laid your letter, dated 14th November, before His Excellency. *Primâ facie* the Viceroy approves of the postscript which you have drafted for the despatch and does not wish to suggest any changes.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) J. L. MAFFEY.

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No. 53.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR REGINALD CRADDOCK, K. C. S. I., Member of the Viceroy's Council.

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*Delhi, November 18th, 1916.*

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

On arrival here I find that some of our colleagues do not quite like the postscript regarding Sankaran Nair's Minute. The alternative revised by Hill



and Lowndes, which I have touched up slightly, is therefore enclosed. They would not demur to the postscript as already printed, but they consider it a little too vigorous, or as Lowndes put it to me "a little petulant". I daresay that, after my long discussions with Sankaran Nair, I may have felt a little petulant. I do not mind which version goes so far as I am concerned. Some of our colleagues also are a little doubtful whether it is wise to put Sinha's speech in full as an appendix. My object for including it was simply that it was the best statement of moderate India that is anywhere available, and also that if this despatch and Minutes should hereafter be published, their readers might not have access to Sinha's speech, but I am content to leave this entirely to Your Excellency's decision.

We are arranging to have a meeting of Members of Council to discuss the war taxation on Monday next and ought to have arrived at some conclusion by the next Council meeting.

Yours very sincerely,  
(Sd.) R. H. CRADDOCK.

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#### REVISED POSTSCRIPT.

We should not ordinarily have wished to make any comment upon the further recommendations that the Hon'ble Sir Sankaran Nair desires to put forward, leaving it to you to consider these upon their merits. But we think that you will agree with us that his presentment of his case is such that we cannot well pass it over in complete silence. We cannot refrain from expressing our regret that our Honourable Colleague should have elected in his Minute to base his recommendations for further reforms upon grievances which find utterance principally in the extreme organs of the Home Rule press in India; more especially since he himself does not assert, and thinks it unnecessary for him to do so, that these grievances have any solid foundation.

It seems to us a matter for some surprise that any large measure of reform should be urged by our colleague otherwise than upon a responsible assurance that the grounds for the recommendation are, in his opinion, well founded. We regret also that it should have been suggested to you, however indirectly, by a member of our Government that these grievances actually exist, and are both widespread and widely felt in India. That they form, and have formed for years past, the favourite theme of a certain class of newspapers you will be well aware; but we believe that their constant reiteration in this way is the only foundation for any general belief in their reality that may be found among the limited class who read these newspapers.

We are also altogether unable to accept the suggestion that there is any general demand throughout the country for the very advanced reforms which

our Honourable Colleague advocates. They are no doubt the cry of the extremist politicians of the day, and are put forward by them as the one and only panacea; but we venture to think that our Honourable Colleague has altogether ignored the far larger, though no doubt less vocal, body of moderate and thoughtful Indians whose views found free expression in the Presidential address delivered by Sir S. P. Sinha before the Indian National Congress in December 1915, to which we have already made a reference in the despatch. We would also leave it to you to judge how far the immediate acceptance of our Honourable Colleague's political programme would be compatible with the maintenance in India of the supreme authority of Parliament upon which Lord Morley laid such stress in connection with the reforms of 1909.

We need hardly say that we do not accept the description given by our Honourable Colleague of existing conditions as correctly representing the feeling of India, and we are not impelled by a perusal of his Minute either to ask for a greater increase of advance than we have proposed in our despatch, or, on the other hand, to draw back any part of our recommendations through mistrust of our own reading of the political situation.

We therefore adhere to all that we have advocated in our despatch, and we earnestly trust that any inference that might be drawn from the dark picture painted by the Hon'ble Sir Sankaran Nair—the correctness of which he safeguards himself from certifying—may not be thought to justify the refusal of any part of our recommendations.

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#### No. 53a.

Extract from a letter from the Right Hon'ble Lord Stamfordham, P.C., G.C.V.O., &c., Private Secretary to His Majesty the King-Emperor, to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 21st November 1916.

You must have had a strenuous six month at Simla, but His Majesty regards the deliberations of your Council upon *post-bellum* proposals as wise and opportune; as the Government of India will have to be prepared to deal with important, and possibly far-reaching, changes whenever the end of the war comes.

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#### No. 54.

Extract from a letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to His Majesty's Secy. of State for India, dated the 24th November 1916.

I must explain the circumstances in which our despatch to you on the subject of *post-bellum* reforms has been delayed. You will remember that throughout my correspondence I have dwelt on the unanimity of Council with regard to our proposals, with the solitary exception of Craddock who always

held out on one point, *viz.*, the territorial basis of franchise which he said connoted an overwhelming majority of elected Members in the Councils. Both Barnes and I were in substantial agreement with him, and, in deference to our views, the proposals were modified to the shape in which you will find them in paragraph 48 (3). This was the general position until we came to the discussion of the draft despatch. Sankaran Nair had accepted everything and suggested no amendments—in fact, he had told us individually and collectively that he would sign. And then, as a bolt from the blue, he announced that he must write a dissenting minute and he produced something on the lines of the effusion which is appended to the despatch. We were all taken aback and pointed out to him that if, as he said, he agreed to the main proposals of the despatch, but wanted to go further, it was open to him to say so, but that it was most undesirable for him to give his imprimature to all the alleged grivances against British rule, which are put forward by extremists, by setting them out *seriatim* in his minute. However, he was obdurate and resisted all argument and attempts at persuasion, and so you will have his minute, setting forth what he says India believes to be her grievances, appended to our despatch.

I do not believe for one moment that Sankaran Nair has done this *proprio motu*. It is inconsistent with his whole attitude to the question during the last six months. I believe myself that he came under the influence of the elected Members of the Legislative Council during the Session, who said to him—“Whatever you do, don’t give us away by signing the despatch without adding a minute of dissent.” And I doubt myself whether he even wrote his minute of dissent. It does not have the stamp of his style. I told you in a previous letter that I regarded him as a timid man and I am confident that in this matter of the despatch he has yielded to political pressure. It is not to be wondered at, but we had all entertained higher hopes of him, especially that he would not have lent himself to the repetition of crude and flimsy charges against British rule, which he admits have no substance, but which he says are widely held.

Well, the matter is now in your hands and we are done with it, but I should like to assure you that it represents some six months’ very solid work, in the course of which we examined many proposals, but we always came back to this—that an advance is absolutely necessary, and that it must take place on the three roads which we have described.

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No. 17 of 1916.  
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.  
HOME DEPARTMENT.

POLITICAL.

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## GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

## HOME DEPARTMENT.

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POLITICAL.

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To

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN,

*His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.**Delhi, the 24th November 1916.*

SIR,

You are aware that for some time past we have had under our most anxious consideration questions of great moment arising out of the part played by India in the present supreme crisis of the Empire, and the recognition which is her just due for the ungrudging services that she has rendered, and the steadfast loyalty which she has displayed. We have now the honour to lay before you the broad general conclusions at which we have arrived, esteeming it to be no less our privilege than our duty thus to represent the cause of India before you, and having the fullest confidence that these representations will receive on the part of yourself, and of His Majesty's Government, that most willing and sympathetic attention for which her noteworthy services to the Empire have given her the right to hope.

2. We need make no apology for the fact that we are placing our proposals before you at a time when the crisis of the war has still not been fully surmounted, and when the conclusion of an honourable and victorious peace may yet be distant. While we recognise that after the stress and turmoil of the war have ceased, the statesmen of the Empire will be for long engrossed both in the complicated negotiations connected with the conclusion of peace, and in the settlement of world and Empire problems of the greatest magnitude, we earnestly desire that the interests of India shall in no way suffer through any hesitation or delay on our part in putting them forward. We wish to emphasise that the future position of India within the Empire is itself one of the most important of these problems, and that no settlement of the relations of the mother country with His Majesty's dominions beyond the seas which fails to take into due account the special position of India, the generous traditions of her princes, and the growing self-consciousness of her peoples, can ever prove satisfactory or enduring.

3. It is doubtless true that among the broad proposals that we are about to lay before you there are several in regard to which detailed decisions can only be arrived at after protracted discussion and consultation between the authorities most competent to advise, and the people whose interests are most deeply concerned, and that in respect of these no immediate announcement will be possible on the restoration of peace. But there are others which admit of early decision, and in the case of all of them we believe that certain principles may be accepted and affirmed, to the great satisfaction of all those in India who are looking for an early sign that the appreciation by England and the Empire of the faithful services that she has rendered will not pass away with the emergency that called them forth. It is for this reason that we have thought it right to press on your attention the expediency of an early decision upon all those matters upon which a decision is possible, so that when the time comes for the public recognition of India's legitimate hopes and aspirations arising out of her support of the Empire during the war, her loyal expectations may not be chilled by any suggestion of tardiness or of a grudging spirit in the announcements that it is finally found possible to give out to the world at large.

4. Before we pass on to a detailed explanation of our proposals, we deem it wise to place on record our appreciation of the situation in India as it has developed since the commencement of the war, and as it appears to-day. Our enemies have done their utmost to persuade the world that India has been throughout the war on the brink of revolution, that the chiefs are disloyal, the educated classes seething with sedition, and the masses in a ferment of discontent. They have done their utmost to seduce her troops in the field, to stir up and support with emissaries and money, as well as by lavish promises of arms, the small knot of revolutionaries and anarchists from which no country in the world is free, and to arouse Muhammadan fanaticism, both within and without her borders, by incitements to a religious war for the protection of Islam. But the support that they have received from the people at large has been utterly feeble and insignificant, and their plots have ignominiously failed.

On the outbreak of the war there occurred that outburst of spontaneous loyalty to the British Crown and Empire, which evoked the gracious acknowledgments of His Majesty and the enthusiasm of both Houses of Parliament, and excited the wonder and admiration of all friends of the British nation throughout the world. Our enemies may endeavour to console themselves with the cynical view that India has acted under compulsion, that the generosity of her chiefs and her richer citizens has been prompted merely by hope of favours to follow, that her army is an army of intimidated mercenaries forced to go where they are ordered, and to fight when they are told, and that the thousands of offers of help and services proffered by men of all degrees, high and low, have merely been the offers of a lip loyalty

professed by a servile people, without sincerity, and inspired only by motives of self-advantage.

We need hardly deign to refute these calumnies, for we have only to contrast the state of things, as it has been and is, with the state of things as it would have been had the condition of India at all resembled that which our enemies believed, or affected to believe, it to be. If their estimates had been even approximate to the truth, not a soldier nor a gun could have been moved from India; on the contrary, we should have been forced to ask for help from England at a time when her resources were strained to the utmost. Instead of this, we have been able to place our troops, our guns and our resources, limited though they may have been, at the disposal of the Empire for employment in every one of the numerous theatres of the war. We were able for a time to reduce our garrison of British troops to the smallest dimensions, and afterwards to accept, in lieu of trained regulars, territorial units and garrison battalions, many of which at the time that they arrived in this country were only partially trained. Our guns and equipment were at times dangerously depleted, and even the small obligatory forces retained were kept more with regard to the dangers on the frontiers than to anticipated disturbances of internal peace.

5. We have no desire to ignore such untoward incidents as the *émeute* of part of the 5th Light Infantry at Singapore, or the disorders in the Punjab which marked the end of the year 1914 and the opening months of the year 1915. These incidents and events caused us much anxiety at the time, but their failure and speedy suppression have demonstrated more clearly than any other argument could how false were the hopes of those who placed their dependence upon the disaffection of India to British rule. In the case of the Singapore incident the mutineers had been subjected to constant preaching of sedition by the returning emigrants from the Pacific Coast and the Far East, and there were local as well as general causes which contributed to the outbreak, but had there been any general feeling of disaffection abroad in the Indian Army, such an incident could scarcely have failed to be the spark to kindle a wide conflagration, and the conduct of these men would surely have been imitated over every cantonment in India. Similarly, as regards the *Ghadar* movement in the Punjab which was engineered by Sikh malcontents from abroad, while we have the greatest admiration for the firmness and promptitude with which the Lieutenant-Governor dealt with the situation, the Lahore trials have given the most conspicuous testimony of the courage and fidelity of the police, and of the true feelings of the people, who not only failed to sympathise with the conspirators, but took an active part in their detection and capture. The fact that scattered handfuls of sepoys, here and there, have been untrue to their salt, and have succumbed to the seductions of a few sinister conspirators, serves but to enhance the effect of the valour and fidelity exhibited by the vast majority of the Indian troops, and is a striking testimony both to the loyalty of the troops themselves and of the masses from whose ranks they are drawn.



6. The entry of Turkey into the war on the side of our enemies caused a serious strain upon the allegiance of His Majesty's Muhammadan subjects. Amongst so many millions of Moslems there are of necessity many dreamers and religious fanatics whose sympathies for Turkey, already aroused by her war with Italy and by the Balkan wars which preceded the present great conflict, were stimulated by the fact that her hereditary enemy Russia was her most prominent adversary, and by the perception that the victory of Great Britain and her allies must almost surely be followed by the disappearance of the ancient Islamic empire from the place among the greater powers of the world which she has for so many centuries occupied. We consider that that strain has been most admirably borne, and we have every hope that the same restraint and support of our cause, which have thus far been exhibited by Indian Muhammadans as a body, will continue to the end. If the vicissitudes of the war, or dangerous ferments and attacks on the North-West Frontier, or deep, though unfounded, anxiety for the safety of the Holy Places, should, unhappily cause a wave of uncontrollable fanaticism to spread over the Muhammadan races of India and lead to serious disorders, it will not be on account of any temporal disaffection towards British rule, but will be entirely due to religious causes which alone could momentarily seduce the Muhammadans from their allegiance. For, apart from impulses of this nature which may at any time carry away ignorant and unreasoning men, the Muhammadan subjects of His Majesty have, as a whole, been singularly free from seditious tendencies. We do not apprehend any such calamity, though religious movements require the most careful watching, and while we should be foolish to be over confident that all risk of any unfortunate turn of events has passed away, we do not feel that such risk as may still exist is sufficient to induce us to keep back our recommendations for the recognition of the loyalty displayed by all classes in India not excluding the Muhammadans.

7. Again, we have no wish to minimise the unpleasant features connected with the anarchical movement in Bengal. This movement in no sense owes its origin to the war; it developed long before the war, and it is likely, we fear, to continue for some time after the war is over. That there has been a temporary connection between the anarchists and our enemies, owing to the feelers thrown out by members of the party abroad and to the desire on the part of Germany to encourage and take advantage of any movements which were likely to cause us some embarrassment, is an undeniable fact. But the German supporters of the movement have already been disillusioned of any hopes that they may have entertained regarding the practical assistance that they might have received from their anarchist allies. The money that they expended has mostly been intercepted or wasted, and, thanks to the vigilance of British consular agents and other officers abroad, and to the protection afforded by the Navy, they have been unable to carry out their grandiose intentions of supplying arms on a large scale to a supposed host of Indian revolutionaries only waiting the receipt of these weapons to rise *en masse*. Even, however,

had they succeeded in landing arms on the coast as they had intended, we feel sure that the small band of conspirators in India would still have failed completely to excite the general populace, or to enlist any support to their schemes. We are far from underrating the seriousness of the anarchist conspiracies in Bengal. They are most deplorable; and they constitute potential sources of danger, both in Bengal itself, and as *foci* whence contamination may spread to other parts of India, but they represent not any deep-seated or widespread dissatisfaction with British rule, but the morbid and malignant product of an ill-digested and ill-regulated education which has turned young men from being singularly intelligent and amenable students into paths of conspiracy and crime. We have been obliged during the war to use stern measures to repress these manifestations, and must continue to resort to them when necessary in the future, but we recognise fully that repressive methods alone will not suffice to extirpate the evil, and we are concerting with the Government of Bengal constructive measures of a remedial nature. The considerable personal daring shown by some of these conspirators, and the feeling that the motive behind them has its origin in a genuine, though wholly perverted, sense of patriotism has no doubt evoked a measure of sympathy even among some of the older men of the educated classes, while among students and school-boys they are regarded in the light of heroes. But there is no popular movement of any sort behind these anarchists. They are cordially disliked by the people at large, and the sort of sympathy for daring which they may gain from the educated classes would give place to serious alarm if any greater success should attend their conspiracies.

Recent instances have occurred in which these so called political dacoits have met with vigorous resistance from the villagers, and an inspiring outcome of these nefarious crimes has been the constancy and devoted courage shown by the police officers of their own race, and of every grade, many of whom have lost their lives from the bombs and pistols of these political assassins. We recognise indeed that there is a dangerous secret society in Bengal—a cancerous growth among the educated and semi-educated youth of that province, which must be extirpated if the body politic is to be healthy; but it is in no sense a popular movement, it dare not come out into the open, and we do not despair that by vigorous repressive measures against the older and more hardened conspirators, and by patient remedial action to improve the system of education, and to divert the energies of young Bengal into healthier channels, we shall succeed, after some interval of time, in mastering this movement, and securing its death from inanition. But the existence of a Camorra in one province in India affords no index of the general attitude of the people towards British rule. Though it may have attracted some thousands of adherents and sympathisers among school-boys and students, these form but an insignificant fraction among the teeming millions who inhabit Bengal; and its existence, greatly though we lament it as a dark spot on the picture, constitutes

in our judgment no obstacle which should deter us from calmly and quietly pursuing those measures of progress which we believe to be just and proper.

8. Lastly, we do not overlook the existence of extremists and political agitators in many provinces of India, who are seeking to make political capital out of the services rendered by the ruling chiefs, by the Indian Army, and by the thousands of loyal men who have worked hard in our cause, and to exploit these services as a basis for their own most extravagant claims. Extremists of this description have their counterpart in every country and every community, but, in India, excesses of speech and writing committed by men of this kind require special restraint. In their hands liberty becomes license, and in an oriental country they may, if allowed this license, succeed in perverting the ignorant and deluding the youth of the land. Indeed, it was in such perversion that the anarchical movement of Bengal had their origin, and the example of Bengal is a sufficient warning to us against too indulgent a toleration of such abuses of the liberty of speech and writing. The right policy in our judgment is, while continuing to restrain extravagances of this nature, to follow an even path of progress, in the assurance that by so doing we shall win and retain the confidence of the many loyal and moderate men of educated India, who recognise our difficulties and realise that advances that are too rapid may end in disaster.

9. We have now reviewed the situation in India as we believe it to be today. The only conclusions that we can draw from the facts that we have set forth is that our enemies within the gate are proportionately very few and that the miserable failure of the efforts that they have made against us is the surest testimony to the staunchness of the people at large. We do not expect to find organised demonstrations in our favour among the vast masses of the population. To them the war is a long way off, and they do not realise their hearths and homes to have been in jeopardy. But even in respect of them our officers have paid eloquent tribute to the many words and deeds of individuals which have shown their devotion to our cause. Humble as well as wealthy subscribers, men and women, have generously and eagerly contributed not only to the large war relief funds, but to such objects as the supply of aeroplanes, motor ambulances and launches, and generally to purposes connected with the comfort and care of the troops. The military censorship has brought to light the spirit of loyalty and of exhortation to courage and patience, until the arms of the King-Emperor shall have finally triumphed over his enemies, that has permeated the correspondence between the troops in the field and their relatives in India.

No one would be so foolish as to imagine that, among so vast a population, there will not be found criminal classes and turbulent spirits chafing under the restraints of civilization, who see in any weakening of control an opportunity for plunder or the gratification of old family feuds and private animosities, but

British rule has been so long established that the innate conservatism of the masses has been enlisted in its favour. Such panics as have occurred, and such fantastic rumours as have from time to time passed through the bazaars, though doubtless fostered by ill-wishers of constituted authority, have been actuated, not by any desire for our discomfiture, but rather by a natural timidity and a genuine alarm lest our arms should suffer defeat. As British regiments were withdrawn one after another in the early phases of the war, much genuine consternation was expressed by men of many classes. Had there been any real or general disaffection pervading the people their departure would have caused not uneasiness but delight.

It has been our policy throughout the war to endeavour to maintain all the appearances of a normal tranquillity, to keep the surface unruffled, and to preserve unimpaired that confidence in the strength and justice of British rule which has ever been the bulwark of the Empire of India. We realise how great is the difficulty felt by men of a reserved and unemotional Western nation in interpreting the working of the minds of oriental peoples, but we are firmly convinced that the heart of India is staunch and loyal, and that the war has brought home to the people, rich and poor, educated and ignorant, consciously or subconsciously, the realization of all that British rule represents, in a way that half a century of peace had entirely failed to achieve. It is on this conviction that we place before you the conclusions and proposals which follow.

10. These proposals fall into several categories. Some are of the nature of rewards for meritorious services rendered, while others consist of changes or developments of policy or administrative practice hitherto followed, with the object of removing grievances material or sentimental which are felt to reflect upon the trustworthiness or self-respect of Indians, and the continuance of which has been a constant cause of complaint. Others again represent the steps forward in political progress that we think it wise to recommend, in deference to Indian aspirations, and in pursuance of the desire to associate them with ourselves to a continuously increasing degree in the administration of their country.

We shall therefore treat these subjects under the following separate heads:—

Rewards and recognition of distinguished services rendered.

Measures designed to remove existing grievances.

The goal before India.

The early advance towards that goal in the domains of  
urban and rural self-government;

larger employment of Indians in the higher ranks of administration; and

general political progress.

The difficulties to be surmounted in the advance.

We cannot entirely avoid all overlapping between these several questions, but we think that some such broad classification will assist you in considering this long despatch.

#### REWARDS AND RECOGNITIONS.

11. We feel no doubt that you will agree with us that the most signal services that have been rendered to the Empire by India have been those of the ruling chiefs and the Indian Army. The princely gifts of the ruling chiefs, the aid of their Imperial Service Troops, and in several cases the personal services rendered by some of the chiefs themselves and their near relations, will ever be famous in the annals of the Empire. It is, however, with the affairs of British India that we are most concerned, and though no record of the roll of India's services would be complete which contained no mention of the distinguished loyalty of the ruling chiefs and their invaluable support the recognition of their high merit falls outside the scope of this despatch, and is reserved for separate consideration.

12. Not less remarkable have been the valour and fidelity displayed by all ranks of the Indian Army in every theatre of war in which they have been called upon to serve. The timely arrival of these troops in France in the autumn of 1914 enabled the front in Flanders to be maintained intact at a moment when fresh reinforcements of trained British troops were not available. The Indian regiments took their place, with their British comrades from India, in the very front of the battle line. In a strange land, and in climatic conditions to them most trying, they were exposed to the strain of the most terrible and scientific warfare that the world has yet seen, against an enemy at that time superior in numbers, in artillery and in every mechanical engine of destruction. The honours and decorations which they have won for acts of valour and heroism are the most striking proof of the devotion and courage with which they fought. They gave the Empire breathing time to gather its resources at a time of great stress and crisis, and their casualty lists show the greatness of their effort and sacrifice. In Gallipoli, Egypt, East Africa and Mesopotamia distinguished Indian regiments have nobly maintained the cause of the King-Emperor, and added fresh lustre to their rolls of honour. To them the conflict has been one of determination to crush the King's enemies, without that full realization of the deadly consequences of defeat which has animated and inspired the men by whose side they fought. The fact that, for the first time in history, men of Indian race have fought on the battlefields of Europe to maintain the cause of liberty must leave an ineffaceable mark on the self-esteem, and on the traditions of the Indian Army, as these are handed down from father to son for generations to come.

We feel sure of your agreement that the services of the Indian Army should not go unrecognised and unrequited, and that rewards to them should hold the foremost place in the recognition accorded to the loyal support of India, when once the present crisis is overpassed.

13 By the rank and file of the Indian Army no mark of approval will be more appreciated than an increase in their pay and pensions. And, similarly to the Indian officers, commissioned and non-commissioned alike, who have long been apt to contrast their remuneration unfavourably with that received by their brethren in civil life, such increases will be most welcome. We are in separate correspondence with you on this important subject, but the close of the present war will afford the most fitting occasion for the announcement to the army of such increases in their pay and pensions as you may be pleased to sanction.

14. The increases that are decided upon will represent material benefits which it is just and right to grant; but the appreciation of rewards of this kind is naturally evanescent. They are at best mercenary in their nature; and they require to be supplemented by other marks of confidence, which appeal more to the imagination both of the soldiers themselves and of the general public.

In Indians the sentiment of heredity is particularly strong; the young are wont to appeal at every turn to the services of their forefathers as their chief claim for consideration, and the deepest concern of the old is the maintenance unimpaired to their descendants of the honours and benefits, comprehended in the familiar vernacular word "*izzat*", which they themselves enjoy. We are now engaged in considering a system of land grants, or military *jagirs*, as a reward to those who have rendered the most meritorious services. Grants of this kind are not only thoroughly in accord with the sentiments and traditions of the people, but they keep alive, as nothing else can, the memory both of the services rendered and of the reward received. In other cases of conspicuous merit we contemplate the grant of special pensions in money, the terms and conditions of which are still under our consideration. We shall address you separately regarding the details of these proposals.

15. The better education of the children of soldiers is another direction in which the Government can well do something to show their appreciation of the services of the army. Hitherto the sons of Indian officers of the army have received no special attention at the hands of Government and we regard it as most desirable that this omission should be supplied. We have in our minds an institution for the sons of officers at which the system of education should differ from that of the ordinary schools. It should aim at preparing its *alumni* for a military career, though its leaving certificate should also qualify for entrance into other public services. The institution that we contemplate would be managed more on the lines of the English public school than on those of an ordinary Indian high school, and the teachers would largely be Europeans. We would not insist upon masters with distinguished university degrees, but would be prepared to draw upon officers of the Indian Army for some of the instructors. We feel sure that some very suitable masters would

be forthcoming from this source, and that the traditions of honour and discipline, which they would inspire, would have a most beneficial effect on the afterlives of their pupils. There would be many questions to be considered, and some initial difficulties of language, site and location to be overcome, before this proposal can take concrete shape, but we think that the foundation and maintenance of such an institution would constitute a worthy memorial to the late Earl Kitchener, and would receive wide and enthusiastic support in this country. This would specially be the case if the "Kitchener College" were to become a preparatory training ground for a higher and more important military career than is now open to the young men of the country.

The last question we shall presently discuss in some detail, but before leaving the subject of education, we would advert to the education of the sons of sepoys. We do not think that it would be necessary to provide separate institutions or special instruction for these, since they can share in the general education open to the classes to which they belong. But the orphan sons of those soldiers who have perished in the war, as well as the sons of those who have been permanently incapacitated from earning their living, and are in straitened circumstances, should receive their education at the cost of the State, and the Government should make it clear to all that the welfare of these children is their special care.

16. The rewards that we have thus far enumerated involve no change in the constitution of the Indian Army. But the war is bringing within the horizon problems of army reorganization which may result in very wide and radical alterations in the existing system, and one of the most important of the questions that will call for early settlement is whether the time has not come for opening to Indians British commissions in His Majesty's army. Such a step forward, although primarily the most striking recognition possible of the services of the Indian army, would at the same time remove a grievance long felt and in many quarters resented; it would also form an appropriate part of the policy of admitting Indians to the higher ranks of the public services. It would, in fact, fall within all the three categories of recognition described in an earlier paragraph.

The removal of this bar before the war might not from the point of view of the Indian army have been received with quite unmixed satisfaction. The present generation of Indian officers and men have grown up in the existing system; they regard with respect and attachment the British officers under whom they serve, and under whose fathers, in many cases, their own fathers had also served before them, and before they would have been ready to welcome officers of Indian race, they would have liked to know what sort of men these would be and from what races and classes they would be drawn. Of the many gallant Subadars and Risaldars serving in the army but few could be found qualified by age and education for selection to the British commissioned

ranks. The question to them was therefore not one of pressing and personal interest; and it is correct to say that, before the war, the demand for commissions for Indians was a great deal stronger from outside than from within the army itself. This has all been changed from the day that the Indian regiments valiantly passed through their baptism of fire on European battle-fields. They have seen how quickly their small band of British officers can be swept away, they have seen or heard that in the French and Russian armies, men of the African and Asiatic regiments may rise to full commissioned rank. They have seen Turkish officers bravely leading their troops in the most modern warfare, and they must ask themselves why to Indians alone this privilege should be denied.

While, however, they have realised their worth—it is well to use plain words to represent plain truths—they have also realised their limitations. While, on the one side, for the first time they have felt the proud privilege of fighting for the very liberties of the Empire, on the other they have realised, as never before, the mighty resources of that Empire, the fortitude and numbers of its men, and its almost limitless capacity for producing guns and all the engines of war. We trust that the time may never come, when serious and organised attempts by enemies within our borders may sorely tempt the Indian troops from their allegiance, but, if unhappily such efforts should be made, the army will know, as it never knew before, the utter folly of any such treasonable designs. The war has, indeed, at one and the same time established the case for the new privilege, and removed one of the old causes of apprehension which for so long has barred the way.

17. On the other grounds for the grant of this privilege we need not dwell at length. The opening of a higher military career to their sons would be welcomed by all Indian fathers who have been connected with the army, by the landed aristocracy, and by many who have attained eminence in other walks of life. By Indians at large it would be welcomed as the removal of a bar which has been felt to be a slur upon their loyalty and capacity. To grant it would be in keeping, to refuse it inconsistent, with the whole policy which underlies our recommendations.

While we advocate unhesitatingly the taking of this step, we do not fail to recognise how many and how great are the obstacles that stand in the way. It is impossible for us to submit to you at this stage any detailed and considered scheme for carrying out this most important recommendation. We apprehend, though we have no information on the subject, that great and important changes will be effected in the whole military system of the Empire as a consequence of the war. From these changes India, and the Indian army, cannot stand aloof. They may have a vital bearing, not upon the principle of our proposal, but upon the methods whereby our object may best be achieved. Further there are social difficulties to be surmounted, and



problems of training to be solved. Even among those who know India and the Indian army best, widely different opinions are held. Some advocate the training of Indian cadets who shall in time completely officer Indian regiments especially constituted for this purpose; others lay great stress on the intermingling of British and Indian officers in the same units. Some advocate the foundation of an Indian Sandhurst; others insist that the training should be carried out in England, as an indispensable condition to its success. Others again would lay stress upon the young cadets of both races being trained together in whichever country that training may take place, in the belief that it is in early youth that they can best learn to appreciate each other's merits and understand each other's idiosyncracies.

18. We cannot yet offer final opinions on these and kindred points of difficulty, but we shall lose no time in investigating these most important questions. We consider, however, that at the time when the grant of this privilege is announced in general terms, it would be most prudent to use words of caution. The efficiency of the army must not be jeopardised by too rapid an advance on untried ground, and the numbers to be admitted must at first be comparatively few, and on a scale that is tentative, until practical experience has shown us how to secure the best material, how best to train it, and how best it may be utilised.

We must not forget that, even in the sphere of civil employment, the present stage of progress towards the free admission of Indians was not reached at once; the beginnings were small, and the process a slow one. In the army the issues at stake are more vital, and the consequences of a false step more disastrous, the need of good leadership is more essential, the disciplinary relation between superior and subordinate is much more strict, and the social intercourse between men of different race in the same service necessarily closer, than is the case in civil life.

It is not by ignoring these difficulties, but by facing them frankly, and by patiently solving them that the best hope of success lies for this new and striking departure that we so earnestly commend to your attention.

#### MEASURES DESIGNED TO REMOVE EXISTING GRIEVANCES.

19. We now turn to those measures which fall within the second of the three categories into which we have divided our recommendations, the removal of grievances, material and sentimental, under which Indians labour. These matters vary considerably both in kind and degree, but they resolve themselves roughly, into two distinct classes, those which wound the self-esteem of India as a component part of the British Empire, and those which appear to impose upon Indians in India itself disabilities harmful to their proper pride. Both these kinds of grievances are closely interconnected, and they do not admit of entirely separate consideration, but, so far as possible, we shall endeavour to distinguish them in the observations that we are about to make.

20. At the outset we would refer you to the resolution passed unanimously by the Imperial Legislative Council at the meeting of the 22nd September 1915, a copy of which, with the speeches of the non-official members and of Lord Hardinge's own pronouncement upon the subject of the resolution, accompanied our despatch No. 7 of the 16th of June last. This resolution asked for the official representation of India upon imperial conferences of the Empire. His Majesty's Government promised, in terms which were publicly announced in the Council by Lord Hardinge—"while preserving their full liberty of judgment, and without committing themselves either as to principles or details, to give an undertaking that an expression of opinion by the Imperial Legislative Council in the sense of the resolution before them would receive most careful consideration, as expressing the legitimate interest of the legislative council in an imperial question, although the ultimate decision of His Majesty's Government must necessarily depend largely on the attitude of the members of the conference".

That is how the matter now stands; and we hope that an early and favourable decision may be found possible. We expressed an earnest recommendation in forwarding those papers that "the interests of India in the Empire, no less than the interests of the Empire in India, fully justify her admission in some definite form to the deliberations of an Imperial Council". We can only leave it to the combined wisdom of the statesmen of the Empire to find a satisfactory solution of the problem. We must, however, express the hope that whatever may be that solution, the interests of India will not be prejudiced by the fact that she is not, and cannot for a long time become, a fully self-governing nation. That very fact indeed constitutes the strongest possible reason why her interests and claims should receive the most impartial and punctilious attention at the hands of the conference. Her vast territory, her huge population, her undeveloped resources, her great potential wealth when once those resources are prudently developed, and last, but not least, her loyal support to the Empire during the present crisis, plead most eloquently on her behalf. It would ill become a great Empire, as it reckons up the sum total of its own assets, to dwell with pardonable pride on that territory, that population, those resources, and that loyal support of India, and then to turn a cold shoulder to her just petition. We can only urge once more that her claim to a hearing be not disregarded.

21. We believe that, outside the ranks of a few men of extreme views, educated India as a whole views such representation chiefly as the means by which Indian interests may be secured against neglect and meet with more sympathy at the hands of future imperial conferences. The fact that men of the Indian army have fought in the battle line side by side with men of the great colonial contingents should, we trust, tend to assuage differences and allay irritation whenever the relations of India with the colonies come under

discussion. Such matters as the admission of Indians into the colonies and their residence therein, wherever such residence is already established, are matters requiring the most delicate consideration and the highest mutual forbearance. In this connection we earnestly trust that restrictions, designed against an influx of labouring men, may be withdrawn in the case of Indians of education and good social position, who are travelling either for study or pleasure and with no intention of becoming settlers. The treatment of all Indians alike, as if they were coolies, is most hurtful to the feelings of a high spirited and sensitive race. We commend these observations to yourself, for consideration by all those who have a voice in the issues involved.

22. It is not only in her relations with the self-governing dominions of the Empire that Indian sentiments require special considerations. In one of his farewell speeches Lord Hardinge looked forward to the day when India should be regarded "as a true friend of the Empire and not merely as a trusty dependant". There are relations also both with the mother country and with the crown colonies in which Indians have felt acutely their position of dependency. On the subject of one of these, indentured emigration, we have already submitted to you our conclusion that the indentured system should cease, and we have asked you to discuss this matter with the colonies concerned. On our side we are working at a solution by which, while the emigration to distant colonies of such Indians as think they can better themselves there might be permitted under due safeguards, the employment there obtained should not carry with it any badge of servitude, or bear any of the ugly features which have grown out of the existing system. We are now in correspondence with the various local governments upon this subject, and shall in due course address you further. We mention this matter therefore only because no statement of the grievances felt by Indians and admitting of removal would be complete without such mention.

23. The grievance just mentioned is one which is partly sentimental in character; but the levy of the cotton excise duties, to which we will next refer, is regarded both as most unjust in itself, and as most humiliating to India, since in the case of other industries no excise duty is imposed to countervail our import tariff. At the same time, too, we are precluded from raising the duty on imported cotton goods to our general tariff level. India's position in this matter is not even that of the trusty dependant of whom Lord Hardinge spoke: it is that of a vassal bound to submit to the will of the overlord if his interests clash with her own. The history of these duties is well known to you, and we need not go into the discussions of the past. The expediency of abolishing them is a subject which unites nearly all non-officials, European and Indian, who would carry with them practically unanimous official support also, if the officials were at liberty to express publicly their own views on the subject. We cannot insist too strongly upon the expediency of removing this grievance

as being a source of irritation and distrust. No enlightened country in these days would ever dream of imposing a special embargo, however small, upon one of its own industrial enterprises, and Indians feel with some justice that their rights are being sacrificed to the interests of a manufacturing community in England, against whose powerful influence their voice is of no account. We feel, too, apart from the question of justice, that the interests of the British manufacturer are in the long run badly served by any fiscal duty which has even the appearance of placing a disability on India's industrial enterprise. Even in cotton manufactures, India, relying, as she must, on a largely preponderating proportion of short staple cottons, can never become a serious competitor with Lancashire in regard to the finer counts; while it is to the interest of British trade and British industry that she should emerge from her present comparative poverty into the fullest development of her industries that her soil and climate, and the capacities of her people, permit. Her agriculture will ever continue to be her principal industry, but as her industrial prosperity increases, her value as a customer of British manufactures will become much greater than it has ever been in the past.

As above indicated, cotton cloth manufactured in India, being mainly produced from yarn of the coarser counts, competes only to a very small extent with the class of cloths produced in England, but Japan has during recent years greatly increased her production of cotton cloth, especially of the coarser qualities, which she is now exporting to India in large quantities. She is thus reaping by far the greater share of the benefit of the cotton excise duty which was originally enacted in the supposed interests of English manufacturers.

We recognise the difficulties with which His Majesty's Government are confronted in coming to an early decision on this question, and we gratefully acknowledge their attitude of readiness to consider the case, along with other trade problems of the Empire, when circumstances permit, as indeed our Honourable Colleague, Sir William Meyer, was authorised to announce when introducing the budget for the current year; but we could not in this despatch omit reference to the extreme desirability of removing a grievance that has been so long and so acutely felt.

24. One further defect, for which Indian public speakers and writers never cease to reproach both the British Government and the Government of India, is the slow development of Indian industries. They point to the wonderful expansion of Japan, and contrast unfavourably the small advance made in India during the same period. This is not an indictment to which we are willing to plead guilty. Whatever degree of truth may once have attached to a charge of unfair treatment of Indian industries, it is certain that for many decades past the Government and its officers have never ceased to impress upon the people by precept, and in some cases by direct or indirect assistance, the necessity of devoting their energies and their capital to the restoration and

improvement of their ancient industries, and to the introduction of new ones from abroad. But the response until lately was, generally speaking, exceedingly cold. We do not, however, seek to blame the people for a backwardness that was mainly due to a lack of capital, lack of confidence, and lack of experience: nor can we deny that Government officers themselves had been brought up in a school which regarded industrial development as the particular attribute of private enterprise. But all are now convinced that India's advance has been one-sided, and that her future welfare depends on the equilibrium being restored by such a development of her industrial activity as shall utilise her great latent resources, give scope to the energy of her workers, skilled and unskilled, and engage the capacities of her best educated sons in occupation of usefulness and profit. Such a policy will help to relieve the pressure on the land, and the present competition for Government service, and for literary and professional employment, which threatens to give a one-sided bias to her educated classes, to the neglect of aims which are equally deserving of their attention.

25. We need not recapitulate our previous correspondence with you on this most important subject, and we are looking with confidence to the help of the Holland Commission (now just entering upon its labours), in order to find the best solution to these many industrial problems and to decide upon the most promising lines of progress. From the scope of that commission's enquiries has been excluded all consideration of future fiscal policy. Greater independence in the financial position of India, liberty to control such matters as protective tariffs for the encouragement of nascent industries, are *desiderata* upon which Indian politicians lay much stress. But the whole fiscal system of the Empire is in itself in the melting pot, and until the future relations of the Empire's trade with her component parts, with the allied countries, with neutral states, and with her present enemies, have been decided, any specific recommendations regarding the fiscal system of India in the future would be entirely fruitless. We can only express the general hope that the place which she occupies in the future scheme will be determined in accordance with her importance both as a producer of raw materials and as a country eager to develop by manufacture her natural resources. We would also urge that she should be allowed a larger amount of discretion in shaping her tariffs with reference to her fiscal as well as her industrial needs.

26. There remain for consideration two grievances which have been a constant theme of complaint in the columns of the Indian press, and are the subject of most insistent reference at all congresses, leagues, and conferences where non-official Indians meet to discuss their present position and their aspirations for the future. These grievances are wholly internal in their nature, and are cognate in subject. We refer to the question of Indian volunteering, and to the administration of the Arms Act. Discussion on both these subjects is often accompanied by much loose talk and confusion of thinking.

The subject of Indian volunteering is one of much difficulty. By statute there is no bar to the enrolment of Indians as volunteers; but in practice such admission has been limited to individuals who have been accepted by officers commanding volunteer corps, with whom the discretion now lies. With a very few exceptions these admissions have undoubtedly been on a very limited scale. We cordially sympathise with the dislike that is felt by Indians at their virtual exclusion from volunteering, but the form in which this grievance most commonly finds expression, namely, that Indians as such are debarred from defending their country, rests, we think, on a misconception.

The regular army of India is constituted to defend her frontiers against foreign aggression, and is also charged with the maintenance of internal peace. That the troops are now mainly drawn from Northern India is due to the belief hitherto prevalent that the greatest efficiency in return for our large military expenditure was to be secured by the employment of martial races from the north. This has been the sole reason for the practice, and it was with no thought of excluding Indians in other parts of India from fighting for their country that it came to be adopted.

The drain upon the present recruiting grounds which the war has caused, and the excellent fighting qualities displayed, for instance, by such Maharatta regiments as are still to be found in the army, have brought into prominence the question whether the area of recruitment might not be greatly extended, and an attempt made to revive the martial spirit among races which, though not of late recruited for military service, are known to have supplied good fighting men in days gone by.

The existing system of reserves for the Indian army has also proved unsatisfactory. The reservists are in most cases either old or of poor physique, and the main dependence for repairing the wastage of war has had perforce to be placed upon young, raw, and hastily-trained recruits. This serious flaw in our military system demands a remedy.

27. These most important questions must come up for settlement when the restoration of peace relaxes the present pressure on the high military authorities, and permits them to devote time and thought to these and other problems of military reconstruction. We should be rash indeed to attempt any forecast now of the probable results of a reorganization of the military forces in India, but a possible outcome might be a complete reconstitution of the volunteer corps which now form part of our military system. These European and Anglo-Indian corps, like the regular troops, and unlike the old volunteers in England, are liable to be called out in aid of the civil power to suppress local tumults and disorders. They had their origin in troublous times, and when the country was disturbed, and, in their relation to the proportions fixed between the British and Indian forces in India, they have been regarded as a local supplement to the British element in these forces.

In these circumstances, it is impossible for us to proceed further now with this much vexed question of Indian volunteering, but we can at least give the assurance that, whatever shape the expected reorganization may take, the right claimed by Indians to be given their due share in the defence of their country will not be disregarded. We do not think that you are likely to disagree with us on this important principle, and we see no objection to such a general assurance being made public when the war is over.

28. The cognate grievance regarding the restrictions upon the possession and use of arms by the people at large, to which we will next refer, has been the subject of much uninformed criticism. The demand for the redress of this grievance is usually couched in the form of a request for the repeal of the Arms Act. But that act is concerned with much more than the mere possession of fire-arms, it deals with cannon, and every kind of munition of war, and with the control over the import, export, transport, sale and manufacture of arms and munitions. The advocates of the drastic proposal to repeal the act are probably unaware that the act itself neither requires repeal nor modification to meet their views. Such relaxations as they desire could be effected merely by modifications of the rules and schedules, and in some respects even by the executive action of local governments. In fact, it is not the act itself that should be the stumbling block in their eyes, but the present method of its administration. By the rules made under the act certain persons and classes of persons are exempted altogether from the operation of certain sections of the act, and the rest are obliged to obtain licenses from Commissioners of Police in the presidency towns, and from District Magistrates elsewhere, if they wish to possess or carry arms. Such licenses may be obtained to carry arms for the protection of crops and human life from wild animals, for the general protection of life and property, and for purposes of sport or display, while licenses for bare possession in their houses may also be granted, and the holders are at liberty to use such arms against thieves or dacoits to the extent that the law allows a right of private defence. The grant of arms licenses of these various kinds to respectable persons of all classes, to meet their reasonable requirements, is regulated by the local officers under the supervision of the several local governments, and is a subject which, to our knowledge, receives from them constant care and vigilance. Those who ask for all restrictions on bearing arms to be swept away can hardly have paused to reflect upon the consequences if their request were to be accepted. They probably have never contemplated what would happen if firearms were to replace bludgeons in the faction fights, the agrarian disputes, and religious riots which figure so frequently in the records of our criminal courts. In the dacoities which occur over the land the weapons that are most commonly used are axes, spears, and clubs, and, except in our border districts, fire-arms are few and far between. In Bengal only, in the case of anarchist dacoities have pistols and revolvers, stolen or illicitly obtained, figured largely in recent years in these serious crimes of

violence. If fire-arms are freely held and freely used throughout this land, overt bloodshed and secret assassination might become a common feature, and the armed police might probably have to be increased to many times their present strength.

29. We hold that, in respect of the general restrictions upon the possession of arms, no reasonable grievance exists that we can find it possible to redress. But it is in regard to the exemptions that we think a real grievance will be found to lie. Some exemptions are common to India as a whole, others are granted by the various local governments on personal grounds, and these latter are more jealously restricted in some provinces than in others. To most of these exemptions no objection is taken by the advocates of repeal, for, in fact, universal exemption is what they claim. But there is one exemption which rankles in the minds of many Indians, namely the fact that Europeans and Anglo-Indians, however humble their degree, are exempted as a class, while many respectable Indians are forced to apply for a license if they wish to carry arms. This purely racial exemption had its origin in the same considerations (to which we have previously referred) as gave rise to the enlistment of the European and Anglo-Indian volunteer corps; and it extended for the same reason not only to British subjects but to all European foreigners and to Americans. We think that this racial exemption at least can no longer be supported. Times have changed; and it was a shock to many to realise that on the day after the war broke out alien enemies were bearing arms without license, under a privilege denied to Indians of good social status and unblemished character. That exemption was at once revoked; but it brought into the immediate arena the vexed question of arms privileges which had from time to time engaged the attention of our predecessors only to be dropped till a more convenient season. We therefore addressed all the local governments on the subject, and suggested to them that the best solution might lie in the total abolition of exemptions, so that all, high and low, Europeans and Indians, might be on the same footing and all alike be required to take out licenses in order to possess or carry arms. The replies of the local governments show that there are great difficulties of sentiment among many classes of men, whose feelings are entitled to our respect, which stand in the way of so sweeping a departure, and we have not yet had time to come to a decision upon this difficult question. But it is the general view that the exemption of a whole class is no longer warranted, and that if exemptions are to continue they should depend, for Europeans as they do for Indians, on office, status, and character, and not on racial distinction. We shall in due course consider further this important subject, and submit our final recommendations for your approval; but we can at once unhesitatingly ask for your agreement to the removal of this one distinction which Indians have for some time past regarded as a stigma of racial inferiority.

#### THE GOAL BEFORE INDIA.

30. We now pass to the third category of our recommendations, those forward steps in political progress, which we believe to be both prudent in themselves,



and calculated to prepare the ground for future advances along the same path when the time for them seems ripe, and as the experience gained may justify. The proposals that we have hitherto made in this despatch are such as we believe will command general acceptance, but we are conscious that we are now entering upon controversial regions in which the opinions held are many and various.

The two questions that we have set to ourselves to answer are, first, what is the goal before British rule in India? and secondly, what are the early steps that should be taken in the direction of that goal?

31. On the first of these questions there are many who doubt the wisdom of an attempt to define—much less to announce—the goal before India, or to penetrate the veil behind which her political future is shrouded. These urge that future political changes are determined by the stern logic of events, and not by the prophecies of statesmen, and they contend that the premature announcement of a distant goal may lead only to greater disappointment and disillusionment than if no such attempt to foresee the future had been made at all. It will, they think, awaken hopes that may never be realised, and provoke anticipations that may never be fulfilled. They fear that, in the long run, such an announcement may be the cause of more unrest and dissatisfaction than if the aspirations of Indians were allowed to rest upon the basis of progress already achieved and the hopes derived therefrom of further progress to come, without any more precise definition of far off aims and ultimate destinations. They point to the natural impatience of the advanced leaders of Indian ambitions, and they do not conceal their alarm lest this impatience should lead to premature and ill-advised attempts to reach the goal by means that may be harmful to the public good, and by attempted short cuts that may only imperil the prospects of a safe arrival at the promised destination.

32. We have not failed to recognise the weight of these objections, and it may be, that if there had been no war, we might have acquiesced in the view that it was right to wait for some time longer before an attempt was made to define and proclaim any goal to which the Government and the peoples of India should alike direct their gaze. But while many of the changes effected by the war are obvious and patent, there are others which are none the less real because they are more subtle and less visible. There are changes in the outlook of peoples which cannot wisely be ignored. By effecting such changes the war has really taken the decision out of our hands.

33. Some ten years have now passed since advance political opinion in India first began to formulate a goal for itself. Some indeed proclaimed a goal of complete independence, others favoured adherence to the British Empire. The congress attempted a goal of "self-government on the colonial system", the Moslem League asked for "a form of suitable self-government". But the Government itself has made no sign. The Royal Proclamations that were issued from time to time by Queen Victoria and her successors on the Throne have all reiterated their affection for their Indian subjects, their determination to

respect their religious faiths, their promises of equal justice to all, their sincerest assurances of solicitude for their welfare, and their fervent hopes for their continued progress and prosperity. They have indeed intimated possibilities of higher trust and higher responsibilities, but they have never proclaimed any final aim of their sovereignty over India, or pointed the way to any definite land of promise.

34. In the third paragraph of their notable despatch proposing the change of the capital to Delhi, Lord Hardinge's Government foreshadowed greater association of Indians with the Government in the conduct of public affairs, and greater delegation of powers to local governments, which they designated by the name "Provincial autonomy"; but the answering despatch of your predecessor, Lord Crewe, contained no reference to this particular paragraph, and made no allusion to its subject matter. Some public men both in India and in England read into the Delhi despatch a wider meaning than we believe that our predecessors intended to convey. The latter no doubt wished to indicate that a withdrawal of the Government of India to a capital at Delhi would be in full harmony with the policy of granting greater independence to local governments, and they pointed out that as, in course of time, Indian aspirations found more satisfaction, it would be in provincial matters, rather than in imperial, that the best scope for their activities would lie. Ambitious Indian politicians read into the paragraph the promise of the very early grant of a provincial autonomy under the popular control, and the passage has been quoted again and again as a pledge that the Government was about to commit its powers to representatives of the people. We cannot support any such extravagant interpretations of the language of the despatch, and while we are in full harmony with what we understand to have been the intentions of our predecessors, the line of advance which commends itself to us in present circumstances is that developed in the ensuing paragraphs.

35. Soon after the Delhi announcements His Imperial Majesty King George gave to the people of India his parting message of hope. We believe that the changed outlook of thoughtful Indians, and the clearer realization by all classes of the people of the permanent nature of India's connection with the British Empire has now made it imperative that His Majesty's gracious message should receive some concrete interpretation. The interpretation must be such as will appeal to the imagination of an oriental people, and will be a beacon light to guide successive generations of Englishmen who are called to assist in the administration of this land, as also all those loyal and moderate Indians, who, while yielding to none in their desire for the emancipation of India from her state of tutelage, are fully conscious of the many and formidable difficulties to be surmounted before the distant goal can be attained.

The desire for a goal of this kind found earnest expression in the notable presidential address made by Sir S. P. Sinha, sometime member of the

Viceroy's Executive Council, at the last annual meeting of the National Congress. No one is better qualified than he to speak on behalf of those loyal sections of the educated community who are not led away by extravagant ambitions to make demands upon us for the immediate grant of powers which they must know in their hearts that they are not yet fitted to exercise. While, therefore, we are prepared to envisage a goal, we will not essay the fruitless task of defining its precise character. The conditions of India have no parallel in the history of the civilised world, and we may search the centuries in vain for any exact analogy. Nor must we raise false hopes in the hearts of impatient reformers. We must clearly indicate how toilsome is the path, and how many the obstacles, and the measure of our sincerity must be judged, not by the qualifications upon which we find it necessary to dwell, but upon the actual steps that we are prepared to take in the direction of our desired destination. We have deliberated long and anxiously over this most vital matter. We have consulted many experienced and competent advisers, and we now, in the passage which next follows, formulate an ideal which we believe will give satisfaction to Indian aspirations without embarrassing the present or future administration of the country.

*The goal to which we look forward is the endowment of British India as an integral part of the Empire, with self-government, but the rate of progress towards that goal must depend upon the improvement and wide diffusion of education, the softening of racial and religious differences, and the acquisition of political experience.*

*The form of self-government to which she may eventually attain must be regulated by the special circumstances of India. They differ so widely from those of any other part of the Empire that we cannot altogether look for a model in those forms of self-government which already obtain in the great Dominions. In all parts of the Empire which now enjoy self-government, it has been the result, not of any sudden inspiration of theoretical statesmanship, but of a steady process of practical evolution, substantially facilitated by the possession of a more or less common inheritance of political traditions, social customs and religious beliefs.*

*British India has been built up on different lines, and under different conditions, and must work out by the same steady process of evolution a definite constitution of her own. In what exact form this may eventually be cast it is neither possible nor profitable for us to attempt now to determine, but we contemplate her gradual progress towards a larger and larger measure of control by her own people, the steady and conscious development of which will ultimately result in a form of self-government, differing perhaps in many ways from that enjoyed by other parts of the Empire, but evolved on lines which have taken into account India's past history, and the special circumstances and traditions of her component peoples, and her political and administrative entities.*

*Our most anxious desire is to see a real and immediate advance made towards this goal, and in the belief that the time has now come when the rate of progress may be accelerated on definite lines, we propose :—*

- (a) To develop urban and rural self-government in the direction of giving greater powers to the local boards and councils, and making these more predominantly non-official and elective in character, while at the same time extending the franchise in the wards or other constituencies by which the elected members are chosen.*
- (b) To increase the proportion of Indians in the higher branches of the public service, and thereby to enable Indians to take a more important part in the administration of the country.*
- (c) To pave the way for an ultimate enlargement of the constitutional powers of the provincial legislative councils—(i) through an increase in the elected element ; and (ii) through a material expansion of the constituencies by which elected members are chosen, so as to bring about a state of things under which they will become more truly representative of the interests of the people as a whole.*

Our formula pointing the goal thus indicates three roads of progress each in a separate domain, and also three conditions which must regulate the pace of the advance along those roads. We now turn to each of these domains, and indicate the steps forward on each road that we think it wise to take in earnest of our good intentions.

#### FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF URBAN AND RURAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.

36. The first road lies through the domain of local self-government, the village, the rural board, and the town or municipal council. In this domain the course was first set by Lord Ripon a little more than 30 years ago, but the advance has as yet, on the whole, been slow. As might be expected, it has been more rapid in the great towns, but it has lagged behind over the country at large. All history teaches that this domain of urban and rural self-government is the great training ground from which political progress and a sense of responsibility have taken their start, and we feel that the time has now come to quicken that advance, to accelerate the rate of progress, and thus to stimulate the sense of responsibility in the average citizen, and to enlarge his experience.

The subject was most carefully considered by the Decentralization Commission a few years ago, and Lord Hardinge's Government made a pronouncement\* upon the recommendations of that Commission, but we have

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\* Education Department Resolution No. 5557, dated the 28th April 1915.

thought it right in the altered circumstances to consider the subject afresh, and to emphasise once more the great importance that we attach to progress in this domain. A subject which ranges from the great municipal corporations of the presidency towns down to the humblest village punchayat in remote rural areas, involves in its examination much minute detail, with which we would not burden a despatch of this length and importance. But in regard to the general principles which should be followed in the development of local self-government we would draw your attention to a memorandum, which was sent by His Excellency the Viceroy to the heads of provinces, and which forms an appendix to this despatch. The main principles set forth in that memorandum have met with general acceptance and we now recommend them for adoption, while, as regards its eighteenth paragraph, you have lately approved\* the general principles which we propose to lay down, so far as these relate to the functions of local bodies with respect to education, and these have now been published. We fully recognise, however, that it will not be possible to make all the injunctions of the memorandum of absolutely uniform application, and we are therefore willing to reserve to the local governments the power to modify their application in specific cases, and for special reasons.

Advance in this domain has always found a prominent place in the programmes of reform which eager Indian politicians are wont to press upon our attention, and we believe that the principles that we lay down in our memorandum are such as will command the approval of all who are interested in the welfare of the country.

#### ADMISSION OF INDIANS TO THE HIGHER RANKS OF THE ADMINISTRATION.

37. The second road of advance lies in the domain of the more responsible employment of Indians under Government. This is a very important line of progress. Administrative experience not only sobers the judgment, and brings with it appreciation of the practical difficulties in the way of the wholesale introduction of attractive reforms, and theoretical ideals, but it will also equip India with an increasing number of men versed, not only in the more humdrum details of day-to-day administration, but in the whole art of government. The services of these men will not be lost to the country by their retirement; on the other hand, they will constitute a source of experience and training from which excellent and tried material for legislative assemblies may in future be drawn.

With the progressive increase in the number of educated young men in India seeking honourable and dignified employment, the question of securing their entry in larger numbers into the Indian Civil Service, and other important public services, has with the passage of time become increasingly insistent. The Public Services Commission of 1886 had opened the door to the development of provincial services in the various departments of

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\* Secretary of State's despatch No. 131-Public, dated the 18th August 1916.

Government, but the progress attained did not keep pace with the demand, both for larger and for more responsible employment. It was in response to this demand that the Royal Commission on the Public Services in India was appointed in 1912. The publication of the report of that commission has now been sanctioned by yourself, and its recommendations should be before the public about the same time as this despatch is leaving our hands.

38. The fact that the whole subject has so recently been under investigation by a responsible body of men representing many shades of opinion, and that their proposals require careful consideration by the local governments and ourselves, precludes us from making any immediate and specific recommendations regarding the reconstitution of the different services, or as to the fresh opportunities which may now be made open to Indians, both for entry into them, and for rising to the higher appointments which they severally offer. In these circumstances we are obliged to confine ourselves to enunciating certain general principles, and we would formulate these for your acceptance in the following four propositions :—

- (1) It is essential to the progress of India towards the goal which we contemplate that Indians should be admitted in steadily increasing proportion to the higher grades of the various services and departments, and to more responsible posts in the administration generally.
- (2) This policy has indeed received recognition in the past, but in deciding upon the further advance that is now possible, the Government possess a great advantage in having at hand the recent report of the Royal Commission on the Public Services and their detailed recommendations regarding these several services. But the circumstances and considerations arising out of the war, and the loyal support which India has rendered to the Empire during this period of crisis, must also constitute an important factor in the consideration of the advance now to be made.
- (3) The public interests no doubt require that the public services shall be filled by competent men, but in pursuing this object, we must have regard, as has been laid down in the cognate matter of local self-government, not merely to considerations of departmental efficiency, but to the training of Indians to administer their own affairs. Full opportunity for Indians to qualify themselves for the more important posts in the public services, and to demonstrate by faithful and meritorious service their fitness for still more responsible duties, must be one of the guiding principles of our administration.

- (4) It must, however, be recognised that intellectual qualifications, combined with physical capacity should not be the sole tests for admission to important posts in the public services. Due regard must also be given to such considerations as character and the hereditary connections of candidates, both with the Government, and with the people with whom their work will mainly lie; while, in the present conditions of India, it is essential that there should not be an undue predominance of any one caste or class.

39. While we have to be content at present with laying down the general propositions formulated above, there is one most important recommendation falling within this domain of advance which we can place before you without waiting for the results of our examination of the Royal Commission's report. As you are aware, the inclusion of an Indian member in the executive councils both of the Government of India and of those provinces enjoying the form of council government was a very important feature in the reforms introduced by Lord Morley and Lord Minto in 1909-1910.

In the case of the Imperial Executive Council we do not at present propose any\* change, but we think that the time has now come to modify the executive councils of provinces, which now enjoy this privilege, so that half the members (not including the head of the province) shall be Indians. In the Presidency Governments of Madras, Bombay and Bengal, the simplest method of effecting this object will be by raising the strength of the council (again excluding the head of the province) from three to four, thus providing for the inclusion of two Indian members. In Bihar and Orissa, and in the United Provinces (where we hope soon to see an executive council shortly established), as well as in all other provinces on which such councils may hereafter be bestowed, we prefer to leave the actual strength of the council an open question for the present, merely predicating the general principle that of the colleagues associated with the head of the province, half the number shall be Indians. This principle would, of course, receive equal application whether the head of the province is given four councillors or two.

#### FURTHER STEPS IN POLITICAL PROGRESS.

40. The third road mentioned in our goal formula lies within the domain of the legislative councils. Of all the various spheres into which our recommendations fall there is none in which a large advance is so hotly urged by advanced political opinion in India, as in the direction of giving larger powers to legislative councils, on the plea that they are representative assemblies which voice the popular will, and therefore that they should exercise not merely influence upon, but real authority over, the will of the executive government. There

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\* Our Honourable Colleague Sir Sankaran Nair is of a different opinion on this point, *vide* his separate Minute.

is also no subject which gives rise to so much difference of opinion, not only among the most experienced officers of Government, but also among Indians themselves.

41. In their origin these councils were first called into existence to form bodies of advisers to the various governments, imperial and provincial, when legislative work was in hand. These advisers were few, and were at first selected entirely by nomination.

The reforms instituted by Lord Lansdowne in 1892 introduced for the first time an elective element into these councils, and gave them the privilege of interpellation, as well as a right to discuss the annual budget, but without the power to amend it.

Seventeen years later the Morley-Minto reforms completely revised the constitution of these councils, by expanding them numerically and by increasing the number of their elected members, as well as by enlarging considerably the constituencies which these latter represented; they added to the right of interpellation by permitting resort to supplementary questions; they gave the right to move resolutions both in connection with the provincial budgets, and on other topics of public interest; and last, but not least, they provided for a majority of non-officials in the provincial legislative councils.

42. Only seven years have passed since these important and far-reaching reforms were introduced, and had it not been for the special circumstances arising out of the war, we do not think that a strong case would have existed for any immediate alterations in the new system, other than minor improvements in practice and procedure which the experience of the last seven years might have suggested. But having regard to the situation developed by India's attitude during the war, on which we have throughout this despatch so often and so earnestly dwelt, and also to the fact that we now propose to lay down both an ultimate goal and the various roads which lead to it, we feel that it would be most inexpedient to adopt a rigid attitude in relation to the demands pressed upon us, and to refuse to assent to any further progress in this third domain of advance.

43. In this domain the main lines of possible advance are three in number :—

*First*, the re-arrangement of the existing constituencies and broadening of the franchise so as to make the elected members more really representative;

*secondly*, an increase in the proportion of elected members so that the council shall contain an elected majority; and

*thirdly*, an expansion of the constitutional powers of the councils.



To take the last point first, it must be remembered that, apart from the right of interpellation by individual members, the powers of the councils are two-fold. In the first place, the council has full control, as a legislature, over the law-making activities of Government, for no Government bill can pass into law without being supported by a majority in the council. And private bills if passed by the council also become law unless vetoed by the head of the province, or by the Governor-General, or, at a final stage, by the Secretary of State. In the second place, the legislative councils can at present pass resolutions, either in respect of the budget or in regard to matters of general public interest. Constitutionally, however, these are not in any way binding on the government: they are requests which can be acted on or not as it may think fit.

We do not recommend any immediate expansion of these powers in the direction which a number of "progressive" politicians desire. We have no wish to develop the councils as *quasi*-parliaments. Nor are we prepared at present to give them anything in the nature of direct financial or administrative control; this may we think come at some later stage of their political evolution, but we have no doubt that the time for such an advance is not yet. There is much to be done in the way of political training, and towards the inculcation of a real sense of administrative responsibility, before any forward step can be taken in this direction; and, above all, it is essential to attempt the task of making the elected members of the councils representative of India in the truest sense. As these are now constituted, the members are returned by such restricted constituencies that it is clearly impossible to suggest that they represent any considerable body of the people at-large. We desire therefore to confine the immediate political advance on this road to what has already been indicated in clause (c) of our formula (paragraph 35 of this despatch), that is, to paving the way for an ultimate enlargement of constitutional powers of the councils through an increase in the elected element, and a material expansion of the constituencies. Our Honourable Colleague, Sir Sankaran Nair, dissents from the opinion expressed in this paragraph.

44. The present constitution of the provincial legislative councils is based upon a system of representation of classes and interests which at present consist of basic constituencies representing landholders, groups of district boards, and groups of municipal townships. The three presidency corporations return special representatives, but, except in their case no individual town or city has its own special member. In two provinces, municipalities and district boards, are themselves grouped together. To these basic classes are added representatives of universities, chambers of commerce, trades associations, and other like communities, the members returned being in the great majority of cases elected, but in some few instances nominated. On these constituencies have been super-imposed certain special Muhammadan electorates.

45. The electoral bodies vary very greatly not only in different provinces, but in respect of different classes and interests, and in many instances the body of electors is ridiculously small. For example, in Bombay, the members to represent the district board and municipal groups are not elected even by the members of these boards and committees, but by a limited number of delegates elected by those members. In no province does the franchise for these constituencies go lower than the comparatively few members who have seats on the boards and committees. Instances of the small constituencies now existing will be found in Appendix II.

The landholder electorates are also in many cases extremely restricted. They are in most provinces based on assessment to a certain sum of land revenue, or in Bengal and Behar road cess, but in some instances, notably in Madras, property and income from land form alternative qualifications.

In respect of Muhammadans, the necessity for devising special electorates, in place of the utilization of machinery already to hand in the shape of existing bodies, institutions, and associations, or by the adoption of standards such as the payment of land revenue, has resulted in the creation of special franchise lists reaching much lower down in the social scale, and in property qualifications, than any of the other constituencies, with a result that in many provinces there are persons with certain property or educational qualifications who have a vote if they are Muhammadans, but not if they belong to any other creed. This system has resulted in serious anomalies which excite the jealous comment of other communities. And there is the further valid grievance that Muhammadans, besides voting in their own special constituencies, also vote in the general electorates, to counterpoise which these constituencies were themselves created.

46. The great varieties of franchise in the different provinces, as well as in the constitution of the actual electorates, can only be disentangled by an analysis of the complicated regulations dealing with these matters in the several provinces, and we do not propose to enter into a minute discussion of them. But it is obvious that, in such small electorates as at present exist, personal inducements, and personal pressure, can be, and sometimes are, brought to bear upon the voters to an extent that is most undesirable. There are also other restrictions in respect to candidates for election which certainly require reconsideration. For example, the requirement, that candidates to represent municipal and district board constituencies should themselves have served for at least three years on such boards, has the effect both of disqualifying certain eligible persons who have for various reasons not taken part in the work of these boards and committees, and also of causing the boards themselves to be utilised for political purposes, and without regard to the class of work for which alone they exist. These are all matters on which there appears to us to be special need for reform,

47. We do not think it necessary at this stage to discriminate minutely between the composition of the actual councils as now existing. In all of them (except in Burma, where the circumstances are quite special, and the Lieutenant-Governor has appointed a committee to consider the question of enlargement of the local council), there is already a majority of non-officials. In some provincial councils this non-official majority has been slightly increased in practice through official seats being left vacant, or by the nomination of non-officials in the place of officials. But the non-official majority is made up of nominated, as well as of elected members, and only in Bengal is there a bare majority of elected members over all other interests. There is a strong demand in "progressive" circles for a large increase in the elected members of these councils, and it is contemplated, in the schemes put forward by political associations, that elected majorities should be large ones, and that the members returned by electorates composed of Indians should largely preponderate over all other interests. Heads of local governments have been privately consulted in this matter, and we find that great differences of opinion exist both among them and among their immediate advisers, whom in their turn they, with our permission, took into consultation.

48. After careful consideration we have come to the following general conclusions on these matters :—

- (1) There should be an elected majority in the councils: each local government to consider and suggest what the size of this majority should be in its own province. In the event of any particular local government considering that an elected majority is undesirable in its province, it would have to demonstrate clearly the reasons for that opinion.
- (2) There should be a wide extension of the franchise in the various provinces, adapted to their local circumstances, so that the members of their councils shall be returned by really large constituencies.
- (3) As to the system of electorates, some of us regard one based primarily on territorial units as *primâ facie* more convenient than one of purely class constituencies, as tending to give greater play to local interests and ideas, and larger weight to the landed interests which are so enormously preponderant in the India of today. We are not all equally convinced regarding the relative merits of either system, upon which the opinions of those whom we have confidentially consulted also differ, but with the exception of our Honourable Colleagues Sir Reginald Craddock and Sir Sankaran Nair, we agree that the question is one on which discretion may be left to each local government to determine for itself whether to adopt territorial constituencies, or retain class

and interest electorates, or to combine both systems as they may find most suitable after full consideration of local circumstances.

- (4) The adoption of these views would probably require an enlargement—in some cases it may be a considerable enlargement—of the numbers of the existing councils, and legislation to this end would be necessary and desirable.

It will thus be seen that we hold that there can be no uniform system that must apply to every province regardless of its state of progress and its local conditions. Such a method would either force the less advanced provinces into changes for which they are not yet ripe, or conversely, and more probably, keep back the provinces which are politically more advanced. We are therefore prepared to agree, where necessary, to marked differences between province and province in the composition of the councils, the extent of the elected majority and the constituencies and electoral franchise upon which these councils are based. Our Honourable Colleague Sir Reginald Craddock differs from us, however, on two points. While not objecting to an elected majority, he is entirely opposed to the enlargement of the present statutory limits of the larger councils, and he is so convinced of the necessity of maintaining class representation, that he is not willing to allow to local governments the option of adopting the territorial system. He has explained his reasons in a separate minute. Our Honourable Colleague Sir Sankaran Nair on the other hand, would make the territorial system universal. We do not wish to lengthen this despatch by including in it further arguments on these subjects, but in fairness to the advocates of a system of territorial electorates, we attach as Appendix III extracts from a memorandum which was circulated to heads of governments by His Excellency the Viceroy. These extracts state the case for the territorial system, and may be of assistance to you in forming your own conclusions on the subject.

49. On the question of Muhammadan representation we are again unanimous that, whatever system of general constituencies is adopted, where Muhammadans have special constituencies marked off for them, they should not also have a vote in the general constituencies, and that the franchise conditions should be the same for Muhammadans as for others. We have considered the question whether we are definitely bound by Lord Morley's promise of 1909 that Muhammadans should have larger proportionate representation than their numbers would warrant, and our conclusion is that all that Lord Morley's promise requires is that, when Muhammadans are in a minority in a province, their representation on the legislative councils should be somewhat higher than the number which a strict numerical proportion would give them. But it is not necessary in allotting special constituencies to go appreciably beyond the numerical proportion in the matter of seats. The balance can be made up by nomination, and local governments would be instructed accordingly. With this last conclusion the Honourable Sir Sankaran Nair disagrees.

When Muhammadans are in an electoral majority in a province they do not need special protection, and whether they are or are not in such a majority must of course be determined by the electoral rolls, and not by the census statistics. On this point also Sir Sankaran Nair dissents.

50. The concession of separate representation to Muhammadans encourages applications from other communities for similar recognition. There is, however, no other community for which the case is equally strong over India as a whole, and on general principles we do not regard with favour any proposal to extend a system of proportionate representation to classes other than the Muhammadans. But if, in any particular province, the local government is able to demonstrate a case for exceptional treatment—as might for example occur in respect to Sikhs in the Punjab—we consider that the proportionate representation for any community thus singled out should follow the same lines as those determined for the Muhammadans.

51. There are some other matters relating to provincial councils upon which suggestions have been made at various times. The power of veto on legislation now vested in the head of a province, and in the Governor-General, must, it is urged, often prove useless because the only alternatives are the rejection of a measure generally beneficial, or its acceptance with the inclusion of some very undesirable clauses. There is no halfway house between total acceptance and total rejection. It has therefore been suggested that the constitution might provide for a power of partial veto under which the Governor-General or the head of a province might excise offending clauses without sacrificing the bill itself. We have considered this suggestion, but have decided to reject it. It would open the door, under the cover of this partial veto, to amendment by the executive of bills passed by a legislative council. The use of such a power of amendment might be open to serious objection, and there are no precedents, that we can discover, that would support such a proposal. We think, however, that it would be desirable, following Australian and South African precedents\*, to give power to the head of a government to return a bill to his legislative council with an intimation that he cannot accept particular clauses, but would pass the bill if they would consent to omit them. We think also that a similar power might be given to the Governor-General at a later stage when a provincial bill comes up to him for acceptance.

The present regulations provide for a term of three years as the life of the various legislative councils. Circumstances may be conceived in which a council had ceased to fulfil properly the functions for which it existed. To meet such a contingency it would seem to us desirable that a power of dissolution, within the ordinary term of the council's duration, should reside with the head of a local government. There are some precedents for this power in the

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\* 63 and 64 Victoria, Cap. 12, Section 58.

9 Edward 7, Cap. 9, Section 64.

constitutions of some of the crown colonies, notably Malta, Jamaica, and the Barbados, Bahamas and Bermudas Islands.

52. Although, as already indicated, we are not prepared at the present time to enlarge the constitutional powers of the legislative councils, there is one matter, in which the non-official element might be taken more into the confidence of the executive government. At present there are finance committees in the provincial legislative councils, which consist, as a rule, of even proportions of officials nominated by Government and of non-official members selected by their colleagues, and these deal, though subject to the ultimate discretion of Government, with a portion of the provincial budget. That portion is, however, a relatively small one, consisting of what is called the unallotted expenditure of the province, from which category are excluded those amounts which are considered definitely ear-marked for existing establishments, or for schemes which have already received the approval of the Secretary of State and the Government of India, or which are under correspondence with these authorities. Non-official members complain, and not unreasonably, that this exclusion leaves very little scope for advice, since the really important matters are taken out of the cognisance of the finance committee because the local government is already committed. We think that it would be preferable to have two or three non-official members of the council (elected for the purpose by their colleagues) associated with the government as advisers in the preparation of the provincial budget as a whole. The full council would of course still possess the power of passing resolutions on matters appertaining to the budget, and of dealing, on its legislative side, with bills which embodied additions to, or modifications of, local taxation.

53. There are other matters in which the non-official members of these councils complain of restrictions now placed upon them, for example, the admission of proposed questions and resolutions, and the procedure relating to private bills. When a general reference is made to local governments regarding the proposed reform to which we have asked your general agreement, we shall be prepared to consider how far it is possible to relax any restrictions which in actual practice have been found to be needlessly irksome, but we do not at present propose to examine this matter in detail. We think, however, that a tendency sometimes shown by non-official members to constitute themselves an organized Opposition to a government in power might be diminished if greater scope were allowed for the free expression of individual official opinion with regard to a resolution or bill which did not involve vital issues. We should thus encourage greater freedom of discussion, and divisions which followed the rigid line of official and non-official would be less frequent. This is not a matter which affects the regulations; it lies entirely within the discretion of the government, but it has a certain bearing on the subjects that we have under our consideration.

54. We desire to emphasise the fact that the proposals which we have made in regard to the provincial legislative councils do not apply to the Imperial council. On the short experience gained since the Morley-Minto reforms were introduced, we do not think it advisable to modify the constitution of that council for the present. It will have been seen from what has gone before that our object is gradually to work up to a state of affairs in which the constitution of the provincial legislative councils will come to justify an expansion of their powers and functions, and we must wait until this development has taken place before we can safely contemplate any serious modification in the constitution of the Imperial Legislative Council. That council is *sui generis*. It is concerned with the affairs of British India as a whole. It may often have to deal with matters of grave importance, such as the army and the higher finance, as well as with the control of the great imperial departments. Its business sometimes touches upon the interests of the Native States, and may also be concerned with matters affecting the relations of India, both with Great Britain and other parts of the Empire.

These considerations will not necessarily preclude us later on from considering some slight changes in the actual constitution of the Imperial Council, such as might be required, for example, to give further scope for the representation of special interests and communities; but such changes form no part of our schemes for constitutional reform, and will be separately dealt with on a convenient opportunity. Our Honourable Colleague, Sir Sankaran Nair, as his separate minute shows, dissents from this opinion, and would like to see some modifications also in the constitution of the Imperial Legislative Council as part of the scheme of reforms.

#### DIFFICULTIES IN THE ADVANCE.

55. Before we bring this despatch to a close there is one aspect of the advance towards the goal of our formula which is, perhaps, the most important of all. We have defined the goal, we have described the roads of advance that lead to that goal, we have pointed out the domains in which these lie, and we have indicated the immediate steps in advance that we desire to take along each road. We must now make a few observations upon obstacles that have to be surmounted, before the roads become free and open to even greater progress in the future.

The first of these obstacles is ignorance, which can, as we have stated, only be removed gradually by "the improvement and wide diffusion of education". As you are well aware, great efforts have been made of recent years to extend education, but the wide diffusion that we seek is still a long way off. Even more pressing is the question of its improvement. Impatient reformers appear to us to lay an excessive value on quantity, and to attach insufficient weight to the quality of the education imparted. They point

reproachfully to the small percentage of literates which the census figure disclose, and urge upon us an immediate campaign to banish illiteracy from the land. They are apt to overlook that the mere multiplication of schools without regard to the efficiency of the teachers, and the suitability of the curricula, will not by themselves suffice to batter down this formidable obstacle in the way of progress. In our judgment, the system of education in this country requires the most patient reconstruction. The distinctions which now mark off the stages between the primary and the middle courses, between the middle schools and the high schools, and between the high schools and the colleges, are still not suitably adjusted. Sound middle vernacular studies are often rejected by parents for their sons in favour of a smattering of English, and boys, who would better be engaged in learning in the schools, enter the universities before they are educationally qualified.

Owing to the enthusiasm of the middle classes, and their growing standard of living, there has been during the last few years an unprecedented increase in the number of students receiving higher education, and the demand for greater facilities for this kind of instruction is continuous and insistent. It has not, however, been found possible for the supply of funds, public or private, to keep pace with the rapidity of the demand. In their anxiety to secure the advantages attaching to the higher grades of education, the people are prone to acquiesce in lower standards of efficiency, and any effort which may be made to improve the quality of the instruction imparted is wont to be resented as an attempt to restrict the number of those in receipt of higher education. Nothing is further from our wishes than to impose any such restriction; but, in the present circumstances, the main efforts both of Government and of the public can most wisely be directed towards securing a standard of higher education that shall be comparable to that enjoyed by other nations and in other parts of the Empire.

56. In dealing with elementary education we are similarly confronted with a difficult set of problems. The quality of the teachers, and the proportion of trained men among them, still leave much to be desired, though much has also been done of late years to secure this object; and of the money recently spent for the benefit of primary education a great part has been laid out on improving the training and the prospects of the teachers. There is an increasing desire for elementary instruction, but among the classes actually affected its expression is less insistent and less prominent than that of the middle classes for higher education. There is much leeway to be made up, and the scope for expansion is still very great.

We recognise the great desirability of a wide extension of elementary education, but we cannot yet see our way to make it compulsory. The policy of free education, on the other hand, which has often been urged upon us, does not really connote that it should be free to the locality, but only that it should



be free to the pupils. And if the desire for more and still more primary schools is as strong and genuine, as we believe it to be, then it is incumbent on each locality to assist in finding the necessary funds, and to demonstrate, at least within its own limits, the strength and genuineness of this desire. We have recently reaffirmed our policy under which the responsibility for elementary education is laid primarily on local bodies, and we shall look to them to discharge that responsibility to the best of their powers. We shall in our turn freely give, within the limits of our financial resources, the support and assistance of the Government to bring this kind of education within the reach of all classes of the population.

57. But the removal of ignorance is not to be attained merely by imparting knowledge, that is superficial and often quickly forgotten to the greatest possible number, but by so teaching the young, boys and girls, that when they grow up to be men and women they may have been trained to think and act by the light of an education that has fitted them for the walks of life in which their lot is cast. Technical education, under which term we include agricultural, industrial, and commercial training, must, therefore, have a large claim on our available funds, and there are many other matters which require early remedial measures. The lamentable backwardness of female education demands our immediate attention, but here we have to contend with many difficulties arising out of existing social customs. The qualifications of teachers of all grades call for early improvement. The lines on which moral influences may be brought to bear on the young scholars and students need careful experiment and definition.

The problems to be solved will not admit of any uniform solution, for they vary in the different provinces, just as the progress already achieved has varied, both in extent and in quality, in different parts of the country, and among different communities. The aims that we have in view cannot be fully secured within a single generation, while our attention and our resources require to be more equitably distributed between the several sides of educational progress than has been the case in the past. The task before us is a long and difficult one. Our motives may, from one standpoint or another, be open to misrepresentation, but we cannot on that account allow ourselves to be diverted from those measures which we feel must, in the long run, offer the best chances of success. This obstacle of ignorance bars the way not to political progress only, but to all that is required to make nations healthy and happy, as well as progressive and prosperous. And it is only by its gradual removal that true progress towards the creation of an enlightened and self-governing people can ever be achieved.

58. In respect to the second obstacle, that of racial and religious intolerance political progress must largely depend, to use the words of our goal formula "upon the softening of racial and religious differences". In this the Government can take no direct part, except by the elimination of any factors within

its control which may tend to accentuate such differences, or, to encourage their continuance. But all real progress must come from within, from the birth of a conciliatory disposition among races and sects, as well as from the gradual disappearance of religious bigotry and racial intolerance. Here too, we feel that, as in the case of ignorance, sound education will do more than any other agent.

59. The third and last obstacle delaying approach to the goal is that of political inexperience, and the removal of this also is largely bound up with the spread of good education, and the quality of its results. Moderation, sense of proportion, restraint and balance in public affairs are attributes which go to make up the enlightened and self-reliant citizen. It is only by slow degrees that these qualities can be acquired, and the proposals that we have made for vitalising local self-government, especially in the sphere of rural administration, should greatly stimulate their acquisition.

60. The recommendations that we now have the honour to submit for your acceptance have been made after long and most careful consideration. They represent what, to our minds are the needs and possibilities of the present, and they also prepare the ground for still further developments in the future. We hope that, though they may fail to satisfy the ambitions of impatient idealists, they will be accepted by thoughtful Indians as the genuine expression of a desire to find for India a definite and honourable place within the Empire, to which she may, from this time forth, look forward as the goal of her destiny.

We commend them now to your sympathy, and express the earnest hope that they may meet with your approval.

Our Honourable Colleague, Sir Sankaran Nair, while he endorses all the positive recommendations that are made in this despatch, would desire to go further in several respects than the rest of us consider expedient, and has appended a Minute recording his personal views.

We have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient, humble Servants,

CHELMSFORD.

C. C. MONRO.

R. H. CRADDOCK.

W. S. MEYER.

C. SANKARAN NAIR.

C. H. A. HILL.

G. R. LOWNDES.

G. S. BARNES.

## POSTSCRIPT.

We should not ordinarily have wished to make any comment upon the further recommendations that the Honourable Sir Sankaran Nair desires to put forward, leaving it to you to consider these upon their merits. But we think that you will agree with us that his presentment of his case is such that we cannot well pass it over in complete silence. We cannot refrain from expressing our regret that our Honourable Colleague should have elected in his Minute to base his recommendations for further reforms upon grievances which find utterance principally in the organs of the Home Rule press in India: more especially since he himself does not assert, and thinks it unnecessary for him to do so, that these grievances may not be exaggerated or even groundless.

It seems to us a matter for some surprise that any large measure of reform should have been urged upon you in this Minute otherwise than upon a responsible assurance that the grounds for the recommendation are, in our Colleague's opinion, well founded. We regret also that it should have been suggested to you, however indirectly, by a member of our Government that these grievances actually exist, and are both widespread and widely felt in India. That they form, and have formed for years past, the favourite theme of a certain class of newspapers you will be well aware; but we believe that their constant reiteration in this way is the only foundation for any general belief in their reality that may be found among the limited public to whom these newspapers appeal.

We are also altogether unable to accept the suggestion that there is any general demand throughout the country for the radical changes which our Honourable Colleague advocates. They are no doubt the cry of certain politicians of the day, but we venture to think that our Honourable Colleague has altogether ignored the far larger, though no doubt less vocal, body of moderate and thoughtful Indians whose views found free expression in the Presidential address delivered by Sir S. P. Sinha before the Indian National Congress in December 1915. We append a copy of this speech to which we have already referred in paragraph 35 of the despatch.

We would also leave it to you to judge how far the immediate acceptance of our Honourable Colleague's political programme would be compatible with the maintenance in India of the supreme authority of Parliament upon which Lord Morley laid such stress in connection with the reforms of 1909.

We need hardly say that we do not accept the description given by our Honourable Colleague of existing conditions as correctly representing the feeling of India, and we are not impelled by a perusal of his Minute either to ask for a greater increase of advance than we have proposed in our despatch, or, on the other hand, to draw back from any part of our recommendations through

mistrust of our own reading of the political situation. We therefore adhere to all that we have advocated.

CHELMSFORD.

C. C. MONRO.

R. H. CRADDOCK.

W. S. MEYER.

C. H. A. HILL.

G. R. LOWNDES.

G. S. BARNES.

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#### MINUTE OF DISSENT BY THE HONOURABLE SIR REGINALD CRADDOCK.

It is with very genuine regret that I feel myself obliged to differ, however slightly it may be, in regard to any of the recommendations included in so important and noteworthy a despatch. So momentous, however, to my mind, are the issues involved, that I find it impossible to follow my own inclination and sink my personal views in those of my Honourable Colleagues. We have worked long together at the pleasant task of devising our recommendations for a worthy recognition of the loyal part played by India during the war, and of the natural desire felt by her educated sons for some substantial addition to their political stature; and I console myself with the reflection that the points of disagreement are few, and relate to only one out of the sixty paragraphs which the despatch contains. And I can truthfully say that if their views on those points of difference are presently put into effect, and my own apprehensions regarding them are then proved by events to be unfounded, no one will be better pleased than myself. For, like their own, my chief desire is to find, if possible, the safest method and rate of progression by which India may in time come to be governed in accordance with the wishes of responsible representatives of her own people, and conducive to the welfare and satisfaction of the whole of her vast population.

2. The points on which I differ from my Colleagues can be very briefly stated; and though the arguments in support of my own opinions will require some considerable elaboration, I shall endeavour to keep them within as small a compass as is consistent with a clear explanation of the views that I hold and of the grounds upon which I hold them.

My Colleagues express their approval of an elected majority upon the provincial legislative councils, and to this proposition I agree. But they go,

further, and contemplate with equanimity the expansion of the councils themselves beyond their present statutory limits, with a view to the elected element being very substantially extended, so as to give to that element a fuller play than the present limits permit. To this I cannot assent. I recognise that my Colleagues do not desire to press such enlargement upon the governments of provinces that do not want it, but they are ready to give more latitude in this matter to those that do than I can regard as either prudent or necessary in present circumstances.

3. The existing Act of Parliament allows a maximum of 50 additional members to the larger provinces, and 30 to the smaller ones. Bengal is at present the only province, major or minor, in which constituencies have been formed to supply the full number of statutory seats. In the United Provinces the number is still one short of the maximum, while Madras and Bombay have each six unfilled seats, Bihar and Orissa 9, the Punjab 2, the Central Provinces and Assam 5 each. Burma may be left out of account: it is still in a much earlier stage of development. There is, therefore, some scope in most of the provinces for enlargement even on the present statutory basis, and I am prepared to increase this slightly by a small change in the law which would enable expert members to be nominated outside, instead of inside, their present statutory constitution. These experts should be allowed to speak but not to vote, so that even if they happen to be all officials the influence of the elected members would not thereby be affected. I would also have no objection to some increase to the statutory number of seats in the Punjab or the Central Provinces, the disparity between which and the other larger provinces is not so great as is represented by the present difference in the appointed numerical limits. Beyond these two changes I would not go for reasons which I shall later on explain.

4. The next point on which I do not see eye to eye with my Colleagues is in regard to their attitude towards the introduction of constituencies based on territorial units to take the place of the present constituencies which are based on the representation of classes and interests. The arguments in favour of the territorial system are stated in the extracts contained in Appendix III to the despatch, and although my Colleagues as a whole have decided to adopt a neutral attitude upon the merits of both systems, and do not seek to force either system upon unwilling local governments, they are prepared to leave the latter as much latitude in the matter, as these may care to ask for. Moreover, it is not only the opinions of my Colleagues that I have to consider (and the Honourable Sir Sankaran Nair goes further than some in supporting this change), but I have to pay regard to the fact that the adoption of the territorial system is likely to become in the near future a prominent demand of Indian politicians when once they realise that the question has become a practical issue, and the advantages that the class to which they belong are likely to

derive from it. It is also not merely a comparison of the relative advantages of two systems of franchise that is in issue, but, as I shall endeavour to make clear, the question has a most important bearing upon the approval promised by my Colleagues to a substantial increase in the elected element in the councils, and to any consequential enlargement in the strength of the councils themselves that may result therefrom. In fact, the arguments on both these subjects of my dissent are so closely inter-connected, that I cannot entirely separate them from one another.

5. The existing system of representation of classes and interests dates back from Lord Lansdowne's reforms of 1892, when a concession to the elective principle first supplemented individual nomination by Government, and the same system was continued, and its advantages emphasised, both by Lord Minto's Government and by Lord Morley in devising the reforms of 1909. I do not wish to burden the body of this minute by long quotations, and I therefore attach to it a separate annexure containing extracts from older correspondence and speeches of statesmen showing how and why the representation of classes and interests was considered to be the only system practicable in India.

Twenty-five years are but a small period in the constitutional history of nations and it cannot truly be said that fresh and radical revisions of the constitution are in any sense overdue. I do not hesitate to assert that, when Lord Morley and Lord Minto introduced the far-reaching reforms of 1909, every one fully expected that these schemes would continue for at least one or two generations with only such minor amendments in regulations as experience of their working might from time to time suggest. I do not fail to appreciate the new situation created by the war. I have cordially agreed with my Colleagues that the war has changed the outlook of India towards the Crown and towards the British Empire, and this change in the outlook has found full recognition in our despatch by our willingness to declare an appointed goal and to make progress along the roads that lead to its attainment. There have indeed been changes in the outlook. The extreme section who looked for complete independence outside the Empire have changed the spirit of their dreams; the less ambitious who wished for a form of self government within the Empire have had their hopes and aspirations quickened; educated Indians not of the political world, but none the less eager for India's progress, have been confirmed in their loyal belief in the benevolence and power of the British Government; while, even to the vast masses, who are fed on rumours of the market place, who know no geography and have never seen the sea, and who therefore do not understand the great issues that have been involved, the winning of the war will bring an added confidence in the stability and enduring character of the British Raj and in the *iqbal*, or prestige, of the great Empire which is to them personified in the just and impartial district officers

with whom they are most brought in contact. Such is my own analysis of the altered outlook.

But while the war has effected all this, it has not worked a miracle. It has not lifted the pall of ignorance, it has not removed all apathy, it has not reconciled all differences between creed and creed, and between race and race. It has not adjusted the balance between class and class. These all remain just as they were before. The war has changed the outlook towards the Empire, but it has not changed, for indeed it could not, the varied characteristics and habits of thought of the many peoples who inhabit this land. The same problems still press for solution; and, if we ignore these realities, we shall soon find ourselves in deep waters. My own desire for maintaining for a long time to come a system of class representation as the basic constitution of our councils is not a matter of personal preference, or caprice, but is founded on causes that are much deeper than any of the ephemeral considerations which might seem to govern the question.

6. It is not at all easy to bring to English minds, unacquainted at first hand with India and her problems, a true picture of the circumstances which must determine the form of government that is at present, and for some time to come, essential to the true welfare of the medley of creeds, races and classes that make up her population. But I shall do my best to make this clear by the use of analogies.

The doctrine of the "balance of power" has now for nearly two centuries been constantly on the lips of the statesmen of Europe, and has determined the diplomacy of the great powers towards one another according as they desire to maintain or upset that balance. The present great conflict has indeed been the outcome of the determination of a great empire to destroy the balance, and to obtain domination over all the rest. In India this doctrine of the balance of power has not applied, as in Europe, to separate states and kingdoms, small or large; for the paramount supremacy of the British Government has precluded all chance of internecine war between them. But, on the other hand, there is in India a balance of power to be maintained not only between various creeds and races, but even more between the various classes of the people, to an extent which can with difficulty be appreciated by a nation which has taken many centuries in her evolution from absolute autocracy to democracy under a constitutional sovereign. In England, as well as in some other states of Europe, the first step in this evolution was the combined resistance of the nobility and aristocracy to the arbitrary exercise of power by the Crown. The next stage, but after a long interval of time, was the effort by the upper middle classes to restrain the domination of the aristocratic classes, and in course of time they successfully established their claims to exercise an influence on the government that should be proportionate to their growing prosperity and importance. The exercise of this influence has gradually distributed itself down through the various strata of the middle classes, but it was

only in times comparatively recent that the next great stage in evolution was reached; from which time the assertion on the part of the labouring classes in their turn of their right also to a proportionate share in the direction of the common-wealth became so great a factor in domestic politics. Thus, as each class asserted itself in turn it did not attain complete domination over the others, but secured only its own share of authority, and, though not without some fluctuations, a fair balance between them all has so far been attained.

7. India has known none of these stages or processes of evolution. Whatever claims may now be put forward on behalf of some of her ancient states and dynasties, or her reputed miniature village republics, it cannot be disputed that she had for long been subject to autocracies and despotisms, when the intervention of the British Government brought to a sudden standstill any process of evolution which she might eventually have worked out for herself on her own lines, and imposed upon her a civilization, which was of a totally different type and had reached a totally different stage, to her own. To a series of autocracies of various types and strengths there succeeded one single and supreme benevolent despotism in the shape of British rule, and an entirely new process of evolution was set in motion.

The establishment of the various public offices and courts of justice which formed the prominent feature of the new British administration, expanding almost from day to day, with the increase of territory administered and the growth of complexity in the system of administration, soon created an ever-growing demand for officials and clerks for the offices and for judges and lawyers for the courts, and English education began to be eagerly sought for by those of the middle classes who wished to make their living by the pen. In the new process of development thus inaugurated, the nobility, the fighting men, the landholders and the trading classes held aloof, while below, the great mass of cultivators and labourers scarcely paused in their labours to heed the changes that were going on about them.

8. After a period of political gestation which, compared with the slow progress of constitutionalism in self-developed nations, has been incredibly short, and on precedents which are entirely exotic to the soil, we are now being asked by reformers to concede to a small stratum of the middle classes that exercise of powers over the whole of the population which we have hitherto kept in our own hands. If we were to accede to this demand the balance of power between class and class upon which I have laid so much stress would be entirely upset, and we should be abdicating not to the responsible representatives of a whole and united people, but in favour of a small oligarchy of professional men. Is there anything either in the history of India, or of any other nation, which would justify such an abdication on our part?

9. I fully expect to be told by some critics that I am most needlessly alarmed, and that I am drawing upon heroic arguments from history in order



to combat suggestions which are really of comparatively minor importance; and my critics may point to the paragraph in our despatch in which we have ourselves emphasised the inexpediency of enlarging the constitutional powers of the legislative councils, until sufficient time has elapsed to test the value of those changes in their constitutions and in the electorates that the majority recommend. I willingly concede that our intentions are common. The majority of us agree that the time is not yet for bestowing larger powers upon these legislative bodies. We all alike recognise that steps in advance are needed to improve their representative character, and we all alike desire to train them in responsibility. My difference with my Colleagues lies in this, that, whereas they believe that the permissive course which they propose will meet requirements, and involve no serious risks, I, on my side, am equally convinced that the objects desired by them can be otherwise secured, and that the untoward consequences that I have mentioned will be the inevitable result of the latitude which they propose to allow.

10. Let me first take the adoption of territorial units for electoral purposes, a change, which so far as I am aware, has not until lately received much notice in any political programme. To begin with, this is the basis of all representative government; yet, we are agreed that the time for representative government is still far off. If this change were made it would encourage the fiction that the councils have already become representative of the people at large. It would be the first step towards the representation not of classes but of *numbers* (and numbers are very formidable in this country), and it would mean the adoption of the very basis on which the franchise in all self-governing countries is founded, and upon which all claims for its extension invariably rest. The supporters of this system believed that it will give greater representation to the land and to other communities which cannot at present make their voices heard on the councils as now constituted. To me these are pious hopes which stand no chance of fulfilment. Surely there is less likelihood of securing men representing the landed interests, for instance, on a general electorate, than in a constituency upon which both the electors who vote, and the candidates for election, must exclusively belong to the landholding class; and it is the same with commerce, or with any other special interest to which it is desired to give special representation. I regard it as certain that these proposed territorial units, so far from giving more representation to other interests, will return men almost exclusively of the lawyer politician class. Some may think that the mere increase in the number of voters will bring into play new considerations and a sense of their responsibilities which will restore the equilibrium between various interests of the community. In the first place, the electors will only acquire responsibility after long experience and training, and when education has had time to broaden their minds and bring to their comprehension the real meaning of the issues upon which the candidates whom they elect are called upon to express their opinion.

And, secondly, if it is merely the training of electors that is desired, enlarged electorates on the class and interest system, to which I am quite prepared to agree, will equally well serve as training grounds for responsibility. Resort to the territorial system is not at all essential to secure this object.

Thirdly, I do not think that sufficient consideration has been given to the concrete results of introducing this system. Once numbers, and not classes, become the basis of election there is no limit to the demands that will be made for increased representation. A lower unit than a district can hardly be adopted and the larger districts will all ask for second representatives; if a town of 50,000 inhabitants is given one member, a town of 200,000 will certainly demand two, if not three. The minorities will begin to clamour for special seats. Muhammadans have in any case to be provided for. And other classes whose claim for representation might have been recognised on a class system of electorates, will plead that they are being put under a single section of the community. Land and commerce will be loud in their complaints, and it will be no answer to them that they have only themselves to blame.

11. It must be remembered that political influence, under the effect of our artificial elevation of the small class which controls the Press, and almost monopolises public platforms, is rapidly becoming concentrated in a single section of the educated community. The landed aristocracy may still figure prominently at durbars and pageants, but the prestige which they once enjoyed is disappearing. The law and the law courts fetter their freedom in regard to their tenantry, while they shun political publicity, and fear the ridicule and obloquy which may be their lot if they take part in electoral campaigns and voice the conservative views that are held by their class. They shrink instinctively from a prospect of defeat at the polls by self-made men who in their eyes have no family traditions behind them, and they will therefore either refrain as a body from taking any part in such contests, and will leave the field entirely open to the politicians, or individuals may go over to the extreme radical party, and leave their own class in the lurch. These and other complaints of non-representation will result in further seats being superadded to the territorial constituencies, and the result must either be councils swelled beyond all workable dimensions, or discontent among those who find the professional middle classes absorbing all the power.

To sum up, these territorial electorates have not hitherto found a place in the programme of Indian politicians. They are not essential as training grounds for the voters, they will seriously disturb the balance of power between the classes of which the Government is the sole custodian in India; and finally they will encourage a false idea that the legislative councils are already representative assemblies, and bring about not only undue expansion of their numbers in the immediate present, but repeated and ever-increasing pressure for their constant further enlargement.

Holding these views, it is impossible for me to give even a conditional approval to a change of which the advantages are to me so theoretical and dubious, and the disadvantages so patent and so grave.

12. I now turn to the question of the elected majority on the provincial councils. Here again my Honourable Colleagues may point to the fact that in our despatch we do not propose any material enlargement of their constitutional powers; but again I must answer that it is not our common intentions but the results which I anticipate from their proposals that I so much fear and disapprove.

The advanced section of Indian reformers ask for councils of at least 100 members, and I do not think that the kind of representation which my Colleagues recommend can be secured with a lesser numerical strength than 70 to 75 members. Upon such councils it is impossible to provide more than some 15, or at the very utmost 20 official seats, and that only to the prejudice of the work of inspecting officers whose duties require them to go on tour. I cannot bring myself to imagine non-official majorities of this overwhelming nature remaining content to see the executive government disregarding their resolutions and vetoing their private bills. Nor do I see how Government can pass its own legislative measures if the non-officials choose to oppose them, or to include in them amendments which nullify their purpose. It appears to me at least that all legislative business might soon come to a standstill. To these objections, those who support this drastic proposal reply that the newly-constituted constituencies, and the representatives that they will return, will themselves bring into the councils both that conflict of interests, and that sense of responsibility, which will secure the Government against all risk of a determined opposition to all those of their measures which should command the support of reasonable men. These appear to me to be unduly sanguine hopes, which depend for their realization upon hypothesis and not upon past experience. These hopes indeed place reliance upon that very balance of power between classes which, as I have endeavoured to demonstrate, cannot exist unless it is buttressed by the Government itself.

13. We have, in one of the early paragraphs of our despatch, referred to the existence of political agitators and extremists in many provinces; we have before us the spectacle of the Home Rule League and the schemes of many ardent reformers, the avowed object of which is to secure full control by these councils over the executive, and, I ask myself, do these afford any encouragement to the view that large non-official majorities on the councils will refrain from pressing to the full the opportunities that we are rash enough to give them? I do not think that history affords any instance of a Government that is in a permanent minority in its own legislative assemblies, and I can see no reason why we should expect that this experiment will succeed in India. The appetite for power will grow with the opportunity for its gratification, and even if, here

and there, a few members are returned who thwart the ambitions of advanced politicians by their support of the government, good care will be taken that after the next elections the councils will see them no more. I do not at all wish to be misunderstood regarding the professional middle classes. They are fully entitled to their own share of seats, indeed it is part of my contention that in the present circumstances of India the great majority of the men who now, and for a long time to come, are likely to find seats on the councils must be drawn from the classes of lawyers, journalists, and professional men. They are the men who can speak and write most fluently, they revel in the arts and can best tolerate the buffets of electioneering campaigns, they captivate the minds of the youthful and immature, in whom they will find zealous canvassers, and their every day relations with numbers of people, as pleaders to their clients, will ensure to them an influence which no other class can at present command. And they will monopolise both the influence and the seats unless Government adopts measures to hold the balance even. It is not that I seek in the least to disparage the men of these classes. They have produced from their ranks individuals of great intellect, and high character. Some, however, are blinded by their own ambitions. Others, who sincerely believe that, if they could secure control over the management of affairs, the condition of the country would be materially benefited, have not the experience either personal or inherited which might sober their judgment. They therefore urge upon the Government counsels of perfection, and specious schemes of theoretical reform, without pausing to examine the many objections that stand in the way, or even the facts and arguments upon which their recommendations are supported. But the sincerity of their motives does not affect the duty of the Government towards the people with whose welfare it has become charged, and does not impose upon it any obligation to part with its control to persons not yet fully qualified either to represent the people at large, or to take over the powers and duties of the present custodians.

If I did not believe that these things will right themselves some day I could not have been a party to the main proposals of our despatch; but the process will be long and tedious, and the precipitate grant to so small an oligarchy, drawn almost solely from one small section of a class, that is itself only one among many others, of even the power to impede the Government and to block its measures, will not, I believe, further the real progress which we all alike desire. Rather is it likely to provoke great friction or even disaster, and, perhaps, to set back the clock of progress for a very long time. Believing all this, I cannot express my assent to such a course.

14. I may be asked, if I am so strongly opposed even to such permissive action as my Colleagues contemplate, why I am prepared to agree to an elected majority at all. To this I must answer simply that these councils already contain non-official majorities, and that I am willing to transfer nominated seats to election. My agreement is also subject to the understanding that the electorates, however

much enlarged, continue on the present basis as electorates constituted to represent the principal classes and interests to be found among the community. On this basis I look for some conservative leaven upon the councils, which can for the present be obtained in no other way. With this leaven, and with a small elected majority only, the desired balance of power can be retained, while the grant of that majority, even though it be small, will be an earnest to the people most interested that we are anxious to pave the way for more extensive, if gradual, reforms. In order, however, to obtain the election of persons of weight and standing, I would not allow a vote to any one below 25 years of age, for it would be absurd that our electorates should be swamped by callow students who are at the mercy of noisy demagogues. In the case of the landholding electorates, as well as on some commerce electorates that I would introduce, I would also insist upon the qualification for the candidate being much higher than that required for the voter. In these constituencies at least we must see that the profession politicians do not creep in by the mere possession of a few acres of land, or by some minor interest in a commercial concern. I would lay stress upon this commercial representation, not because India's commerce as a whole is not represented by the great chambers of commerce of the presidency towns and other large trade centres, but because there is need upon the councils of some representatives of the Indian trading classes. When the results of an extended franchise, and of a small elected majority, have been watched for a number of years, and in a variety of weathers, calm and rough, then will arrive the time once more to count up the progress, and to estimate what further advance is possible in the direction of representative institutions. But, for the present, we shall continue to see the most conservative people in the world returning mainly men professing the most democratic sentiments.

15. Lastly, I may be asked why if my Colleagues do not wish to force new systems upon any provincial government that is reluctant to accept them, I in my turn should wish to deny permission to those Governments which might like to try them? Having already pointed out what dangers in my opinion lurk behind these apparently harmless suggestions, I scarcely think that further answer to this question is needed. For I should first have to be convinced by such Governments that the dangers which I apprehend do not exist, and until I am converted I could not agree. I fear that however much they might believe that, in spite of large elected majorities on their legislative councils, they would retain the whole substance of executive power in their own control, they will find that it is the substance that they have parted with, and only the shadow that remains in their possession.

And while I do not object to such relative differences as are possible within the scope of my proposals, say between provinces so dissimilar as Bombay and the Punjab, I should certainly find objection to any striking departure being made by one single province at this early stage in the constitutional life of British India. All experience shows that a constitution granted to Bombay could not for long be refused to Madras, or Bengal. The pressure of the demand

would be too great to be withstood, and the other provinces would not be slow to follow. It must be remembered that the refusal to one province of political privileges granted to another cannot be defended on the mere preference of the local government of the day, but must be justified by concrete differences in their circumstances which admit of the clearest public demonstration. This would certainly not be the case with the changes now in question. One might distinguish a presidency town from other cities in India, but what justification could there be for giving to Poona what was denied to Lahore, or to Ahmedabad what was considered unsuitable for Cawnpore? While, as to districts in India, their state of enlightenment does not vary according to the province to which they belong, but on entirely different considerations which may be found in any and every province.

16. No trustee of costly, delicate and complicated machinery would willingly place it in the hands of novices who might damage it irretrievably, whether it were from curiosity, want of skill, or bad intent; these must first go through a long apprenticeship in training and trustworthiness, and they must fully understand the delicacy and complication of the machinery. No sanguine hopefulness about their probable genius for mechanics will justify him in risking so precious a charge (a charge which is really not his to risk) in their hands until he has some sure and certain proof of their mechanical proficiency. And so it is with India, and with the delicate machinery of government that we now control. It is not ours to hand over for rash experiment, it may be, to a political caucus which may damage it beyond repair. We hold it in trust for the owners, still not of age, who are the whole people of India and not merely for the few small and inexperienced shareholders who have just come of age and want to take over the control of the machine. When the majority of the owners of that machinery are grown up, and have gained the wisdom to select their own agents, then we may with a clear conscience and good hope assent to the transfer.

These are the points of difference between myself and my Honourable Colleagues, and these are the reasons upon which I base my dissent. On all else I do most thoroughly agree with them.

DELHI;

24th November 1916.

REGINALD CRADDOCK.

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#### ANNEXURE TO SIR R. CRADDOCK'S MINUTE OF DISSENT.

PREVIOUS PRONOUNCEMENTS REGARDING LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS, AND RELATING TO THE REPRESENTATION OF CLASSES AND INTERESTS.

(*Vide* Appendix III, pages 32 to 37 of Volume).

## MINUTE OF DISSENT BY THE HON'BLE SIR C. SANKARAN NAIR.

1. I agree with the proposals in the despatch for increasing the pay and pensions of the rank and file of the Indian Army and for the better education of their children, also for the grants to be made to them. I would emphasise the necessity of opening a higher military career to Indians. I agree in the earnest recommendation regarding the necessity of Indian representation, in some definite form in the Imperial Council otherwise than by the Secretary of State, or any person appointed by him in England. With all that is said about indentured emigration and cotton excise duties I cordially agree. I endorse the recommendation about a liberal administration of the Arms Act and about the removal of the existing racial differences in respect of its administration. I agree with all that is said about the necessity of accelerating the rate of progress in the domain of local self government. I heartily join in the recommendation to provide an equal number of European and Indian members in the Provincial Executive Councils. I agree fully with the recommendations to give an elective majority in the Provincial Legislative Councils, to extend the franchise in the various provinces, and for a system of territorial in preference to purely class constituencies. I agree also with what is said about Muhammadan representation, with a slight difference hereafter referred to.

Recognising that these proposals taken together will constitute an appreciable advance, I have signed the despatch. But there are important reasons which compel me to write this minute of dissent. Before doing so, I should like, if I might without impertinence or impropriety, to say that the country will be deeply grateful—for the opinion so forcibly expressed in the despatch and with which I fully concur that the existence of a few anarchists should not be allowed to stand in the way of any reform that might be necessary.

2. I feel however that the despatch does not attach sufficient weight to the value and the necessity of Indian co-operation in the interests of good government and general progress. It views not with trust and confidence but with alarm the growth of representative institutions. The movements symptomatic of such dissatisfaction as undoubtedly exists in the country even in the minds of loyal and moderate persons are scarcely referred to or attributed to the right causes, and a general impression is left in one's mind that conditions exist which necessitate measures on the part of Government which in my opinion will conduce neither to peace nor prosperity. The despatch gives no indication of the necessity of reforms from the Indian point of view, nor are the measures of reform advocated, though good as far as they go, likely in my opinion to ensure such improvement in the administration of the country as will satisfy educated opinion.

We must realise the conditions which have given birth to the demand for self-government or Home Rule and any reforms which we recommend must

be based on a true estimate of such conditions. The educated classes as a body have loyally agreed to avoid raising any controversy likely to embarrass the British Government during the progress of the war. But there is considerable dissatisfaction in the country and there are certain facts which cannot be ignored.

3. In the words of an experienced Lieutenant-Governor "however skilled and benevolent our rule, it is an alien rule, and as such it will yearly become more difficult and its mistakes more conspicuous". It is carried on by foreigners, who keep themselves practically aloof from Indians during their stay in the country, and after their term of service, have no further direct interest in the country which then loses the benefit of their knowledge and experience. It cannot be denied that in India large masses of the people are in a chronic state of grinding poverty; arts and industries are in the most backward condition; education, such as there is, is confined to a small section of the people and the condition of the country as a whole compares unfavourably with that of any other part of the civilized world. Ever since 1885, when the Indian National Congress held its first meeting at Bombay, the condition of the country has been discussed by the Indian National Congress, the Industrial Congress, the Provincial and the District Congresses and latterly the Moslem League at their annual sessions, and by Indian politicians in the Legislative Councils after the introduction of the elective element therein. Eminent Indian publicists, notably Dadabai Nowrojee, Romesh Chunder Dutta, and Gopal Krishna Gokhale have dwelt upon the alleged shortcomings of the administration. They have been supported by not a few Englishmen including members of the Indian Civil Service. The official replies to their criticisms have failed to convince the popular mind. All these have generated and confirmed the belief not only in the reality of the evils complained of but in the responsibility of the existing system of bureaucratic administration for their continuance. At the same time other great movements have come into existence generating a sentiment of nationalism both amongst Hindus and Muhammadans, a pride in their past, a feeling of self-respect, a consciousness of their increasing capacity to deal with the great problems of government.

On the other hand, the officials compare the present with the chaotic condition of the country when they assumed its government. The older civilians also compare the present with the India of their younger days and rightly point to the progress made in their time. Some of them are even bitter at the apparent ingratitude of the people who, in their opinion, are unreasonably impatient and do not recognise the progress that has been achieved. The people, however, apply to the present a standard of good government which they have been taught to consider as absolutely necessary in the interests of progress. Such government has been promised to them by the people of England who, they believe, are anxious to carry out their promises.



These different standpoints, though not mutually antagonistic, were in any event bound to create friction. But matters have unfortunately gone further. The Indians have come to believe, rightly or wrongly, that the officials are averse to imparting English education or any higher education; to any local self-government worth the name; to the association of Indians with Englishmen in the government of the country and to the removal of any grievance which might interfere with their prestige or emoluments; and it is in some quarters even believed that dissensions between communities, classes and castes are encouraged with a view to maintain the existing order.

The consequent unpopularity of the officials is one of the main causes for the demand for some radical change in the present system of administration.

I would be content with this description of the conditions which exist in the country, but I may be permitted to mention a few specific matters in connection with which there is a considerable feeling of bitterness. I do not assert, and it is not necessary for me to do so, that the grievances in connection with these matters may not be exaggerated or even groundless; but the fact remains that the congresses, conferences, and leading Indian politicians, past and present, affirm their reality and the people concerned feel them as real and genuine grievances. It is neither politic nor possible to ignore them. Nor would it be wise to delay all measures calculated to allay these feelings of bitterness.

4. The complaints which are most commonly made in this connection are as follows:—

- (a) The combination of the judicial and executive functions is a serious blot on the administration of criminal justice, and gives rise to a feeling of general insecurity.
- (b) The revenue system of the country which allows the executive government, except in the permanently-settled tracts, to raise the revenue by means of recurring settlements without the sanction of the legislature and without the restraints of any statutory rules contributes to general impoverishment, places the landholders under the control of the executive, drives away capital from the land, and deprives the cultivator of the fruits of his labour.

It is the same system which compels India to export her natural products, when she requires them both for purposes of food and manufacture.

- (c) English manufacturers are unduly favoured by measures which tend to discourage indigenous industries; capital borrowed in England on disadvantageous terms is spent not so much for the benefit of Indian labour and for the improvement of technical scientific

knowledge and organizing capacity in India, as for the benefit of English industry and labour; a system of currency prevails, which greatly favours the English capitalist.

- (d) The test mainly applied for appointments in the public services is that of race, not fitness.
- (e) Commercial, scientific and technical education has not been adequately fostered with the result that India cannot compete with England and other manufacturing countries on fair and equal terms.
- (f) The policy for the diffusion of education, initiated by Lord Macaulay and followed for nearly half a century with beneficent results, has been reversed for political purposes.
- (g) Expenditure is wastefully incurred in promoting the interests of Englishmen in the higher services to the detriment of departments which are mainly manned by Indians.
- (h) The trend of subsequent legislation has been to reverse the general policy of local self-government enunciated more than thirty years ago; official control has been enhanced and facilities for popular training have been materially diminished.

5. Many of these charges have been dealt with from the official point of view; and the officials, believing them to have been fully met, consider there are no real grounds for discontent; but the fact remains: the people remain totally unconvinced, and confirmed, therefore in the improbability of reforms under existing conditions. In estimating the present situation, what is material is—not so much how far these charges are true, but how far they have affected the popular mind. The youth of the country accept these charges without hesitation. The English professors, under whom they receive their education, are unable to shake their belief in the reality of their grievances, because they do not possess their confidence and are looked upon as interested parties.

The result is that there is a constant addition to the stream of disbelief in the existing system of administration; and a conviction all but universal has been induced that nothing short of complete self-government will supply any effective remedy.

The expectations raised by events that have occurred during the war and by utterances of responsible English statesmen; the uneasiness caused by various announcements of commercial and industrial policy believed to be prejudicial to India; her threatened degradation in status in the Empire when she may have to exchange England for England and the Colonies as her overlord—all these have aggravated the situation above described.

Leaders of Indian thought see no escape from the position thus created, except by such reforms in the constitution of government as will assure the

country that the English people as well as the Government of India are both willing and anxious to remedy all real grievances, and that there is a reasonable prospect of an early settlement of, among others, the outstanding questions mentioned above.

The Memorandum recently submitted by nineteen out of twenty-four elected Indian Members of the Imperial Legislative Council clearly indicates the direction in which Indian opinion asks the Government to move.

It is vital that our recommendations should not disappoint the universally cherished hope that India will, after the war, become an integral and self-respecting portion of the Empire. It is my belief that the recommendations contained in the despatch which I have signed will not bring about the desired assurance, and that nothing short of the administrative reforms which I venture to suggest below will create that confidence and tranquillity which are essential to the future well-being of the country.

6. In that view and with that object I would make the following proposals :—

*Provincial Councils.*

In the local legislative councils—

- (1) There should be a majority of elected Members, the size of the majority being left to each local government. The system of election should be based primarily on territorial constituencies, such as districts, and ordinarily half the Members of the legislative councils should be elected by such territorial constituencies. There should be a wide extension of the franchise.
- (2) The resolutions of the Council with reference to the budget or relating to matters of general administration should be binding upon the executive government, except when they refer to the pay and emoluments of the permanent services ; and in their case also any increase in pay or emoluments or any creation of new appointments in the higher services should be made subject only to the sanction of the Council.
- (3) All the resolutions of the Council in any respect whatever should be subject to the veto of the Governor, the Viceroy and the Secretary of State.
- (4) All the provinces except Frontier province should have an Executive Council. Half the members in every Executive Council should be Indians.
- (5) Every Member of the Executive Council should have a right to address the Viceroy or the Secretary of State through the Governor.
- (6) Every head of a province must be a Governor appointed from England.

*Imperial Council.*

- (1) Half the Members of the Legislative Council should be elected.
- (2) There must be another Indian Member in the Executive Council.  
For this purpose an additional membership may, if necessary, be created.
- (3) The Additional Official Members of the Legislative Council should be free to speak out their minds and vote according to their inclination save in exceptional cases.
- (4) In every Department there should be an Indian either as Member, or as Secretary, or as Adviser entitled to place his views before the Viceroy.
- (5) Every Member of the Executive Council should be entitled to address the Secretary of State through the Viceroy.

## II.

## CONSTITUTION OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

7. The accompanying list will show the present constitution of the legislative councils. The European non-official members generally, if not invariably, vote with the officials. Nominated Indian non-official members are not the class of persons from whom the country expect any real representation of Indian grievances. As for the elected members they are representatives of certain classes and interest, not of the masses or ryots. If it was the intention of the framers of this constitution to bring into the councils men who would represent the wants of the people, it is obvious therefore that the electorates are not so constituted as to carry out that intention. An examination of the accompanying table will amply support this statement, and will also indicate the direction in which reform should take place.

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Provinces.	Officials.	Europeans.	Nominated Indian non-officials.	Corporation.	University.	Municipality.	District Boards.	Zemindars and large Landlords.	Muhammadians.	Commerce (Indian).	Total of Columns 2 and 3.	Total of Columns 2 and 4.	Total of Columns 2, 3 and 4.	Total of Columns 5 to 11.	Total of Columns 2 to 11.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Punjab	11	2(a)	5	...	1	4	5	...	...	...	13	16	18	10	28
Madras	17	7(b)	4	1	(i)	9		5	2	...	24	21	28	17	45
Burma	9	3(c)	7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	12	16	19	...	19
Assam	10	4(d)	3	...	...	2	2	2	2	...	14	13	17	8	25
Bombay	14	4(e)	11	1	1	4	4	3	4	2	18	25	29	19	48
Bihar and Orissa	18	3(f)	3	...	...	5	5	5	4	...	21	21	24	19	43
Bengal	16	8(g)	5	2	1	5	5	5	5	...	24	21	29	23	52
United Provinces	17	3	8	...	1	4	9	2	4	...	20	25	28	20	48
Central Provinces	12	...	4	...	...	7(i)		3(j)	...	...	12	16	16	10	26

(a) 1 Ch. of Com., 1 nominated.

(b) C. C.; Trade Association, Plant; University 1 each; nominated 3.

(c) C. C.; Trades Association, nominated.

(d) Indian Tea Association 3, nominated 1.

(e) C. C. (2)

(f) Min Plant, nominated.

(g) C. C. (2); Trades Association, Chittagong Port, Planters—one each elected; jute 1; 2 nominated.

(h) One alternately by the Municipalities and the Landholders of the Chittagong Division

(i) According to the Civil List there are only nine members representing Municipalities, District Boards, Zemindars and Landholders.

It will be seen that the official, European and nominated non-official members of the Councils (columns 2, 3 and 4) out-number the elected Indian members (columns 3 to 11) of all the classes in every province. Even excluding the nominated members, the officials and Europeans together out-number the elected members. To my mind this is conclusive to show that there is no effective Indian representation in the Legislative Councils.

I propose next to show that the existing representation by classes and interests and otherwise is totally inadequate for the purpose we have in view.

### EUROPEAN MEMBERS.

8 Let us now take one of these classes—the European members. I shall state the Indian view. They are not interested in the general administration of justice in India so far as Indians are concerned. They are tried by different tribunals consisting of their own countrymen; they are not affected by the press laws or any coercive legislation; therefore on the question of the separation of judicial and executive functions and the administration of criminal justice their opinion is generally opposed to the Indian view; the land-assessment question does not appreciably affect them. The question of local self-government scarcely concerns them. Similarly, so far as the question of appointments of Indians to higher posts is concerned, their bias is generally in favour of the appointment of their own countrymen. With reference to the commercial and industrial policy to be followed, their interests and those of Indians are not generally identical. As far as education is concerned, the Anglo-Indians form a special class. They are not as a body interested in the administration of the Salt or Forest laws which are felt to be oppressive, nor to any great extent in the reformation of the Police administration which is one of the crying needs of the country. Their attitude in reference to excise administration has been either indifferent or antagonistic to the Indian view. The result is that on all the great questions which agitate the country the people cannot expect any support from the European members. For all practical purposes therefore, European non-official votes according to the Indian view must be counted as official votes, without official responsibility.

### ZEMINDARS.

9. The zemindars are another class to whom special representation is allowed. If the Legislative Councils have done nothing else than to induce the zemindars and the Muhammadans to take interest in public questions, they will have quite justified their existence. In all the questions that directly affect them, the zemindars do not hesitate to speak out their minds. But many of the great questions under discussion affect other classes. Landlords even in England are not generally recognised as competent to speak on the wants of the middle, lower, and the labouring classes. They are no doubt directly

interested in questions relating to land revenue assessment. But when revenue is increased, they generally pass on the burden to their tenants. They labour, however, under a great disadvantage. Rent questions and numerous other questions that arise between them and their tenants are in many provinces disposed of by the executive officers and not by the civil courts: with the result that they are greatly under the influence of the executive officers. The zemindars must continue to be represented in the councils as a class. But, it will not be right to rely upon them to voice the needs of the general community.

### MUHAMMADANS.

10. Separate representation for the Muhammadans has fully justified itself. It was usual to oppose the various proposals in favour of local self-government: and the appointment of more Indians to higher posts on the alleged ground that the Muhammadans were opposed to them. But now their cultured leaders are as vehement as the other classes in pressing for reforms though the rank and file are not as advanced as the Parsis or Hindus. The time has not come to discard separate representation in their case. As to the form of representation or the mode of election, the Muhammadans are the best judges and we should conform to their wishes. As they are in a backward condition and behind the Hindus in material prosperity I think in the interests of their political education they should get a larger representation than is warranted by the electoral roll. I would give them seats in proportion to their census numbers which would be more than what they would get under the electoral roll, not on the ground that Lord Minto promised it; but because in the present peculiar conditions of the Muhammadans it is a just policy. I am unable to agree to any nomination as suggested by my Colleagues. It would be a retrograde step. It would not be in pursuance of the policy to educate the Muhammadans and might be considered a device to discount real Muhammadan representation by election.

### TRADE AND COMMERCE.

11. Trade and commerce must of course be represented. But Indian trade and commerce must be represented at least on equal terms as English trade and commerce. They too should have the right of electing their own members. It must be remembered in this connection that it is the large trading and commercial interests in the Presidency towns that are now mainly represented.

I have referred to all the special electorates. The class representatives may be trusted to look after the class interests, and as each class is more or less interested in questions which affect the general community, they may be trusted to act impartially except when class interests stand in the way, but they are not elected to represent the general community though among these class

representatives are persons who, by their eminent public services, have acquired a right to speak on behalf of the general public.

12. I shall refer now to the general electorates.

*The Universities.*—The Senates contain only between one-fifth and one-tenth of members representing independent electors. *The Presidency Corporations* include members nominated by Government, and a substantial number of Europeans. The other electorate is the *Municipalities and District Boards*. They have on the whole a large percentage of nominated members. They are men elected on other issues to look after sanitation, education, communications in their areas—not for their fitness to deal with questions of the kind I have indicated. The District Boards generally are under official control and many of the Municipalities are under official chairmen. None of these electorates can therefore be reasonably expected to return members whose primary duty would be to agitate in Council for the removal of the general grievances I have referred to.

13. According to the present system, therefore, the persons who are very much in need of representation, the villagers, *i. e.*, the large body of ordinary landholders, the pattadars, ryots holding lands under Government or under the great zemindars, the ordinary traders outside the Presidency towns, &c., are not represented by any electorates. Territorial representation will enable them to make their voice heard, and it is only territorial representation that will enable these middle classes, the ryots, &c., to send their representatives into the Council. This will also get rid of the present system of election by intrigue, &c., and will introduce the healthy system of election on the candidates' political programme openly announced. I think it is, therefore, necessary that we should have territorial representation so far as concerns the main body of the members of the Legislative Council; whether this is to be effected by the abolition of District Boards as electorates or otherwise is a detail which it is unnecessary now to consider. This question of territorial representation is so very important that it should not be left to the discretion of the local governments, whether or not it should be given effect to in their provinces.

#### ELECTED MEMBERS SHOULD FORM THE MAJORITY.

14. The reasons which called the Legislative Councils into existence, *viz.*, to ascertain the wishes of the people through their accredited representatives also require that the majority of the members should be elected. The majority of the heads of the provinces whom we have consulted are in favour of this view. We want these councils to express the real opinion of the country and this cannot be done if the majority are officials or nominated members. With a permanent majority behind them there is rarely any attempt by the officials to persuade the elected representatives as to the soundness of their views. The elected members feel the hopelessness of their situation. They consider that,



however valid their arguments might be, they cannot make any impression on the officials who have come prepared to vote against them. We accordingly keep away from the councils many competent persons who consider their presence useless either in support of or in opposition to Government. The result on public opinion also is deplorable. They feel that there is no attempt to meet the arguments of their representatives in the Legislative Council, and they think accordingly that no arguments are available. Increasing discontent is the result. Again, nothing is more common than for the officials to say that the elected members of the Legislative Councils do not really represent public opinion, and that they do not really care for the interests of the masses. This is stoutly denied by the latter according to whom they alone properly voice the grievances of the public. If we have a majority of members who are elected by proper constituencies—this question can easily be settled. Furthermore, there will be genuine attempt on either side to convince the other when it is seen that arguments determine the conclusions. In this connection it is interesting to notice the opinion of a Lieutenant-Governor who has had large experience of Legislative Councils that “the Council is useful in bringing together different points of view and in giving to official apologists opportunities which are otherwise lacking, but in training the people for the work of Government it does little or nothing”. I do not think any objection would be taken to this proposal, but for the apprehension that the Legislative Councils might acquire a certain degree of control over the executive. This brings us to the question whether we should enlarge the constitutional powers of the Legislative Councils.

#### CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

15. An elected majority alone in the councils, as now constituted, would not necessarily enlarge the constitutional powers of the Legislative Councils. It would no doubt afford some check to the passing of unpopular laws, but considering the divergent interests represented in the Council, it is very doubtful whether it will be an effective check. We have however to consider this question of the power of Legislative Councils mainly with reference to the budget and to the binding character of the resolutions. I have mentioned what are considered by the people of the country to be some of the evils from which they suffer. If they are real, it is only by enlarging the powers of the councils that they can be remedied. The officials of their own motion can scarcely be expected to remove them. If they are not real, the Governor's power of veto is a sufficient check.

It is to be remembered that taxation is now imposed by one race over another race. It does not comparatively affect the tax-imposing class themselves, or their relatives, or practically their own race. On the other hand, it benefits them as it is spent mainly on the services, so that even if the taxation or the

expenditure incurred is proper, the people are often tempted to ascribe it to unfair motives. It is believed that the expenditure is generally increasing for the benefit of English Services and not to meet the real needs of the country as understood by the people, or for carrying out reforms which are urgently needed and which are put off on the ground that money is not available. The expenditure which brings direct benefit to the people (*i. e.*, that on education sanitation, medical relief) is according to them kept at a low figure and popular opinion is not given effect to. It is believed that the lower ranks in the police, revenue, education, judiciary, &c., departments are starved, while revision brings increase of pay and allowances to the higher ranks. If we want the local bodies to become what we hope they will become, there should be a great readjustment by the elected members of the financial resources between the provincial and the local budgets. Imperial and provincial funds devoted for purposes of education, &c., are lying idle and have not been utilised as they would have been if the elected members had been able to exercise their legitimate influence.

The argument that power should not be given to the Legislative Councils on the ground that they might exercise it unreasonably proves either too little or too much. If it is to be supposed that they would paralyse executive administration, it is equally possible to suppose that they might combine to vote against Government with regard to any necessary piece of legislation. Until it has been proved that the majority of the council will ever pass any measure which is embarrassing or paralysing to the administration, we have no right to assume that they will do so. On the other hand, I think we will be right in assuming that when and if so many divergent or contrary interests combine, in passing any resolution they are probably in the right, and the official view to the contrary is wrong. We have had legislative councils containing elected members for more than 20 years. It would be a strong argument in favour of not giving any constitutional powers to these legislative councils, if the opponents of reform in that direction were able to pick out even a few resolutions in any of the Legislative Councils in India brought forward by elected members which, if passed, would have proved embarrassing to the executive government. I do not think they will be able to do so. Nor do I think that it is possible to refer to any motion by any of the elected members—not class representatives—which is against the interests of the masses. Nor will it be found that they have opposed any step for that purpose taken by the government. On the other hand on various occasions the elected members have been almost fruitlessly pressing the grievances of the ryots and other landholders upon the Government. Sometimes the Government after opposing their proposals in the Legislative Councils have given effect to them on such widely different questions as finance and jail management. Even when convinced ourselves that the non-official members were wrong in respect of the proposals which they put forward, we have afterwards, at the earnest importunities of

some of them, appointed commissions to inquire into the facts alleged, found that their allegations were true and our contentions unsustainable. Motions have been brought forward by elected members before the Legislative Councils which if accepted would have prevented rioting and blood-shed which subsequently occurred, and those resolutions were, in fact, given effect to subsequently. Experience therefore justifies the conclusion that there is no reason to apprehend that the Councils will exercise their powers unwisely. Indian Civil Servants of very long experience, Governors of Provinces, Members of Parliament, whose voice is listened to with respect, have both publicly and in private testified to the capacity, moderation and wisdom of the Indian leaders. There is no reason to suppose that they will, in future, develop qualities of a different nature.

With all respect to my Colleagues I am unable to accept the reasons given in the despatch against the grant of any financial or administrative control. What is put forward as the strongest reason that the elected members are not representatives "in the truest sense" may apply, if at all, to the councils elected under the regulations now in force and for which we ourselves are responsible, but not to the councils to be constituted under our present proposals. If the latter are not sufficiently representative it is our duty to make them so. It is not a fair argument to put forward this ground when we ourselves refuse to take such steps as might be necessary and as are in our power to fulfil the conditions requisite to the grant of control. Moreover, in my opinion, experience has shown that this argument is not valid. The argument based on the want of "a sense of administrative responsibility" ignores the distinction between legislation and administration; the want of political training, the only other reason given, can be supplied only by the exercise of political powers. The real reason for withholding such control is what is implied in the statement that the councils should not be allowed to develop into "quasi-parliaments", *i. e.*, a distrust of representative institutions. It is unnecessary for me to say that I entirely differ from this view.

I think for these reasons it is essential that the constitutional powers of Legislative Councils should be enlarged.

Every resolution in the Legislative Council may be subject to the Governor's veto. If that safeguard is not enough, and further checks are required it may be provided that so far as the existing services are concerned, it would not be open to the Legislative Council to interfere with their pay or emoluments; as for any increase in such pay or emoluments, the sanction of the Council should be necessary. It appears to be indispensable that with reference to certain heads like Abkari, Forests, Salt, Education, Local Self-Government, &c., the Legislative Councils should have absolute powers of control, and I can imagine no conceivable case in which they can do any material harm by the exercise of such powers and in particular when they are subject to the Governor's power

of veto. On the other hand, the refusal of such powers, even in such instances which do not concern the peace and security of the country, will intensify the feeling of discontent.

#### PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.

16. It is quite as necessary that the Indian element in the Executive Council should be equal to the European element. As we are unanimous on this point I would not make any further observations.

#### GOVERNORS—HEADS OF PROVINCES.

17. In my opinion, it is desirable that the head of a province should be a Governor appointed directly from England. In all questions arising between the officials and the Indians he might be expected to be impartial, whereas a Lieutenant-Governor belonging to the same school of thought as the local officials will be inclined perhaps unconsciously to take the same view as the latter. Even if his conclusion is right, it is likely to be attributed to bias or class interest. The Legislative Councils will feel, in the case of a Governor, that their view is impartially considered and when overruled that the veto was due to an honest difference of opinion by an impartial mind. In the despatch the necessity of political training for Indians to be admitted into the government of the country is justly insisted upon. The argument applies with greater force to the case of a Governor; and there can be no comparison between the political training of a person appointed from England and of a person who has spent all his life in India amid unfavourable surroundings. A Lieutenant-Governor is likely to have his likes and dislikes on account of his long residence in the country. The chiefs and also the aristocracy prefer a person appointed direct from England and preferably a Nobleman to one whom they have known in the lower ranks of the service. In the case of the head of a province, it is not so much knowledge that is required as capacity to form a sound judgment. All the materials necessary for him to form a right conclusion will be available to him. For analogy, we may refer to Chief Justices appointed from England, who are quite competent to form sound conclusions if cases are properly placed before them. It is, moreover the fact that the people, as a whole, prefer a Governor appointed from England to a Lieutenant-Governor appointed in India.

#### EXECUTIVE COUNCILS IN ALL PROVINCES.

18. I am also of opinion, for similar reasons, that in all the provinces, except perhaps the frontier province, we ought to have executive councils. It is practically impossible for one man properly to carry on the government of a province consisting of millions of inhabitants. Where there are no councils the Secretaries, in effect, exercise the powers which elsewhere are exercised by the Members and it is not denied that in the Punjab, United Provinces and

Central Provinces there are men quite as competent as in the other provinces to be made councillors. There is no objection except what is based on financial considerations suggested against their appointment as councillors. In my opinion this objection has not much force. Unlike the autocracy of a Lieutenant-Governor a Council Government conduces to independence of spirit among the people and prevents personal dislike of the head of the Government when it exists from degenerating into ill-will against the Government itself.

### PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY.

19 I cannot leave the question of the provincial governments, without referring to the question of provincial autonomy. According to the Delhi Despatch, it was intended "gradually to give the provinces a larger measure of self-government" that they might be "autonomous in all provincial affairs". The object of it was to satisfy "the just demands of Indians for a larger share in the government of the country". The devolution of powers, therefore, by the central government must be accompanied with larger powers to Indians. I am unable to accept any interpretation other than that supported by the words which I have quoted above (see paragraph 3 of the Despatch). The question of provincial autonomy was not dealt with by Lord Hardinge's Government for the first time. It was advocated by the late John Bright and it underlay the proposals of Lord Mayo's decentralization scheme. Most of the questions that I have referred to can be dealt with by the Local Governments.

### III.

#### IMPERIAL COUNCILS.

20. In considering any proposals about the Imperial, Executive and Legislative Councils, it must be borne in mind that the duty of governing India is really vested in the Secretary of State (see, in particular, sections 2, 20 and 21 of the Government of India Act, 1915), and the Government of India are in every respect under his control. The Secretary of State has to defend every measure relating to India in Parliament, and he is accountable to Parliament. Reasons of policy which had their origin in the inadvisability of entrusting a foreign bureaucracy with absolute control over the people of the country apparently account for this. It also shows that any relaxation of his authority must be in favour only of the people of the country when they become fit to exercise such powers. It is surely desirable, under these circumstances, that the Secretary of State also along with the Viceroy and the Executive Council must, not only for arriving at sound conclusions, on the various questions that come before them but also for testing Indian political capacity be kept well informed of the popular opinion on any proposed measure. For this purpose neither the Executive nor the Legislative Councils are properly constituted.

### IMPERIAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.

21. An Indian is brought up in a different environment from an European. He looks at questions from a very different standpoint, and on many important questions he is likely to take very different views from his colleagues; there are wide and various differences amongst Indians themselves. It is surely reasonable, therefore, under these circumstances, that there should be at least more than one Indian Member in the Executive Council. Two Indian Members if possible belonging to different communities, and belonging to different schools of thought, would be able to represent Indian opinion in the Executive Council and to the Secretary of State far more effectively than one Indian Member and his English Colleagues. However much the latter might try to ascertain Indian views, channels of information available to the Indian Member are not open to them; nor can they enter into Indian feelings and thoughts in the same intimate manner. I, therefore, venture to suggest the addition of another member to the Executive Council. The fact that there is no majority in the Viceroy's Legislative Council of elected members strengthens the plea for the creation of an influential Indian element in the Executive Council. It is obviously necessary that a Member should have the right—not only when he writes a minute of dissent to a despatch but in every instance—to place his views before the Secretary of State of course through the Viceroy. Not only should there be at least two Members, but it is necessary also that there should be Indians in every Department to place before the Viceroy and the other members, if necessary, the Indian point of view on every question. Ordinarily a member is concerned only with the administration of his own department, and he deals with other questions some of them of the greatest importance ordinarily dealt with in another department only when and if they are referred to the Council for consideration by the Viceroy. The power to call for records is of no use when he is not aware of their nature. The reasons which induce the Members of Government to accept the proposals finally adopted are fully given in the notes recorded by them in circulation and not always in the Despatch to the Secretary of State. Those notes are not forwarded with the Despatch. It would be well, in these circumstances, that there should be an Indian in every Department whether as Member, Secretary, or adviser to lay before the Viceroy, or the Secretary of State all the arguments from the Indian point of view which may have a bearing on the question for decision.

### IMPERIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

22. A consideration of the present constitution will prove clearly that the general community, or the masses, as opposed to the classes and special interests, have no effective or indeed any representation in the Imperial Legislative Council. Having regard to the fact that the elected members now entirely, and even after any reconstitution of the local councils would, mainly,

consist of representatives of classes and interests,—though direct representation to some extent at least is very desirable—I think we can safely increase this number so as to constitute them a moiety of the council. It would be noticed that this moiety will include European members who may be counted as officials for this purpose and, considering the divergence of interests represented by these members, there is scarcely any possibility of a combination against the Government. The nominated officials should be free to speak and vote as they like in all but exceptional instances. If on account of the official additional members or the European members voting with the elected members a majority is secured, in the case of any particular resolution, it is very probable that the Government in that case is wrong, and it would be open, even in that case, for the Viceroy or the Secretary of State to veto the resolution, if necessary. I do not think there can be any harm therefore in making these small changes which seem to me to be not open to the objections advanced in the Despatch.

23. I recognise that all questions relating to the Army, Navy, and generally to the defence of India, should be decided finally by England, and that the charges to be paid by India should also be settled by England. This, however, makes it very necessary that no decision should be arrived at except after a full and impartial consideration of the Indian claims. The Indians now consider that the charges levied from India are unduly heavy and, in some instances, extortionate. They are settled in a manner that does not command the confidence of the people. My proposals, if carried out, will ensure a comparatively fair hearing and full consideration. The opinion of the members of the Legislative Council, both officials and non-officials being absolutely free to speak and vote as they like, must necessarily carry great weight. Similarly any protest raised by the Indian members of the Executive Council when they agree with the Legislative Council is bound to receive full consideration at the hands of the Secretary of State. Many of the Viceroys have noticed that the Secretary of State is often powerless against the English Treasury, but it would be more difficult for the latter to disregard the view of the Government of India when they are supported in this manner by the Legislative Councils.

There is another class of cases in which also India must leave the decision of the question to the Imperial Government. Where in any particular instance the latter has determined upon a certain line of policy to be followed by the Empire as beneficial to the interests of the Empire as a whole, India should be bound to accept that policy though it might be detrimental to her own interests. In those cases also and for the same reasons India's claims must be fully considered; and I think such hearing will be ensured by some scheme similar to what I have set forth.

There are questions relating to expenditure and taxation which do not concern England and with reference to which the Government of India take *the same view* as the people of India. Now if we have a Council of the kind

suggested of officials and non-official elected members expressing freely their opinions; if any question is in addition pressed upon the attention of the Secretary of State by the members of the Executive Council and by the Indian members in particular, it may well be that the interference of the Secretary of State would become very rare.

In the innumerable cases in which Indian or European opinion differs from the Government of India, it is surely desirable that the Legislative Councils should be able to speak with a voice which will command the respect to the Government and the Secretary of State. It may well be doubted whether the Bengal Partition Act would have become law if such a free Legislative Council as I have suggested and two Indian Executive Council Members of different schools of thought had existed then to warn the Viceroy and the Secretary of State of the strength of Indian feeling and opinion and the unfortunate consequences that were certain to follow. In varying degrees the same argument applies to all cases in which there is marked difference between Indian and official opinion. When such difference of opinion arises on a question where the interests of the people and the services are in apparent conflict, it would be very valuable to elicit the opinion of a properly constituted Legislative Council. Any attempts to avoid the expression of such opinion will be regarded as a confession that the official view will not bear scrutiny—and this will tend to enhance the official unpopularity. In the numerous cases in which the Indians believe that the interests of India are sacrificed to the interest of England or any class in England, it must be very valuable to have the opinion of a free and properly constituted Legislative Council and of Indian representatives in the Imperial Executive Council. The protest of a legislative council, as now constituted, may be brushed aside as not representative of the true feelings of the people. The protest of their own countrymen who compose the executive council cannot carry the matter very much further. It is only strong Indian protest backed up by official concurrence which will awaken England to the dangers of a policy which will alienate Indian opinion from her.

The necessity becomes equally apparent when we have regard to financial questions. I shall not recapitulate the reasons which I have already put forward when discussing the same question with reference to the Provincial Legislative Councils. Indian opinion is not well put forward before the Government of India and the Secretary of State and will never be without better representation in both the executive departments and the Legislative Councils. The protection afforded to Indian interests by the Financial Department though important is inadequate. It is only the tax-payer representatives who can sufficiently check the growth of unnecessary expenditure. Moreover official opinion in the Legislative Council itself may not be united and the Legislative Councils as enlarged with increased Indian representation might reasonably be expected to lead to economy, retrenchment and reform.



There seems to be scarcely any doubt that India's interests are sure to be affected by the reconstruction of the Empire after the war. It is therefore very desirable that India should be able to make her own voice heard. This can be done only by increasing the Indian element in the Imperial Executive Council and the Indian elected representatives in the Imperial Legislative Council.

I am aware it will be said that the logical consequence of my arguments requires that the elected members of the Imperial Legislative Council should form the majority, and that there must be more than two Indians in the Executive Council. This may be so; but I would wait and watch the course of events. It is for many reasons desirable to proceed slowly and after realizing the consequences of every forward step.

#### VOLUNTEERING, &C.

24. The only other questions that I propose to refer to are those about volunteering and about the admission of Indians to the higher ranks in the army. I think there should be a clear promise in any pronouncement after the war about the admission of Indians into the higher ranks. About volunteering, with all respect to my Colleagues, I must say that the reasons given in the despatch for not conceding at present their claims do not seem to me to be satisfactory. The claim of the whole country for volunteering must not be confused with the claim of certain races now excluded to be allowed to enlist in the army. When it is said that the Indians are not debarred from defending their country because they are admitted into the regular army it is ignoring the distinction between the rights or duties of a citizen volunteer and the obligations of a common soldier in the regular army. The two matters are entirely different. If a general assurance is given that the Indians will have their due share in the defence of their country, *i. e.*, by being enlisted in the regular army, as the despatch recommends it will be treated by the country as a refusal to admit the prayer for volunteering, which to me seems a matter of regret. It is said that there are certain proposals according to which the volunteer corps might disappear. They are not yet before the Government of India so far as I know, and it does not appear that these proposals have yet assumed a form which would justify us in postponing the consideration of this question. If any general assurance, as is suggested in the despatch, is to be given only after the war, it is obvious that there is sufficient time for us to make some definite proposal.

25. Again, in view of certain recent events, I think it necessary to emphasise the attitude of India that she will view with alarm and dismay any control of her affairs or policy by the Dominions unless her own elected representatives are also members of the Imperial Assembly which contain the Dominion representatives. Indian representation, desirable even otherwise, is

indispensable in case of Dominion representation. If this is granted, India would welcome the opportunity for co-operation with the Dominion representatives.

26. While I entirely agree with what is said in the despatch about the necessity of accelerating the rate of progress in local self-government, I cannot help giving expression to my doubts, due to our past experience, whether our despatch will have any greater effect than the declarations of policy by Lord Ripon or Lord Morley. Sound principles promulgated by one class for the benefit of another when they prejudicially affect the former are almost always wanting in what Burke calls the "executive principle". If we leave it to the Local Governments to disregard these principles with only the obligation to state their reasons, years hence our successors will, I am afraid, be under the same necessity in which we are placed of impressing upon the Local Governments the necessity of carrying out the principles formulated by Lord Ripon. Our despatch is also likely to be misunderstood as opening a door to the creation of more appointments for the exercise of Government patronage.

27. In conclusion I must express my regret that this note has run to such a length. But the questions involved are so important and the occasion so momentous that I feel I should not have done my duty either to the Government or to the country if I did not place on record what I consider to be the Indian point of view, as fully and as clearly as lies in my power.

DELHI;

24<sup>th</sup> November 1916. }

C. SANKARAN NAIR.

APPENDIX I.

MEMORANDUM CIRCULATED BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY TO  
HEADS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

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(*Vide* pages 6 to 15 of Volume.)

## APPENDIX II.

## STATEMENT RELATING TO PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

This appendix is concerned with the constitution of the (additional) members only. The number of ex-officio members varies according to the system of government. It includes the head of the province, the members of the executive council and, in Madras and Bombay, the Advocate-General. In the provinces where there is no council government, the head of the province is the only ex-officio member.

2. The table at the end of the appendix shows the constitution of the various provincial legislative councils: their statutory maxima: their actual numbers at present: the present proportion of elected members in the councils: the number of elective constituencies; and the average number of voters in those elective constituencies which consist of (a) landholders, (b) municipalities, (c) local boards and (d) Muhammadan electors.

3. Under the head *special constituencies* are included:—

- (a) Universities (5).
- (b) Chambers of commerce (9).
- (c) Trades associations (4).
- (d) Planting communities (6).
- (e) Port Commissioners (1).
- (f) Mining community (1).

Of these the smallest constituency is that of the Port Commissioners, Chittagong (9). Besides this there are about 15 special constituencies of less than 100, and the remainder are over 100. The largest is the Bengal tea planting community (219). These special constituencies are from their nature limited, and, with the exception of the universities and the Port Commissioners of Chittagong, are designed to obtain representation upon the councils of certain trading and industrial interests which have already formed representative bodies of their own in the shape of chambers or associations. They thus form ready made constituencies which ensure that the persons returned to the councils are truly representative of the interests concerned.

4. There are only two electorates, the Muhammadan electorates in Bombay and Bengal, where the average number of voters exceeds 1,000. In all the other electorates there is only one instance (landholders in Madras) where the number of voters averages over 500. The municipal and local board constituencies in Bombay and the United Provinces are particularly small.

Over the whole of India, there are some 33,000 voters on the general constituencies electing to 120 seats. Of these a little under 16,000 elect to 21 Muhammadan seats, rather less than 7,000 voters return 25 landholder members, and the remainder, 74 seats belonging to the municipal and local board interests are filled by the suffrages of about 10,000 men.

*The composition of the Provincial Legislative Councils showing (additional) members, and the electorates by which elected members are returned.*

Name of Province.	(1)	Statutory maximum No. of nominated and elected members.	Seats allotted by regulation.	Actual strength of nominated and elected members on the 1st April 1916 (a).	No. of officials, nominated, non-officials and experts.	No. of elected members.	Percentage of elected members to actual total strength.	NUMBER OF MEMBERS ELECTED BY					AVERAGE NO. OF VOTERS PER CONSTITUENCY IN			
								Special constituencies.	Landowners, &c.	Municipalities and corporations.	Local boards.	Muhammadians.	Landowners' constituencies.	Municipal constituencies.	Local boards constituencies.	Muhammadian constituencies.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Madras	..	50	44	43	22	21	48.8	4	5	10		2	532	271		665
Bombay	..	50	44	42	22	20	47.6	5	3	5	4	4	363	66	49	1,273
Bengal	..	50	50	48	20	28	58.3	6	4½(b)	7½(b)	5	5	124	183	223	1,069
Bihar and Orissa	..	50	41	39	18	21	53.8	2	5	5	5	4	57	119	52	300
United Provinces	..	50	49	49	28	21	42.8	2	2	13(c)		4	398	63		393
Punjab	..	30	28	27	16	11	40.7	2	..	4	5	..	..	Not known		..
Burma	..	30	19	18	16	2	11.1	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Central Provinces	..	30	25	25	15(e)	10(e)	40.0	..	3(d)	4(d)	3(d)	..	357	161	144	..
Assam	..	30	25	24	13	11	45.8	3	2	2	2	2	96	59	108	594

(a) The figures show the actual strength of the councils on the 1st April 1916, with the exception of the Punjab, the figures for which show the actual strength on the 1st July 1916.

(b) One seat is shared between the municipal commissioners and landholders of the Chittagong Division who elect alternately.

(c) The number of electors in four of the municipal constituencies is not known. There are 8 purely municipal constituencies electing alternately and nine mixed municipal and district board constituencies.

(d) Includes a Berar constituency the member for which is nominated to the council after election.

(e) Although three members from Berar are nominated to the Central Provinces Council, they are really elected members returned by constituencies in Berar, this device being adopted as Berar is not legally a part of British India.

## APPENDIX III.

BEING EXTRACTS (PARAS. 9 TO 14) FROM A MEMORANDUM CIRCULATED  
TO HEADS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE  
VICEROY.

(*Vide* pages 42 to 44 of Volume).

## APPENDIX IV.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS OF SIR S. P. SINHA DELIVERED AT THE BOMBAY  
SESSIONS OF THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS ON THE  
27TH DECEMBER 1915.

BROTHER-DELEGATES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—

I return you my profoundest acknowledgment of gratitude for the high and honourable position to which you have called me. It is a peculiarly responsible position, for this year the task of delivering the annual message of the Indian National Congress is beset with special difficulties. The atmosphere created by the titanic struggle overshadowing the entire civilised world is not helpful to the calm and dispassionate consideration of our many complex and delicate national problems. And my task is made all the more difficult as the cruel hand of death has removed from our midst, within a few months of each other, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Pherozeshah Mehta and Henry Cotton—three of our most beloved and sagacious leaders whose counsels would have been of incalculable value to us to-day and whose loss we all so deeply mourn.

Would that this task had been committed to some one more competent than myself. Willingly would I have avoided it,—gladly would I have remained for the rest of my life, as I have been in the past, a humble camp-follower of the Congress.

You know that I did not seek this position any more than I had sought that other exalted position which it fell to my lot to occupy a few years ago as the first Indian Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council. I pray I may not be misunderstood, for I say this is no boastful spirit but in all humility. For no one is more conscious than myself that my appointment as Law Member was not due to any extraordinary personal merits of mine. No one knows it better than myself that that honour was conferred not so much on me personally as on the Indian National Congress, in recognition of the justice and moderation of the claims it had persistently put forward for over a quarter of a century on behalf of the people of India.

For myself, I had never dared to aspire to the chair of Macaulay and Maine any more than I ever dreamt of occupying this chair hallowed by its association with some of the most devoted workers in the cause of our Motherland. In both cases, I yielded to a sense of supreme duty. And on this occasion, I cannot do better than what I did on the other, *viz.*, to invoke aid from on high that I may do nothing and say nothing which will compromise the rights and best interests, the honour and the dignity, of my country.

*The King-Emperor.*

My first duty to-day is again to lay at the feet of our august and beloved Sovereign our unswerving fealty, our unshaken allegiance, and our enthusiastic homage. His Majesty has been with our soldiers on the battle-field. His son snares with them all the hardships of war. And we desire to express our gratitude to Almighty God for shielding our beloved Emperor and enabling him to endure with fortitude the physical suffering inseparable from his recent accident and restoring him to devoted people in renewed health and strength. Long may he live to lead his people and promote their happiness and prosperity.

*The War.*

The question which, above all others, is engrossing our minds at the present moment is the war, and the supreme feeling which arises in our minds is one of deep admiration for the self-imposed burden which England is bearing in the struggle for liberty and freedom, and a feeling of profound pride that India had not fallen behind other portions of the British Empire, but has stood shoulder to shoulder with them by the side of the Imperial Mother in the hour of her sorest trial. In the great galaxy of heroes, in the imperishable Roll of Honour, there are now, and there will never cease to be, beloved Indian names testifying to the fact that our people would rather die unsullied than outlive the disgrace of surrender to a bastard civilisation. Our conviction is firm that, by the guidance of that divine spirit which shapes the destiny of nations, the cause of right will ultimately prevail and the close of the struggle will usher in a new era in the history of the human race.

Brother-delegates,—My next duty is to convey our unstinted admiration and our heart felt gratitude to those of our brethren who have been shedding their blood in the battle-fields of Europe, Asia and Africa, in defence of the Empire. The war has given India an opportunity, as nothing else could have done, of demonstrating the courage, bravery and tenacity of her troops, even when pitted against the best organised armies of the world, and also the capacity of her sons of all classes, creeds and nationalities to rise as one people under the stimulus of an overpowering emotion. That the wave of loyalty which has swept over India has touched the hearts of all classes had been ungrudgingly admitted even by unfriendly critics. The Bengalee is just as anxious to fight under the banner of His Majesty the King-Emperor as the Sikh and the Pathan, and those of them to whom an opportunity has been given to serve either in ambulance, postal or despatch work; have shown as great a disregard of danger and devotion to duty as others employed in the more arduous work of fighting. India has arisen to the occasion, and her princes and peoples have vied with each other in rallying round the imperial standard at a time when the enemies of the Empire counted on disaffection and internal troubles. The spectacle affords a striking proof as much of the wisdom of



those statesmen who have in recent years guided the destiny of the British Empire in India as of the fitness of the Indian people to grasp the dignity and the responsibilities of citizenship of a world-wide empire. Nor must we forget to tender to the families of those who have laid down their lives in the glorious cause our sincere and respectful sympathy.

Brother-delegates,—Doubts have been expressed in some quarters as to the wisdom of the Congress assembling while the war is still going on. It has been suggested that discussion of political problems might be misconstrued as an attempt to advance individual national interests at a time of imperial stress. I do not think that such apprehensions are well-founded. If we had any doubt as to the ultimate success of England, we might well hesitate to discuss questions which can only arise after the war is over and peace is concluded. We want to make it perfectly clear, if we have not done so already, that there is no one among us willing to cause the slightest embarrassment to the Government. We seek to make no capital out of the service so ungrudgingly rendered by our countrymen to the Empire. There is not, I trust, a single person in our camp who expects reforms as the price or the reward of our loyalty. That loyalty would indeed be a poor thing if it proceeded from a lively sense of favours to come. Nor could any serious and responsible Indian publicist advocate that, as the result of the war, there should be a sudden and violent breakage in the evolution of political institutions in India. The problem before us is how, without asking for any violent departure from the line of constitutional development which far-sighted statesmen, English and Indian, desire for India, we can still press for a substantial advance towards the development of free institutions in this country. It is our earnest hope that the spontaneous outburst of loyalty throughout the country has dispelled for ever all sense of distrust and suspicion between ourselves and our rulers, and that, after the war is over, British officials will consider it their duty not so much to administer our affairs efficiently as to train the people themselves to administer them, and that, with this change of spirit, the people also will begin to look upon these officials as zealous co-adjutors in the task of their political self-government.

Brother-delegates,—This brings me naturally to what has been a burning topic in the Congress for many years, which has led to bitter differences and fierce dissensions, and with regard to which you are entitled to ask my views—our political ideal, our duties in the present, and our prospects in the future.

#### OUR IDEAL—SELF-GOVERNMENT.

What, to begin with, should be the political ideal of India? To some, the raising of this question may seem to be unnecessary and at best academic and, the others, positively mischievous. To me, however, it seems that the greatest danger in the path of the future well-being of the country is the want

of a reasoned ideal of our future such as would satisfy the aspirations and ambitions of the rising generations of India and at the same time meet with the approval of those to whose hand our destinies are committed. It is my belief that a rational and inspiring ideal will arrest the insidious and corrupting influence of the real enemies of our Motherland, even if it is not able to root out from the land that malignant mental disease which has been called anarchism and whose psychology it is so difficult to analyse. It must be obvious to all sincere and impartial judges that no mandate whether of the Government or of the Congress will be able to still the throbbing pain in the soul of awakening India, unless the ideal which is held up by the Congress and accepted by the Government commends itself first to the heart and then to the head. It seems to me, brother-delegates, that the only satisfactory form of self-government to which India aspires cannot be anything short of what President Lincoln so pithily described as "government of the people, for the people, and *by the people*".

When I say this, I do not for one moment imply that the British Government is not the best Government we have had for ages. We have only to look round to see the manifold blessings which have been brought to this country by that Government. But as a British Premier early in this century very truly observed, "good government cannot be a substitute for self-government". Says a recent writer in a well-known British Periodical: "Every Englishman is aware that on no account, not if he were to be governed by an angel from heaven, would he surrender that most sacred of all his rights, the right of making his own laws.....He would not be an Englishman, he would not be able to look English fields and trees in the face, if he had parted with that right. Laws in themselves have never counted for much. There have been beneficent depôts and wise law-givers in all ages who have increased the prosperity and probably the contentment and happiness of their subjects, but yet their government has not stimulated the moral and intellectual capacity latent in citizenship or fortified its character or enlarged its understanding. There is more hope for the future of mankind in the least and faintest impulse towards self-help, self-realisation, self-redemption than in any of the laws that Aristotle ever dreamt of". The ideal, therefore, of self-government is one that is not based merely on emotion and sentiment, but on all the lessons of history.

I believe in all sincerity that such has been the ideal which the British Government itself has entertained and cherished almost from the commencement of British rule in India. Generations of statesmen have repeatedly laid down that policy, solemn declarations of successive sovereigns have graciously endorsed it, and Acts of Parliament have given it legislative sanction. I will not burden my speech with quotations from these: they will all be found in previous Presidential addresses. But, with your leave, I will quote only

one passage from a speech of John Bright delivered at Manchester on the 11th of December, 1877: "I believe it, said John Bright, "that it is our duty not only to govern India well now for our sakes and to satisfy our own conscience, but so to arrange its government and so to administer it that we should look forward to the time when India will have to take up her own government and administer it in her own fashion. I say he is no statesman—he is no man actuated with a high moral sense with regard to our great and terrible moral responsibility—who is not willing thus to look ahead and thus to prepare for circumstances which may come sooner than we think and sooner than any of us hope for, but which must come at some not very distant date."

It is, however, unfortunately the fact that a few years ago unhappy statements and even actions of responsible statesmen gave rise to a widespread suspicion among large classes of people in all parts of India that there was a change of policy—a deliberate intention to retrace the steps. That this suspicion is not wholly without foundation will appear from the estimate of an eminent French publicist who cannot be charged with either lack of admiration for the British administration of India or an excess of sympathy to the Indian reform party. This is what M. Chailley says (I am reading from page 188 of the translation by the present Finance Member, Sir William Meyer): "Had England taken as her motto, India for the Indians, had she continued following the ideas of Elphinstone and Malcolm to consider her rule as temporary, she might without inconsistency grant to the national party gradual and increasing concessions which in time would give entire autonomy to the Indians, *but that is not now her aim.*" (The italics are mine). Does any reasonable man imagine that it is possible to satisfy the palpitating hearts of the thousands of young men who, to use the classic words of Lord Morley, "leave our universities intoxicated with the ideas of freedom, nationality and self-government", with the comfortless assurance that free institutions are the special privilege of the West? Can any one wonder that many of these young men, who have not the same robust faith in the integrity and benevolence of England as the members of this Congress, should lose heart at the mere suspicion of such a policy, and, driven to despair, conclude that "the roar and scream of confusion and carnage" is better than peace and order without even the distant prospect of freedom? Fifteen years ago, Lord Morley said: "the sacred word 'free' represents, as Englishmen have thought until to-day, the noblest aspiration that can animate the breast of man". And to-day, millions of Englishmen are freely sacrificing their lives in order that others may be free: therefore, an Englishman will be the first person to realise and appreciate the great insistent desire in the heart of India, and I for myself say with all the emphasis and earnestness that I can command that if the noble policy of Malcolm and Elphinstone, Canning and Ripon, Bright and Morley, is not steadily, consistently and unflinchingly adhered to, the moderate party amongst us will soon be depleted of all that is fine and noble in human character. For my part, I

believe with the fervour of religious conviction that that wise and righteous policy is still the policy of the great English nation. When His Majesty sent us his gracious message of sympathy and later on of hope, what do you think he meant but sympathy for our political aspirations and hope for their ultimate fulfilment? As late as the 8th day of October this year, His Excellency the Viceroy, addressing a large number of representative officials at the United Service Club of Simla, said :—

“ England has instilled into this country the culture and civilisation of the West with all its ideals of liberty and self-respect. It is not enough for her now to consider only the material outlook of India. It is necessary for her to cherish the aspirations, of which she herself has sown the seed, and English officials are gradually awakening to the fact that high as were the aims and remarkable the achievements of their predecessors, a still nobler task lies before them in the present and the future in guiding the uncertain and faltering steps of Indian development along sure and safe paths. The new rôle of guide, philosopher and friend is opening before you and it is worthy of your greatest efforts. It requires in you gifts of imagination and sympathy, and imposes upon you self-sacrifice, for it means that slowly but surely you must divest yourselves of some of the power you have hitherto wielded. Let it be realised that great as has been England's mission in the past, she has a far more glorious task to fulfil in the future, in encouraging and guiding the political self development of the people. The goal to which India may attain is still distant and there may be many vicissitudes in her path, but I look forward with confidence to a time when, strengthened by character and self-respect and bound by ties of affection and gratitude, India may be regarded as a true friend of the Empire and not merely as a trusty dependent. The day for the complete fulfilment of this ideal is not yet, but it is to this distant vista that the British official should turn his eyes, and he must grasp the fact that it is by his future success in this direction that British prestige and efficiency will be judged.”

These noble words of Lord Hardinge, which must still be ringing in our ears, are not the idle speculations of an irresponsible enthusiast, but the well-considered pronouncement of a statesman who, after guiding the ship of state during a period of unprecedented storm and stress, sends forth this message both to his own countrymen and to us. Lest there be any among us of so little faith as to doubt the real meaning of those memorable words, lest there be any Englishmen inclined to whittle down the meaning of this promise, I hope there will be an authentic and definite proclamation with regard to which there will be no evasion, no misunderstanding possible. So far as we the people are concerned, there is no real reason for mistrust, for this policy proclaimed so long ago and repeated so recently has been fruitful of innumerable beneficent results. Officials, even the highest, may sometimes have spoken or even acted in a different spirit, but England always did and does still consider it her glorious

mission to raise this once great country from her fallen position to her ancient status among the nations of the earth, and she enjoins every English official in India to consider himself a trustee bound to make over his charge to the rightful owner the moment the latter attains to years of discretion.

But are there any among us who, while accepting His Excellency's message of hope, are disposed to demur to the qualification therein expressed, namely, that the goal is not yet? If so, I do not hesitate to express my entire disagreement, because I would sooner take the risk of displeasing than injuring my beloved countrymen. I am fortified in my opinion when I find that almost every prominent leader of the Congress has laboured to impress upon all true lovers of our country that the path is long and devious and that we shall have to tread weary steps before we get to the promised land. "Day will not break the sooner because we get up before the twilight." The end will not come by impatience. I maintain that no true friend of India will place the ideal of self-government before us without this necessary qualification. It inevitably makes passionate youth, anxious to avoid the steep and weary path, take to dangerous and even fatal short-cuts, for it is unfortunately true that impetuous youth finds it easier to die for a glorious ideal than to live and work for it with steady patience and persistent self-sacrifice. I yield to none in my desire for self-government but I recognise that there is a wide gulf between desire and attainment.

### *One Goal. One Path.*

Let us argue out for ourselves freely and frankly the various ways by which we can obtain the priceless treasure of self-government. It seems to me that it is possible only in one of the three following ways:—

Firstly, by way of a free gift from the British nation.

Second, by wresting it from them.

Third, by means of such progressive improvement in our mental, moral and material condition as will, on the one hand, render us worthy of it and, on the other, impossible for our rulers to withhold it.

Now, as to the first, the free gift. Even if the English nation were willing to make us an immediate free gift of full self-government—and those who differ most from the Congress are the first to deny the existence of such willingness—I take leave to doubt whether the boon would be worth having as such, for it is a commonplace of politics that nations like individuals must grow into freedom and nothing is so baneful in political institutions as their prematurity: nor must we forget that India free can never be ancient India restored. Such a vision, as has been justly remarked, could only be realised if India free from the English could have stood in a tranquil solitude or in a sphere of absolute isolation, but unfortunately the hard facts of the modern world have to be faced and India, free from England, but without any real power of resistance, would be immediately in the thick of another struggle of nations.

As to the second, I doubt if the extremest of the extremists consider it feasible to win self-government immediately by means of a conflict with the British power. Such a conflict is impossible, if not inconceivable: and I cannot imagine any sane man thinking that assassinations of policemen and dacoities committed on peaceful un-offending citizens will do aught but retard progress towards our goal. Such acts, if they proceeded from any considerable section of the people, would only emphasise our absolute incompetence for self-government, which demands the highest qualities of patient preparation and of silent and unobtrusive work in every aspect of our social and political life. Fortunately, acts like those I have mentioned are reprobated throughout India. They may appeal to the perverted imagination of misguided youth, but are abhorrent to the sober sense of the great mass of the great peoples of India. They alienate not only the sympathy of those Englishmen whose support would be invaluable to our cause both in India and in England, but they provoke the bitterest resentment among our own people who naturally shrink from an ideal where lawlessness is likely to have sway. On your behalf and my own, I express my utmost and unqualified detestation of these lawless acts, and I fervently appeal to all sections of our people to express in unmistakable language their abhorrence of these dastardly crimes which besmire the fair fame of our country and I pray to them so to co-operate with the authorities as to render their detection and punishment absolutely certain.

Brother delegates,—We are left, therefore, with the third alternative as the only means of attaining the goal of self-government. Before I deal with it, let me remind you of a parable in Mr. Edwin Bevan's thoughtful little book on *Indian Nationalism*. He likens the condition of our country to that of a man whose whole bodily frame, suffering from severe injuries and grievous lesions, has been put in a steel frame by a skilful surgeon. This renders it necessary for the injured man, as the highest duty to himself, to wait quietly and patiently in splints and bandages—even in a steel frame—until nature resumes her active processes. The knitting of the bones and the granulation of the flesh require time: perfect quiet and repose, even under the severest pain, is necessary. It will not do to make too great haste to get well. An attempt to walk too soon will only make the matter worse, and, above all, the aid of the surgeon is indispensable and it is foolish to grudge the necessary fee.

When we ourselves have so far advanced under the guidance and protection of England as to be able not only to manage our own domestic affairs, but to secure internal peace and prevent external aggression. I believe that it will be as much the interest as the duty of England to concede the fullest autonomy to India. Political wiseacres tell us that history does not record any precedent in which a foreign nation has with its own hands freed from bondage a people which it has itself conquered. I will not pause to point

out, what has been pointed out so often, that India was never conquered in the literal sense of the word, and, as very properly observed by the late Sir John Seeley, India is not a possession of England in the sense of legally being a tributary to England any more than any of her colonies. I will not wait to examine the cases of French Canada and the Boer Republics in South Africa to whom free institutions have been granted. But has there been a situation before this in the history of mankind like that of India to-day? Has there been a nation whose ideas of political morality have ever reached those of the great English nation? Has there been another nation which has fought so continuously and strenuously for the freedom and liberty of other nations as the English? My faith is based not on emotion, not on unreasoning sentiment: it rests on the record of what has already been achieved by the undying labours of farsighted English statesmen and noble-hearted Indian patriots, both those who are still working for the cause and those whose labours are done and whose spirits hover over us to-day and guide and inspire us. The East and the West *have* met—not in vain. The invisible scribe who has been writing the most marvellous history that ever was written has not been idle. Those who have the discernment and inner vision to see will know that there is only one goal and there is only one path.

The regeneration and reconstruction of India can take place only under the guidance and control of England, and while we admit that the goal is not yet, we refuse to believe that it is so distant as to render it a mere vision of the imagination. We deprecate the impatience of those who imagine that we have only to stretch our hands to grasp the coveted prize. But we differ equally from those who think that the end is so remote as to be a negligible factor in the ordinary work of even present-day administration. It seems to me that, having fixed our goal, it is hardly necessary to attempt to define in concrete terms the precise relationship that will exist between India and England when the goal is reached. Whatever may be the connection of India with England in the distant future, her impress on India could never be effaced and the inter-communication of the spirit and the breathing of new life into India by England will be a permanent factor which could never be discounted. Autonomy within the Empire is the accepted political faith of the Congress, and I find it difficult to believe that our patriotism and our love of country cannot be reconciled to the picture of the future which generous statesmen like Lord Haldane draw, in which Englishmen and Indians will be fellow-citizens of a common empire and of a common and splendid heritage, all of us bringing our special talents to bear co-operatively for the common good of the whole. For the attainment of this great ideal, our first great duty is the exercise of the difficult but indispensable virtue of patience. There is no royal road to that goal, and we must all patiently, persistently and strenuously co-operate in all measures necessary for that purpose. Some of these can be undertaken only by the Government others will depend on ourselves alone, but none will bear

fruit without a spirit of mutual trust, toleration and forbearance. In order to foster this spirit so far as we, the people of India are concerned, it is vitally necessary to admit them, in an ever-increasing measure, to direct an active participation in the higher work of government in all its branches, civil as well as military, executive as well as judicial, administrative as well as legislative. It is cruel calumny which asserts that, when asking for the expansion of the powers of our Legislative Councils for the appointment of Indians to the Imperial and Provincial Executive Councils, for the admission of a larger number of Indians to the Indian Civil Service and all other branches of the higher public services the Indian National Congress asks only for honours and appointments for the members of the educated classes. It may be that some of those who still persist in repeating this libel on the intelligence and patriotism of this country in good faith believe it to be true. If so, they have failed to take note of well known facts, namely, that Congress leaders like Telang, Tyabji, Krishnaswamy Iyer and other accepted high office only at considerable personal sacrifice, and that others had to refuse because they could not afford to make the necessary sacrifice. These critics have neglected to read the literature of the Congress. In any case, they have missed the point of it all, namely, that these measures are advocated only as means to an end. They are valuable chiefly because they concede the demand of the people for direct and active participation in the work of Government, not merely as tools and agents, but as members of the Government itself. They are valuable only in so far as they tend to identify the people with the Government, and enable them to think of the Government as their own and not as an alien bureaucracy imposed on an unwilling people by a conquering nation. We can afford to treat the taunts of these unfriendly critics with contempt, but there is another school of critic whose counsels are more seductive though not more sound. These insist on the importance of the Reformed Legislative Councils, whose resolutions they ridicule as mere pious wishes. They see no good in the powers of interpellation and discussion of the budget. They treat the admission of one Indian into each of the existing Executive Councils as a matter of no consequence, because it has not produced immediate or far-reaching changes in the ordinary routine of administration. They insist that even a liberal and philosophic historian like Viscount Bryce has pointed out that no more in India than in the Roman Empire has there been any question of establishing free institutions, either for the country as a whole or for any particular province; and that the Council Reforms of 1861, 1892 and 1909 were merely intended to give opportunities and means for the expression of Indian opinion and not to give any real power to the people. Well, it does not require much political acumen to discover that we in India are yet a long way off from free institutions and that the reforms so far effected have not yielded any real power to the people either in the Imperial or in the Provincial Councils. But it is my firm belief that the privileges already acquired, if used with industry and moderation and tact, will in no distant future receive considerable enlargement, and we must continue to press for



further expansion in all the directions I have mentioned, undeterred by the criticism of the one and the cynicism of the other. We shall continue to urge the enlargement of the powers and modifications of the constitution of the Legislative Councils. We shall continue to ask for larger and yet large admission of Indians to the higher ranks of the public services in all its branches and we shall claim these not as mere concessions but as a gradual fulfilment of solemn pledges for the progressive nationalisation of the government of the country. We shall continue our labours till really free institutions *are* established for the whole of the country,—not by any sudden or revolutionary change, but by gradual evolution and cautious progress.

*What the Congress wants.*

When I accepted my nomination for this chair I knew—as all of you must have known—that I was not likely to be able to suggest any specific measures of reform other than those so long advocated by this Congress. But I felt—I trust without undue presumption—that having been in the inner Councils of the Government for however short a time, it was peculiarly my duty to act as your spokesmen on this occasion. It is in that belief that I appeal to the British nation to declare their ungrudging approval of the goal to which we aspire, to declare their inflexible resolution to equip India for her journey to that goal and to furnish her escort on the long and weary road. Such a declaration will be the most distinguished way of marking their appreciation of India's services and sacrifices—her loyalty and her devotion to the Empire. Such a declaration will touch the heart and appeal to the imagination of the people far more than any mere specific political reforms. These latter may fall short of the high expectations raised by utterances of the responsible English statesmen as to the future place of India in the Empire and they may cause general disappointment. But an authoritative declaration of policy on the lines I suggest will, without causing such disappointment, carry conviction to the minds of the people that the pace of the administrative reforms will be reasonably accelerated and that henceforth it will be only a question of patient preparation. The most appropriate opportunity for such a declaration will be the moment when the victory of England and her Allies will establish for ever the triumph of free institutions over old-world doctrines of military absolutism.

Let me not be misunderstood. I do not say that all that is wanted, all that would satisfy us, is a mere declaration of policy: what I do say is that there should be a frank and full statement of the policy of Government as regards the future of India, so that hope may come where despair holds sway and faith where doubt spreads its darkening shadow, and I ask that steps should be taken to move towards self-government by the gradual development of popular control over all departments of Government and by the removal of disabilities and restrictions under which we labour both in our own country and in other parts of the British Empire.

I have great pleasure in availing myself of this opportunity to acknowledge with gratitude two recent measures which, though not exactly steps towards self-government, amount to some recognition of India's place in the Empire. The first, thanks to the statesmanlike efforts of Lord Hardinge, is the partial amelioration of the condition of the Indian emigrants in South Africa, and the other is the acceptance by Lord Hardinge's Government of my friend the Hon. Mr. Shafi's resolution for an official representation of India at the Imperial Conference. I would, however, venture to suggest that in addition to the official representative, one or two of the Indian Princes who have rendered such conspicuous service to the Empire might fittingly represent the great Continent of India. The delegation of one or two distinguished Indian Chiefs to the Imperial Conference will, in addition to other honors no doubt in store for them, be a just recognition of their pre-eminent services and will gratify public opinion throughout the length and breadth of India.

Coming to domestic politics, I do not think it necessary that I should on the present occasion deal in detail with the various concrete measures which the Congress advocates as an effective advance towards self-government on lines suited to India's special requirements. A decisive advance towards provincial autonomy, the liberalisation of the Council Regulations, establishment of elective as opposed to non-official majorities, an increase of their powers of control, specially in regard to finance, a larger representation of Indians in the various Executive Councils as also in the Council of the Secretary of State, the admission of larger numbers of Indians to all the higher branches of the public services, the long-delayed separation of judicial and executive functions, the expansion of primary, scientific and technical education, the abolition of indentured labour and the improvement of the position of Indians in other parts of the Empire—these are reforms which have long been urged and which will be dealt with by you, I have no doubt, so far as you think necessary. I am afraid, however, most of them must stand over for adjustment till peace is in sight. For myself, I will be content with dealing as shortly as I can with three specific matters which have become increasingly urgent and with regard to which there is a practical unanimity of opinion. They are:—

Firstly—the question of commissions in the army and military training of the people.

Secondly—the extension of local self-government.

Thirdly—the development of our commerce and our industries including agriculture.

*Commissions in the Army and Military training.*

There can be, I venture to think, no true sense of citizenship where there is no sense of responsibility for the defence of one's own country. "If there is trouble, others will quiet it down. If there is riot, others will subdue

it. If there is a danger, others will face it. If our country is in peril, others will defend it." When a people feel like this, it indicates that they have got to a stage when all sense of civic responsibility has been crushed out of them, and the system which is responsible for this feeling is inconsistent with the self-respect of normal human beings.

I shall be the first to acknowledge that various steps have been and are being taken by the Government to promote the right spirit of self-help in the country, but I feel and I feel strongly that hitherto the Government has not only ignored but has put positive obstacles in the way of the people acquiring or retaining a spirit of national self-help in this the most essential respect.

For what is the present condition of things? Except certain warlike races like the Sikhs and Rajputs, the people generally are debarred from receiving any kind of military training. Not only are they not allowed enlistment in the ranks of His Majesty's Army, but they are even precluded from joining any volunteer corps. Even with regard to the classes of men—Sikhs and Rajputs, Gurkhas and Pathans, &c.—who are taken into the regular army for the simple reason that the number of English troops is not in itself sufficient to maintain peace and order in this country—even with reference to these classes it is an inflexible rule that though they may now obtain the highest badge of valour, *viz.*, the Victoria Cross, not one of them can receive a Commission in His Majesty's Army irrespective of birth or bravery, education or efficiency.

While the humblest European and Eurasian and even the West Indian Negro has the right to carry arms, the law of the land denies even to the most law-abiding and respectable Indian the privilege of possessing or carrying arms of any description except as a matter of special concession and indulgence, often depending on the whim and caprice of unsympathetic officials.

To my mind the mere statement of the present system ought to be sufficient to secure its condemnation.

Let men proceed to state shortly what changes we consider essential to remedy this state of things.

1st. We ask for the right to enlist in the regular army, irrespective of race or province of origin, but subject only to prescribed tests of physical fitness.

2nd. We ask that the commissioned ranks of the Indian Army should be thrown open to all classes of His Majesty's subjects, subject to fair, reasonable and adequate physical and educational tests. We ask that a military college or colleges should be established in India where proper military training can be received by those of our countrymen who will have the good fortune to receive His Majesty's Commission.

3rd. We ask that all classes of His Majesty's subjects should be allowed to join as volunteers, subject of course again to such rules and regulations as will ensure proper control and discipline, and

4th. We ask that the invidious distinctions under the Arms Act should be removed. This has no real connection with the three previous claims, but I deal with it together with the others as all these disabilities are attempted to be justified on the same ground of political expediency.

Let us pause for a moment and consider the objections that are generally brought forward against the first three proposals.

As to the right to join the ranks, irrespective of race or province of origin objections are put forward, firstly, that not all the races of India provide good fighting material and that many of them lack the physical courage necessary for the army. And, secondly, that many of them are neither willing nor anxious to join the ranks or to enter the army in any capacity.

The last may be dealt with in a few words. We are asking for a right, and if it turns out that some of us and even all of us are not willing to avail ourselves of that right,—well there will be no compulsion on them to do so and nobody will be the worse off because of the right. On the contrary, it will remove a grievance bitterly felt and loudly complained of and will redound to the credit of Government.

As regards the first objection, *viz.*, the want of necessary martial spirit in certain classes of races, it requires more serious consideration. The argument is this: the country can afford to keep as a standing army only a certain number of trained soldiers and officers and it must get the best it can for the money it spends, and if certain races are unfit by reason of inherent want of courage for the profession of arms, the state would naturally select its soldiers from other classes. So say our opponents.

Taking it at its full strength, this argument has its limitation. For you cannot govern a State on exactly the same principles as you manage a shop. You may get better value for your money by getting as your soldier an Afridi or a Pathan or any non-British subject but by excluding the Parsi, or the Madrasi, or the Bengali, you create a feeling of grievance, if not of actual resentment, which is certain to cause serious embarrassment in the work of general administration. You render it impossible for the excluded classes to consider themselves as *equal* subjects and citizens responsible for the defence of the country, and you fail to foster that spirit of self-help and that sense of self-respect among those very classes which is essential to attain the goal of imperial unity.

Hitherto I have proceeded upon the assumption that some of the races in India are lacking in the physical courage necessary for the profession of arms. But, I ask, is it a correct hypothesis? Is it true that the Bengali—I am taking him as a type only—has not and will never have the requisite

physical courage? The theory was started by Macaulay in his too sweeping condemnation of the people of the Gangetic delta, forgetting that the Bengal peasantry has always been a sturdy and virile class, particularly in tracts not touched by malaria. But take even the professional or educated classes in Bengal. A good many of them, who enlisted under conditions of great personal sacrifice, are at the present moment working in Mesopotamia in an Ambulance Corps, and I am confident all British officers in that theatre of war from the General in Command downwards will tell you that not a single man in that Corps has proved himself deficient either in physical courage or in endurance.

Take another example nearer home. There is a body of public servants much misunderstood and therefore very often much maligned. I know there is a prejudice against them. I refer to the Bengali officers of the C. I. D. of the Police. Ask any Englishman in Bengal you like, from His Excellency the Governor downwards, and I am sure he will tell you there is not one among those officers who does not unflinchingly face death daily and hourly for the sake of duty and loyalty and, let me add, that he does so, often in spite of much obloquy and great discouragement.

I take leave to point out, therefore, that it is not correct, at any rate at the present time, to assert of any sections of the Indian people that they are wanting in such physical courage and manly virtues as to render them incapable of bearing arms. But even if it were so, is it not the obvious duty of England so to train them as to remove this incapacity as they are trying to remove so many others, especially if it be the case, as there is some reason to believe it is, that it is English rule which has brought them to such a pass? England has ruled this country for considerably over 150 years now, and surely it cannot be a matter of pride to her that at the end of this period the withdrawal of her rule would mean chaos and anarchy and would leave the country an easy prey to any foreign adventurers. There are some of our critics who never fail to remind us that if the English were to leave the country to-day, we would have to wire to them to come back before they got as far as Aden. Some even enjoy the grim joke that were the English to withdraw now, there would be neither a rupee nor a virgin left in some parts of the country. For my part, I can conceive of no more scathing indictment of the results of British Rule. A superman might gloat over the spectacle of the conquest of might over justice, and over righteousness, but I am much mistaken if the British nation, fighting now as ever for the cause of justice and freedom and liberty, will consider it as other than discreditable to itself in the highest degree that, after nearly two centuries of British Rule, India has been brought to-day to the same emasculated condition as the Britons were in the beginning of the 5th century when the Roman legions left the English shores in order to defend their own country against the Huns, Goths and other barbarian hordes.

In asking, therefore, for the right of military training, we are only seeking to remedy the results I have described. We are seeking to regain our lost self-respect and to strengthen our sense of civic responsibility. We are seeking to regain the right to defend our homes and hearths against possible invaders, should the strong protecting arm of England be ever withdrawn from our country. It is no mere sentiment that compels us to demand this inalienable right of all human beings, though sentiment has its undoubted place in the scheme of every government. Some day or other, our right arm may be called upon to defend all that man holds most precious. For who will venture to prophesy that sooner or later there may not be another such conflict as is now convulsing the world, when there may be new alliances and fresh combinations and when England may not have the same allies and advantages as she has now?

I have endeavoured to prove that neither of the objections which are generally put forward against our claims to enlistment in the army is tenable. I have tried to show the justice as well as the necessity of our demands.

In the face of what has happened in the present war, it is no longer correct to say what Lord Bryce said in 1912. This is what Lord Bryce said:—"To England, however, apart from the particular events which might have created the snapping of the tie and apart from the possible loss of a market, severance from India need involve no lasting injury. To be mistress of a vast country, whose resources for defence need to be supplemented by her own, adds indeed to her fame *but does not add to her strength*. (The italics are mine). England was great and powerful before she owned a yard of land in Asia, and might be great and powerful again with no more foothold in the East than would be needed for the naval prestige which protects her commerce."

The resources for defence which India possesses even now do add to the strength of England as has been so amply proved in the present war. This strength could be multiplied a hundred-fold were our claims ever conceded. For, if the people of India are allowed and trained to bear arms, what nation is there on the face of the earth whose strength would compare with that of England? Nor is there any reason for apprehension that such concessions would be a source of internal danger. If the Sikh, the Gurkha, the Maharatta and the Pathan—good and valiant soldiers as they are—are found to be loyal and law-abiding, there is no reason to think that the case would be otherwise with the other races when admitted to the same status and privileges. Besides, we are only asking that the privileges are to be granted subject only to such conditions, rules, regulations and safeguards as to ensure proper discipline and control.

In the case of volunteers also, they will be similarly subject to all proper safeguards and restrictions which will be for the Government to lay down.

Subject to such safeguards, the ranks of volunteer corps will afford, without any risk whatever to the Government or the people, an outlet for restless energies which now find doubtful and dangerous channels.

In making these demands, I know I raise as large a question as the formation of a national militia. I desire frankly and freely to meet the criticism that such an army, with a preponderance of the Indian element, may be turned against the British Government. I venture to submit in reply that anarchists and seditionists may succeed in winning over an ignorant and mercenary army, but they will never succeed winning over a truly national army, drawn from a people made increasingly loyal by the spread of education and liberal self-governing institutions. Of course, I am not suggesting that the army should be *nationalized* in a day any more than that the government of the country should be nationalized by a stroke of the pen. But I urge in all humility that the time has come for making the beginning of a National Army in India. The tremendous shock with which every part of our world-wide Empire has realised the prime necessity of maintaining an army large enough for its defence and protection renders it imperative that a strong National Army should be raised and maintained in every part of India.

The opening of a military career will fire the imagination and stimulate the virility of India in a way that nothing else can do. And is it too much for India to expect to be treated in the same way as Russia treats her subject races—especially after the proof she has given of the prowess of her sons and their devotion and their loyalty to the imperial standard?

Reason and convenience, justice and necessity, all support every one of the claims I have ventured to put forward; and if a definite advance is not made in these respects, it will be difficult to believe that the war has changed the *angle of vision* of our rulers. It will be impossible to retain faith in what was proclaimed by the present Premier, Mr. Asquith, "that the Empire rests, not upon the predominance, artificial and superficial, of race or class, but upon the loyal affection of free communities built upon the basis of equal rights."

I now come to the last but not the least important of our claims in this respect, *viz.*, that the invidious distinctions under the Arms Act should be abolished. Sentiment as well as reason alike recommends it. Not only will the galling sense of racial inferiority and the overt imputation of universal disloyalty be removed by such a measure, but people will also get rid of onerous disabilities in the way of defending themselves against the attacks of wild animals as well as lawless human adversaries.

### *Local Self-Government.*

Now we come to the subject which has given rise to a considerable discussion among us. If ever we attain our goal of self-government, it will not be

merely through the expansion of Legislative Councils and their powers, nor yet through the admission of more Indians to Executive Councils or the establishment even of a national militia, though all of them have no doubt their proper use and importance in the scheme of our national progress. It will come in a very great measure with the advance and development of local self-government. When people generally so far understand their civic rights and duties as to be able to manage their own communal business, their roads and drains, their tanks and wells, their schools and dispensaries, it will no longer be possible to keep them from controlling the higher work of administration. Indeed, it is not always possible to do the latter satisfactorily without having served a full term of apprenticeship in the former, and I cannot do better than remind you of what was said by Mrs. Besant in her address to the Congress last December, while supporting the resolution on Self-Government: "The training for self-government is of vital import to the nation to-day. For the government of States is at once a science and an art: and in order that it may be worthily exercised, the lesson must be learnt in local self-government, then in provincial autonomy, and finally in the self-government of the nation: for the work of governing is the most highly skilled profession upon earth

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What then should you do? You should take part in the local-government wherever it is possible. As it is, take it and practise it, for you will gain experience and you will gain knowledge; and only that experience and knowledge will guide you when you come to speak in larger councils and to make your voice heard over vast areas. So I would plead to you to face this drudgery. It is drudgery, make no mistake; understand the details of local administration and understand how to manage your own drains, particularly your waterworks. Those are the alphabets of self-government: and unless you go through that drudgery, no amount of enthusiasm and love for the country will make your administration a success."

No less emphatic was the advice of one of our most revered leaders of the Congress, Sir Subramania Iyer, as President of the Reception Committee of the last Congress. If this is the view of our leaders, the views of Government are no less clear. We need not go further back than the memorable Resolution of 1882 of Lord Ripon. You will remember what a generous scheme of local self-government was there laid down "to foster sedulously the small beginnings of independent political life". It will take me long, and it will hardly be profitable, to trace the history of the failure, the dismal failure, of that scheme. But I may be pardoned for pointing out that the failure was due neither to the Government of India, nor to the Local Government, nor yet to the civil service in India, as is sometimes hastily assumed, but, so far at any rate as Bengal is concerned, to the whole frame-work of the scheme being changed by the Secretary of State for India in Council, in spite of the protests and objections of the authorities in this country.



Lord Ripon's Resolution laid down the following fundamental principles :—

1. That the Local Governments should maintain throughout the country a network of Local Boards charged with definite duties and entrusted with definite funds.
2. That the jurisdiction of the Primary Boards should be so limited in area as to ensure both local knowledge and local interest on the part of each of the members.
3. That there should be a preponderance of non-official members to be chosen by election wherever possible.
4. That Government control on these bodies should be exercised from without rather than from within, non-official elected chairmen acting, wherever practicable, as chairmen of the Local Boards.

The Decentralization Commission in their Report dealt with the matter at some length and also made some definite recommendations.

Lord Morley in his Reforming Despatch, dated 27th November 1908, said :—“The village in India has been the fundamental and indestructible unit of the social system surviving the downfall of dynasty after dynasty. I desire,” said Lord Morley to the Viceroy, “Your Excellency to consider the best way of carrying out a policy that would make the village a starting point of public life.”

We have next the Resolution of Lord Hardinge's Government, dated 1st of May 1915, dealing with and assenting to many of the recommendations of the Decentralization Commission. We are, therefore, in agreement with Government as to the importance of local self-government. It is a matter of further general agreement that the re-development of the village as an administrative unit has been brought within the range of practical politics by the spread of the co-operative movement. I find from the report of Sir E. MacLagan's Committee on Co-operation in India that primary societies have grown from 832 in 1906-07 to 14,566 in 1913-14, the number of members from 88,582 to 661,859, and the amount of working capital from *nil* to 46,427,842 rupees. The report states :—“no one reading these figures can fail to be struck by the magnitude which the growth has already attained or to be convinced that the movement has taken firm root. Societies are now so spread over all parts of India and the advantages which their members are obtaining are so patent that it is impossible to doubt that the movement will eventually attain dimensions compared to which its present size will appear negligible. As a consequence, there will undoubtedly arise, through the medium of co-operation, a powerful organisation formed of those agricultural classes, who are at present inarticulate through want of education and cohesion.”

Local self-government, supplemented by the spread of the co-operative movement, will gradually solve many of our most difficult problems—such as primary education, small industries, improved agriculture, indebtedness of the peasantry, rural sanitation and so forth, and to this we must devote our best energies and attention in the immediate future, bearing in mind that we have got to build from the village upwards.

Here is a vast field in which we can in co-operation with the Government work heart and soul for the amelioration of the condition of the masses of our people. It has been forcibly pointed out by that good friend of India Sir Daniel Hamilton that the development of the co-operative movement in the villages requires thousands of men. The civilians who have been in charge of this movement have done wonders considering their numbers. They deserve the very highest praise, but their numbers are far too few. 12,000 village banks seem a large number to have been started in 10 years, but, at the same rate of progress, India will not have been covered with village banks for another 400 or 500 years. Is the great industry of India, agriculture, to wait all this time before it is provided with a banking system? Are the 250 millions of Indian cultivators to go on paying 30, 40 and 50 per cent. for their finance for hundreds of years to come, while the rest of the civilised world gets all the money it wants at 3, 4 and 5 per cent.? What India wants is more men to develop co-operative credit and she must have them. The men are there, hundreds of them being turned out of her colleges every year with nothing to do, with nothing to look forward to. And every Indian will join in the expression of the hope that we shall soon see established in every province of India schools for the training in co-operative methods and co-operative finance of the best of India's young men, who will carry the co-operative flag into every village of India, and wage war on the darkness and the ignorance and the poverty which exist to-day and which are in a large measure due to want of co-operation. In the same connection, my friend Sir Theodore Morison has gathered from official reports highly interesting illustrations which Co-operative Credit Societies are giving to the self-culture of the people. In one instance, a man of middle age learnt to read and write slowly to keep the accounts of the bank of which he was President, and, though his first efforts were painfully hard to decipher, he preserved to such good purpose that his books are now the best kept in the Punjab. In another village, the President and officers of the bank had acquired such influence that they had reconstituted the ancient authority, of the village Panchayat for settling local disputes, with the result that litigation, which had been the curse of the place before, has now much decreased.

While I gratefully acknowledge the efforts now being made by the Government in all provinces for well and truly laying the foundations of local self government, I cannot help regretting that the Resolution of the Government of India of last summer does not go far enough or even as far as Lord

Ripon's Resolution of 1882 in the direction of recommending less official control and a greater extension of the elective principle, both as regards members and chairmen of District Boards. Let not our rulers forget that "self government implies the right to go wrong for it is nobler for a nation as for a man to struggle towards excellence with its own natural force and vitality, however blindly and vainly, than to live in irreproachable decency under expert guidance from without".

It is not impossible for us any more now than it was for Lord Ripon in 1882 to lay down any hard and fast rules which shall be of universal application in a country so vast and in its local circumstances so varied as British India. All we can do is to ask that the principles laid down by Lord Ripon of undying memory should be generously given effect to, *viz.*, distinct funds with distinct duties, not too large administrative areas, more and more of elections (both of members and chairman) and less and less of official control from within. From our side, schemes for different provinces have been put forward from 1870 downwards. I will mention only those of the late Mr. Malabari, Mr. R. C. Dutt and Mr. Gokhale. Schemes have also been prepared from the official side in almost all the different provinces—Bengal, Bombay, Madras, the U. P., the Punjab and the Central Provinces. It ought not therefore to be difficult in the existing state of the land to make an effective advance at once on an adjustment of these different schemes—and, if it is made in the right spirit, I feel confident that the ultimate success of local self government in India is absolutely certain.

It is for us to co-operate whole-heartedly with the officials for the success of the different measures of local self government which are already being undertaken in the different provinces. Let us not assume, as we are sometimes unfortunately inclined to do, that the civilians will be loth to part with the powers which they have hitherto possessed. Let us in justice to the Indian Civil Service remember that the members of that distinguished body have never spared themselves in the service of India. Let me also implore my friends of the Indian Civil Service not to commit the mistake of looking upon the educated Indian as out of touch with his less favoured countrymen or trying to keep the latter down for his own personal profit and advancement. Let us look upon each other as willing and necessary co-adjutors for the advancement of India in every department. Let us not rail at the mote in our brother's eye without considering the beam that is in our own. Let neither of us indulge in prejudice or fretfulness, but work in friendly co-operation for the progress and prosperity of the teeming millions of India.

#### *Development of our Commerce, Industries and Agriculture.*

Whatever difference of opinion may exist as to whether India is growing richer or poorer under British Rule, there is none with regard to her extreme poverty. And there can never be political contentment without material

prosperity shared by all classes of the people. And what the District Administration Committee of Bengal quotes with approval, as regards Bengal, namely, that our industrial backwardness is a great political danger, applies in fact and in reality to the whole of India.

No one will be disposed to question the fact of this amazing backwardness. Rich in all the resources of nature, India continues to be the poorest country in the civilized world. The result is that an unhealthy political activity has arisen among certain classes of the people. As the District Administration Committee of Bengal says: "This unrest compels Government to take repressive measures,—a regrettable necessity which makes all the more desirable the adoption of those remedial and beneficent measures which will afford the most certain cure of the worst evils of the situation while proving that Government is no less determined to create prosperity than to maintain order."

What are these "remedial measures"? Technical schools and even technological institutes are not enough. These have in all modern States generally followed and not preceded the development of industries and manufactures. The first step taken by Japan was to start factories, either financed by Government or with Government control and managed by experts from abroad. In India alone, with the exception of spasmodic efforts, the Government adheres to the exploded *laissez faire* doctrine that the development of commerce and industry is not within the province of the State.

It is high time that this policy were abandoned. The necessity of carrying on demonstration work in agriculture, the greatest industry of the country, on a commercial scale, is admitted by all, and it is only where this principle has been put into practice that agricultural improvements have been taken up by the people. Similar results will follow if the same policy is pursued with regard to other industries and manufactures. They have followed whenever such experiments have been undertaken by the Government, as in the case of aluminium and chrome-tanning in Madras.

The time is singularly opportune. The war has put an end to the enormous imports of German and Austrian goods and Japan is already making great efforts to capture the trade which by right ought to be ours.

I have neither the knowledge nor the capacity to go into details, and I rejoice that the experts at the Congress of Indian Commerce were able to point out specific ways and means by which the Government can assist us in this respect. But I will venture to say that the solution of the problem can no longer be safely postponed. And it will test, as no other question has done, the altruism of English statesmanship, for in promoting and protecting Indian industries it may become necessary—it *will* become necessary—to sacrifice the interests even of English manufacturers.

*A Programme of Self-Help.*

Brother-delegates,—Hitherto I have been dealing with measures that can be undertaken only by the Government, and in doing so I have incidentally mentioned the various ways in which we ourselves must act and move forward. Indeed, the field for such work is so vast as to render it impossible of definition. Primary education, improvement of agriculture and industrial expansion, improvement of rural as well as urban sanitation—there is work enough and to spare for every one of us. And how much could we not do by our own efforts, if only we cared to organise ourselves. I venture to suggest that we, in this connection, should lay down a constructive and continuous programme of work in all these directions as a part of our Congress activities, and that Provincial and District Committees all over the country should occupy themselves throughout the year in some one or more of these manifold directions, so as to show the achievement of some result, however small, however insignificant, at the end of each year. For instance, while waiting for the establishment of a system of free and compulsory primary education, let each district branch of the Provincial Congress Committees be able to show that they have either directly or indirectly contributed to the establishment of ten, or even five, or even two primary schools in their district during one year. Similarly, we might very usefully and profitably extend our activity in supplementing the work of the District Local Boards and in spreading among our rural population some elementary knowledge of hygiene and sanitation and in organising relief for local and provincial distress, if and when need be.

For this kind of self-help, the first requisite is to raise funds for the propaganda. Are we willing to do so? I confess to a feeling of diffidence, for though friends and leaders like Allan Octavian Hume have repeatedly asked us to make permanent provision for the work of the Congress, both here and in England, their advice seems to have fallen on absolutely deaf ears. Sir S. Iyer suggested last year that a body of Congress supporters should be brought into existence, each member thereof paying a subscription say of Rs. 25 per annum. He very modestly presumed that it would not be difficult to find in each province a few hundred of such subscribers, and he suggested that the funds so raised should be held and administered by a few trustees duly appointed, who should further be clothed with a corporate character by registration under the law so as to make them really competent to receive and hold, for the Congress, donation and endowments, which he hoped would not be long in coming. That is still to come. Let us, at this Congress, wipe out the reproach that moderate Indian opinion only devotes a few days to public business in order to have the right during the rest of the year not to think any more about it. Let us engrave in our hearts the advice which Mr. Hume gave us in 1904 when he said: "As for yourselves, stop foolish quarrels and depressing rivalries, substitute close and loyal co-operation and reasoned and constant

action, give freely your time, your money and your hearts; speak little and do much." Let us begin to deal with the concrete problems of civic life on the basis of ascertained and accepted facts, and in order that our beloved institution, the Congress, may be a living actuality, let us begin by collecting first the funds which are indispensable for the carrying on of its work. It is my hope that this Congress may be a fertilising stream of steady effort fed by the spirit of service and sacrifice and spreading far and wide the blessings of peace and prosperity. If in speaking to you to-day—and I spoke freely and frankly—I have succeeded in the smallest possible measure in advancing the object of the Indian National Congress and in appealing successfully, in however small a degree, to the better mind both of England and India, I shall consider my humble labours to have been more than amply recompensed.

### *Our Future.*

And now, brother-delegates, I have placed before you, to the best of my light, what the Government should do for us and what we should do for ourselves, so that we may have an India of the future answering our ideal, satisfying our aspirations, and rising to the height of our noblest emotions.

And towards this end the war is rapidly helping us onward. In the midst of the carnage and massacre, there is being accomplished the destruction of much that is evil and there is the budding forth of much that will abide. False pride and aloofness are giving place to union and genuine co-operation between those whom nothing before now seemed able to draw together. Protestant and Catholic, Churchman and Dissenter, Hindu and Moslem, Englishman and Indian, Colonial and coloured peoples are offering their daily worship not in separate sanctuaries but under the improvised shelter of the trench or the barn, animated by the same faith and trusting in the same inspiration. A new spirit of self-sacrifice, a new interest in the weak and suffering is abroad: self-indulgence is giving place to self-sacrifice, and throughout the British Empire there is prevailing an atmosphere of good-will and mutual service and esteem. It seems to me that, under the benign dispensation of an inscrutable Providence, we shall emerge into a new era of peace and good-will, and our beloved Motherland will occupy an honoured place in the Empire with which her fortunes are indissolubly linked, and we shall be the free and equal citizens of that great Empire bearing its burden, sharing its responsibilities, and participating in its heritage of freedom and glory as comrades and brethren.

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No. 56.

Secretary of State to Viceroy

Telegram P., No. 2043, 27th Novr. 1916, 7-30 p. m. (Recd. 28th, 7-30 p. m.)

*Private.* I am being a good deal pressed to make some declaration of policy before meeting of Congress in hopes that it may strengthen hands of moderates. I have up to now refused, wishing first to have your proposals and being doubtful of usefulness of general declaration without specification of particular reforms to be earliest undertaken. But I should like to have your opinion whether declaration on lines of my letter to Lord Willingdon of September 30th, of which I am asking him to send you a copy, would be useful or the reverse. I could probably arrange friendly question if this would be helpful to you.

No. 57.

Extract from a letter from the Right Hon'ble Austen Chamberlain, P. C., M. P., His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 27th November 1916.

3. I am impressed by the sensitiveness of Indian opinion to any fancied neglect. There is a good deal of restlessness about my silence, and I am pressed from many quarters to make some declaration of future policy and of the results which India is to achieve by her participation in the struggle. This opens a very big question and, as you know, I have shrunk from making general declarations whilst unable to define particular reforms. Above all I have not wished to say anything until I was in full possession of the views of your Government, and I have not been quite certain that when the time came for a declaration it would not be better made by you than by me. But some little ceremony in the transmission of the Flag to India at the present time might serve to show India that her position in the Empire and her services to it were not forgotten, and might go some way at least to confirm the faith of wavering Moderates.

4. It is this fear that, unless we can throw some plank to them, the Moderates would be swept away in the approaching Congress that has caused so many people to press me to make some declaration. I am not convinced that they are right, but I have been sufficiently impressed by what they say to telegraph to you upon the subject. In the course of my correspondence with Willingdon, I wrote some sentences expressive of my general views on Indian policy which Lucas observed might some day form the basis of such a declaration. I have telegraphed to Willingdon to send you a copy of this letter, as it will give you the sort of lines which I think any statement by me might follow. I have no desire to force the pace or to anticipate action by you; but if you thought that it could be useful, I could easily make or find an occasion for saying a few words. It would, I think, be possible to go a little further than I did in the letter to

Willingdon. I could, for instance, say that the well-known aspirations of Indians dealt with two sets of questions, external and internal; that the external questions had regard to the position which India was to occupy in the Empire and to her relations with other parts of the Empire. As to these, I could recall Hardinge's declaration on behalf of His Majesty's Government that they would give most favourable consideration to the resolution of the Legislative Council asking for representation in future Imperial Conferences, and I could express my hope that India's appeal would be favourably considered by the other Dominions. I could further recall the Prime Minister's declaration that India would be consulted and represented in the Fiscal Conference of the Allies, and I could say that meanwhile your Government was pursuing its enquiries and that you were kept informed of all that was material in the same way as the Governments of the Dominions. In connection with external affairs, I could also mention the decision to bring the present system of indentured emigration to a close. Then turning to domestic matters, I could say that His Majesty's Government had reserved the consideration of fiscal questions for review, together with the general policy of the Empire in those matters at the close of the war.

5. As regards internal reforms, I might add that you were taking steps to secure as early a decision as possible on the many important recommendations contained in the Civil Service Commission's Report; that you were considering what other measures of reform were desirable, and that I was awaiting the expression of your views. I should have to add that the special claims of the Indian Army for its services in the present war were engaging our careful attention. I wonder whether something of this kind would be useful or the reverse.

6. I wish I had put the whole subject before you with this fulness at an earlier date, for this letter will, I fear, arrive too late for the special emergency which called forth my telegram.

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No. 58.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., Viceroy's Camp, 1st December 1916, 8-45 p. m.

*Private.* Please see your private telegram of the 27th ultimo. Our despatch should be in your hands about the 20th December.

I am very doubtful whether any statement you made would be of any value unless it specifically stated advance which we were prepared to make. Your letter to Lord Willingdon will not reach me for some time, as I am in Burma. Congress is not likely to pass any resolutions which falls short of memorial of 19 members. We thought we had converted Lord Willingdon to the undesirability of vague declarations in October last when he was in Simla.



## No. 59.

Extract from a letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated the 3rd January 1917.

7. You have now received our Reform proposals, and I am very anxious to learn from you what view you take with regard to them. As you have probably seen, people are anxiously awaiting a pronouncement. For my part, I am prepared to remain silent if you think such a course advisable, but, between ourselves, I think it would be wise now to give an indication of our policy, in view of the prolongation of the war, as early as we can, and I should prefer a complete and full statement rather than an announcement by dribblets. The latter would be regarded as a sign of weakness, and each dribblet, as it came out, would be taken as a concession to pressure from outside rather than as a part of a considered policy and would invite further agitation.

I imagine your chief difficulty will be the announcement of the goal, and the extension of the elective principle in the Councils.

I would earnestly press for the former and I do not think that I can add to the arguments which have been put forward in the despatch, which, I would remind you, was unanimous on this point.

With regard to the latter, I might perhaps suggest a compromise which would meet the case—an elected majority, but on the Interests and Classes basis. This is really Craddock's proposal, and I think would be accepted willingly by us, with the exception of Sankaran Nair.

I meet my Legislative Council on February 7th, but I doubt whether it will be possible for you to give me your views by then.

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 No. 60.

Copy of a letter from the Hon'ble Sardar Sunder Singh, Majithia, Honorary Secretary, Chief Khalsa Diwan, Amritsar, to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, No. 5075, dated the 3rd January 1917.

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 PRAYER ABOUT POST-WAR REFORMS.

On behalf of the Sikh community, I have the honour to lay before you, for the consideration of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor and for communication to His Excellency the Viceroy, the following views with regard to the reforms which the Sikhs, as dutiful subjects of His Imperial Majesty the King-Emperor, would beg leave to submit, for favourable consideration of Government, to be introduced in the administration of the country upon the termination of the present war.

2. Before, however, setting out in detail the views, I am desired to submit that the first and the foremost duty that the Sikhs feel lying upon them, and for the matter of that upon all Indians, is to do all and everything that may be needed for the successful termination of the war. The Sikh community feels that the gigantic struggle requires very great efforts and sacrifices on the part of the whole Empire. The part so far played by India in the struggle has not been a mean one and the Sikh community has every reason to feel proud of the share contributed by itself in such efforts and sacrifices. It is not our habit to talk loudly of our services to the British Empire which, ever since the annexation of the Punjab to the British Empire and the Indian Mutiny, form a brilliant chapter of Indian military history, whether fighting has had to be done on the frontiers of India or abroad; and it was only the other day that the Sikh community was gratified to learn from the mouth of His Imperial Majesty's Secretary of State for India that of the honours and rewards awarded to Indian troops for distinguished services in the present war nearly 30 per cent. were won by the Sikhs in the army. These awards could not but be won by huge sacrifices made and daring deeds performed on the battle-fields, and my community is proud that the Sikh armies have so well maintained their high military traditions. In the matter of recruitments also, the Sikh community has not lagged behind in their patriotic sacrifices, and we are happy to know that our efforts in this direction have been very kindly acknowledged by His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. Although the Sikhs form only 12 per cent. of the total population of the province, they have supplied approximately one-third of the number of men recruited for the army during the first two years of the war. It is fully believed the community will not lack in patriotism in future and will maintain these proportions both in the supply of men and in the performance of deeds of valour and making of sacrifices so as to bring the war to a successful issue.

3. It has been said that the part that India has borne in the present war and the manner in which Indians have faithfully and loyally stood by England in this world-war has evoked feeling of gratitude in the hearts of the English people and that the Government, being alive to the situation, is contemplating measures of reform in the administration of the country. The civilising effect of the British Government in India and the noble traditions of the British have raised hopes and aspirations in the minds of the people of this country, and the reforms introduced by Lords Morley and Minto have helped to advance the country a good deal. In this world-war, the Sikhs are proud to have taken their humble share and have placed their resources in men and means at the disposal of the benign Government who always have the best interests of the weak communities at heart. In India Sikhs form a minority—though an important one—and as such they expect consideration similar to one granted to the Mahomedan community by the Government of Lord Minto. They however feel that hitherto the community has not received that share of encouragement which

is their just due, and that in any scheme of further progress and development which may be formulated, they are likely to suffer considerably as against the more vocal sections of their countrymen, unless their position and status are distinctly safeguarded by the benign Government. The past history of the Councils puts it beyond doubt how any scheme which does not specifically provide for the adequate representation of the community is doomed to failure, so far as the Sikhs are concerned. No scheme of reform will therefore be helpful and beneficial to the Sikhs which does not guarantee to them a share in the Provincial and Imperial Councils, as well as in the civil administration of the country which may be proportionate to the importance, position and services of the community, with due regard to their status before the annexation of the Punjab, their present state in the country and their past and present services to the Empire. I am therefore to impress upon the Government that, in any scheme of reforms in the Council of the Secretary of State, Imperial and Provincial Councils, both Executive and Legislative, a share may be reserved for the Sikh community in proportion to their services and status, and that the same principle of proportion be recognised in the recruitment for the civil administration, due regard being had to the efficiency of the services. In order that such representation may be adequate and effective and consistent with their position and importance, the Sikhs claim that a one-third share in all seats and appointments in the Punjab is their just share and should be secured to them as their absolute minimum. Similarly, their share in the Viceroy's and the Secretary of State's Councils should be adequate and fixed on principles of the like nature.

4. With the above prayer, the Chief Khalsa Diwan would beg to suggest the following measures of reforms for the consideration of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, His Excellency the Viceroy and His Majesty's Government in England :—

I.—The Punjab and all other major provinces of India to have each a Governor with an Executive Council.

II.—The number of Indians on the Executive Councils to be up to one-half, but not less than one-third, both in the Imperial and Provincial Councils, due regard being had to the representation of important minorities thereon.

III.—The statutory obligation in favour of public services in Executive Councils to be removed and the hands of His Majesty's Government and of His Excellency the Viceroy to be free in the selection of suitable men for appointment as Executive Members either from the public services of India or from outside sphere.

IV.—The Provincial Governments to be granted autonomy as foreshadowed in the despatch of the Government of India, dated 25th August 1911.

V.—All Legislative Councils to be enlarged and the Punjab placed on an equality with the other major provinces of India; electorates to be expanded

and separate communal representation allowed. Important minorities like the Sikhs in the Punjab to be given special representation in proportion to their status, importance and services to the Empire and on proportion already stated.

VI.—Indian element on the Council of the Secretary of State for India to be enlarged and the Sikh community to always have a seat thereon.

VII.—In any scheme of Imperial Federation, India to have a place equal and similar to that of self-governing Dominions of His Majesty.

VIII.—Greater powers of local administration to be granted to local bodies and the interests of the minorities to be safe-guarded in their constitution, communal representation being allowed in proportion to the importance status and services of a community with a minimum of one-third for the Sikhs in the Punjab.

IX.—Settlements of land revenue to be made permanent, but if this be considered impracticable, then the term of settlements to be increased so as not to be less than fifty years in duration.

X.—Complete separation of the Judicial and Executive functions in the administration of the country to be effected.

XI.—The right to carry arms to be granted to Indians equally with the Europeans, the Government reserving the power to restrict such right in cases of criminal tribes and individuals of criminal tendencies.

XII.—Colleges for military training of Indian youths to be established in India and admission thereto given freely to Indians. Higher ranks in the Indian army to be given to the qualified cadets of such military colleges and to deserving native officers of the Indian army. The emoluments of the Indian army to be considerably increased in view of the rates of ordinary labour prevailing in the country.

XIII.—Indians to be allowed to enlist as volunteers and units of a territorial army to be established in India.

XIV.—A scheme of Tariff reform to be introduced in India, whereby Indian industries may receive protection from competition with foreign products.

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#### No. 61.

Extract from a letter from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 10th January 1917.

2. I propose to constitute a special Committee of Council to consider your suggested reforms. When they have had a preliminary discussion, they will be able to indicate the points on which they wish to have advice from the departmental officers and, on obtaining this advice, they can examine the

Despatch in detail and submit a draft reply. I hope by this method of procedure to make more rapid progress than would be the case if the papers followed the ordinary departmental routine for less important matters. I shall very probably attend some meetings of the Committee myself, but I am a little shy of going to Committees of Council, because I think the presence of the Secretary of State rather deters the Members from expressing their opinions freely, and that I get their minds more fully when they hold their deliberations without me than is the case when I preside over them.

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No. 62.

Extract from a letter from H. E. the Right Hon'ble the Lord Willingdon, G. C. I. E., Governor of Bombay, to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 14th January 1917.

I must ask your consideration about a matter as to which I have written Craddock, namely, what is to be our policy and plan of action with regard to this Home Rule propaganda, and what action are we to take, if any, with regard to speeches or articles in the press which are of such an extreme nature as to be likely to create feeling against the Government.

To my mind the question of "Home Rule" must be considered from an India point of view, and not from a provincial one, otherwise we shall have different provinces taking different action and give opportunities to the extremists for much merriment at the expense of the Government which they won't be slow to take advantage of.

This difference of action has already begun in the case of Mrs. Besant. My Government, with the approval of the Government of India, prohibited her from coming into this province, the Central Provinces follow suit. But Meston in the United Provinces lets her in, and not only that, he sits cheek by jowl with her at the National Congress.

We are only at the beginning of this Home Rule movement which is, now that Tilak and Mrs. Besant have collared the Congress, likely to become a formidable political agitation in the near future.

Ought we not to have a settled policy which we ought all to follow and take common action in every province? If it is the policy of the Government of India that Mrs. Besant should have the ban taken off her here, I'll do so of course, but I honestly say that, after the action in the United Provinces, I am in some difficulty as to what is the proper course for my Government to adopt. If Mrs. Besant, for instance, were to try and force her way within the bounds of this province, I must arrest her; but my action is presumably entirely opposed to that of the United Provinces, and *which has the approval of the Government of India*? Forgive my emphasising the situation so strongly, but I am sure you will appreciate my difficulty. I sincerely believe that,

unless we are ready for concerted action, and if each province takes a different line, the result may be a very serious danger to the position of the government in India.

If you would very kindly think this matter over and advise me, I should be very grateful.

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### No. 63.

Extract from a letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to H. E. the Right Hon'ble the Lord Willingdon, G. C. I. E., Governor of Bombay, dated the 21st January 1917.

With regard to the Home Rule movement, we can, I believe, only combat it by formulating our own policy—a course with which I believe you to be in agreement. Our policy is before the Secretary of State, and I am pressing him to allow us to publish it *en bloc*. I am no believer in piecemeal publication. It only leads to agitation on the points not dealt with and such successive publication creates the belief that we can be squeezed. Our despatch practically covers the whole field and all doubt as to our policy will be removed by its publication.

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### No. 64.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 52, 22nd January 1917, 5-15 p. m.

In my speech opening Legislative Council on February 7th, am I at liberty to announce the fact, already widely known, that we have sent home a despatch on the subject of reforms?

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### No. 65.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 143, 23rd January 1917, 2 p. m. (Recd. 24th, 8 a. m.)

*Private.* I have no objection to your stating that you have sent home the reforms despatch, but you will of course give no indication as to the nature of your proposals. This is with reference your private telegram of 22nd instant.

No. 66.

**MEMORANDUM BY THE HON'BLE NAWAB ALI CHAUDHURI.**

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I understand that the Memorandum over the signatures of nineteen of my non-official colleagues of the Imperial Legislative Council regarding Post-War Reforms submitted to the Government last September at Simla is at present engaging their attention. It might be remembered that I was one of those who refused to sign this document. I believed that it was not an opportune time to press on the attention of the Government of India and the Home Government problems of great import and consequence, when the Government was most seriously engaged in the prosecution of the war. Not only would it be undesirable, I felt, to divert the attention of the Government from the most urgent and serious purpose on hand, but I feared that, during such a crisis, Government could not devote to the problems of reconstruction that amount of calm and dispassionate consideration which they deserved. There were other considerations as well. Certain of the more important proposals did not seem to me of any practical value. Moreover, I did not find any adequate safeguards for the interests of the Muslim community. These were in the main my reasons for withholding my assent from the Memorandum.

But as the Government are, in spite of the existing state of war, reported to have been considering the proposals, I feel that I should not remain quiet, lest the interests of the country and of my community might from my point of view irretrievably suffer. I have, therefore, ventured to set below my views on the subject.

To begin with I think it necessary to point out in what suggestions I agree with my colleagues. So far as their request with regard to the dignity and status of Indians in other parts of the Empire in such matters as immigration and indentured labour are concerned, I am entirely one with them. It is not justifiable, nor is it a credit to the freedom-loving instincts of the British nation and to their traditions, to allow a particular section of His Majesty's subjects to domineer over and treat another section almost as though the latter were inferior beings and in no sense citizens of the British Empire. The treatment of Indians in the self-governing Colonies and other parts of the Empire is a matter for strong disapproval; and the sooner things are entirely rectified the better will it be for India and the Empire. In this and in the proposals Nos. (7), (8), (9), (11), (12) and (13) I am in full accord with the signatories of the Memorandum. For convenience's sake I shall transcribe them here:—

- (7) In any scheme of Imperial federation India should be given through her chosen representatives a place similar to that of the self-governing dominions.

- (8) The Provincial Governments should be autonomous as foreshadowed in the Government of India's despatch, dated August 25th, 1911.
- (9) The United Provinces as well as the other major provinces should have a Governor brought from the United Kingdom with an Executive Council.
- (11) The right to carry arms should be granted to Indians on the same conditions as to Europeans.
- (12) Indians should be allowed to enlist as volunteers and units of a territorial army to be established in India.
- (13) Commissions in the army should be given to Indian youths under conditions similar to those applicable to Europeans.

Conceding so far, I shall briefly point out wherein the other proposals contained in the Memorandum did not on their own merits seem to me practicable or well considered.

To explain myself I shall take proposals Nos. (2), (4) and (5) together. No. (2) urges that there should be a substantial majority of elected representatives in the Legislative Councils. No. (5) says that the Imperial Legislative Councils should have power to legislate on all matters and discuss and pass resolutions relating to all matters of Indian administration, the Provincial Councils having similar power with regard to provincial administration. Only in military affairs or foreign relations, declaration of war, the making of peace, and entering into treaties other than commercial, would the Government be allowed independence. No. (4) asks that Budgets should be passed in the shape of money bills. Reading these three proposals together the position of the Government of India, to confine myself to it for illustration, would be somewhat this. The Government of India would be reduced to complete dependence on the Legislative Council in which the Government and the nominated Members would be in a distinct minority. Every action of Government, other than those of the kind mentioned above, will have either to be suggested by the Legislature or approved by it. There is no other alternative. The veto of the Governor-General could at best have a merely negative effect. If the Government wishes to have anything done and the Legislature refuse to give its assent to it, the Governor-General has no power to do anything in the matter. Take for example the Budget which is to be passed in the shape of money bills. Suppose the Legislature rejects it. The Governor-General has no power to intervene. There is no third party to decide. There could hardly be a Referendum in India. The Government is not bound to resign, nor if it could, is it clear who would undertake the Executive functions. Alternative financial proposals or estimates put forward by the Legislative Council may fail to satisfy the Executive, and the Governor-General may therefore refuse to accept them. The result would be a state



of deadlock in the administration of the country—a complete breakdown of the administrative machinery. Let me take another illustration. It is suggested to allow freedom of action to the Government of India in matters relating to war, peace, treaty, &c. Suppose the Government of India declare war on some foreign Power. Money is required to carry it on. A Bill is therefore introduced for the purpose. I think that under the scheme there is no other method of getting this money. Suppose the same fate awaits it as in the former case. The result would be disastrous to the country. The scheme, therefore, strikes me as not only impracticable but inconceivable. I do share with my colleagues the desire for a greater voice for the non-official Indian Members of the Legislative Council in the administration of the country and should have a greater control of its finances, but the suggested reforms do not in my humble opinion solve the difficulty. It is in reality breaking down one fabric only to rear another which cannot stand. The system of budgets being passed in the shape of money bills is unworkable unless the entire Legislature and the Executive are made elective.

There was one more proposal which struck me as somewhat arbitrary. Proposal No. (1) asks for Executive Councils both Imperial and Provincial, with half the Members Indians. So far, I am prepared to agree with my colleagues. But I cannot understand what useful purpose can be served by thrusting them on a Governor or Governor-General by returning them through election. It is highly doubtful whether a Governor or a Governor-General, who has to bear a large measure of responsibility for the action of his Executive, could or would agree to share that responsibility with persons in whose selection he had no direct voice. I can understand a wholly elective executive body, though it is another question whether such an arrangement is desirable for India at this stage of her political existence. But I cannot conceive of an executive, half elective and half nominated. It is moreover not desirable to remove the statutory obligation that a few Members should be drafted into the Council from the public services in India. This should apply both to Indians and Europeans. It will not be in the interests of good administration if, as suggested by the nineteen Hon'ble Members, all the European Members, including the Governors, should be laymen, fresh from England. The analogy of the English Ministry is deceptive. In England the Ministers, though they may not be well acquainted with the actual details of administration, are at all events well acquainted with the condition of the people and their needs and aspirations. An Indian Executive Council, consisting wholly of men fresh from England, will by no means be in an enviable position, and I therefore do not wish to lay any hard and fast rules in the selection of European Members. As regards Indian Members, persons employed under Government service should, as far as possible, be encouraged. For I believe a large part of the flower of Indian intellect is at present serving under Government. It may be added that, as regards the Musalman Members,

if in any province eligible candidates are not available, qualified men from other provinces should be brought in.

These were some of the reasons why I could not subscribe to a document which advocated an unworkable scheme of reorganisation. Apart from these I was influenced by larger considerations. The danger inherent in the scheme of reform put forward by the 19 Members, and inherent in the Minto-Morley Reforms already undertaken, is the over-representation of a single advanced class whose power of influence far exceeds its numerical proportion. The Members of such a class, useful and essential though they may be in any progressive advance, may be tempted, as they find themselves in power, to mould the policy of Government according to their notions and gradually to create a kind of oligarchy in which, through the agency of Government, they will dictate their wishes to the other and larger communities of India. These classes, which, though politically less powerful, are just as vital, or even more vital, to the healthy life of the country, are at present largely unrepresented, or, if they are represented, are less nimble to combine in counsel and to press their opinion. Lack of education, pre-occupation in commercial, industrial, or agricultural pursuits, and various other reasons prevent them from formulating so united a policy, and giving expression to it in so effective a manner. Hence it is of essential importance that as Government more and more delegates its authority to Indian agencies, more effective representation should be given to sections of the people who are less able at present to defend their own interests. If this is not done, the result will be class injustice leading to economic, racial and political disturbance.

Among the classes, which are in danger of being swamped, it is my particular duty as a Musalman to press the claims of the Musalmans. It is not my intention to set up any new claims in depreciation of those of any other community. There is no question of Hindu-Muslim differences involved in it. My aim is that each community, characterised as it is by peculiarities of its own, should feel secure in its position, so that with the natural strength that ought to belong to each they may co-operate with each other for the common good of the country. My aim, in fact, is to see one set of interests as apprehended in the foregoing paragraph, not swallowing up other interests, but working hand in hand with those others for the promotion of the general interests of the country. In India at present we have to recognise three distinct principal parties—the British Government, the Hindu community and the Muslim community—not to speak of the considerable depressed population. Though all of them have to work for the common good of the country, we must recognise that each has its own ends to satisfy. There was a time when a certain class of Indian politicians did not recognise any special interests apart from those pertaining to the general good of the country. But times have changed. The clear admission made by Lord Minto when replying to the Muslim Deputation that waited upon him in Simla on the eve of the

Minto-Morley Reforms, of the political importance and special interests of the Muslim community, followed by a provision of special representation for them on the Legislative Councils in the said reform scheme, was accepted by the Congress at its last session at Lucknow. There is, therefore, no necessity for me to explain in detail the nature of the importance of the community as recognised by Lords Morley and Minto and the Government. When at first the principle of special representation was recognised by the Government, it was feared by a large number of the leaders of the Hindu community that the gulf that was thought to have existed between the two great communities would be widened still more. But that these fears were ill-founded has by this time been clearly demonstrated. The Muslim Members on the reformed Legislative Councils have, during these years, whole-heartedly co-operated with their non-official Hindu colleagues and the Government in all matters concerning the well being of the country at large, never striking a jarring note as was feared, though it may be questioned whether the same correct attitude has always been maintained by representatives of other communities. The Muslim Members in the Councils have never misused their position. They have loyally supported their Hindu colleagues and the Government. They have clearly shown that given their proper share they can conduct themselves with a dignity and sanity of judgment which has always been their characteristic, never intruding on or jeopardising the legitimate interest of other sections of the people of this land. It is, therefore, my firm belief that the greater the extent to which their claims are properly and justly recognised to a greater extent will they rise equal to the occasion and co-operate with others for the betterment of the country. In these days there is a persistent cry made that the intended reforms should come as a reward for the loyalty of the people. Though I discountenance this line of argument I submit that, even if no other ground than this could be adduced for asking for reforms, I may, with the utmost confidence, say that the Muslim community throughout India has been behind none in their staunch loyalty to the cause of the Empire. No other community in India has been put to a severer test both in the present war and in the territorial changes in India which preceded it than my community, and I am sure that the remarkable self-restraint and moderation that have characterised them has not been lost on the Government.

The Musalmans can therefore, from the view point of their loyalty as well as for other obvious reasons, plead for a fuller recognition of their claims in the scheme of reforms that may be introduced into India soon after the war. It is true that, in the Memorandum submitted by the nineteen Hon'ble Members, mention has been made of the claims of the minorities either Hindus or Musalmans wherever they are found. But this important subject is disposed of in a phrase coupling them together with imaginary other minorities. If any safeguards are necessary, it is in the case of Musalmans who are everywhere in the minority-except in Bengal and the Punjab. Even in these

two provinces the real political power is not effectively shared by the Musalmans. The Minto-Morley Reforms had anticipated that the importance and the needs of the community demanded a larger number of seats in the Legislative Councils than were actually allotted in the scheme, but it was thought that to make up for the deficiency a few Musalmans would be returned through general electorates. I need not point out that, except in rare cases, this has remained but a pious wish. The Musalmans, therefore, should be granted in the coming reform scheme their proper share in proportion to the increase of privileges that may be conceded to the people of the country as a whole. The primary need of the Muslim community is still educational. The Musalmans are still backward in English education and have not come up to the general level of the other sister communities. I may, without the least hesitation, say that in the main the Government is responsible for this state of affairs through having instituted a system of education which could not have appealed and actually did not appeal in the early days of British administration to the community at large. Though a great deal has been done by the Government by way of compensation still there is a great deal more to be done. That the educational interests of the Musalmans, not to speak of their other needs may not suffer, and that they may receive adequate attention, it is necessary that the community have a voice in the Councils of the State commensurate with its needs and importance. For, unless the Musalmans came up educationally to the level of the other communities, it is idle to expect that India can really advance politically in the scale of nations, or that the Musalmans can seriously believe themselves to have been benefited by any reform that may be introduced into the administration of the country. Any scheme of reforms that we may obtain should, therefore, be so drafted that, through them, not only the general interests of the country may be advanced, but communities such as the Muslim may be enabled gradually to come up to the general level. That the ultimate aim of India's advancement may not be indefinitely delayed, I think that due regard should be paid to the claims of the Musalman community in the reform that we all hope will come after the war.

The kind of measures, therefore, which commend themselves to me would include the increase of Indian Members on the Executive Councils with full safeguard for the representation of Mahomedan interests in the same way in which they are represented in the Secretary of State's Council. As regards the Legislative Councils, while I agree with the Members in urging an increase of the Indian element on them, I would at the same time urge the safeguarding in the manner suggested above of communal interests in order that the interests of any single class or small group of classes should not be permitted by their composition to become dominating. But where the Musalman population is not in a minority or, as in the case of Bengal and the Punjab, in a distinct majority, at least half the Indian Councillors should be Musalmans. The Council of the Secretary of State may be so

remodelled as to include a larger number of Indians, the present proportion of the Musalmans being preserved. May be, too, the Secretary of State should have the assistance of three permanent Under Secretaries, one of whom should be a Musalman. Similarly, while the powers of local bodies should be extended, provision should be made for the representation of Musalmans as on the Legislative Councils. Their constitution should not be made entirely elective, but should include experts. The necessary number of seats should continue to be reserved for those actually engaged in the administration of districts or taluqs.

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No. 67.

FROM RAJA DALJIT SINGH, C. S. I.

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*Lahore, April 9th, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. MAFFEY,

Herewith I enclose my note on the despatch of Government of India with regard to post-War Reforms. I shall be much obliged if you will lay this before His Excellency for his perusal before you send it on to the Secretary of State. As was arranged in Delhi, I should so much like to have a talk with His Excellency during his stay here, for I will send this note to England after seeing him. In case he may be too busy here, I can go down to Dehra Dun, where he will have more leisure at his disposal.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) DALJIT SINGH.

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[ ENCLOSURE TO THE ABOVE LETTER. ]

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[ *SECRET.* ]

NOTE BY RAJA DALJIT SINGH, C. S. I.

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The enthusiasm and patriotism with which India has at this juncture thrown in its lot with the Empire and risen to the occasion in the service of the mother country will form a brilliant chapter in the annals of British administration of India. At the same time it serves as a testimony, if one was needed, to prove the high excellence and efficiency with which it is being governed by His Majesty's representative and his assistants in the great work of administration. And I must begin this note by giving expression to my

great appreciation of the way in which India's loyal services have been recognised by giving her a proper place and status in the Conference of the Empire, and also of the liberal and generous spirit which pervades the despatch and the recommendations made therein. I have only a few observations to make which I will divide according to the headings of the despatch.

*Rewards and Recognitions.*—I strongly support all the recommendations made under this head. The need of the rewards and of the recognition of the services of the whole of the Indian Army cannot be over-rated.

*Pay and Pension of the Indian Army.*—It had been my intention to press the claims of the Army to a more liberal scale of pay, but the Government of India's announcement of the 1st January 1917 has made it unnecessary for me to do so. I wish, however, to leave on record my opinion that the question was one not merely of justice to the Army, but of vital importance to the Government. The Indian Army is a mercenary army drawn almost exclusively from the agricultural classes. With the increasing profits of agriculture and the rise in the wages of agricultural labour, the market has been rising against us, and we were finding it more and more difficult to get the men we wanted at the price we were prepared to pay.

*British Commissions to Indians.*—There is only one other matter falling under this head on which I need to touch, and that is the grant to Indians of British Commissions in His Majesty's Army. The words of the despatch with regard to this need no commendation. The acceptance of this proposal will inspire a deep sense of gratitude in millions of people, literate and illiterate. The privilege or rather the right is one which under no foreign Government was ever denied to Indians. Up to this day in Native States in giving higher Commissions no distinction of race or religion is made. Now that Indian soldiers have, in the words of the despatch, "seen themselves that this privilege is enjoyed by men of African and Asiatic races in Russian and French Armies, and the Turkish officers leading their armies in the modern warfare", it seems to me there could be nothing more impolitic than to withhold it from Indians any longer.

The military service should be opened in the same way as the Indian Civil Service, though there may be a difference in the method of recruitment. In the military service, a system of selection and giving preference to men of good families should certainly be adopted. Such a system, in the interest of the Army itself, is indispensable in a country where caste and class have been predominant features from time immemorial, though deserving non-commissioned officers should not be excluded. A definite announcement should be made with regard to the adoption of this principle and Government should undertake to carry it through, of course, with all possible care and discretion.

As regards *all* the military rewards or reforms, a definite announcement should be made as soon as possible or immediately after the war is over. No

chance should be given to the military classes, which include almost all the agricultural tribes, to identify themselves with the so-called educated classes in any grievance. The Extremist party will be very ready to exploit any grievance of this kind and they should be forestalled.

## II.

### MEANS DESIGNATED TO REMOVE EXISTING GRIEVANCES.

*Emigration.*—Under this head I support all the items mentioned, but I should like to draw attention to the question of Indian emigration to Canada. This point seems not to have been included in the despatch. With due regard to the economic and other points raised by Canadian Government, there seems to be no reason why Indians should not enjoy the same facilities and privileges as the Japanese. An enactment which has the effect of separating Indians from their wives and children is a cruel form of legislation.

*Volunteers.*—I should like to make a few remarks about the question of admitting Indians freely as volunteers. The volunteer system has, I believe, not been a success. The needs which led to its establishment no longer exist, and this circumstance, together with the failure of the system, makes a strong case for its abolition.

At the same time, the right of Indians to defend their own country should not be denied to them. In my humble opinion this object could be achieved by making the Indian portion of the Defence Force permanent. To make this force efficient, I should suggest regular military training and discipline for a certain period every year. Without this the force would be as useless as the old Volunteer Corps. The strength of the force should, of course, be limited. If this suggestion be adopted, I believe that a number of political and economic problems will be solved.

*Arms Act.*—In the end I am glad to find that the suggestions I made last year, with regard to the administration of the Arms Act, have been supported by different Local Governments and are adopted in the despatch. All that is wanted is to remove the racial distinction. I should strongly deprecate any idea of making the Act more restrictive. Such exemptions as do not create racial distinctions ought to be retained for the sake of the *izzat* of the respectable people and the prestige of the officials.

### THE GOAL.

I should like to offer a few remarks with regard to the description of the "goal". Steps should certainly be taken to remove the confusion now existing with regard to the goal of British administration in India. The idea that the British Government is in India as a schoolmaster should be dropped and emphasis laid on (1) the vested interests of the British people in India;

and (2) their responsibility for good government. The formula adopted, however, will not serve its purpose. To some it will appear nebulous, others will think it goes too far, while others again will build on it hopes which cannot be realised for many years to come. In short, in my humble opinion the formula does not declare anything explicit one way or the other. Besides it should be considered from the point of view of Native States as well. Though the word British India technically prevents the Native States coming within the scope of the formula, yet in practice it must have far-reaching effects on them.

I cannot close these remarks without drawing attention to the absence of an organised moderate party. Men of moderate views exist in very large numbers throughout the country, and until their views can be vocalised as those of the more advanced are now, it is difficult, if not impossible, for Government to gauge the real public opinion.

*Local Self-Government.*—It has been said that ever since the introduction of local self-government more than thirty years ago little progress has been made. This is perhaps due to two reasons. First, training and education for this work take time. And, secondly, where the presidents of the boards who should pay special attention to this training are in charge of districts, they are so much occupied with other administrative duties that they are unable to bear constantly in mind the necessity for such training. I believe local self-government is the real foundation of "the goal". The only sure and sound method is to build up the fabric of self-government from below. So far the main function of the boards has been executive. In a large and thickly-populated country it is these boards that should form the nucleus of real public opinion, and in turn serve as mirrors to reflect the popular opinion for the enlightenment of the Government. I am glad to find that it is proposed to give greater powers to local boards, though I am afraid it may on account of fiscal difficulties not be possible to do much in this direction immediately. For unless they are given powers of taxation, they cannot make full use of their executive power. But, as things are, I do not think they could impose a tax, however small might be, without exciting strong opposition. Recent experience in the Punjab has afforded a striking example of this. A Bill was introduced to empower District Boards to impose a small tax for the construction of light railways. It was welcomed by the Press as a real step in advance, but it was unanimously opposed by the Members of Council who represented the District Boards on the ground that their constituents deprecated additional taxation. And indeed additional taxation will always be a difficulty, until economic and industrial conditions improve. This, however, is by the way. What I would propose for the present is that District and Municipal Boards should be empowered to advise Government on almost all matters connected with local administration, such as Land Revenue, Excise, &c.



There is much to be said for taking a step in advance of what is proposed in paragraph 7 of the Appendix I, and putting rural boards on the same footing as municipal boards so far as the election of non-official chairmen is concerned. This, of course, will have to be regulated according to the special circumstances existing in local areas, and these circumstances vary not only from province to province, but in different parts of the same province. It, however, seems to be beyond all doubt expedient that this principle should be definitely adopted. So far there is only one class which has any experience of public affairs, but such experience as they possess includes no practical acquaintance with actual administration and its difficulties. The object of the proposed reform is to create a class of non-officials who will be able to take part in the administration to the advantage of both the country and the Government.

*Admission of Indians to higher ranks of Administration.*—As the line of progress in this direction depends on the conclusions arrived at in regard to the report of the Royal Commission on Public Services, I need say little in regard to their proposals here.

While agreeing with the general sense of the four principles laid down in paragraph 38, I may point out that, in dealing with a matter like that of the Public Services, I do not believe that the consequences of the war can change the whole situation. Therefore the right way to meet popular expectations would be by giving Council Governments, as proposed, to all the important provinces.

I do not think that the other changes proposed in paragraph 6 of Sir Sankaran Nair's note of dissent are necessary. No benefit would result from giving to every Member of the Executive Council a right to address the Viceroy or the Secretary of State direct. In the first place, a note of dissent by a Member is always attached to a despatch. Secondly, in administrative matters in which the responsibility rests with the Governor and the majority of his Council, no Viceroy or Secretary of State would be disposed to interfere. And, thirdly, the introduction of such a system is likely to bring about a feeling of disharmony which is most undesirable.

Nor do I attach much importance to the head of the Provincial Government being a Governor. Much has been said by Indian publicists and journalists about the superiority of a Governor appointed direct from England to a Lieutenant-Governor, which I do not believe. A Governor is a much more expensive article than a Lieutenant-Governor, and we do not always get a man who is worth the extra expense. The attractions of a Governorship are not always strong enough to attract English statesmen of the first class, and an average English statesman will be no great improvement on an experienced Civilian. A Governor from home may have no prejudices, but he has also no local knowledge and will have to lean for support and guidance on his advisers. Moreover, to deprive the Civil Service of a prize appointment is to

remove one important stimulus for the development of the high administrative qualities which are of vital importance in a Lieutenant-Governor, and these qualities, useful also in lower spheres, are qualities for which the Indian Civil Service is well known.

#### FURTHER STEPS IN POLITICAL PROGRESS.

*Religious and Communal Representation.*—I entirely agree with the three main lines of possible advance sketched out in paragraph 43. We have at present two classes of special representation in the Councils—representation (1) of religions and communities; and (2) of special secular interests. With regard to the former, I have not clearly grasped either the recommendations of the Government of India or those of Sir Sankaran Nair. The special representation of Mahomedans is said to have “resulted in serious anomalies which excite the jealous comment of the communities”. It has also been pointed out that “Mahomedans besides voting in their own special constituencies also vote in the general electorates to counterpoise which these constituencies were themselves created”. From what the despatch recommends and what Sir Sankaran Nair says, I do not see how the double representation of Mahomedans can be avoided. The alternatives are—

(1) Special electorates for Hindus as well, for the remaining voters will be, generally speaking, Hindus.

(2) Under the present circumstances a simple solution is to create separate electorates, as now, for Mahomedans when they are in a minority, with the modification that those who vote in these special constituencies should not have a vote in the general electorate. This will mean that the communal electorate will be quite separate. The same privileges may have to be given to some other communities which, though in a minority, are yet important enough to be separately represented, as is the case with the Sikhs in the Punjab. The number of members allotted should be slightly in excess of the strict numerical proportion to the total population. In this way there should be no ground for friction or jealousy. And so long as the racial and religious differences remain as they are, this is perhaps the only satisfactory solution. It would remove the anomaly of Mahomedans having double representation and yet give full representation to each community. There is, however, one objection to denominational representation, and that is that under this system men of extreme religious views are generally returned, and our political experience has shown that the class which is most persistent in pressing communal demands generally entertain extreme political views. My own feeling is that minorities at present are not prepared to forego their right to separate representation. There is, however, another solution which I should like to see tried. A solution is wanted which will not only remove the above-mentioned

anomaly, but also bring about a *rapprochement* between Hindus and Mahomedans. I would suggest that there should be one electorate consisting of both Hindus and Mahomedans which should return a specified number of Hindus and a specified number of Mahomedans. The details of this suggestion could be discussed and settled later, if the principle is accepted. The result would be a tendency to exclude bigoted Hindus and bigoted Mahomedans. No Hindu could be certain of succeeding unless he were to some extent a *persona grata* with Mahomedans, and no Mahomedan could succeed unless he were to some extent a *persona grata* with Hindus. This would not, of course, apply fully where one community had a large majority, but as long as the number of seats is fixed for each community, there could be no serious objection to the system. In fact, I see no other way to soften racial and communal differences and to give a training to both communities to work smoothly with each other, and in the attainment of this object, I take it, lies the solution of most Indian problems.

*Constituencies.*—Coming to the question of forming constituencies, I would support the views of Sir Reginald Craddock in giving preference to class representation. Though after a time the system of a territorial electorate may be better than the class one, under existing circumstances I am afraid the purpose for which the territorial system is recommended will not be served.

The Government of India recommend "larger constituencies, primarily based on recognised territorial units, such as districts, and with the franchise pitched sufficiently low to admit of considerable bodies of voters". The object in so doing "is to give a fair chance to the agricultural element", or, as Sir Sankarn Nair says, to "representatives of masses and ryots". It is also expected that representatives returned by such electorates will have to shape their political views according to those of their constituents. And lastly that a better class of men will come into "the open" for election.

I am indeed very doubtful as to the desired results. In the first place, neither the so-called agricultural element, nor the masses and the ryots, at all understand the responsibility of voting and have neither political views nor political training. Not only they but the bodies—district and local boards—who represent them have not as yet been properly educated to understand their responsibilities and the nature of the work that is entrusted to them. Therefore if the local boards, with their long training, do not return suitable representatives, how can we expect the masses, who are politically speaking in their infancy, to return better men.

As regards the expectation that the representatives will have to shape their political views according to those of their constituents, in my opinion the result will be all the other way. The candidates will all belong to one school of political thought and the voters who have no political views of their own

will have no alternative but to accept the one-sided views of the only candidates available. We shall, in fact, be opening a very large field for the spread of immature political ideas among the rural classes. Lastly, I do not think there is, under the proposed system, any chance of better men coming out into "the open" for election, for we must remember that the election system is an exotic in this country.

Besides, if the representatives of special constituencies, such as Commerce, Universities and the Mahomedans are retained, and over and above this territorial electorates are formed, the strength of the Councils will have to be enlarged to an extent which may detract from their utility.

There appear to be two objects in proposing the change in constituencies, *viz.*, to get (a) men of better administrative and political experience; and (b) real representatives of the rural masses.

The question is how can we, consistently with the special circumstances on which the definition of "the goal" is based, achieve these objects.

I would say at the outset that in a country like India to have representatives of the masses seems to me impossible. Nor can these objects be achieved by adding largely to the size of the Councils, as this would be unsuited to the constitutional powers that it is proposed to give to these Councils. The only method, to my mind, of achieving these objects is by effective reforms in local self-government, as I have already indicated under that head. And it is, I think, by the adoption of that suggestion that local bodies will be able to return men of the sort we want, *i.e.*, men educated in administration and qualified to represent the views and needs and wants of their constituents. Moreover by giving boards power to pass resolutions on all matters on which their opinion is invited, the voice of the people will be before the Government and the Council for their guidance, and the representatives of the boards will have the views of their electorates to shape their own views. On the other hand, with big and inarticulate constituencies, the representatives will have only their personal views with regard to the needs and wants of their electorates. Therefore, instead of introducing an exotic system, the responsibilities of which are at present not realised, I would recommend that the present system should continue, as suggested by Sir Reginald Craddock, provided my suggestions in regard to local self-government are adopted.

*Elected majority on Provincial Legislative Councils.*—I quite see the points in favour of elected majorities in the Provincial Councils, but I know that a vast number of people, who, for want of proper organisation, are unable to voice their views, would regret the abolition of nomination. I do not see why a nominated non-official should not be regarded as a representative of the people. Almost all public men, such as Sir Ferozshah Mehta, Mr. Gokhale and Sir Rash Behari Ghose and many others have from time to time been selected by the Government. In a country where public opinion is yet in course of

formation and class and communal interests are to be maintained on the Councils, a stronger case could be made out for a non-official Indian majority, composed of both elected and nominated members than for a purely elected majority. The Viceroy and the Heads of Local Governments should certainly have power to nominate non-officials to the Imperial and Provincial Councils respectively, in case a certain class or interest remains unrepresented as a result of the elections, as often happens. Without this power the Councils may frequently be deprived of the most valuable advice in the country. Besides, there are a good number of men who hold rational and moderate views and are otherwise well informed and who can assist materially in the deliberations of the Councils, but who do not care to be returned by election.

*Constitutional powers of Provincial Councils.*—Before the powers of Provincial Councils are expanded, it is necessary that we should have a number of men with administrative experience and sound political views. It is admitted that there is a paucity of such men. Therefore the first thing required is to produce them by giving the necessary education. What I would suggest is that we should appoint for a fixed term non-official Indians as Council Secretaries to Government something on the lines of Parliamentary Under Secretaries of State. Their duties would be to reply to questions, to put the Government point of view in regard to resolutions, and also to introduce bills of minor importance on behalf of the Government. Thus they may take the place of different junior officials now serving on the Councils. These Council Secretaries would not be whole-time servants and would be paid annual allowances for the work they would do. They would have to vote like other officials with the Government and support its policy whenever Government adopted a definite line. They would, in fact, form a Government party in Council, and would be selected from among the moderates, so that in the great majority of cases, in supporting the Government, they would only be expressing their own views. Occasions would arise on which Government would give no line and they would then like the ordinary official members be able to contribute their own ideas to the discussion. They would, of course, have access to official papers in regard to questions and resolutions that they might have to deal with.

The advantages of this system will be two-fold. In the first place, we shall gradually get a class of men who have learned to look at questions from the administrative point of view; and, secondly, without interfering with the powers of the Council a non-official element will be introduced into what I may call the executive side of the Legislative Council. This should to a great extent meet the demands of the educated classes. The Council Secretaries may, strictly speaking, be officials for the time being, but the fact that they are Indians and are not by profession Government servants should produce a good effect.

I do not think that the changes proposed in paragraph 6 of Sir Sankaran Nair's note of dissent with the exception of the proposal for the expansion of the Legislative Councils are necessary.

Government is gradually becoming more and more regardful of public opinion. Under the changed conditions which the reforms now advocated will introduce that regard of public opinion will become more pronounced. And with the formation of a real public opinion the Government is sure to become more solicitous to act in accordance with the same. It is therefore unnecessary to provide that the resolutions of the Legislative Councils be binding on Government, subject only to the veto of the Governor, the Viceroy or the Secretary of State.

*Aristocracy and Landed Gentry.*—Before concluding my note, I feel I must say a word about a class which has not been taken account of in the despatch, but the members of which have rendered valuable services in the past, while their services in the present crisis may be counted as next to those of Ruling Chiefs. These services have always been duly recognised in different utterances of Governors and Viceroys. This is a class which has always in war and peace served the Government most loyally, and its importance has often been emphasised by some of the most eminent rulers of India, such as Lord Lawrence, Sir John Strachey, Lord Minto and Lord Hardinge. This is the class which has the largest stake in the country. Their interests are identical with those of the Government and they have themselves proved a most useful link between the Government and the people. In spite of their having fallen into comparative obscurity, from which they are now emerging, nevertheless up to this day they have not ceased to command influence among the masses. I see no reason why such a class should be left out of consideration at a time when they have recently rendered valuable services. Those who know the country and have well studied the psychology of the Indian mind will bear me out in what I have said of the importance of this class, both to the Government and to the people. The policy of maintaining this class has been frequently emphasised by eminent politicians. Therefore the best recognition of their services would be a step that may preserve them as a class.

So far there have been two causes leading up to their present condition—(1) lack of education, and (2) the system of division and sub-division in the families. The latter cause has reduced some of the most important families to the status of ordinary *pattidars*. It was to preserve this class that Government some time ago took up the question of their education, and slow but steady progress is being made. Along with this the question of establishing primogeniture was considered. I believe that in the extension of the system of primogeniture lies the remedy. Something has already been done. In Oudh, for instance, landholders can protect their estates,

wholly or in part, from being divided up by adopting the system of primogeniture. A list of Taluqdars is kept by the Government, and any Taluqdar in whose family primogeniture does not already exist can apply to the Government to bring his property, in whole or in part, under the Act, and the Local Government by a notification in the gazette includes him in the list, and this has the effect of establishing primogeniture in regard to the property specified. A similar Act is now proposed by the Province of Agra, while

Punjab Descent of Jagirs Act, 1900.

in the Punjab a somewhat similar system exists in regard to *jagirs*. I should welcome such measures in all provinces. I am, however, afraid that the mere prospect of preserving their estates intact after their own death will not prove a sufficient attraction in itself to induce the heads of families to take action. The remedy, I think, is a very simple one. Government in deserving cases gives hereditary titles, and I would combine the system of hereditary titles with that of primogeniture.

I would propose a new Order being started, consisting of, say, four grades of hereditary titles. For instance, we might have (1) Sardar or Diwan, (2) Raja, (3) Maharaja and (4) Maharaja-Adhiraj. Similar Muslim titles could be found. A landholder seeking entrance into the Order would have to show that he had a certain minimum income from land or paid a certain minimum of land revenue. The minimum of a higher grade would be maximum of the grade next below it.

Members of the aristocracy or of the landed gentry could apply to their Local Government for admission into the "Order", giving particulars of their status and income and specifying the property in regard to which the rule of primogeniture was to be established. Government, of course, would have to be satisfied that the specified property was free of all encumbrances.

The Local Government would from time to time select candidates who were worthy from all points of view—(services, family circumstances, &c.)—from among the applicants, and would recommend their names for admission into the different grades of the "Order". The final decision would rest with the Government of India who would announce the approved names in the Honours lists.

It should be provided by legislation that, as soon as a name appears in the gazette under this "Order", the specified property shall be set apart and rendered inalienable, impartible and subject to the rule of primogeniture.

No hereditary title should in future be given to any one except in the above-mentioned way. Otherwise we shall have title-holders in the third generation quite unable to support the dignity of the title.

If this suggestion is adopted, it should preserve and maintain a class which is bound to prove useful, in the future as in the past, without entailing

any cost to the Government. The effect of such a measure, in my opinion, would be invaluable not only as regards this particular class, but throughout the masses, the majority of whom are in some way or other connected with the landed interest. It will also awaken the much cherished hope of rising to the aristocracy in the minds of the middle classes.

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No. 68.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 497, 18th May 1917.

[*Private.*] Political Position. I am today sending you an official telegram on this subject. My Council earnestly deprecate the idea of a Commission, especially if, as has been suggested, it is to come out to India and take evidence. We are not encouraged by the experience of the Public Services Commission to look with hope to good results from a Commission which has to advise on policy. The issue at stake at the present moment is not a question of fact, but of policy, pure and simple, which we respectfully submit is a matter for decision of Governments.

In default therefore of your being able to visit India personally and investigate the position, which might stay agitation, we feel bound to press upon you our policy as laid down in our Reforms Despatch. This matter of an announcement has secured our very careful consideration, and it has been pressed upon us by the Government of Bombay, whom the Home Rule agitation particularly affects. We have hesitated before this to press you for a decision at a time of such grave preoccupation, but we feel now that it is our duty to do so. I may say that, while a Commission is strongly deprecated by us, we should be willing, if you desire it, to take consultation with outside non-official opinion in India on the proposals of our despatch. But until we had an expression of your views on the proposals of our despatch, we should much prefer this being deferred.

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[ ] Made official *vide* Secretary of State's telegram of 12th June, No. 79.

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No. 69.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 509, 18th May 1917. (Despd. for Home Dept.)

The situation at present renders it extremely desirable that some public declaration should be made by Government in regard to the constitutional and administrative changes proposed after the war and also as to their attitude towards the agitation which has been inaugurated by the Home Rule League.



2. In the last few months the political feeling in India has been materially affected by the revolution in Russia, statements made in public as to the right of peoples to govern themselves, the reception at the recent War Conference accorded to the representatives of India by the authorities in the United Kingdom and by the representatives of the British Dominions, the feeling that India has done much to assist the Empire during the war, and the general democratic influences of the war.

3. Mrs. Besant, Tilak and others are fomenting with great vigour the agitation for immediate Home Rule, and in the absence of any definite announcement by the Government of India as to their policy in the matter, it is attracting many of those who hitherto have held less advanced views. The recent judgment of the High Court of Bombay in the case against Tilak under section 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has encouraged this party to further efforts, and the agitation is having a mischievous effect on public feeling throughout the country, though signs are not wanting that the movement is regarded with mistrust by many. Consistent and malicious attacks on the system and methods of present administration are aggravating the danger. Many of the advocates of immediate Home Rule must know that such abrupt revolutionary changes in the whole administrative machinery are impossible, but this is not realised by the public to whom they appeal, and we fear that, when it is found that Government fail to meet the demands made, the result will be a feeling of bitter disappointment and possibly of dangerous unrest.

4. On the other hand, there is an influential, though timid, unorganised and comparatively inarticulate body of opinion which is opposed to, and afraid of, any sudden and violent changes in the constitution and looks to Government for support against the extremist propaganda. There are also many waverers who are looking to us for guidance. The general public misunderstands the omission of Government to make its attitude clear on this subject, and it leaves a free field to extremists. Indeed absence of any pronouncement has caused some embarrassment to Local Governments.

5. As the Government of India are not in a position to state specifically what their proposals are, and as any statement which they make will be open to the criticism that it is too vague to be of practical use in combating the attractive and plausible programme of the extremists, we realise the difficulty of making any declaration of our policy at present. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated above, *and in order to arrest the further defection of moderate opinion*, we think it very desirable to make the position of the Government clear as far as this is possible. It is therefore proposed, subject to your concurrence, to *publish* the following statement :—

: 6. *Begins.* The Government of India, in view of the misapprehension which exists as to their intentions regarding constitutional and administrative

changes after the war, consider it desirable to make a general statement in regard to their policy in this matter. The Government have, as is generally known, addressed the Secretary of State on the subject of these changes, with particular reference to the future development of self-government in India and have expressed themselves in the following terms :—

“The goal to which we look forward is the endowment of British India, as an integral part of the Empire, with self-government, but the rate of progress towards the goal must depend upon the improvement and wide diffusion of education, the softening of racial and religious differences, and the acquisition of political experience.

“The form of self-government to which she may eventually attain must be regulated by the special circumstances of India. They differ so widely from those of any other part of the Empire that we cannot altogether look for a model in those forms of self-government which already obtain in the great Dominions. In all parts of the Empire which now enjoy self-government, it has been the result, not of sudden inspiration of theoretical statesmanship, but of a steady process of practical evolution, substantially facilitated by the possession of a more or less common inheritance of political traditions, social customs and religious beliefs.

“British India has been built up on different lines and under different conditions, and must work out by the same steady process of evolution a definite constitution of her own. In what exact form this may eventually be cast, it is neither possible nor profitable for us to attempt now to determine, but we contemplate her gradual progress towards a larger and larger measure of control by her own people, the steady and conscious development of which will ultimately result in a form of self-government, differing perhaps in many ways from that enjoyed by other parts of the Empire, but evolved on lines which have taken into account India's past history, and the special circumstances and traditions of her component peoples, and her political and administrative entities.”

7. It is apparent from this that the Government recognises self-government within the Empire as a legitimate and praiseworthy aspiration deserving of all encouragement.

8. In the same despatch the Government of India expressed their anxious desire to see a real and immediate advance made towards this goal and have laid down the general lines on which, in their opinion, such an advance could properly be made. These include—

“ (I) the development of urban and rural self-government in the direction of giving greater powers to local boards and councils and making these bodies predominatingly non-official and elective in character ;

(II) an increase in the number of Indians employed in the higher branches of the service, in order to enable Indians to take a more prominent part in the administration of the country; and

(III) steps towards an ultimate enlargement of the constitutional powers of the Legislative Councils in certain directions.

9. The policy of the Government of India in this matter is therefore clear and the proposals which they have put forward have been conceived in no illiberal spirit and are designed to secure as much real and immediate progress as is compatible with the present stage of development of the country, the protection of the legitimate rights and interests of *all classes* of His Majesty's subjects and *the position of India as an integral part of the British Empire*.

10. The specific proposals made in order to give practical effect to the policy enunciated above are at present under the consideration of the Secretary of State. It is hoped that within a short time it may be possible to give further information, but it would be premature to make any further statement at present.

11. From what has been stated above, it is clear that it is not the intention of Government to embark on any sweeping and abrupt changes in the whole constitution and administrative machinery of India. This machinery has been gradually evolved in the light of many years' experience to meet *the requirements* of very diverse and often conflicting interests and could not safely be transferred otherwise than very gradually to the control of new and inexperienced authorities.

12. Indeed if the very serious responsibility of the Government in the matter, both to the peoples of India and to the British Empire, be considered, it will be patent to all those who have made any study of the subject that the Government could not consistently with its duty to the Crown be a consenting party to revolutionary changes or rash experiments. The Government of India are however aware that changes of this character have been advocated by various political associations in India, some of which have indeed gone so far as to press for such an immediate enlargement of the powers of the Legislative Councils as would be tantamount to transferring to those bodies the control of the whole of the internal administration of India.

13. The Government of India do not think it necessary to discuss in detail the dangers of such a course. They are content to say that, in their opinion, such a policy could only have disastrous results and must prejudice the ultimate realisation of the goal which the Government and all really patriotic Indians have in view. They believe that these dangers are fully appreciated by those who have vested interests in the country, or have made an intelligent study of the complicated administrative machinery of Government. Indeed they find it difficult to believe that any such wholesale and immediate transfer

can honestly commend itself to anyone who is capable of a statesmanlike appreciation of what is practically possible under present conditions.

14. At the same time the Government of India are most anxious to avoid any action which might even suggest that they seek to stifle fair criticism or legitimate movements for the political advancement of this country, particularly at a time when India has rendered, and is rendering, great service to the Empire. They recognise also that there are and must be honest differences of opinion as to the rate of progress towards the goal of self-government, and they seek to enlist the co-operation of all sections of the community in accelerating progress on sound lines towards that ideal.

15. They cannot, however, but view with grave concern the attitude of those people who, either in ignorance of the difficulties which the problem presents, or from a desire to embarrass Government, place before an ill-informed public a political programme impossible of early attainment, the refusal of which must lead to disappointment and consequent unrest. The action of such agitators is the more blameworthy when, as is *sometimes* the case, they support their views by misstatements of fact, by misrepresenting the intentions of Government and by *unfair* attacks upon the administration. *In normal times it might not be necessary to take public notice of such attacks, but the position is different* when the Empire is engaged in a vital struggle and when it is essential that its united strength should be concentrated on one object, the successful prosecution of the war.

16. Hitherto the Government of India have abstained *from any public statement in regard* to this movement in the hope that the impracticable nature of the programme put forward would in itself be enough to prevent it from acquiring any power for mischief; but in view of the spread of these ideas and of the undesirable methods employed in promoting them, they feel that they should no longer refrain from making public their attitude in regard to it, and they hope *by this statement of their own policy and of the dangers consequent on unscrupulous agitation for revolutionary changes to secure active support in discouraging such movements* from all who have the welfare of their country at heart and who realise not only the impossible character of the demands now being made, but also the injury which unscrupulous agitation for revolutionary changes must inflict upon the cause of order and progressive development. *Statement ends.*

17. Sir Sankaran Nair desires it to be mentioned that that part of the statement beginning with the words "The policy of the Government" and ending with the words "an integral part of the British Empire" is not accepted by him, also any other statements which are inconsistent with his Minute of Dissent which accompanied despatch No. 17 of the 24th November 1916,

## No. 70.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 976, 22nd May 1917, 11-10 p. m. (Recd. 23rd, 12-40 p. m.)

*\*Private.* Declaration of policy. The papers are being submitted to the Cabinet by me and I am asking for an early meeting for discussion and decision. [I have expressed my views at greater length in my private letters of May 2nd, and especially May 15th.] I have regretfully come to the conclusion that an impossible situation would be created by the personal visit of the Secretary of State to India, and I therefore adhere to the idea of a small Committee or Commission which is asked for by Indians, recommended by my Council, and pressed on me by Members of Parliament and others here.

Such Committee or Commission would bear no resemblance to the Public Services Commission. It would be a small impartial body to advise His Majesty's Government. On that account it would sit for the most part in private. It would be much easier to constitute if it sat here as suggested by you, and this is urged on me by Sir S. P. Sinha, Sir W. Wedderburn, &c., who obviously fear that it will come too much under official influence if it goes to India.

On the other hand, unless it goes to India, it could not consult Governors and Lieutenant-Governors, nor do I see how moderate and especially conservative elements could be represented before it.

The only witnesses would be such as you could send or I supply here and delegates of 19 members, Congress and Moslem League and the like.

It might be possible to arrange that sittings should open here, and that India should be visited later by the Commission or some of its members.

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\* Made official, *vide* Secretary of State's telegram of 12th June, No. 79.

Words in brackets omitted.

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## No. 71.

Secretary of State to Viceroy. (Home Dept.)

Telegram P., No. 977, 22nd May 1917, 10-35 p. m. (Recd. 23rd, 1 p. m.)

Constitutional reforms. The reasons which lead you to wish to make a statement of your policy has my appreciation, but I think it must be deferred until the Government here have considered issues of high policy raised by your proposed definition of the objective of the British rule in India and have come to a decision as to immediate action to be taken in the way of a political advance.

To publish as you propose the text of your definition before the Government here have accepted it would be most embarrassing. It would be taken either as committing the Home Government, or as forcing their hands, or as revealing a conflict of views between the two Governments. I should be

pressed to publish at once the despatch and accompanying dissents and whole full particulars of reforms would be subject of public controversy before it had been settled by the responsible Governments. To be effective and conclusive, a pronouncement by your Government on so momentous a subject as self-government for India and the lines of advance towards it should represent the considered views of His Majesty's Government and be made in language expressly authorised by them.

I hope to obtain the decisions of the Government shortly on the recommendations of your despatch and must ask you to defer until then any declaration of policy.

Without prejudging their decision, my conclusions at present are as follows :—

(1) The first three paragraphs of your definition of goal seem too elaborate and formal. All my information shows it would not give satisfaction and its very elaboration lends itself to criticism. A simpler declaration of policy will probably be preferred.

(2) As to lines of advance numbered A, B and C in definition, I am in general accord with A, but would ask you to work out system of external control over local bodies, such as is provided here by Home Office and Local Government Board, and so provide permanent service of local officials before withdrawing internal control and expert advice afforded by present official Chairman. Despatch on this subject will follow.

(3) To B I agree.

(4) I agree with your object in C, but doubt whether your proposals will promote it. Unless associated with increased power and responsibility, increase of elected element is not an advance towards or training in self-government, and would be an obstacle if it resulted only in irresponsible criticism of administration and perverse action in legislation. Nor are mere increase of elected element and enlarged electorates likely to satisfy demand for political advance. Further objection is that constitution and powers of Imperial Legislative Council are untouched. Your proposals seem to me not to reach kernel of problem which is devolution of power and responsibility within such limited sphere as may at present be practicable and reasonably safe.

(5) For these reasons a further study of the problem is, I think, desirable. My idea is to announce that Government being desirous to developing free institutions within the Empire and considering the time had come for further advance in India, have decided to appoint a small Committee or Commission to examine the working of the Morley-Minto reforms and to advise what changes in composition, constitution and powers of the Legislative Councils are desirable and what should be their relations to Executive Councils.

The decision of the Government will be communicated to you as soon as possible. On it will depend the form of warning which you wish to give to the public. Some such statement is, I agree, desirable.

This is in reply to your telegram of the 18th instant.

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No. 72.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR MICHAEL O'DWYER, K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Governor of the Punjab.

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*Simla, May 27th, 1917.*

DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

Your Excellency very kindly told me yesterday of the later developments of the Post-War Reforms at the hands of the Home authorities. Craddock once told me I should probably get for my own confidential information a copy of the Government of India despatch on the subject, but either the matter went out of his head, or there may have been some official reason for not giving a copy, and I didn't care to move in the matter. But if the matter of the despatch is again likely to come under discussion by Local Governments, I think it would be a great help to be put in possession at least of the substance of the Government of India's recommendations.

There appears to be serious danger of public opinion and public men at home being carried away by a wave of sentimentality, and by viewing the services of India through a false perspective. It is not easy for them to realise—as we can in India—the wide gulf between word and deed in this country, and until that is realised, no true conception of Indian problems can be formed. Those who know most of Indian mentality and Indian philosophy—personally I know but little of the latter—dwell on the fact that the Indian mind hardly distinguishes between the word and the deed, and regards the former as much of a concrete fact as the latter.

One sees something of the same defect in the Irish character now and again which perhaps helps to explain, what Indians often affirm, that an Irishman understands them and their ways better than any other European.

Anyhow in the case of the response to the Defence Force and the University Coy., we have had lamentable but convincing evidence of the small value of the professions of those who talk and claim to guide and sway Indian opinion.

What one fears is that the people at home will take those professions at their face value, as reflecting the full and honest opinion of India, and base

their reform policy on the expediency of satisfying those opinions, disregarding the views and needs of the solid masses who pay the revenue, help to fight our battles, and trust to the *Sirkar* for stable and good government in return.

Hoping you will excuse this gratuitous dissertation.

I remain, yours sincerely,

(Sd.) M. F. O'DWYER.

### No. 73.

Extract from a letter from H. E. the Right Hon'ble the Lord Pentland, G. C. I. E., Governor of Madras to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 29th May 1917.

You may be interested to see copies of two recent educational\* orders, and of remarks upon them and kindred topics, made by me in closing the proceedings of last week's meeting of the Madras Legislative Council here, so I now enclose herewith copies of them.

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### EXTRACT FROM SPEECH.

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I mention these particulars as indicating the desire of the Government to do everything in their power to expedite the development of local self-government within the Presidency, so far as legislation can achieve that object.

The development of this side of local self-government like all other development, if it is to be healthy and a permanent advance, must inevitably be by stages; and in this matter, Provincial Governments can only move within limits, which are determined by financial and other considerations. Within these limits, it is the desire of this Government to do everything in their power to expedite the development of municipal and district and taluk board government throughout the Presidency. The work committed to the charge of these authorities affects closely the lives of each one of us, far more closely and intimately than the more high sounding work of Parliaments and National Assemblies; and I am not sure that its dignity and importance and true usefulness is as fully recognised here as it is in countries like the United Kingdom, where self-governing institutions have been longer at work. There the proprietors of great estates, merchant princes, men who have held high political office, are to be found serving their term of membership or chairmanship of the town council or county council where their home lies. Only the other day the news was telegraphed that the late Secretary of State for India,



Lord Crewe, who has been a member of several Cabinets and held some of the highest offices in the State, has accepted the office of Chairman of the London County Council, the municipal authority for greater London. I trust sincerely that such examples may be followed here, and that men of position and influence will more and more come forward and work upon these local authorities. This is of real importance in its bearing upon that development of self-government in the wider sphere of Legislative Councils, which is so desirable and indeed unavoidable as time goes on, however gradually it may come. For after all Government is an art in which, as in other arts, proficiency can only be attained by hard work and experience; and for self-government these local authorities are not the only schools available to us, but they are best schools we can have, in which to demonstrate fitness for wider responsibilities. The health and welfare of all classes, in mind and body, and also political progress, depend largely upon the wisdom and public spirits brought to bear upon the work of the local authorities, with which these Bills are concerned; and I commend them heartily to your careful consideration when the time comes.

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This leads me to make some observations upon another topic. You are all aware that since the beginning of the war an active agitation has been initiated throughout India having for its purpose the advocacy of the grant to India of responsible self-government at the close of the war which, it is assumed, means at a very early date.

Self-government is the salt and strength of the British Empire. It stands or falls on self-government; and you know well how it is standing now for justice and freedom all the world over, and that all parts of it will at all times welcome any signs of growth in the willingness and capacity of Indians to undertake in increasing measure a share in the administration of India. It has been said that prosperity makes friends and adversity tries them and it is some compensation for the common sufferings and anxieties of the past three years that they already seem to have increased mutual good-will and understanding between all parts of the British Empire. Those of us too who have the opportunity and privilege of acquainting ourselves here more or less closely with the conditions of Indian life and feeling, rejoice, as I do, heartily to be able to testify to an awakening sense of responsibility and a gradual but steadily increasing fitness of Indians to take part in the administration of Indian affairs.

Such reforms, however, represent only a small and minor portion of the demands now put forward and do not satisfy even for the immediate future those who are responsible for the advocacy of the early grant of responsible self-government for India. It is not the province of this Council, nor is it my

intention, to discuss the published proposals of the leaders of this movement. These proposals will no doubt receive the careful consideration of those to whom they were addressed.

Now however honest his intentions may be, the candid friend is never popular; but as a sincere friend to these aspirations, I shall venture to be candid. Let us endeavour honestly and candidly to measure the situation. If as stated far and wide Home Rule means nothing less than at a very early date the placing of the Executive Government in all its departments under the direct and full control of Legislative Councils containing a large majority of elected Members, then I feel sure that I carry you with me when I say that among Indians acquainted with public affairs nobody having any true sense of responsibility considers it, or will declare it, within the range of practical politics. Yet it is this which the present political propoganda seeks to persuade the educated classes in India to expect.

If, on the other hand, progress is to be steady rather than rapid, as the Viceroy said the other day, that is to say, an ideal to be attained by slow and orderly change, then consciously or unconsciously all of us who have the honour of taking any part in the government of any portion of India are working for and accelerating the approach towards that ideal, however distant it may be.

Here and now it is impossible for us to foresee what reforms in these respects will be proposed for India at the close of the war. Whatever they may be, they will fall far short of the proposals to which I have alluded. Yet there is no sign of any relaxation of this agitation and the educated classes in India are being led to expect that which will not come, and in some cases that which they know will not come.

It is obvious that this situation contains the elements of misunderstanding, of difficulty and possibly of friction. The present concern of the Madras Government is not with a final solution of this problem, but with the possible reaction upon public opinion in this Presidency of the situation which I have tried to describe. To ignore facts is to deceive ourselves; to ignore warnings from such sources is to court disappointment and humiliation, feelings which among ill-informed and irresponsible people, however sincere and well-meaning, may provoke serious difficulties. For any such difficulties the leaders of this agitation and all who support and sympathise with them will be directly responsible. Against all advice and warning they have chosen to initiate and persist in this agitation at a most unsuitable time. One-sided discussion is always possible: fruitful discussion is quite another matter; and in the full sense is manifestly impossible at the present time. Throughout the whole British Empire, the utmost efforts and the best brains are focussed upon the immediate tasks of the war, and it is futile to expect men in high office or leaders of public opinion anywhere to concentrate their attention at such a

time upon the subject of Indian government. The result is that discussion is wholly one-sided, not subjected even to friendly criticism, misleading as to the real condition of opinion, and thus inevitably unfruitful and unsafe as a guide to action. That this is largely recognised among the educated classes in India, I am of course well aware. I can well believe that many of them recognise that a movement conducted on such lines and by such methods is an untimely and ill-judged departure, far more likely to shake the confidence of their friends in the fitness of Indians for self-government, than to further the development of that self-government in any sphere.

Unfortunately, too, and in this lies the greatest danger, this agitation has employed and continues to employ as the most obvious if not the main instrument of its purposes the publication and widespread dissemination of unbalanced and intemperate criticisms persistently directed against those who are responsible for the present government of this country. Honest and well-intentioned criticism is never unwelcome and I am aware that these critics have declared themselves to be opponents of revolutionary methods of agitation, and that they advocate their views on the ground of their loyalty to the person of the King-Emperor and to the British Monarchy as an essential link of Empire. But it is quite impossible to accept these pleas as justifying this campaign of constant detraction and condemnation directed against the actions and motives of officials in the service of the Government in all its departments. That any such justification should be suggested indicates a complete absence of practical sagacity and political instinct on the part of those who are responsible for it.

Whatever changes the future may bring, let me ask you as men of affairs to face the present situation. In the interests of progress as well as of order, all thoughts of the early grant of responsible self-government should be put entirely out of mind and all violence of language should be condemned. I would appeal to all men of leading and of influence, whether personal or hereditary, to dissociate themselves in these ways from this unfortunate agitation as it is at present being conducted. In the meantime the Madras Government is directly responsible for the good government of this Presidency. This reckless campaign of calumny directed against it can have no other result but to lower the authority of all Government officials and servants with all classes, and especially among those large masses of people who are unthinking and inexperienced in public affairs. It is fraught with real danger not only to good government, but to the law-abiding spirit and the good-will among all classes which at present exist in this Presidency and upon which all good government must ultimately rest. And on behalf of my Government I call upon all who hear me or read these words for their support in any action which the Government may be forced to take to discourage these unwise and dangerous methods and the extravagant aims which they are designed to further.

No. 74.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 567, 30th May 1917, 6 p. m.

[*Private.*] Please refer to your [public and private] telegrams, dated the 22nd instant, regarding Constitutional Reforms. Until I have received and considered your \*[private letters of the 2nd and 15th May,] I propose to defer sending formal reply to you official telegram. In the meantime, however, I think it necessary to send you my views on the urgent question of appointing a Committee or Commission for the purpose indicated in paragraph 5 of your public telegram. With the exception of Sir Sankaran Nair, these views have the concurrence of my Council.

2. From your telegrams I assume that you consider the further investigation by a Committee or Commission necessary, and that it is a settled policy, but I ask you to weigh the following points.

3. If the Commission is appointed by you and its sittings are held in England, the views of the Government of India must inevitably be represented inadequately or go by default. No member of the Government of India could give evidence in England, and proposals which had been examined and rejected by us after careful consideration would probably be placed before the Commission. We however would neither be aware of this, nor able to put our views before the Commission. Our despatch is very full; but it does not purport to deal with every possible proposal which could be brought forward, or with many which were considered and rejected. For instance, we had before us the scheme contained in a pamphlet issued by the Round Table entitled "suggestions for constitutional progress in Indian polity", but we were unable to accept it. It was not, however, thought necessary by us to deal with its proposals in our despatch.

Again, a simpler definition of the goal would be gladly welcomed by us, but we only arrived at our definition after six months' examination and rejection of many alternatives.

If the Commission sits at home, we see great difficulty in bringing such matters to their notice, and we apprehend that the reasons upon which our decisions were based will not be represented adequately before them.

4. On the other hand, we feel for obvious reasons grave difficulty in such a Commission as you suggest coming out to India and subjecting the Government of India and its members to an examination.

5. The appointment of a Commission of impartial men would probably mean, I respectfully suggest, the appointment of men of definite political views of some kind, but with no practical experience of the difficulties in India. These men will probably examine many proposals which have been rejected by the Government of India for practical reasons and will report perhaps unfavourably, but perhaps favourably upon these proposals over our heads, but by virtue of the special conditions of their appointment, their report will carry a weight out of all proportion to their knowledge or experience.

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[ ] Made official, *vide* Secretary of State's telegram of 12th June, No. 79.

\* More detailed views.

6. So far I have alluded to difficulties *vis-à-vis* the Government of India and its members, I gravely doubt however whether a Commission sitting in England will be able to get any evidence of value. There are few officials in England who are conversant with the present position in this country. The Commission will get evidence from the Congress and various other extreme bodies, but it will be impossible for it to get witnesses from the conservative classes of India and similar difficulties will arise in respect of officials out here in close touch with the present condition of affairs. It is obvious that a knowledge of the views of these classes is essential for any satisfactory decision by the Commission on the questions placed before them, but such knowledge will not be obtainable.

7. I earnestly urge, therefore, that, if a Committee is to be appointed, it should be a small body of officials and non-officials to be nominated by the Government of India to enquire into the points referred to in paragraph 5 of your public telegram, and that this Committee should sit in India. I would suggest that one-third of the Committee, including the President, should be selected by you from among impartial persons of eminence not connected with the administration of India. As to the remainder of the Committee who would be selected by the Government of India, I should propose that one-half should be Indians. It would probably be advisable to include a Ruling Chief among the Indian members, as Native States are vitally interested in the political progress of British India. I do not think it could be maintained that a Committee thus constituted would be subject to undue official influence.

8. The Committee I propose would base its conclusions largely on existing records, supplementing them when necessary by the private examination of selected witnesses. I do not think that any useful purpose would be served by the public record of evidence, and acute racial feeling would in present circumstances certainly be evoked by such a procedure. The Committee would report to the Government of India, and we should, of course, put before you our views on their proposals.

9. Even if it should be decided that the Committee should hold its sittings both in England and in India, in the matter of recording evidence I should deprecate differentiating between the procedure to be followed in the two countries.

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No. 75.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1055, 1st June 1917, 8-25 p. m. (Recd. 2nd, 11-45 a. m.)

[*Private.*] Constitutional reforms. Your [private] telegram of the 30th ultimo. I will take care that the Cabinet are in full possession of your views. They hope to discuss the question next week. Till I have their views, I defer further observations.

No. 76.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR MICHAEL O'DWYER, K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Governor of the Punjab.

Simla, June 2nd, 1917.

MY DEAR VINCENT,

I return with many thanks the telegrams between the Government of India and the Secretary of State which you so kindly sent me. The Committee which the Secretary of State suggests to consider Council Reforms would, I think, be a dangerous and unnecessary experiment. In so far as the members would be men without knowledge of India, their advice on matters of much moment would be either valueless or dangerous; in so far as they would represent Indian politicians, their views would be unnecessary, for we have already heard them *ad nauseam*.

Anyhow the inevitable result would be that the large body of conservative opinion would probably not be represented at all, and as far as they are concerned, the case would go by default, for the Indian Government which professes to speak for them would be regarded as an interested party.

Yet as recent experience has shown those are the people who count for most in the country and who can and do give practical support to the Government and the Empire.

The combined efforts of the Press and the politicians in the Punjab have so far not produced a score of men for the I. D. F., or a hundred for the University Double Company. One local squire in the W. Punjab has alone produced 3,000 men for the combatant and auxiliary forces; and yet he and those of his class who regard with the greatest suspicion any step that would transfer power to the educated middle class, will have no voice in the final settlement.

If, however, we disregard their views in order to meet those of the advanced politicians, we are storing up trouble for ourselves hereafter. They will probably turn a deaf ear to future appeals for their loyal and active support of Government in a crisis. They will say, ask for support from the classes to whom you have given power in the land disregarding our position and services.

Unfortunately these classes, even if they have the will to help, have not the power. They may cry themselves hoarse, but when it is a question of risk or sacrifice for Government, no one will listen to them. We have had clear demonstrations of that.

Pray excuse this discourse, but I think I have correctly represented the Punjab standpoint.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) M. F. O'DWYER.

No. 77.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 614, 11th June 1917, 5-30 p. m.

[*Private.*] Constitutional Reforms. Please refer to your Home Department telegram of 22nd May. Owing to my inability to make any authoritative

announcement of policy, the position here is becoming increasingly difficult. We are being pressed by both Bombay and Punjab for an authoritative statement as to how to deal with Home Rule. Statements have been made by Lord Pentland and Sir M. O'Dwyer, and other Local Governments are most uncertain what to say. If His Majesty's Government do not see their way to sanctioning the announcement suggested in our Home Department telegram of 18th May, I would urge you to make an announcement on the lines of paragraph 10 of your private letter of May the 2nd.

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10. I am myself tending strongly to the conclusion that, if we are to make a declaration as to the goal of our policy, it would be worse than useless to invent any elaborate formula. It seems to me that once we undertake to define our goal, we can say nothing but that it is the development of free institutions with a view to ultimate self-government. If such a declaration is to be made—and I am coming round to your view that a statement of our object is necessary—then I think it should be accompanied by a very clear declaration that this is a distant goal, and that anyone who pretends that it is realisable today or in the early future is no friend to Government and no friend to India herself. I think, too, that we should have to assert plainly that the rate of progress and the times and stages by which it is to be reached must be controlled and decided by His Majesty's Government.

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No. 78.

To H. E. THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE LORD PENTLAND, G. C. I. E., Governor of Madras.

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*Viceregal Lodge, Simla, June 11th/12th, 1917.*

MY DEAR PENTLAND,

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You have been vigorously attacked over your speech in your Legislative Council on the subject of Home Rule. But what you have said seems to me entirely consistent with the circular letter which we sent out to Local Governments, and you, as a Provincial Governor, are in a position of grater freedom to discuss this matter than I am, who am bound by the Secretary of State's dictum that I must not say anything on the subject.

Personally I can see nothing in your speech which justifies the strong attacks which have been made upon you, but I hope that, in the course of the next month or so, we may get from the Secretary of State an announcement of policy which will enable us all to speak with one voice on this important question.

We are all the subject of press attacks at the present moment, and if it is your turn today, it probably will be my turn tomorrow.

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Very sincerely yours,  
(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.

No. 79.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1119, 12th June 1917, 9-15 p. m. (Recd. 13th, 1-45 p. m.)

*Private.* Please refer to your private telegram of the 11th instant. I am pressing for a decision at an early date.

May I suggest, for your consideration, that the private telegrams on this subject, excepting that from Maffey to Kisch of May 26th and the latter's reply of the same date, be now made official and communicated to your Council. If you desire to do so, I have no objection to your giving Council relevant extracts from my private letters in explanation.

Please let me know what decision you arrive at.

No. 80.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 634, 15th June 1917, 1-10 p. m.

*Private.* Please see your private telegram of 12th June. I agree to the telegrams in question being made official. I should add that, in dealing with this question, I have throughout taken the Members of my Council into my confidence.

No. 81.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1141, 15th June 1917, 9-55 p. m. (Recd. 16th, 1-30 p. m.)

*Private.* A telegram to the *Times* from Bremner, dated Madras, 15th instant, reports a statement made by Subramania Iyer in *New India* "which is regarded as reply and challenge" to recent speech made by Lord Pentland in the Legislative Council—presumably that referred to in your private telegram of June 11th regarding reforms. Will you kindly let me know what he said?

No. 82.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 649, 18th June 1917, 7-50 p. m.

*Private.* The speech made by Lord Pentland was very long and couched in conciliatory language. A summary of the important parts of it relating to Home Rule is as follows:—He pointed out that home rulers demanded the placing of Executive Government at a very early date under the direct and full control of elected Legislative Councils and he added—"I am certain that I carry you with me when I say that among Indians who are acquainted with public



affairs, nobody having any true sense of responsibility, consider it or will declare it within the range of practical politics." He urged that slow and orderly progress was essential, and after remarking on the impossibility of foreseeing what reforms would be proposed after the war he said "whatever they may be, they will fall far short of the proposals to which I have made allusion". He emphasised that the present agitation must produce misunderstanding, difficulty and friction and was being carried on in spite of advice and warning and was calculated to shake confidence in fitness of Indians for self-government. He dilated on the fact that agitation employed as its weapons misrepresentation, detraction, unbalanced and intemperate criticism and constant attacks upon the actions and motives of Government and Government officials. He went on to say "whatever changes the future may bring, let me ask you as men of affairs to face the present situation in the interests of progress as well as of order. All thoughts of the early grant of responsible self-government should be put entirely out of mind and all violence of language should be condemned". His speech ended with an appeal to all to dissociate themselves from agitation and to give their support to Government in any steps that might be taken by them to discourage it.

In great part the speech followed the lines of a confidential circular which was issued by the Government of India on the 20th March 1917, though no reference was made in the circular to a public pronouncement, nor was any contemplated at the time of its issue, nor were we aware that a speech on the subject was likely to be made by Lord Pentland. For this speech he has been violently criticised, but the speech, combined with the subsequent action of his Government in restricting Mrs. Besant, Arundale and Wadia, should go far to remove the difficulties we have had to face owing to the absence of an authoritative pronouncement.

This is in reply to your telegram of the 15th instant.

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No. 83.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR JAMES MESTON, K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Govr. of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh

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*Naini Tal, June 20th, 1917.*

DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

The action of the Madras Government in restraining Mrs. Besant and her companions has given very great satisfaction to all of us who have been watching the pernicious effect of her Home Rule campaign. At the same time there is every reason to expect that the orders will be followed by a widespread agitation of a serious and uncompromising character. Some of my officers incline to the view that the weather at present is against such an agitation; and that may be true in places. But the Press will be rampant, and excited public

meetings of protest will be convoked all over India. I would invite Your Excellency's special attention to the letters from Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru in the *Leader* of the 18th June. They indicate in moderate, but unmistakable, terms what is intended. They look as if they had been written with some foreknowledge of the Madras Government's action; be that as it may, however, they leave no doubt, especially when read with the short leaderette in the same issue of the paper, that a big outcry is being engineered.

2. If we were dealing with unimpassioned men, we could of course point that the Madras Government have struck not at the Home Rule movement as such, but at the mischievous and revolutionary turn which has been given to it by Mrs. Besant and her followers; we are not restraining the demand for Home Rule, but the mischief which, under the guise of constitutional agitation, is being wrought among the young men of India, the racial bitterness which has been fomented, and so on. It is quite useless however for us to draw that distinction. People at large will be told by their leaders that Government has determined to strangle Home Rule, and they will believe it, whatever we may say officially to the contrary. The agitation now is going to be one of protest against the intention of Government to crush the legitimate aspiration of India to govern itself; and the whole strength of the Advance Party will now be put forth to show that the British Government in India is hostile to any real constitutional advance.

3. As Your Excellency knows, I have never taken a gloomy view of our political situation, but I regard the position now as one of considerable gravity. At a time when we are particularly anxious to devote the attention of India to the War and to enlist the help of her people, the country will be flooded with oratory and newspapers attacking us for crushing the liberty of speech, for deliberately suppressing the very same movement for liberty which our British statesmen are encouraging in Russia and Ireland. I do not anticipate rioting or bloodshed; but there will be a great increase in the bitterness of feeling and—what is almost as bad—a heavy additional burden on our administration at a time when we are short-handed and when all our energies are needed for bigger things. Take my own province. I could of course gag the Press by pre-censorship, and I could ask you to let me apply the Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act of 1911, and shut down all public meetings of protest forthwith; but this would only force the excitement into less public and more dangerous channels. I am asking all my District Magistrates to watch the meetings and the speeches, and to deal with them under the ordinary law:

wherever they infringe it ; but long experience has taught the organisers of these agitations how to evade the law and yet to instil much poison into the public ear.

4. Personally, I am going to try an appeal to the leaders in this province. I am starting for the plains at once, and will see groups of them and speak to them with the utmost frankness. Subject to Your Excellency's general concurrence, I shall say something on the lines of the memorandum which is enclosed in this letter, and I shall appeal earnestly for moderation. But I confess it is a forlorn hope. They have already embarked on agitation, and they now have a text which is more effective than any purely political cry of recent years. How can we expect them to refrain ? And how can I or the head of any other province answer the questions which they will certainly put, and which are clearly foreshadowed in Dr. Sapru's letter—"Have you any words of hope for the people ? Will you give us a clear and definite declaration of your policy ? Are you going to lay down a programme of reform leading up to self-government ?"

5. I am venturing to address Your Excellency because I think matters are now going to move beyond the stage to which the orders in your recent Home Department letter apply. I feel that all attempts to cope with an agitation which may be more productive of mischief and virulence than any of our previous excitements will be hampered by our inability to appeal to any declared policy of Government. I fear that the result will be all the more unfortunate in view of what India has recently gained, and of the hopes that we therefore entertained of winning over moderate opinion to our support. I would therefore earnestly beg Your Excellency to intervene, if it is in your power, and strengthen our hands by an indication of the attitude which His Majesty's Government is prepared to take up towards the demand for self-government. Nothing short of that will now enable us to go on with the peaceful tasks of administration and progress.

With utmost respect,

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) JAS. S. MESTON.

No. 83a.

FROM THE HON'BLE MR. J. B. BRUNYATE, C. S. I., C. I. E., Member, India Council.

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*Queen Anne's Mansions, S. W.-1.,*

*June 20th, 1917.*

[Private.]

DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I saw Mr. Chamberlain on joining at the India Office last week and he spoke to me a good deal about the Reforms Despatch and suggested to me—in response I take it to my message about Your Excellency's objections to a Commission on the subject—that I should write to you about the conversation. It was hardly, however, so much a conversation as a considered exposition of Mr. Chamberlain's views on the subject.

As regards a number of heads, he spoke of matters being well in train : local self-government, military commissions, and so forth ; and I do not recall anything special for me to pass on. The two principal points on which he dwelt were, I think, the question of "the goal" and the general question of political reforms (enlargement of the numbers and powers of the Legislative Councils, &c.). As regards the goal, he told me that he had originally been averse from any formal pronouncement on ultimate aims, but had been definitely converted. I need not elaborate the reasons, for that is the view of Your Excellency's Government also. But he did not feel happy about the half-page formula proposed in the despatch. Its qualifications would be criticised and its text dissected till it became, not a final statement on which moderate opinion could take its stand, whole-heartedly supporting the Government, but the starting point of new controversy. Mr. Chamberlain felt that, once the necessity for defining our aim is accepted, there can be no other declarable aim than "self-government" *tout simple*, not necessarily or probably in the early future, and not necessarily on the colonial model, but something which, though the product perhaps of an experimental and evolutionary process, and adapted may be to Indian conditions, must be recognisable and definable as self-government and nothing else. Any qualification, imposed now, on India's ultimate ambitions would he felt be intensely disappointing.

Much of this is of course merely a repetition of the formula of the despatch, but the difference is, I suppose, that, while the Government of India

would wish to include it all in the public pronouncement, Mr. Chamberlain would confine the latter to some such declaration as the following :—

“ Our aim is the political education of India for an appropriate form of self-government\* ”.

I felt myself (Mr. Chamberlain, I think, wished me to indicate to Your Excellency the impression his statement made on me) that his view was the right one, and I know that it is shared by others here ; a minute, for example, by Sir Thomas Holderness, shows that he feels strongly as to the difficulties of the larger formula. Apparently, too, even Colonial opinion will expect something less apparently grudging for India. Mr. Chamberlain said that at the Imperial War Conference, instead of suspicion and condescension towards India, the prevailing attitude was : “ why, they’re very decent and very capable fellows : why *can’t* you let them govern themselves ”. Generally, too, I suppose all this business of the closer association of the different units of the Empire is sure to hurry forward the satisfaction of Indian aspirations. India, and even the Government of India on occasion, are sure to re-ent any tendency for India to lag conspicuously behind the Colonies, even though willing to accept a dependent relation towards England were the Colonies not in question. I felt all this very strongly in the corresponding case of Egypt when Sir Reginald Wingate was discussing with me the *pros & cons* of annexation outright in lieu of the present rather artificial arrangement there.

I feel it rather an intrusion to be inflicting on Your Excellency my, by no means, expert views on a question you have so closely and anxiously studied, but I suppose Mr. Chamberlain took me on as a sort of “ man in the street ” and was anxious to see, and for you to know, the sort of impression his chain of thought would make on such an audience.

Then as to political reforms and the question of a Commission. Mr. Chamberlain, as you already know, feels much difficulty in treating the despatch as the final word on the subject. From such glimpses of India Office procedure as we get from time to time in India, we have always felt (and Your Excellency I expect much more so, from your private correspondence with him) that he was anxious to support us whenever he could. But this question is a basic one : Mr. Chamberlain’s hands are evidently weakened by the fact that the Government of India themselves are not unanimous ; and even more perhaps by the fact that the Local Governments, too, are deeply divided. This last point indeed is a difficulty which the Government of India have evidently felt in proposing to leave so much of the direction and future elaboration of

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\* My wording, Mr. Chamberlain gave me no formula.

political reforms to the option of the Local Governments themselves. If he accepts the despatch *en bloc* without any further inquest, he will be told that the scheme is one evolved *in camera* by the bureaucracy itself without any adequate consultation with the political opinion, whose aspirations it is intended to meet, and that even the bureaucracy is not at all clear as to what it wants to do. Also no doubt to some extent he accepts (in such a matter at any rate) the position, which political opinion looks to the Secretary of State to assume, of arbiter in some measure between the governed and the governors.

The position would have been easier for him if the Government of India had differed from their advisers in recommending a much more generous immediate advance. But in some respects, *e. g.*, in the refusal of immediate further powers to the Imperial Council, the proposals in the despatch will doubtless be regarded by public opinion as somewhat grudging and he feels that it is difficult for him to rest on them without further enquiry and consideration of alternatives.

Lastly, there comes in the question of the Mesopotamia Commission's report. I have not yet seen it (Your Excellency will doubtless have done so before this letter arrives). But I understand that—whether fair or unfair—it is an extremely damaging and unpleasant document and is sure to prove very prejudicial to the prestige of the Government of India as a governing and administrative body. Also, though Mr. Chamberlain did not put it that way, I take it that it shakes his own position rather badly, and does so on this particular point of his support to the Government of India.

To me personally it seemed that this last factor of the case was much more conclusive than any of the others. I have always dreaded the result of this Commission, not for what it might say of finance (which I don't yet know) or of military administration, but for its possibly disastrous effect on the prestige of the Government of India as a whole. From this point of view I believe the report is as bad as the worst one could have feared, and I take it that for some time to come succeeding Governments of India, beginning with Your Excellency's Government, will have to pay the penalty in some degree. Simultaneously the Secretary of State himself and the India Office are attacked, so that their hands are weakened too. The whole thing is very lamentable, but I do not see how we can completely escape its consequences.

I do not gather that Mr. Chamberlain contemplates that his proposed Commission should necessarily take evidence in public; or that it should examine large numbers of witnesses. But he does consider that it should go out to India and it should see at any rate selected representatives of the different organs and classes of political and administrative opinion. Personally I should

have liked to have seen the visit to India avoided almost at any cost, even if numerous witnesses had to be sent home, but the almost impossible conditions now-a-days in regard to travel would evidently make the adoption of this alternative very difficult and open to obvious criticism.

Mr. Chamberlain had evidently much appreciated, and been much tempted, by your invitation that he should come out himself, but he has no doubt already told you of his difficulty in accepting it.

I am very glad to be at home after a somewhat adventurous journey (we were wrecked, though not submarined, off the coast of Italy and I got a compulsory trip to Naples and Rome); and am much interested in seeing the India Office from inside. The procedure here however does not exact any great sacrifice of time on the part of the Members, nor does it encourage excessive activity in other forms. But I must not further trespass on Your Excellency's time; indeed I must apologise for having already taken so much of it.

Yours sincerely and respectfully,

(Sd.) J. B. BRUNYATE.

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No. 84.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 662, 21st June 1917, 3-20 p. m.

*Private.* Your private telegram of the 12th instant. Political position. I am making official following private telegrams with necessary verbal alterations so as to exclude references to private letters:—

My private telegrams, May 18th and 30th and June 11th.

Your private telegrams, May 22nd and June 1st.

I am also making official first-half of paragraph 10 your private letter of May 2nd down to words "controlled and decided by His Majesty's Government".

I am sending by mail copies of these telegrams as amended and also copies of parts of letters communicated privately to my Council.

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No. 84a.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., 21st June 1917, 7-45 p. m.

*Private & Personal.* Having regard to the affair of Mrs. Besant and the agitation which it has aroused, I do urge for an authoritative announcement of the goal. A letter from Meston has just reached me from which I quote—"Matters are reaching a serious point and anxiety is being felt by a number of my most experienced officers. I will maintain things as quiet as I can, but I certainly consider that the time has now arrived when a certain amount of assistance from the British Government is wanted by us all."

No. 85.

Viceroy to Lieut.-Governor, United Provinces.

Telegram P., No. 668, 22nd June 1917.

*Private.* I see no harm in terms of your proposed conversation, but do you think it worth while in view of the fact that these gentlemen are not in the least likely to fall in with your suggestions?

This is in reply to your letter, dated 21st instant.

No. 86.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1181, 22nd June 1917, 2-10 p. m. (Recd. 8-50 p. m.)

*Private. Clear the line.* Reforms. I am communicating your private and personal cypher "U" telegram of the 21st of June to the Cabinet at once.

No. 87.

TO H. E. THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE LORD PENTLAND, G. C. I. E., Governor  
of Madras.

*Viceregal Lodge, Simla, June 25th, 1917.*

MY DEAR PENTLAND,

I had a long conversation with Pandit Malavya this morning and I need hardly say I supported your action throughout, but in the course of our conversation he asked to be allowed to see the circular letter which we addressed to Local Governments on the subject of Home Rule. He alleged that you had shown it to Sastri. I told him that I must decline, that it was a confidential communication from the Government of India to Local Governments, and that I felt sure he was mistaken. I hope you will give me authority to tell him that he was misinformed.

Very sincerely yours,  
(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.



No. 88.

TO THE HON'BLE SIR JAMES MESTON, K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Govr. of the United  
Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

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*Viceregal Lodge, Simla, June 25th, 1917.*

DEAR SIR JAMES,

Malavya informed me this morning that some officer in your province had shown our confidential circular letter to Local Governments on the subject of Home Rule to some non-official. I can scarcely believe this to be so, but I should like you to make enquiry as to it and inform me of the true facts. I declined myself to let him see it, and said that a confidential communication of this sort could not be shown.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.

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No. 89.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR CLAUDE HILL, K. C. S. I., C. I. E., Member of the Viceroy's  
Council.

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*June 26th, 1917.*

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I have managed to complete, though not to my satisfaction, a note on the desirability—I personally think it a necessity—of proposing to devolve a measure of real power on the Legislative Councils as reformed. In my anxiety to find a safeguard I have been driven to suggest the expedient of a second Chamber; but, as you will see from the note, the suggestion is supported on its own merits as desirable if we are to develop Parliamentary institutions—and our avowed goal connotes this.

Perhaps you may think it worth while to discuss it. I have finished it in haste, because, owing to being laid up, I can see no immediate prospect of

the leisure necessary to study and elaborate the details. Perhaps, however, you will think that a mercy, since the note is already too long.

I can only find a proof copy of my note of last year which I quote; if Your Excellency kept copies of our notes of May 1916, perhaps you would kindly ask Maffey to return me the proof copy.

I do hope the two days' change did you good.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd.) CLAUDE H. HILL.

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[ ENCLOSURE TO THE ABOVE LETTER. ]

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NOTE BY THE HON'BLE SIR CLAUDE HILL, DATED THE 26<sup>TH</sup> JUNE 1917.

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On the file relating to the Meston proposal to refer our recommendations for reform to Indian politicians for consideration, I attached a note, which I was in process of writing, on the subject of the change in the situation which I suggested had occurred since we wrote our reforms despatch. That file, however, was concerned directly with the question, raised by Sir William Vincent, whether it was not possible to convene a meeting of non-officials and others with whom we could confer on the subject of post-war reforms generally; and we have since addressed the Secretary of State by telegram on the subject. My object in writing the note which I attached to that file was, however, a somewhat wider one than the precise issue then under consideration, and I have His Excellency's permission to note separately on the question I had there contemplated raising and to amplify the argument then set forth.

2. The proposition which I wished in that note to suggest for consideration was that the situation, as it presented itself to us last year, when considering the reforms which we should advocate in our political institutions, had materially developed since our despatch issued. I do not contend that there has been any material modification of the internal situation in India, or that there have been within India any developments justifying, in themselves, any reconsideration of the recommendations which we have laid before the Secretary of State; but I desire to suggest that the external situation has developed very materially, and that we should not be justified in closing our

eyes to the fact that changes in the external situation must react very directly upon any proposals for change in the internal organisation of the administration of India. I suggest that the external situation has changed materially—(1) in respect of the outlook of the Dominions towards India; (2) in the assembling of the War Conference and the resolutions of that body relating to the representation of India upon future Conferences; and (3) in respect of the revolution in Russia.

Taking the last point first, it is not suggested that the events in Russia would of themselves justify us in reconsidering the political changes which we contemplated, aiming at developments which should pave the way towards ultimate representative and responsible government in India; but the events in Russia have unquestionably quickened the expectations not only of Indian politicians, but of the statesmen of the democracies constituting the Empire. Consequently, if we *can* safely develop our proposals it would be politically advantageous to do so.

In regard to (2), the War Conference and its results; these constitute an alteration in the outlook which reacts directly upon the magnitude of the step we can take in the direction of the goal which we have formulated for India.

Finally, in regard to (1), the outlook of the Dominions, the change is likely to have a radical effect on the future relations of Dominion statesmen towards India, and consequently to influence British statesmen in the direction of favouring a more rapid development of democratic institutions as a condition precedent to the surrender of the meticulous control at present exercised by the Secretary of State for India over the fiscal financial and administrative autonomy of the Government of India.

3. When we addressed the Secretary of State last year, we did so as a bureaucratic government with the responsibility of such a government to see that our recommendations, while conscientiously aimed at the goal formulated, should in no way involve the risk of precipitate advance; since we had to bear in mind the fact that any advance we recommended would be of a permanent character, and that we could not recede from any development which we recommended. Bearing these considerations in mind, the suggestions we formulated were:—

(1) The deliberate and formal recognition of the goal towards which India should aspire. That goal was defined as being "the endowment of British India, as an integral part of the Empire, with self-government". We went on to safeguard ourselves from the commitment that self-government for India would necessarily mean precisely the same in form and substance as the self-government which has been evolved in different conditions by different parts of the

Empire. I take it, however, that there is no difference of opinion in regard to the question whether by self-government we intended responsible government, and that we contemplated that the form of responsible government would ultimately model itself, with such modifications in detail as are required by India's very exceptional circumstances, upon the principles underlying that of the other self-governing parts of His Majesty's Dominions.

2. In the second place, as a step towards that goal, we proposed to pave the way for an ultimate enlargement of the constitutional powers of the Provincial Legislative Councils, but we qualified that step by limiting it for the present to (i) an increase in the elected element; and (ii) a material expansion of the constituencies by which the elected members are chosen. In other words, we proposed a modification of the political *machinery* in order to secure more truly representative bodies upon our Legislative Councils, but, except in regard to budget committees, we entirely omitted to provide for any increase in the *material* upon which the improved machinery would have to work.

4. The question which I desire to raise is whether or not the alteration of the external situation, which I have endeavoured briefly to summarise, justifies or does not justify a reconsideration of the question whether, side by side with the improvement and development of the political *machinery*, we should not also propose a development of the *material* to be worked upon by that machinery.

5. Last year it was held that until we saw the results of the reformed elective system which we advocated, it would not be safe to confer enhanced powers upon the reformed Councils. At the same time I have always felt that it is impossible to form a true judgment as to the efficiency or otherwise of any assembly for conducting affairs unless and until the responsibility for such conduct rests directly upon that assembly. In other words, while the enlargement of the constituencies and the presence of a larger proportion of elected Members upon our Councils might in course of time give some indication of the aptitude of the electors, on the one hand, for forming a judgment regarding public matters of importance, and of the Members, on the other hand, for gauging public opinion and representing it, we should be in no better position ten years after the introduction of our reforms to estimate the capacity of the elected Members for administration and the control of affairs than we shall be after ten years' experience of the Morley-Minto reforms. We are, in fact, reiterating the proposition, which has proved so futile in the past, that we should only extend powers and responsibilities to people when they are fitted for it; but we provide no effective means whatever for fitting them, or testing their fitness, for their proper discharge. If this contention is concurred in, then I fear it must be admitted that our proposals hardly constitute a real step

in advance towards the inculcation of a sense of responsibility among our public non-official men.

6. To revert to the question whether the changes in the external situation justify a revision of our proposals, I admit that, in the position of ignorance in which we at present are as to the concrete terms of the resolutions passed at the recent Imperial War Conference, it is extraordinarily difficult to establish the view that the representation of India upon future Conferences, to be held annually, brings about that essential change in the situation which alone would materially modify the responsibilities which rest upon our shoulders in the matter of delegating real power to the revised assemblies. Until we know more precisely what the terms of those resolutions are, and how they are received by the Dominion Governments to which they have been referred, it is only possible to rely upon general reasons why it may be contended that we are in a position to advance rather further than we agreed to do last year. The essential reason is, to my mind, that advanced in paragraph 5, and the conviction that we must, simultaneously with our reformation of the machinery, take the risk of committing material responsibility to the hands of the representatives of the people. The contention which held the field when the Morley-Minto reforms were introduced was that it was impossible to convert the Legislative Councils of India into local Parliaments with Parliamentary powers of control. Again, it was also impossible, and still is, to contemplate that the only democratic control which operates in respect of the acts of the Government of India, namely, the control of the Houses of Parliament, should be removed unless and until some other form of popular responsible control could take its place. Such alternative control could only come about in one of two ways,—either (*a*) by the gradual introduction of a *real* measure of responsible democratic government in India; or (*b*) by the substitution for the British Parliamentary control of an Imperial control of some kind upon which the interests of India should have effective representation, or (*c*) by a judicious combination of (*a*) and (*b*).

7. It is not possible to contemplate (*a*) for very many years to come in such form, as regards the central government in India, as would justify the removal of the control of the British Parliament. But it is, I suggest, possible that, especially if India's interests are to be continuously represented upon the Imperial Conference, meeting annually, or whatever form of Imperial Council may eventually be evolved, we can contemplate the devolution of certain real powers of control, in some of the provinces, to responsible ministers selected from among the elected representatives of the people, provided we can devise means of doing so; because we should, in the event of failure, no longer be debarred, as at present, from retracing our steps. It is this proposition which I desire to put before His Excellency.

8. In the note, dated the 9th of May 1916, in which, at the commencement of our deliberations last year, I set forth, at His Excellency's request, my general views on the subject of reform, I made two suggestions, neither of which was pressed by me at that time for reasons with which His Excellency is familiar. In the first place, I wanted to see the provincial budgets debated and voted upon (subject to certain reservations as to the degree in which the vote would become operative) in the Provincial Councils, these being reconstituted upon the model shown in the Appendix (paragraph 34) of my note, in so far as that model was held to be adaptable to the varying needs of different provinces. In the second place, I advocated a first step in the direction of associating the representatives of the people with the responsibilities of Government (*vide* paragraph 6-F. of that note) by means of the appointment by the Governor to His Executive Council of one elected Member of the Legislative Council. I recognised, in paragraph 1 (c) and (d) of my note, the necessity for a common organisation for external defence and foreign policy for the Empire, which could not possibly be committed to the unfettered discretion of any government in India. Such organisation would have to continue to be the concern of the Empire, through an agency, in India, aloof from, and independent of, any self-governing organisation for the internal administration of India alone\*. It was in the light of the safeguard so postulated that I suggested

\* In regard to this I shall be prepared to submit suggestions if desired.

C. H.

that we might devolve certain real powers upon the elected representatives of the people.

9. We had before us last year the "Round Table" pamphlet in which were set out other suggested means of devolving powers and responsibilities upon Governments based on popular representation. Those means may be summarised, for my present purpose, as being the transfer, from the existing Executive Government of certain of the provinces, to the control of a Ministry selected from the elected representatives of the Legislative Councils, of the management of certain selected departments of the administration. It was described and criticised as a dyarchy. If the "Round Table" suggestion was understood correctly, it amounted to bifurcating the functions of the Legislative Councils into two distinct channels. Assuming that Departments A, B and C were made over to the Legislative Councils Ministry, and that D, E and F were reserved, the Legislative Councils, in respect of A, B and C, would be a Parliament independent of the Executive Government except for certain limitations—among others, the limitation of finance—inasmuch as they would have the administration only of such funds as might be made over for the administration of the allotted departments. It was, however, contemplated that, for purposes of the administration of those departments, it should be open to the ministry to propose new taxation. The ministry so contemplated would,

in fact, be a ministry responsible to the elected assembly, holding office at its pleasure, and with full powers, save as to the permanent Civil Services, in respect of the departments made over to it. On the other hand, in respect of Departments D, E and F, that assembly would have advisory powers only with no effective control whatever.

10. So far as I am aware, my own suggestion and those of the "Round Table" are the only positive proposals that have been put forward aiming at a real delegation of *power* to Indians, divorced from effective control. I propose to discuss the "Round Table" suggestion very briefly, first, because it appears to be open to one radical objection to its acceptance. At first sight, the proposal is an attractive one. It does devolve a real measure of power and responsibility upon Indians selected on a representative basis. It also limits the scope of those powers effectively, inasmuch as it restricts their exercise to the four corners of the allotted departments, and, financially, within the limits of the budget allotments made to those departments. Consequently, it is probable that the administration of those departments would proceed with a fair amount of efficiency, and we might reasonably expect that efficiency to increase as time went on. On the other hand, it seems to me for the following reasons almost a retrograde measure in some of its aspects and one which would bring about a position of difficulty and ill-feeling which might develop into serious dimensions. Let us suppose, as would almost certainly be the case, that the Police and Judicial Departments were among those reserved to the Executive, based on the present system; and let us further suppose that it became necessary to present legislation in restraint of the press or sedition within the province concerned. A conceivable situation would be that the Governor and his four Executive Members of Council would find themselves with the whole of the Legislative Council, in its advisory capacity, opposed to them; and the necessary legislation would have to pass into law against the solid and unanimous opposition of the Legislative Chamber, including those responsible Ministers, who in respect of the supposed Departments A, B and C had been appointed by the Governor. I cannot conceive a more undesirable situation. In an extreme case, it could only result in a deadlock in which no Members of the Legislative Council would accept office on the restricted basis proposed, and the administration of the transferred departments, would come to a standstill. I leave aside minor difficulties, such as the certainty of constant attempts on the part of the Legislative Council to assume more and more powers and to obtain the control of more and more departments, because these difficulties are not necessarily vital. There would perhaps be difficulties and conflict, too, in the administration of the country owing to the existence of two separate authorities. But the vital objection is, I think, the one I have indicated, and I confess I cannot see how it could work. There would also be the serious

difficulty that the status of the ministers would be lower, and their salaries probably less, than those of the Members of the Governor's Executive Councillors.

11. I now revert to a consideration of my own two proposals (paragraph 8 above) and I will take first the proposal to appoint to the Executive Council an elected Member of the Legislative Council. I contemplated that he should be selected by the Governor as the King selects a minister, *viz.*, on the principle of securing the man who is most likely to be able to command a following—if possible a majority—in the assembly. Further, that he should be given a portfolio, and paid a salary, in precisely the same manner as his Colleagues on the Council, and that he should have the same status as his Colleagues within the Council. He would be definitely in charge of certain departments probably the same as would have been made over to the hypothetical ministry of the "Round Table" scheme. His position would be one of great influence, but it would be a difficult one. He would be bound, so long as he consented to retain office, to support the Government's programme as a whole, and to do his best to get support to its policy in *all* departments. If he was unable to do this, he would be able to resign; in which case the Governor could send for another member and offer the ministry to him. In an extreme case it is possible that the Governor might find himself unable to find an elected member of the assembly with influence sufficient to secure the support necessary to carry through Government measures. In that event, there would have to be a power of dissolution. The fresh elections might result in a repetition of the deadlock. It was this possibility—the arrival at an *impasse*—that caused me, in the circumstances of last year, not to press this suggestion, for I was conscious that, in the situation in which we were then debating our proposals, these must be such as to involve no such risk, since there could be no going back from them. On the other hand, we might safely assume that the Minister so associated with the Executive would find it to his interest, and to the interest of the elected members, his followers, to avoid bringing about an *impasse*. He would, in fact, have a clear stake in the matter of making a success of the change, with a view to an expansion of the system.

12. It would be unwise in any way to minimise the difficulties which might arise owing to an *impasse*, such as has been referred to in the last paragraph, though it is possible to hope that the considerations suggested in the concluding sentences will create automatically an interest on the part of elected members in seeing that the *impasse* be avoided if possible. Although, as has been indicated in paragraph 6, it is impossible in the state of knowledge existing at present in India in regard to the future arrangements for India's representation on the Imperial Conference to rely with any great force upon such representation as a factor enabling us to contemplate retrocession from an advance in the directions suggested in the last paragraph, nevertheless the representation of India,



however inadequate, upon an Imperial body, does, I suggest, enable us to take considerably greater risk than we otherwise could or than we could foresee last year in the measures which we can legitimately propose. *Per contra*, if we do propose a measure of real delegation of responsible power, then I think we have an argument to our hands for advocating that India shall have stronger representation upon the annual Conferences than is apparently contemplated. We can, in fact, urge that it is of political importance, when promulgating the reform scheme, to grant a real measure of power to the Legislative Councils, and indicate forcibly that this can be done with far less risk of failure if arrangements can be made to secure that India and India's views are more fully represented upon those Conferences. I do not, however, disguise from myself the fact that, if a further safeguard could be created in India tending to secure that the delegation of real power would be exercised soberly and with discretion, it would be a very strong support to any proposals which we could devise.

13. I now come to the suggestion that provincial budgets should be debated and voted upon by the reorganised provincial legislatures. That suggestion was of course subject to strict limitations. I had in mind the possibility of giving greater latitude to the Councils than merely the power to dispose of the unallotted heads of the budget. Subject to the maintenance of the appropriations considered necessary by the Executive for the maintenance of the services essential to the working of the various departments, and to the reservation that schemes of development which had received the sanction of the Secretary of State and the Government of India were inviolable, I would propose to throw the whole of the budget open to debate and to decision by the Legislative Councils with a power of veto in regard to any item by the local executive government and with a second power of veto by the Government of India. Such powers of veto, in reference to the appropriations not safeguarded by the reservations, would seldom have to be exercised, since I take it that it would be preferable to permit the local Councils to make mistakes and to profit by mistakes rather than to render their vote nugatory, save in exceptional circumstances relating to budget provision of real importance.

14. Here I think it is relevant to stop for a moment to consider another aspect of the problem and one which has a special bearing upon the last sentence in paragraph 12. The objections urged by Sir Reginald Craddock to territorial representation as opposed to communal and class representation have a validity of their own quite apart from the general question of political representation. It is the fact, which many Indians of influence deplore and which is fully recognised by Englishmen having experience of India, that, since we began to associate Indian opinion with our machinery for law-making, we have failed entirely to provide for the representation of the influential aristocratic and conservative parties in the country. The difficulty of remedying this very grave

defect, coupled with the steps we have already taken towards democratisation, is almost insuperable so far as concerns our Legislative Councils as at present constituted. If we have taken a false step in failing hitherto to devise measures to secure that representation, I do not think it is possible to contemplate redressing that failure by any reactionary measure affecting the political scheme for representation in the existing Councils. Recognising, however, as one must, that in India, of all countries in the world, where aristocratic influences are still so vital in the social sphere, it was an error to overlook the need for securing representation of conservative and orthodox opinion in the counsels of the country, it seems desirable to examine whether, in devising a further step towards the devolution of powers and responsibility to Indians, the occasion may not be taken to remedy the defect. In our efforts to secure representation of Indian political opinion in a single chamber, we have, I suggest, ignored history and historical analogy as deducible from the evolution of other countries. We have set up the beginnings of a machine which, if consistently developed, would result in the establishment, ultimately, of responsible Government by a single chamber. That is a development which has no real counterpart in even the most democratic of the democracies of the world. From this point of view, it is arguable that, now that we are about to enter upon changes with the deliberate aim of preparing the provinces of India for self-government leading up to fully responsible administration, we should see whether the constitutional machine does not require radical revision; and it is worth while to suggest that one measure, calculated to afford stability and strength, and to provide a safeguard against ill-considered action or extravagant demands, would be the establishment of a second chamber. Incidentally, but by no means of small importance, such a chamber would, I suggest, facilitate the task of devising methods by which a measure of real power and responsibility could be devolved upon the people as represented in the two chambers with a diminution of risk.

15. In our despatch, paragraph 50, we indicated that it might be necessary to supplement any general scheme for giving effect to the elective system by methods devised to secure proportionate representation of minorities. Even if this were done, however, there can be little doubt that the landed interests will fail to secure representation in a purely elective chamber, proportionate to their importance to the country, and that the stronger conservative and orthodox interests will fail to secure representation at all, even if the conditions of representation are so laid down that members of those classes are alone eligible to represent them,—a provision to which there would be grave objection. This consideration, I suggest, fortifies the proposal formulated in the last paragraph.

16. To discuss the precise details of the composition and powers of the second provincial chamber would be premature and possibly a waste of labour.

But, since the suggestion is that the constitution of the second chamber might afford an additional safeguard against the risks inherent in a transfer of real power to a single elective legislative assembly, I put forward below a rough scheme designed with the object of securing this result as well as of remedying what I have ventured to call our failure in the past to have due regard to historical analogy.

17. *A. Composition.*—First of all, the second chamber should be so designed as to secure effective representation of the elements which will probably be left out in any elective assembly chosen on a general franchise; and such representation, to be assured, requires a considerable element of nomination.

Secondly, any second chamber should have a more or less continuing life, *i. e.*, it should not be constituted, whether by nomination or election, so as to require complete renewal at any fixed period. Thus, if it consisted of 30 members, it should be constituted so that one-third (or some such proportion) only retired at one time, being eligible, of course, *caeteris paribus*, for re-election or re-nomination on retirement.

In the third place, the period for which members are nominated or elected should be different from—probably longer than—the period of membership of the existing chambers (as in the case of the Senate of the United States).

Finally, the number of elected members should exceed the number of those nominated.

18. Clearly, it would be out of the question for this chamber to be regularly presided over, as would be the first chamber, by the representative of the executive government. Nor would it always be possible for the government to be fully represented at its debates on all occasions. Therefore, such chamber must have its own Speaker or Chairman, elected or nominated. It would be necessary, further, either that a member of this chamber should be associated with the executive government, or that a member of the executive government should attend the sittings of the chamber. It is desirable to clear up this point here, because upon its determination must depend, to a large extent, the powers which can be conferred upon the chamber. If the position and prestige of a second chamber is to be at all comparable (as it should be) with that of the existing Council, it would seem necessary that a member of that chamber should, as in the case of the lower chamber, be associated with the executive. Whether it would be equally essential that such member should be selected on precisely the same principle depends upon the detailed constitution of the chamber; but I venture to think the general postulate that a proportion of the chamber should be nominated, and that it should have a *quasi*-continuing existence, would make it possible for the Governor to nominate

to his Council a member of it in place of the Indian Member of the Executive Council appointed under the existing system. With a chamber of 30, 10 of whom were nominated, with a tenure of the membership of five years both for nominated and elected members, a field of choice would be open to the Governor at least as wide as exists in present circumstances. Of the 20 elected members, 10 might quite legitimately be landed proprietors elected by an agrarian electorate with a strict *educational* qualification, while the other 10 could be elected by general or special constituencies on a property and literacy qualification. (By "general" is meant territorial, and by "special" is intended class or racial.) It is relevant also to the question of the powers and responsibilities of such a chamber to suggest that, while the members of the executive

\* Who, conversely, though a member of the executive government, would have the corresponding converse status in the Legislative Council chamber.

government, other than the member\* nominated from the chamber, should have no power of voting on matters under discussion there, it should be open to such

other members of the executive to be present at, and intervene in, debates relating to matters pertaining to their departments.

19. *Powers*.—In regard (a) to *Legislation*:—The second chamber should have the same powers as the first. Legislation could be initiated in either, but, to become law, must pass both chambers.

(b) As to *Finance*.—It would be obviously inconvenient to have to introduce and pass the budget in the second chamber as well as in the first, subject to all the latitude which it is proposed to give the existing chamber. It might be arranged, therefore, that, while the budget could be debated in the second chamber and resolutions upon it proposed, such resolutions should not have binding force upon the Government.

(c) *Resolutions*.—The second chamber should have the same powers as the existing chamber.

(d) In reference to certain matters, power might be given to the Governor of a province to convene a joint sitting of the two chambers.

20. As I have said, it would be premature on my part to go in greater detail into the possible constitution and powers of a second chamber at the present stage. One criticism, which is obvious, is that the proposal to constitute a second chamber in those provinces to which are extended the additional powers, which I have suggested, imports a great complication into the machinery of government and provides a constitution too elaborate for the necessities of the provinces of India. To this I would reply that, in the first place, my suggestion only applies to those more advanced and more important provinces to which it may be held to be safe to give the larger powers, and secondly, that in those provinces, so far as population, &c., goes, it cannot conclusively be contended that a second chamber is either inappropriate or excessive. The smallest province to which my suggestion would extend is the Presidency of Bombay, with a population approximating to 20 millions, and the interests, landed, commercial and economic, inherent in that province, are of great importance. I have heard the suggestion made that, if real powers

are to be extended to the Councils of selected provinces, then a safeguard could be established in an aristocratic chamber at the head-quarters of the Government of India. My own view is that such a chamber would neither meet the logical requirements of the case nor satisfy political opinion or provincial needs to anything like the same extent as a second provincial chamber. At the same time, it is a possible alternative which, however, for the present, I do not propose to examine.

21. I venture now to summarise the argument contained in this note—

(a) Changed circumstances make it politically desirable that the Government of India should propose the delegation of definite powers to the Councils reorganised as has been proposed in our despatch.

(b) India's representation on the Conference modifies the risk of doing this.

(c) The delegation of definite powers might be effected in the direction of—

(i) associating with the Executive Government as Member one elected representative of the Legislative Council (paragraph 11);

(ii) committing the budget, subject to the limitations indicated in paragraph 13, to discussion by, and the decision of, the Legislative Council;

(d) A safeguard, other than (a), is desirable. This can be furnished, with much advantage from the point of view of historical parallel and the need for securing representation of conservative and orthodox interests, by establishing a second chamber. (Paragraphs 14 to 19.)

We have, in our despatch, definitely abandoned the position that Legislative Councils are *not* to develop into Parliamentary institutions; and it is therefore only right that we should face the logical consequences of such a radical change in the position. It is suggested, in this note, that we must now make a beginning in the task of devolving responsibility, but that the Legislative Councils which have come into being, for a strictly limited purpose, in the past, cannot appropriately, by themselves, be made to fit the larger purposes, but require to be supplemented.

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No. 90.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR JAMES MESTON, K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Govr. of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

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*Naini Tal, June 27th, 1917.*

DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I have received Your Excellency's letter of the 25th instant, and can, I think, say at once that Malaviya's statement is incorrect. The confidential circular about Home Rule came here and was handled in my absence; but I have seen the papers now, and it is perfectly clear that the letter never went outside the Secretariat. My Chief Secretary is satisfied that it was certainly not shown to any non-official in the Secretariat. Confidential orders based on the letter were sent to Commissioners and District Officers; and in those orders

there were certain extracts from the letter. It is possible that these extracts, or part of them, may have been shown or read by some District Magistrate to a non-official; and I will make full enquiries as to whether this could have happened. But I think Your Excellency may take it that your Home Department letter, as such, was not communicated to anybody.

2. I am afraid that the leakage through our own officers, assuming that it occurs, is not the only means by which information of a most confidential character gets into the wrong hands. Sir Verney Lovett, who has just been down in Lucknow talking to the Nationalists, told me yesterday the following very disturbing fact. Among others, he had sent for Mahmudabad, who had taken part in, and spoken at, the first meeting of the new agitation over Mrs. Besant. Mahmudabad defended his performance on the ground that an agitation expedited matters. He then went on to say to Sir Verney that the Government of India's proposals for reform had been turned down in the India Office, and that a commission of enquiry was to be appointed. As a commission was a lengthy business, he felt that agitation was necessary, &c., &c. Now this particular information cannot have leaked out through any provincial source; for I cannot think that anybody except myself among the officials here knew as much as Mahmudabad evidently had been informed, and I need hardly say that I have kept my own counsel about it. The information may of course have come out from home, though I think that is a little unlikely; otherwise it can only have emerged from the circle which Mahmudabad frequents at Simla. The depressing feature of the matter is that whatever Mahmudabad has heard, is by this time known to the politicians generally.

3. As soon as I get, from the Commissioners of Lucknow and Allahabad, the reports of their conversations with the advanced party leaders, I will write to Your Excellency in full about the progress of this agitation. I will also, as I have said, try to ascertain what colour there is for Malaviya's allegation about leakage here. His veracity could be tested at once by asking him what passages the non-official here saw, because the extracts communicated to District Magistrates were very limited and definite.

With utmost respect,

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) JAS. S. MESTON.

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No. 91.

FROM H. E. THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE LORD PENTLAND, G. C. I. E., Governor  
of Madras.

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*Govt. House, Ootacamund, June 30th, 1917.*

[Private.]

MY DEAR CHELMSFORD,

Your letter of the 25th has just reached me: and you are entirely right. Mr. Srinivasa Sastri has no information whatever from me of the contents of

the circular letter to which you refer, nor of the fact of its issue. It was never mentioned by me to him, nor by him to me; and I have no reason to think or suppose that he was when I last saw him here, or is now, aware of the existence of any such circular.

I may add, for your private information, that he came to see me here after I had addressed the Madras Legislative Council: and from statements subsequently made by him and reported to me on unquestionable authority, I understand that being satisfied as to the limits of the purpose of my speech, he declined to take part in the outcry against it, thereby incurring the criticism and unpopularity of some of his friends, especially in Madras. I cannot but commend and admire his conduct in this respect: though he has no doubt joined in censuring the internments of Mrs. Besant and her colleagues—the further stage.

I am, very sincerely yours,

(Sd.) PENTLAND.

No. 92.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 708, 3rd July 1917, 6-45 p. m. (Despd. for Home Dept.)

Constitutional Reforms. Please refer to my telegram of 30th May. We contemplated despatching a more formal reply to your telegrams of 22nd May after hearing your views in greater detail. But we find that at present we can add very little. In regard to the system of external control over local bodies, we must await result of the despatch which was promised in your telegram of May 22nd, and as regards increased power and responsibility of Legislative Council, your decision regarding the appointment of a Committee or a Commission referred to in our telegram of May 30th is awaited.

No. 93.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 722, 6th July 1917, 4-30 p. m.

*Private.* Reforms. Will you please refer to my official telegram of the 3rd instant? I should be obliged if you would give me any indication as to when I may expect an announcement of His Majesty's Government's decision as to policy and the appointment of a Commission.

Our inability to take any line of policy in the absence of a decision by His Majesty's Government is seriously weakening the position of the Government of India.

If it is decided to appoint a Commission, will you give me an opportunity of suggesting at least one man from India who is acquainted with present conditions?

## No. 94.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1297, 9th July 1917, 5-5 p. m. (Recd. 10th, 8 a. m.)

*Private. Very confidential.* Your private telegram of the 6th instant. Constitutional reforms. The question has been twice discussed by the Cabinet, but the discussion has been delayed and complicated by issues which have been raised by the Mesopotamian Commission. The Cabinet seemed disposed to ask me to visit India next winter to confer with you and with representatives of different shades of opinion. In that case I should be associated with others, but should retain my official position. This would, I hope, meet your objections to my proposal and at the same time give me the help I should require. But no decision has yet been arrived at and I am not certain what it will be.

I shall welcome any suggestion from you in the sense of the last paragraph of your telegram, but please consider whether it would be possible to introduce an official on such committee or delegation without also appointing an Indian. My own idea was to take as <sup>\*intermediaries</sup><sub>assessors</sub> one official and one Indian.

Can I help you by any interim announcement?

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\* Original group = assessor, by change of one figure = intermediary.

## No. 95.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No 740, 10th July 1917, 9-45 p. m.

*Private & very confidential.* Constitutional Reforms. I am delighted at the prospect of your coming out. In our present difficulties an interim announcement would be of immense help to us, and we hope it will be made with as little delay as possible. May I suggest that it be made on the following lines :—

*Begins.* His Majesty's Government, having considered the proposals of the Government of India, concur in the view of the Government of India that self-government within the Empire is the ultimate goal of British rule in India, but His Majesty's Government, in view of their many grave pre-occupations arising out of the war, are unable at present to give the necessary consideration to the steps to be taken on the road to that goal. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government would impress upon Indian politicians the desirability of patience and abstention from agitation, having in view the fact that the Empire is at the present moment in the throes of a great war.

At the request of the Viceroy, Mr. Chamberlain will visit India in the course of the next cold weather for the purpose of conferring with the Government of India and with representatives of different shades of opinion. *Ends.*

I lay special stress on the announcement being of His Majesty's Government. They are making great play in India with the idea that there are two



voices at home in regard to this matter—the voice of the Secretary of State and the voice of the Prime Minister.

An announcement to the above effect, if made promptly, would, I believe, have an excellent effect and the situation would be greatly eased.

This is with reference to your private and very confidential telegram of 9th instant.

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No. 96.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR BENJAMIN ROBERTSON, K. C. S. I., K. C. M. G., C I. E.,  
Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces.

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*Govt. House, Nagpur, July 15th, 1917.*

[ Confidential. ]

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

Since I last wrote to Your Excellency at the beginning of June, I have come down from Pachmarhi, and for the last 10 or 12 days I have been seeing for myself how matters stand in the south of the province, *i. e.*, in Berar and the Nagpur country. The state of feeling amongst the educated people here is such that I consider I should lose no time in bringing to Your Excellency's notice the conclusions I have formed. I may first state that in the north of the province the reports which I receive show that there is not very much excitement there over the Home Rule business. The people of the northern districts generally have never taken the matter up at all keenly; in fact, the prevailing disposition has been to keep aloof from the agitation which has been engineered from Madras and Poona, and this disposition is still manifest.

2. Among the Maratha people in the south, the case is very different. Home Rule has made headway very fast among the literate classes and the internment of Mrs. Besant has brought it on in the last month in a way one could hardly have believed. This is more particularly the case in Nagpur; in Berar the Commissioner has had a steadying influence on the leaders, but the rank and file have become restive. Some of these classes have tried to get to work among the villagers, but I do not think they have made any impression. In what I write I shall speak therefore of the attitude of the educated community in the southern districts, and more especially in Nagpur.

3. The things that have specially struck me are—

(1) The rapid spread of the Home Rule movement.

(2) The intensity of feeling about the grant of a measure of self-government.

Mrs. Besant's internment has been seized on to spread the idea that the "aspirations of the people" are to be repressed. Even well-disposed people, although they have not been caught by this idea, are sore on the subject and have fallen into a way of thinking



No. 95a.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., 10th July 1917. (Despd. midnight.)

*Private & Personal.* Reference my private telegram, dated July 10th. Suggestion as to assessors' names. The following are recommended by me:—

- (1) Sir W. Vincent. He has the advantage of not having been a party to my despatch.
- (2) Mr. Basu.

Could the announcement suggested possibly be made in reply to a question in the House of Commons?

which is very little different, and do not stop to consider the mischievous nature of Mrs. Besant's agitation. There is an undercurrent of feeling that Government is not going to play up, and the revulsion from the expectations raised by the reception of the Indian delegates to the War Conference has created something akin to despondency. I speak now with considerable experience of these parts, and I can say that I have never known so much feeling behind any movement as is now manifest. The very moderation of the speeches at the protest meetings is a sign of this, and my conversations with leading men leave no doubt in my mind as to the "earnestness" which has grown up in people's minds.

(3) Impatience with the attitude of the Government of India.

I think it right to tell Your Excellency that this feeling, which has been gathering force for many months, is now very strong. People may decry the action taken by the heads of the Local Governments, but the real feeling is against the Government of India which remains silent in the midst of all that is happening. The articles by Sir Stanley Reed in the *Times of India* calling upon Government to abandon its attitude of negation and come out with a policy round which the patriotic forces of the country would rally have had a profound effect. I know how the Government of India are situated in this matter, but I cannot impress too strongly on Your Excellency that some step should be taken as early as possible to give the country a lead. Hitherto we have tried to inculcate caution and patience, in order to prevent the agitation gathering dangerous momentum. In my opinion we can no longer go on in the way we have been doing. Sir Krishna Gupta's speech, reported in yesterday's *Statesman*, is an indication of the all-round feeling on this subject. There should be no mincing of matters about the mischievous nature of Mrs. Besant's propaganda; I do not think that the people mind so much about her—in fact, had definite action been taken against her at the beginning, the situation would have been much less acute than it is—it is the idea behind the internment that Government seems to have only a negative policy that rankles. I put it thus plainly, as it is the feeling that has grown up, however mistakenly; we must, in my opinion, lose no time in countering this feeling, or it will only grow more bitter.

(4) Among the more extreme people there is a distinct idea that Government has let the movement go so far that it will not now dare to refuse anything. I think myself that among the better-disposed people much of the seriousness, which I have said is present in their minds, is due to a foreboding

of trouble when Government finally speaks out. The extremists have no qualms on this account and, as I have said, they are coming to the belief that they are going to score. If I am right in this view, it is a further argument for not delaying the declaration of the policy of Government.

4. The above are the impressions I have formed by talking to some of the leading men during the past few days. The rapidity with which the whole outlook has changed within the past few weeks is extraordinary. It is my firm belief that we can no longer go on temporising. The longer we do so, the more difficult will the final solution become. And it is to acquaint Your Excellency with the position of affairs, as this now appears to me, and to urge that no time be lost in making a declaration of policy, that I am writing this letter, after trying to gauge, as well as I can, the recent development of opinion on the subject.

I am, yours very sincerely,  
(Sd.) B. ROBERTSON.

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No. 96a.

Viceroy to Prime Minister, London.

Telegram P., No. 760, 16th July 1917.

In view of the important political problems relating to the Government of India which are now before His Majesty's Government, and the knowledge which Mr. Chamberlain possesses of them, I trust I may be permitted to express the hope that Mr. Chamberlain may be induced to reconsider his decision. The Government of India were anxiously awaiting an announcement of policy on the eve of his resignation, and in consequence of this event, we fear that a decision as to policy may be indefinitely postponed. My procedure is, I realise, unusual, but the gravity and urgency of the question must be my justification for addressing you.

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No. 97.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 774, 18th July 1917, 5-30 p. m.

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I hope now that some action may be taken by His Majesty's Government with reference to an announcement on the subject of constitutional reforms. I had hoped that we were on the point of some such announcement when your predecessor resigned.

Perhaps you will refer to my private telegram of July 10th on the subject. I had extended an invitation to your predecessor to visit India and look

into the Reforms question on the spot, and from one of Mr. Chamberlain's last telegrams there seemed a likelihood of my invitation being accepted by him. I hope that you will take over my invitation. There are of course obvious difficulties, but in these times I consider difficulties should be brushed aside, and the opportunity of talking things over with you would be welcomed by me.

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No. 98.

Extract from a letter from His Excellency the Viceroy to the Right Hon'ble Edwin Samuel Montagu, P. C., M. P., His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated the 19th July 1917.

But of course the really urgent matter in this Department is the question of Constitutional Reforms. I should have thought that His Majesty's Government might have concurred with all the recommendations in our despatch relating to—

- (1) Rewards to the Army (paragraphs 12—18).
- (2) Removal of grievances (paragraphs 19—29).
- (3) The first two roads to the goal (paragraphs 36—39).

They then could formulate their own announcement as to a goal and decide how the vexed question of Political Reforms should be investigated and settled.

I am precluded, by your predecessor's directions and by the omission of His Majesty's Government to reply to our urgent request for an announcement, from making any statement myself, and surely in a matter of such importance it is only His Majesty's Government which can make any satisfactory declaration. I leave the matter with confidence in your hands, but I would remind you that the sands of time are running out, and that each day's delay renders the position more grave.

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No. 99.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1373, 20th July 1917, 9-15 p. m. (Recd. 22nd, 6 a. m.)

\* \* \* \* I greatly appreciate your confidence in asking me to take over your invitation to Mr. Chamberlain and I recognise your anxiety to obtain early decision. I am giving whole question my most earnest consideration and will do my best to press matter on with Cabinet.

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No. 100.

TO THE HON'BLE SIR BENJAMIN ROBERTSON, K. C. S. I., K. C. M. G., C. I. E.,  
Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces.

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*Viceregal Lodge, Simla, July 21st, 1917.*

DEAR SIR BENJAMIN,

Thank you for your letter of 15th July. No one realises more than I do the importance of an announcement with regard to policy, but I should like you to appreciate the position in which we are *vis-à-vis* the Home Government.

Our Reforms Despatch reached the Secretary of State's hands last December, in which we advocated an announcement. Mr. Chamberlain, however, for some months would not look at it and only changed his mind on the subject after repeated strong representations on our part. On the eve of his resignation we were, I believe, on the point of getting something, but then came the Mesopotamian tragedy with its change of Secretaries of State. To my mind, the only statement of policy which will be of value is one from His Majesty's Government, and I am pressing them to make such a statement, but evidently they find it difficult to come to a decision. I know that the matter has been before the Cabinet on two occasions, but no decision has been come to. I am still not without hope of getting the new Secretary of State to say something. I think it must be clear to you that for me to make an announcement which fell short of or went beyond what His Majesty's Government were prepared to say would be futile. This is a matter on which the Home Government alone can speak with authority, and all that we can do is to impress on them the urgency of the matter and await their decision.

Very sincerely yours,  
(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.

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No. 101.

To THE HON'BLE SIR JAMES MESTON, K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Govr. of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

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*Viceregal Lodge, Simla, July 23rd, 1917.*

MY DEAR SIR JAMES,

I forward herewith a letter I have addressed to Sir B. Robertson, which states quite clearly the position of the Government of India. Chamberlain's resignation has of course hung up the decision of His Majesty's Government, but I have impressed on Montagu the urgency of the question and one can only hope that a reply will come soon.

I have not yet seen your official proposals with regard to recruiting and wheat. I am told, however, that as regards wheat, the amount exported from the United Provinces has always been negligible, and that the crux lies in your marketing arrangements. We have asked the Home Government to give us some idea as to their requirements in this respect as soon as possible, and on their reply will depend largely the measures that we shall be constrained to adopt. I am afraid things are not going too well at home, and the end of the war seems to recede each week.

Thank you for your admirable speech.

Very sincerely yours,  
(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.

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[ ENCLOSURE. ]

Letter to the Hon'ble Sir B. Robertson, dated the 21st July 1917, *vide* No.100 .

No. 102.

{ FROM THE HON'BLE SIR BENJAMIN ROBERTSON, K. C. S. I., K. C. M. G., C. I. E.,  
Chief Commr., Central Provinces.

*Govt. House, Nagpur, July 24th, 1917.*

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I am very much obliged to Your Excellency for your letter of the 21st. My intention in writing was to let you know how matters stood down here, as I felt that I should acquaint Your Excellency with the general uneasiness which prevails. I have been speaking to the leading men who come to see me, and I am going out for a few days at the end of this week to visit some of the Maratha districts. By straight talk one can do much to keep things steady, and it is very important that this should be done.

I quite recognise the difficulty of the Government of India's situation, as I mentioned in my letter. But I thought my testimony might be of use to the Government of India in pressing the matter. The development of the "mistrust", as Meston called it, has been sudden, but there is no doubt it is there, and we do not want to let it deepen.

We are having excellent rains; and if we get a really good cotton crop bringing in lots of money, it will perhaps keep people busy and give them less time to think about politics.

I am, yours very sincerely,  
(Sd.) B. ROBERTSON.

No. 103.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR JAMES MESTON, K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Governor of the United  
Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

*Camp Agra, July 25th, 1917.*

DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I am much indebted for your letter of the 23rd, enclosing your statement of the position to Sir Benjamin Robertson. Believe me, if ever I have seemed to be pressing Your Excellency about the political situation, it was with no intention of adding to your difficulties. I very fully understand how you are placed, and have only written as I did in the hope that you might find my suggestions sometimes useful in supporting your own pressure upon the Home Government for some sort of declaration.

2. Robertson had written to me direct about the present condition of affairs. I entirely agree with him that the air has never been thicker with suspicion and mistrust of us than it is today. Whatever be the reasons, the anti-Government and almost the anti-British feeling among the advanced party is stronger than I have ever seen it. Everything that we do is misrepresented, and the whole ground is covered with invisible tentacles of susceptibility which it is impossible to avoid treading upon as one goes about one's daily work. The misunderstandings are spreading into wider circles, and the temper and patience of our officers are being severely tried.



3. There are certain indications that all this has gone too far. The Mahomedans are getting frightened and have begun to keep aloof from the more active forms of excitement. The landed classes are beginning to awake to some sense of their duty, and the new association of zamindars of the Agra province passed, with almost complete unanimity, a resolution at their annual meeting a few days ago, deprecating "the present inopportune political agitation" and assuring the Government of their loyalty. I confess that I am encouraging these demonstrations on the other side, though of course only in private conversation. It does seem to me essential that the people at home, who have very little time to get at the facts, should not be flooded by the reports of public meetings all over India to protest against the internments, and should hear of no movement in the opposite direction; the news they are getting now is enough to make most of them believe that India is one vast Home Rule camp.

4. Meanwhile we are reasonably quiet in this province, at least on the surface. Some of the leading men asked me to say in public what, as I mentioned to you in a recent letter, the Commissioners of Lucknow and Allahabad had said in private on my behalf, by way of quiet admonition. I accordingly took the opportunity of our last Council meeting at Lucknow to make an appeal for commonsense; and I am very glad that Your Excellency did not disapprove what I said. I have now been round all the chief towns and seen most of the politicians. The weather has been in our favour, as it rather discouraged energy, and things are simmering. Meetings have been held and a few unwise speeches made; but the newspapers have combined to exclude any violent oratory, which is always something to the good. The best that can be said is that we can hold on for some time longer; but of course there is no radical remedy until we get what Your Excellency has so long been asking for.

5. I do not know what impression you formed of Bikaner's mind when he was staying with you recently. He certainly thought Chamberlain unnecessarily cautious; but I have no conception that he regarded him as hostile. I was horrified therefore to hear from a perfectly external source that Bikaner had been saying that Chamberlain had broken his heart by announcing that England was not in India for the purpose of letting it rule itself. I can hardly conceive the Maharaja making any such statement, which apparently gained currency through his political officer, and I am writing to sound him with some caution on the point. If it is not correct, then I think it is almost a matter for consideration whether his political officer should not be muzzled. It always seems so hopeless, however, to check mischievous gossip in this country. I cannot find the slightest reason to believe what Malaviya told Your Excellency, namely, that your Home Department's letter about Home Rule had been shown in this province. Not only is his suggestion of breach of confidence now denied by every officer who had to deal with the question, but the letter itself was never out of the Secretariat here, and the most that any one could have seen would have been one or two extracts which were put into the circular of instructions to our District Officers. Malaviya's *fidus Achates*, the editor of the *Leader*, was talking to me the other day, and I

incidentally said I supposed he had seen the Home Rule orders. He shook his head and said that none of the people here had seen them; but that they had been shown in Madras (he himself is a Madrasi) to Mr. Srinivasa Ayengar. Where does truth lie in such matters?

\* \* \* \* \*

I remain, sincerely yours,

(Sd.) JAS. S. MESTON.

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No. 104.

Secretary of State to Viceroy. (Home Dept.)

Telegram P., No. 1415, 27th July 1917, 9-35 p. m. (Recd. 28th, 11-45 a. m.)

A telegram from Horniman of the *Bombay Chronicle* to the press, London, dated July 26th, mentions confidential circular of March last from the Government of India to Local Governments regarding steps to repress Home Rule agitation which has apparently been referred to in *Bombay Chronicle*. Please let me know whether the terms of any such circular have been allowed to become public. Please forward by first mail copies of document referred to and telegraph its purport in the meantime.

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No. 105.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1439, 1st August 1917, 4-10 p. m. (Recd. 2nd, 2-10 p. m.)

*Private.* Constitutional Reforms. I am doing my best to get Cabinet decision on announcement and commissions. It is a question of time and opportunity, for you will readily understand that Cabinet is very overburdened and pro-occupied with general war situation, which at the moment is none too simple. My hands might be strengthened if I had from you an appreciation of the situation in India at the present moment. Have your views on urgency undergone any modification?

Will you kindly send me a reply as soon as possible?

No. 106.

Secretary of State to Viceroy. (Home Dept.)

Telegram P., No. 1441, 1st August 1917, 5-5 p. m. (Recd. 2nd, 2-30 p. m.)

Please refer to my telegram of the 27th ultimo. I have now received the circular to Local Governments regarding Home Rule.

No. 107.

Secretary of State to Viceroy. (Home Dept.)

Telegram P., No. 1445, 1st August 1917, 9-50 p. m. (Recd. 2nd, 4-35 p. m.)

Reforms. I have received long telegram from Joint Congress and Moslem League, Bombay, on which I should be glad if you will let me have your observations generally, though I am of course not sending any acknowledgment.

The conclusion of the telegram is a protest against Bengal Government for prohibiting meeting at Calcutta to criticise action of Madras Government in case of Mrs. Besant. The facts should be telegraphed to me, please.

No. 108.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR JAMES MESTON, K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Govr. of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

*Camp Naini Tal, August 1st, 1917.*

DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

It may perhaps have been brought to your notice that the *Pioneer* has recently embarked, as its first exercise in the field of Indian politics proper, upon a campaign in favour of an Indian Convention. I see that it comes out today with an article in which my name is freely used and suggestions made about my share in the Convention. Though I am sure that it is unnecessary to do so, I write to assure Your Excellency that I have had no hand whatsoever in these suggestions. My invariable principle has been to avoid the Press, and I have never attempted to "work" any newspaper, either in India or in England, for it seems to me contrary to the best traditions of our service to do so, besides being absolutely wrong in the case of a permanent official.

2. Perhaps Your Excellency will allow me to add that I have ascertained from Lionel Curtis that he also had nothing whatsoever to do with this scheme. It seems to have been entirely an inspiration of Rattigan himself, the present editor to the paper. On broad grounds, it is an excellent thing that the *Pioneer* should at last abandon its attitude of supercilious refusal to recognise such a thing as Indian politics. Even if its suggestions are not on the right

lines, the mere fact of its taking up this question at the present moment will do more good than harm.

With utmost respect,

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) JAS. S. MESTON.

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No. 109.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 834, 2nd August 1917, 8-30 p. m.

*Private.* Reforms. I am grateful to you for your private telegram of 1st August. At the present moment there is a very strong and growing political agitation which demands a declaration on the subject of self-government. There is no decrease, but a positive increase in urgency and an announcement of policy as the only means of arresting agitation, is pressed for in each letter I receive from Heads of Local Governments. I have refused to make any announcement, because I have felt that His Majesty's Government alone could make a declaration which would be regarded as satisfactory.

I believe that our difficulties would be greatly alleviated by an announcement on the following lines :—

“His Majesty's Government concur with the Government of India in regarding self-government within the Empire as the ultimate goal of British Rule in India, but while His Majesty's Government regard with sympathy India's aspirations in this respect, they are not in a position, in view of their grave war pre-occupations, to give adequate consideration to the steps on the road to that goal. They will, however, examine them at the very earliest opportunity.”

At the same time I would ask that the Prime Minister (and I lay stress on *his* saying it) should invite Indian politicians to rest satisfied for the moment with this declaration and refrain from agitation which must seriously jeopardise the concentration of effort and will necessary to achieve victory.

You may regard this as a temporising proposal, but time is of the essence of the situation.

By next mail we are sending our despatch on Commissions which elaborates the proposals already agreed to between your predecessor and my Government.

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No. 110.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1463, 3rd August 1917, 9 p. m. (Recd. 5th, 9 a. m.)

*Private.* Aga Khan informs me by letter that he proposes to publish in India next month a scheme prepared by Gokhale shortly before death for political reforms in provinces and in Government of India. Aga Khan received it from Gokhale with authority to publish it at suitable time, which Aga Khan considers has arrived. Aga Khan gave Lord Willingdon a copy and has

sent me one. Unless you and Lord Willingdon gravely object to publication at present juncture, I do not propose to suggest that he should reconsider decision. Scheme in general features is not novel and suggestion possibly might not be well taken. Please reply quickly.

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No. 111.

Viceroy to Governor of Bombay.

Telegram P., No. 857, 5th August 1917.

*Private.* I have received following telegram from Secretary of State :—

*Begins.* Aga Khan informs me by letter that he proposes to publish in India next month a scheme prepared by Gokhale shortly before death for political reforms in provinces and in Government of India. Aga Khan received it from Gokhale with authority to publish it at suitable time, which Aga Khan considers has arrived. Aga Khan gave Lord Willingdon a copy and has sent me one. Unless you and Lord Willingdon gravely object to publication at present juncture, I do not propose to suggest that he should reconsider decision. Scheme in general features is not novel and suggestion possibly might not be well taken. Please reply quickly. *Ends.*

Would you kindly send me your copy at once and let me know your views as to publication ?

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No. 111a.

FROM H. E. THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE LORD WILLINGDON, G. C. I. E., Governor of Bombay.

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*Bombay, August 6th, 1917.*

[Private.]

MY DEAR CHELMSFORD,

I can't quite understand what Montagu is after ! If Aga Khan wants to publish his document, I suppose he is at liberty to do so, but I own I can see little advantage in the production at this juncture of another reform scheme, which, as you will have seen, is fairly comprehensive in its views. It will set tongues wagging again, and we shall have some further fulminations from Horniman against the wicked bureaucracy.

I am still of opinion that what is wanted is a clear declaration of the goal of Government policy, frankly and shortly expressed, which, though belated, will still do much to steady matters, and I am clear that no attempt to discover the trend of public opinion (for that is I suppose what is wanted) by the publication of another scheme of reforms will do any good.

I should think the best thing for Montagu to do would be to try and prevent Aga Khan publishing the document, and to use Gokhale's suggestions on reform in preparing with you the general scheme which he will put before the country after the war is over.

Personally I could go a long way in agreement with Gokhale's scheme, but I think it's much better to use it for our Government purposes than to let it be published and create more talk.

Yours very sincerely,  
(Sd.) WILLINGDON.

*P. S.*—I see by the wire that we are asked if we “gravely object” to the publication of the Gokhale Memorandum. Subject to the general objections I have stated in the earlier part of this letter, I can't go so far as to say that I have any “grave” objection to its publication.

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No. 112.

FROM J. CRERAR, Esq., I. C. S., Private Secy. to the Governor of Bombay.

*Govt. House, Ganeshkhind,  
August 6th, 1917.*

[ Very Confidential. ]

MY DEAR MAFFEY,

With reference to His Excellency the Viceroy's private telegram of today's date, I am to send a copy of the memorandum by the late Mr. Gokhale referred to by the Secretary of State. His Excellency Lord Willingdon is communicating his views separately.

The cipher message has been received in a slightly corrupt form and repetition of two of the groups has been asked for.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) J. CRERAR.

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[ ENCLOSURE TO THE ABOVE LETTER. ]

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## MEMORANDUM ON POLITICAL REFORMS BY THE LATE MR. G. K. GOKHALE, C. I. E.

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### PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY.

The grant of Provincial Autonomy, foreshadowed in the Delhi Despatch, would be a fitting concession to make to the people of India at the close of the war. This will involve the two-fold operation of freeing the Provincial Governments on the one side from the greater part of the control which is at present exercised over them by the Government of India and the Secretary of State in connection with the internal administration of the country and substituting on the other, in place of the control so removed, the control of the representatives of tax-payers through Provincial Legislative Councils. I

indicate below in brief outline the form of administration that should be set up in the different Provinces to carry out this idea. Each Province should have—

- (1) A Governor appointed from England at the head of the administration.
- (2) A Cabinet or Executive Council of six Members—three of whom should be Englishmen and three Indians—with the following portfolios :—
  - (a) Home (including Law and Justice).
  - (b) Finance.
  - (c) Agriculture, Irrigation and Public Works.
  - (d) Education.
  - (e) Local Self-Government (including Sanitation and Medical Relief).
  - (f) Industries and Commerce.

While members of the Indian Civil Service should be eligible for appointment to the Executive Council, no places in the Council should be reserved for them, the best men available being taken—both English and Indian.

(3) A Legislative Council of between 75 and 100 members, of whom not less than four-fifths should be elected by different constituencies and interests. Thus in the Bombay Presidency, roughly speaking, each District should return two members, one representing Municipalities and the other District and Taluk Boards. The City of Bombay should have about ten members allotted to it. Bodies in the *mofussil* like the Karachi Chamber, Ahmedabad Mill-owners, Deccan Sardars should have a member each. Then there would be the special representation of Mahomedans, and here and there a member may have to be given to communities like the Lingayats, where they are strong. There should be no nominated non-official members, except as experts. A few official members may be added by the Governor as experts or to assist in representing the Executive Government.

(4) The relations between the Executive Government and the Legislative Council so constituted should be roughly similar to those between the Imperial Government and the Reichstag in Germany. The Council will have to pass all Provincial Legislation, and its assent will be necessary to additions to or changes in Provincial taxation. The Budget too will have to come to it for discussion and its resolutions in connection with it, as also on questions of general administration, will have to be given effect to unless vetoed by the Governor. More frequent meetings or longer continuous sittings will also have to be provided for. But the members of the Executive Government shall not depend, individually or collectively, on the support of a majority of the Council for holding their offices.

(5) The Provincial Government, so reconstituted and working under the control of the Legislative Council as outlined above, should have complete charge of the internal administration of the Province. And it should have virtually independent financial powers, the present financial relations between it and the Government of India being largely revised, and to some extent even reversed. The revenue under Salt, Customs, Tributes, Railways,

Post, Telegraph and Mint should belong exclusively to the Government of India, the Services being Imperial. While that under Land Revenue, including irrigation, Excise, Forest, Assessed Taxes, Stamps and Registration, should belong to the Provincial Government, the Services being Provincial. As under this Division the revenue falling to the Provincial Government will be in excess of its existing requirements and that assigned to the Government of India will fall short of its present expenditure, the Provincial Government should be required to make an annual contribution to the Government of India, fixed for periods of five years at a time. Subject to this arrangement, the Imperial and the Provincial Governments should develop their separate systems of finance, the Provincial Government being given powers of taxation and borrowing within certain limits.

(6) Such a scheme of Provincial Autonomy will be incomplete unless it is accompanied by (a) a liberalising of the present form of District administration, and (b) a great extension of Local Self-Government. For (a) it will be necessary to abolish the Commissionerships of Divisions except where special reasons may exist for their being maintained, as in Sind, and to associate small District Councils, partly elected and partly nominated, with the Collector, to whom most of the present powers of the Commissioners could then be transferred,—the functions of the Councils being advisory to begin with. For (b) Village *Panchayats*, partly elected and partly nominated, should be created for villages or groups of villages and Municipal Boards in towns and Taluk Boards in Talukas should be made wholly elected bodies, the Provincial Government reserving to itself and exercising stringent powers of control. A portion of the excise revenue should be made over to these bodies, so that they may have adequate resources at their disposal for the due performance of their duties. The District being too large an area for efficient Local Self-Government by an honorary agency, the functions of the District Boards should be strictly limited and the Collector should continue to be *ex-officio* President.

### THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

1. The Provinces being thus rendered practically autonomous, the constitution of the Executive Council or the Cabinet of the Viceroy will have to be correspondingly altered. At present there are four Members in that Council, with portfolios which concern the internal administration of the country, *viz.*, Home, Agriculture, Education and Industries and Commerce. As all internal administration will now be made over to the Provincial Governments and the Government of India will only retain in its hands nominal control to be exercised on very rare occasions, one Member to be called Member for the Interior should suffice in place of these four. It will, however, by necessary



to create certain other portfolios, and I would have the Council consist of the following six Members (at least two of whom shall always be Indian) :—

(a) Interior, (b) Finance, (c) Law, (d) Defence, (e) Communications (Railways, Post and Telegraphs), and (f) Foreign.

2. The Legislative Council of the Viceroy should be styled the Legislative Assembly of India. Its Members should be raised to about one hundred to begin with and its powers enlarged, but the principle of an official majority (for which perhaps it will suffice to substitute a nominated majority) should for the present be continued, until sufficient experience has been gathered of the working of autonomous arrangements for the Provinces. This will give the Government of India a reserve power in connection with Provincial administration to be exercised in emergencies. Thus, if a Provincial Legislative Council persistently declines to pass legislation which the Government regards to be essential in the vital interests of the Province, it could be passed by the Government of India in its Legislative Assembly over the head of the Province. Such occasions would be extremely rare, but the reserve power will give a sense of security to the authorities and will induce them to enter on the great experiment of Provincial Autonomy with greater readiness. Subject to this principle of an official or nominated majority being for the present maintained, the Assembly should have increased opportunities of influencing the policy of the Government by discussion, questions connected with the Army and Navy (to be now created) being placed on a level with other questions. In fiscal matters the Government of India, so constituted, should be freed from the control of the Secretary of State, whose control in other matters too should be largely reduced, his Council being abolished and his position being steadily approximated to that of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

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Commissions in the Army and Navy must be given to Indians, with proper facilities for military and naval instruction.

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German East Africa, if conquered from the Germans, should be reserved for Indian Colonisation, and should be handed over to the Government of India.

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No. 113.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 869, 8th August 1917, 6 p. m.

*Private.* Reforms. Reference my private telegram of 2nd August. My Legislative Council assembles on September 5th. I should be obliged if

you would impress upon the Cabinet that the course of political agitation out here renders it imperative that they should authorise an announcement of some kind, and that I should receive this before the end of August. If I am not able to make any pronouncement when the Council reassembles, our present embarrassments will be gravely accentuated. I have already received private intimation of resolutions to be moved in Council on subject of announcement.

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No. 114.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR ELLIOT COLVIN, K. C. S. I., Agent to the Govr.-General,  
Rajputana, and Chief Commr., Ajmer-Merwara.

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*Ajmer, August 8th, 1917.*

MY DEAR MAFFEY,

I am venturing to send you another note, as I feel the one I wrote last year is completely out of date. I daresay my views will be regarded as both stale and superfluous, but I feel very strongly that some announcement or action is needed from the Government of India at the present time, so I send this note at the risk of incurring such criticism. If you think fit, will you put it before His Excellency on a convenient opportunity?

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) E. G. COLVIN.

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[ ENCLOSURE TO THE ABOVE LETTER. ]

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[ *Confidential.* ]

In a note which I wrote in 1916 I advocated that the Government of India should announce that the objective of its policy for India was, in the distant future, the formation of India into a self-governing dependency under the British Crown. I suggested also that progress for the present should be in the direction of expansion of the Indian element in responsible executive appointments rather than in the direction of an enlargement of the powers of Legislative Councils. These proposals have naturally come in for much criticism, but there is consolation to be found in the violently divergent views of the critics themselves. While the more advanced thinkers regard these proposals as reactionary, the more conservative, and I fear the larger body, label them as revolutionary. It is possible that between these two fires, these views are not unrepresentative of the opinions of the main body of moderate men, who have refrained from criticism altogether.

But whether they be right or wrong, and whether they have any large measure of support or not, there is one element in the situation which probably no one will be found to deny, namely, that since last year events have marched with an astonishing celerity. As the Premier has said, the war is making history gallop, and the development of a country in ordinary times is now-a-days taking shape in a few months. Policies and opinions of a year ago may not be applicable now. Nowhere are these changes and developments working more rapidly than in India. The people of India are stirring from their lethargy. The East will never "turn to sleep again". Everyday, the cry of Freedom is being dinned into their ears, not by their own orators so much as by the British press and British politicians. The war, they are daily told, is a fight between the forces of Freedom and democratic Government against those of Oppression and Autocracy. Is it not natural that they should apply these ringing phrases to their own case? Are they not under an autocratic rule really alien to them? Are they not also entitled to Freedom? Is India to be the only country in the British Empire where that panacea, that idol of the British people, Democracy, is not to prevail?

The fact, of course, is that for twenty reasons, obvious to the outsider, India is not ready for Democratic Government, and will not be so ready for a century. But the feeling for it is in the air; and it is idle to expect Indians to realise that their country is really so very different from other countries, or to be content with a reply to their demands, based on that argument. What Englishmen in India have to do now is boldly, frankly and unflinchingly to face the new situation that has arisen. They must be prepared to go rather faster than strict prudence, had there been no war, might have dictated. If this is not recognised, trouble and sedition are certain, and widespread revolt is to be feared.

Ultimate self-government cannot with reason be denied to India. Every step we have taken in the past, our method of education, our pronouncements on solemn occasions indicate our objective. Every principle of government we publicly acclaim affirms it. Why then should we refrain from the actual announcement? The long silence of Government on this subject is arousing suspicion and distrust. Nothing, that I can see, is to be gained by maintaining silence, but everything, the recovery of lost confidence, the opening out of a road for the future, is to be gained by speaking out.

The future no doubt will lead us along a difficult road, and it will not be less difficult owing to the fact that the war and its developments will oblige us to take the corners at a rate somewhat more rapid than in pre-war days was anticipated. But Government must set the pace; and not too slow, lest the passengers should take charge and lest the car should run away with its entire load over the precipice.

There are probably not two men who would hold identical views as to the exact measures which may safely be taken to meet the present situation. And

the present writer certainly feels wholly incompetent to offer on this subject any suggestions which are likely to find approval with a majority either of his own countrymen or of the people of India. But it does seem to him essential that a serious effort should be made, so that the people of India may realise that the British Government is not out of sympathy with their aspirations, but that it is earnestly considering the stupendous problem before it. The suggestions which follow are those which have occurred to him; it is more than probable that other men, who have thought about the subject have better ones to offer.

It seems necessary to proceed cautiously at first, and the initial steps might therefore well be in nature of an experiment. Moreover, the different provinces of India are in such diverse stages of development that any experiment, which applied to the whole country, might easily be fallacious, and would probably give unduly discouraging results. It would seem wise therefore to begin experiments in the province regarded as already the most advanced, probably Bombay.

A strong Committee might be formed, consisting of selected Indians of various shades of opinion, the only qualifications being a reasonable acquaintance with the Indian administrative machinery and a genuine belief in the maintenance of the British connection, and an equal number of British officials and non-officials, who should be chosen partly for their knowledge of the economic and administrative conditions in India, but largely also for their sympathy with reasonably progressive ideas in regard to the future of India. Two or three members, selected for their knowledge of political and administrative problems in England, might be added by the Secretary of State for India; and the Chairman should be a British official with ripe experience of the Indian political system of today.

The object of the Committee would be to advise the Government of India as to the initial and subsequent measures, needed for the gradual introduction of self-government in the selected province; they should have power to make recommendations as to the conferment of a greater number of posts on Indians; the improvement and gradual broadening of the electoral basis of the Legislative Councils; and the successive steps by which greater authority in those Councils should be transferred to the people. They might also be asked to consider whether a special department should be constituted in the Government of India to watch over the development of the measures which they advise. This task will in the future become so important a branch of the activities of Government that it is possible it will require the constant attention of a separate department. The Committee might also be required, when they have completed their programme for the selected province, to consider the order in which other provinces may be selected for similar treatment, to report on their comparative readiness for such treatment, and the methods, in the case of those which are most advanced, by which the initial measures of self-government may be most appropriately introduced.

These ideas are very much in the rough, and are capable of endless modification and improvement when they have had the benefit of criticism and discussion by other men, better qualified to make suggestions; but they embody the rough outlines of a policy which the present writer believes to be essential and inevitable in these days, and they furnish a skeleton programme for the introduction of such a policy on lines that he believes to be sufficiently safe and prudent.

(Sd.) E. G. COLVIN,

*Agent to the Governor-General, Rajputana.*

AJMER,

*The 8th August 1917.*

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No. 115.

FROM THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE LORD ISLINGTON, G. C. M. G., D. S. O., Under  
Secretary of State for India.

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*India Office, Whitehall, S. W.-1,*

*August 9th, 1917.*

DEAR CHELMSFORD,

I enclose, for your personal information, copy of an address which I gave recently at Oxford on the Problems of Indian Government which I think it may perhaps interest you to see. You will, of course, understand that I was not speaking in an official capacity, but was expressing only my own private views.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) ISLINGTON.

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[ ENCLOSURE TO THE ABOVE LETTER. ]

### THE PROBLEMS OF INDIAN GOVERNMENT.

*Address by the Right Hon'ble Lord Islington, G. C. M. G., D. S. O.*

I have been invited by the Oxford University Delegacy for the Extension of Teaching to contribute my share to the course of lectures by addressing you on "the Problems of Indian Government". It is a vast subject, and one of absorbing interest, and I am deeply sensible of the compliment that has been conferred on me by the invitation. It would have been hard enough to discuss the subject adequately in the time at my disposal even before the war, when the difficulties of Indian administration were less prominent, and when the reforms introduced by Lord Morley and Lord Minto had softened the edge of political agitation; but the war has brought into prominence new facts, and

has emphasised the peculiar character of British rule in India, so that I think it may be fairly said that at the present time there is no question so full of difficulty, so urgently requiring study, so insistently demanding solution, as the problem of British rule in India. My difficulty has been to know, not what to say, but what to omit. India presents every manner of problem, political, social, economic and industrial. To some extent these various aspects are intertwined. It is impossible, in considering any Indian problem, to overlook the fact that India has not attained a full degree of national unity. Her peoples are still sharply divided by differences of religious beliefs, by the degree of intellectual progress, and by the character of their economic development. But though these divisions and differences can only disappear after the lapse of many generations, recent years have seen a steady progress in the direction of greater unity and the development of what, for want of a better term, may be called a national consciousness. This is the result partly of the unifying influence of British administration and law, and partly of the growth of education. Education has inculcated in India the great ideas of freedom and responsibility, which we with other free nations cherish, and has inspired her with the hope of developing these ideas to the same ends as the other great units of the British Empire. So it has come about that at the present time there is one great Indian question which dominates all others, that of India's part in the Empire with which is indissolubly connected the problem of her internal political development. The supreme importance of this question justifies me, I think, in singling it out as the subject on which your attention should be primarily concentrated.

The war has shown how solid and united the Empire is, and India must be given credit for the conspicuous part she has played in this struggle. She has given of her best as generously and as sincerely as any other part of His Majesty's Dominions. She has done this freely and without the application of external pressure, because with the Dominions she realised that in this war the existence of the British Empire was at stake and the principles of liberty on which it is founded were threatened by the contrary forces of autocracy and militarism. This spontaneous response to the high spiritual call of the war has revealed India in a new light and has brought into prominence the problem of her future development. The ideals of the British Empire have been revitalised by the ordeal through which it is passing, and with this reawakening the attitude of the Empire as a whole towards India has changed. This change is exemplified by the invitation of representatives from India to the special series of Imperial War Cabinet meetings which were held last spring, and by the inclusion of her representatives in the special Imperial War Conference which sat at the same time. Among the resolutions of the Conferences was one which dealt with India's representation at the regular Imperial Conferences which will be held hereafter, and it is now an established fact that India will in future be included in those Conferences in which the Dominions and United Kingdom have alone hitherto participated.

This recognition of India's place in the Empire is only India's due. Yet it does not alter the fact that by her constitutional and political institutions India is in a very different position from the United Kingdom, and the great self-governing Dominions. But British rule in India does not stand still, and in statutes and in solemn declarations undertakings have been made which hold out to India visions of higher ideals of government than it has so far been found practicable to attain. The aspiration of India is to continue its march along the lines that have been followed in the self-governing Dominions, lines of progress, it should be noted, that are in no way inconsistent with Indian political development during the last 50 years. India looks forward to a time when under the ægis of the Crown she can take her stand as a self-governing member of the Empire, with all the privileges and responsibilities that this position entails. The problem for British rule is to help India to achieve its aspirations in such a way as may be for the greatest good of India and its vast population.

This is, I think, a fitting subject for students to consider, and for the time being I shall lay aside the official mantle that I wear as Under Secretary of State for India and speak to you as a student to students on one of the most engrossing problems that political students have ever had to consider. You will understand, therefore, that in what I am going to say I am not necessarily voicing the views of the Secretary of State for India, or the views of His Majesty's Government. I shall give expression to my own views as one who has now for long pondered these weighty questions, and who has had the advantage of watching at first-hand the working of British Government in India and at Home.

Now, before it is possible to look into the future, we must cast our eyes back into the past. For this purpose I need not carry you further back than 1858 when the Crown finally took over from the East India Company the administration of the vast territories which had been acquired in the course of the preceding 250 years. We must consider what is the present position of the Indian Government on the Legislative and Executive sides, and when we have grasped this, and studied the changes that have taken place in the last 50 years, we shall be in a better position to consider what the lines of progress should be, and to distinguish between what is immediately practicable, and what must be still regarded as visionary and veiled in the obscurity of the future.

Let us now turn to the early history of the Indian Legislative Assemblies. Immediately prior to 1858 the machinery for Indian Legislation was a Council, which comprised the Governor-General, the Commander-in-Chief, the four Ordinary Members of the Governor-General's Executive Council, and six special Members, two judges and four officials, representing the several Indian Provinces. At the time of the Mutiny, therefore, the whole of Indian Legislation rested with an official body, and non-official opinion had no direct voice in

shaping the destinies of the people. This was clearly a position that could not long endure, and in 1861 an important Act was passed under which the Governor-General was empowered to nominate not less than six and not more than 12 persons, of whom at least one-half were to be non-officials, to collaborate with the ordinary members of the Executive Council and the Commander-in-Chief in the legislative work of Government. These nominated members of the Legislative Council are the additional members, of whom I will say more hereafter. The inclusion of non-officials was a move in the direction of liberalising the Government of India, but it did not introduce as much outside influence as the change would appear to suggest. First, the fact that the additional members had to be nominated by the Governor-General ensured that no one who was likely by his views to be unacceptable to Government would be appointed. Secondly, the business which the Legislative Council was empowered to transact was strictly limited to legislation. The right of interpolation, and of asking questions, was not given by the Act of 1861. Corresponding measures were taken to enlarge the size of the Councils of the Governors of the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras.

The next landmark in the history of the Indian Legislative Councils is presented by the Indian Councils Act of 1892. By this measure the number of additional members of the Viceroy's Legislative Council was increased from the minimum of 6 and maximum of 12, provided by the Act of 1861, to a minimum of 10 and a maximum of 16, and as regards the Legislative Councils of the Governors of Bombay and Madras, the number of additional members was increased from the minimum of 4 and maximum of 8, as provided by the Act of 1861, to a minimum of 8 and a maximum of 20. Corresponding powers were taken to deal with the other provinces. An important change was also made regarding the method by which these additional Legislative members were to be appointed by admitting the principle of representation, the means of giving effect to it being left to the discretion of the Governor-General.

The Act of 1892 also extended the functions of the Legislative Councils. The Governor-General was empowered to make rules authorising the discussion of the annual financial statement in the Legislative Council, and the asking of questions. The functions of the Legislative Councils of the Governors of Bombay and Madras were correspondingly extended. This Act thus marked an important advance on the tentative proposals of 1861. The Legislative Councils were larger; the number of non-official representatives was greater than had been possible before, and the functions of the Council were widened. The method under which the additional representatives were to be appointed was more liberal.

We now come to the third landmark in recent Indian political history, the Act of 1909, which is associated with the names of Lord Morley and Lord Minto, who at the time were Secretary of State and Viceroy respectively.



By this Act the constitution of the Councils was changed in three respects. The maximum number of additional members of the Governor-General's Council was increased from 16 to 60, and in the case of the Provincial Councils the numbers of additional members were doubled or more than doubled. Apart from the additional members, there were, of course, the official representatives of the Executive Government.

This increase in numbers gave room for the introduction of many shades of opinion which previously could not have been represented, and is, in itself, of great importance. But more important still was the change effected by the new law in the proportion between the official and non-official members. Under previous legislation at least one half of the additional members of the Viceroy's Legislative Council, and the Legislative Council of Madras and Bombay had to be non-official. In the case of the other Legislative Councils the proportion had to be at least one-third. An official majority, though not required by statute, had in practice always existed prior to the Act of 1909, except in Bombay, where, for some years, the official members had been in the minority. By the regulations under the Act of 1909 an official majority of four was prescribed for the Viceroy's Legislative Council, but in all the other Legislative Councils there had to be a majority of non-officials.

Lastly, an important change was made in the method of appointment or election. We have seen that under the Act of 1861 the additional members were nominated by the Head of the Government, Viceroy, or Governor, as the case might be. By the Act of 1892 the principle of representation was admitted, though not definitely prescribed. Under the Act of 1909, on the other hand, the additional members had by statute to include not only nominated members, but also members *elected* in accordance with regulations made under the Act. A separate set of regulations exist for every Legislative Council, and rules to suit each province have been laid down as to the method of election. The important point which I would emphasise is that by gradual steps India had advanced to a position under which some members of her Legislative Councils had by law to be elected by non-official bodies in contrast with the system of nomination which prevailed in the Act of 1861. Special provision has been made for the representation of particular communities, such as the Mahomedans, the planting communities in Madras and Bihar, and the tea and jute industries in Bengal and Assam.

The second important group of changes made by the Act of 1909 relates to the functions of the Legislative Councils. These functions, as I explained above, had already been extended by the Act of 1892. Under the Act of 1909, the Executive authorities were required to make rules authorising the discussion of the financial statement and any matter of general public interest and the asking of questions subject to such conditions as might be prescribed. Under these rules members in contrast to their power under previously existing provisions have the right to propose resolutions either on the Budget or on matters

of general public importance and to divide the Councils upon them. The resolutions are not binding upon the Government, but take the form of recommendations to be acted upon or not as the Executive think fit. On public grounds it has been considered necessary to exclude from the subjects that may be raised for discussion matters affecting the relation of the Government with Foreign States or Native States, and certain other special subjects.

The general effect of the Act of 1900 may, therefore, be summarised as follows:—It enlarged the size of the Councils, and in particular provided for a non-official majority in the Provincial as distinct from the Viceroy's Council; it definitely recognised the principle of election; it enlarged the functions of the Councils and increased, indirectly, though the resolutions of the Councils were not binding by law, the influence of the non-official members.

This then is the position of the Indian Legislative Councils today.

I now come to the Executive side of the Indian Government which really administers the country in all its details, and I refer here not to the heads of the executive machinery, that is, the Executive Councils of the Viceroy and the larger Provinces, but to the great administrative services. In dealing with these services, it will be convenient to consider together their present and future development. The question of the evolution of the Executive Councils I will treat later when considering the future of the Legislative Councils, of which I have just given you the history.

You probably all know the principle that in India no distinction of race or colour affects the question of employment under Government. This principle has been asserted by Parliament and by Royal Proclamation. As you know, the Government of India is a bureaucracy. This has been inevitable, owing to the backwardness of large sections of the population in the matters of education and political capacity. It has always been the policy of the British Government to recruit the bureaucracy in such a way as to hold the door open for eligible Indians. The number of such Indians has been steadily increasing. Though this is undoubtedly true, the rate of progress has by no means been as rapid as could have been wished. An elaborate enquiry in 1887, which led to certain important results, divided the chief Indian services into Imperial and Provincial, the Provincial generally speaking holding offices of a subordinate character, the supreme control being vested in the Imperial services, of which the chief is the Indian Civil Service. This Service has been solely recruited in this country by open competition, Indians being eligible to compete with Europeans. The Government were of opinion that the whole conditions of the executive services required re-examination, and in 1912 a Royal Commission, of which I had the honour to be Chairman, was appointed. We undertook a full enquiry into the position of almost all the important services, 24 in number, and have issued a report on each which those of you who are interested can obtain. In that report we set out the progress that has been made in increasing the number of Indians in higher employment

in India, comparing the position today with that prevailing in 1887, when the earlier enquiry was held. We found that, taking the posts carrying a salary of 160% a year or over, the number of Indians had increased from 3,003 in 1887 to 4,573 in 1913. This represents an increase from 34 to 42 per cent. of the total of such appointments in the 26 years. As regards the posts carrying a salary of 400% a year or over, the increase in the number of Indians was 427 to 942, representing an increase from 12 per cent. of the total of such posts to 19 per cent. As regards posts carrying a salary of 640% a year or over, the number of Indians had risen from 77 in 1887 to 242 in 1913, representing an increase from 4 per cent. of the total number of officials on such salary to 10 per cent. You will understand that, as regards posts carrying a salary of less than 160% practically the whole staff is Indian. The Commission fully appreciated the difficulties of making rapid changes in the character of the Government machine, but we were definitely of opinion that, in view of the progress made by the country in the last 30 years, the increase in the Indian element indicated in the figures I have mentioned was quite insufficient.

What I am about to say will, I hope, find its way to India, and be read by many there. Indians know, or at least should know, that I am keenly in sympathy with constitutional and administrative progress in India, and I am content to rest the claim to possess that sentiment on the contents of the Public Services report.

The recommendations of that report display an even recognition of claims for reform in the interests of both European and British elements of the Services in India. To read the Indian criticisms on the report one might be led to suppose that the reference was confined to reforms as regards Indians, and that proposals to ameliorate the conditions of Europeans lay outside the proper purview of the Commission. I need not dwell on the necessity that a scheme of reform in the Services should be comprehensive, and one which should fulfil the requirements of both races—which inevitably differ in certain aspects. I am glad to reflect that there are some highly important proposals in the report which, if adopted, will improve the position of the British officer and will enable him to become much more efficient for the special work demanded of him in India.

Time will not permit me tonight to elaborate many of these latter proposals. But I desire to say a word about those which relate specifically to Indians if only to dispel the erroneous view that has apparently been formed of them through the crusade of indiscriminating and hitherto unchallenged condemnation that has been passed on these proposals in India.

In the first place, the report recommends that several important services of a scientific or technical kind should normally be recruited entirely in India. The most important of these services are Agriculture, Forest, Mines, Finance, Salt and Excise. It will, of course, not be possible in all these departments to start at once appointing only Indians, as there is not at present a sufficient

supply of qualified Indians available, but the report recommends that in most of these cases half the appointments should, if possible, at once be given to Indians after a suitable course of training. In order that the recommendation that recruitment should eventually be wholly from Indians may not remain a mere pious aspiration, the report very strongly recommends that immediate steps should be taken to set up in India new training establishments, or to develop existing institutions, on a level of efficiency comparable with those to be found in Europe, in which the necessary technical qualifications may be acquired by Indians.

I may be allowed, perhaps, to make here a short digression, and say that I regard it as one of our foremost duties to give to India educational facilities for the acquisition of European learning and skill in scientific and industrial methods, so that Indians may be able to study what is most important in European thought and material civilisation without leaving their own country, and also that Western systems of knowledge may have an opportunity of developing in India on lines suitable to the physical conditions of that continent and the peculiar genius of its peoples. I look forward, of course, to there being always an interchange of advanced students between India and Great Britain, but it should not be necessary for an Indian to come to Europe for the essentials of an education of any type, and in this connection I emphasise the importance of including military education. I look forward to selected Indians being admitted to commissioned ranks, and in due course India should have her Sandhurst to train these young officers just as she should possess her Colleges for Agriculture, Forestry, Medicine, Geology, Engineering, &c.

There is a second group of services in which the Royal Commission consider that there are grounds of policy and efficiency for having an admixture both of Indians and Europeans, neither element being, generally speaking, markedly predominant. The most important of these services are Education, Medical, and Public Works.

The present organisation in the Education Department in particular is very defective and fosters many anomalies of an irritating character which tend to emphasise race discrimination. Our proposals include the removal of all these anomalies and suggest an organisation on practical lines, which will ensure the appointment of a large body of qualified Indians to the higher branches of the service.

I now come to a third and last group of Services in which the Royal Commission consider that for the present the preponderating element should be British, in view of the special responsibility of these Services for the security of India. These are the Indian Civil Service and the Police Service. I may say that this recommendation is, of course, framed with a view to existing conditions. What the composition of these Services may be, or ought to be in the course of two or three generations, I will not attempt to prophesy.

In the case of the Indian Civil Service, it is recommended that one-quarter of the superior appointments be filled by Indians, exclusive of any Indians who enter the Service through the examination in England. Under the present proposal, this arrangement will give nine appointments to be filled yearly by direct appointment in India on a system of combined nomination and competitive examination. This will ensure the admission of a much larger number of Indians annually to the Indian Civil Service than have hitherto been able to enter by the competitive examination in England. It will afford them an opportunity hitherto denied them of entering the service by a competitive examination held in their own country—and from their own Universities without being obliged at an early age to leave their home and family surroundings. Again, there is no rigid limitation in the number 9 proposed in the report. It can easily be increased to 12 without any disturbance of the scheme. Were it made 12, this would ensure that one-third of the superior posts of the Indian Civil Service would be held by Indians.

This mention of appointment in India by competitive examination with certain safeguards reminds me that I should say a few words on the general question of the method of appointment of Indians in India to the public services. There is among many Indians a demand for the competitive examination system pure and simple as the universal method of recruitment. The Commission were satisfied that, in the present stage of development of education in India, such a method (though it would doubtless obtain men of high qualifications in certain directions) would not secure the appointment of the most suitable candidates both as regards general character and administrative ability, and would leave certain classes without proper representation in the public services. But the Commission, while recommending in general a continuation of appointment by nomination, proposed that the selection of candidates should always be entrusted to a Committee which should comprise members in touch with educational institutions, and should include Indian and unofficial representatives. Vacancies should be widely advertised, and an educational qualifying test imposed. Under a system of nomination on such a broad basis, the way should not be barred to any Indian candidate of real merit.

One further proposal of the Commission of some importance I will mention, and that is that, in those Services which are to continue to contain both Indians and Europeans, Indians should invariably receive the same pay as Europeans on reaching administrative rank (and in some cases earlier), and all Indians recruited in Europe should receive the same pay as Europeans.

I think that the survey which I have given of some of the proposals of the Commission will suffice to show that its recommendations have been framed on generous lines and in effect grant many of the most important demands which have been made by educated and political opinion in India.

Perhaps the most important feature is that its schemes are in no case of a final nature and offer no hindrance to further progress in the assumption by Indians of the administration.

Mindful as I am of the valuable part this great University along with others has played in the past in training the young officer, British and Indian, for the career of an Indian Administrator, I feel compelled to allude, before passing on, to a proposal in the report that the age at which the Open Competitive Examination for the Indian Civil Service which is held now at from 22 to 24 should be reduced to the school leaving age 17 to 19. There is, I know, in some quarters strong opposition to the change. I realise that this change, if it is adopted, will be accompanied with certain inconvenience to Schools and Universities. but with all the facts before us in this connection, we found ourselves obliged to recommend it in consideration of the very strong appeal that was made to us in India.

The case for the change is based upon the most imperative Indian requirements. We were convinced that civilians should commence their career in India earlier than they do now. The present system brings men out to India at the age of 25. A man of this age must ordinarily have his aptitudes and outlook more or less fixed, and to this extent he is less easy to train in the highly specialised work of Indian administration. His ideas have been already moulded outside India. Again, he is more likely to be married at that age than at the age of 22, and this is a serious disability to him in the early years of his profession. It is objected that boys who have been educated in certain schools will not be able to compete on an equality with those who have been to the English public schools. This, it is contended, would specially be the case in some of the Scottish schools, but is not borne out by the experience of the past 20 years at the Balliol scholarship examinations, which show no less than 44 successes from Scottish Schools and Universities, a truly astonishing record. It is true that in the majority of cases the successful candidates were above the age of 19, but there is a heavy handicap for age in these examinations, and I am confident of eminent support in Oxford in saying that the Scottish educated boy is quite able to compete at the University with the product from the English public school.

Finally, and this is one of the strongest arguments in favour of a change, the present age-limits permit of only a single year's probation. By almost universal consent this has proved insufficient to secure that officers arrive in India with a proper training in the law which they will be called on to administer, in the languages which they will be called on to talk, and in the history and habits of the people whom they will be called on to govern. It is proposed, therefore, to increase the one year's probation to three years. Indians who enter the Indian Civil Service by the Indian examination will all come home for this probationary course. This increase has the additional advantage that it will enable the probationers, both British and Indian, not only to be called to the Bar, but also to qualify for a University degree.

I hope all these facts will be given careful consideration when the time comes to decide whether the age for entry to the Indian Civil Service should be lowered. May I make this plea? If our Schools and Universities are to play their part in meeting the growing demands of the Empire, it is not unreasonable to ask them to make what educational adjustment may be found necessary to enable this important and far-reaching reform for Indian administration to be carried out.

So much for the Report of the Commission.

I would like now to summarise the position that has been reached. Broadly speaking, we have in India a vast bureaucracy, the lower ranks being Indian, the higher ranks being mainly European. On the other hand, we have important Legislative Councils largely composed of Indians with a free power of criticism of the acts of the executive by means of question, and with control over legislation, containing large numbers of Indian representatives who, in spite of the powers to criticise and obstruct, have no real responsibility for the policy of the Government. Suppose then that the policy of the Government fails to meet with the approval of the Indian representatives. On these occasions Indian members record their votes against the Government, and we have the unfortunate result of a division practically based on the race principle. On the other hand, supposing the Government were to concede what the Indian representatives ask, and embark upon a policy which they did not approve, the Indian representative would not be held accountable to India or the Empire in the event of a calamity. This is a very grave defect in the present system, and one which must be reckoned with in modelling any new scheme of political reform.

The free right of criticism which the unofficial representatives on the Legislative Council enjoy is reflected in, and supplemented by, a similar attitude in a large part of the Indian press. The representatives of the Government are thus between two fires, the press on the one hand, and the non-official Councillors on the other. The Europeans in India are of course a very small proportion of the total population, and as is always the case with established Governments, they have not the same opportunities for defence as their critics have for attack. In constitutional countries there is always the safeguard that the critics may be called upon to take the reins of office from a Government that has lost the confidence of the public, and this limits the extent of the criticism and compels those who are anxious to criticise to formulate an alternative constructive policy of their own which they are prepared to put into effect if entrusted with office. In India this safeguard is altogether lacking. Hence it comes about that criticism in India is often not only not constructive but also purely hostile. This tendency to exaggeration is the result of the peculiar situation of India today, in which critics of the Government have full power to criticise, but have no responsibility for the effects of their criticism.

It is easy to dwell on defects. It is harder to devise a means of overcoming them, and before you can form a judgment for yourselves you will

naturally expect me to tell you of the direction in which Indian thought is moving in these important matters.

Some months ago a Memorandum was submitted to the Viceroy by a number of elected additional Members of the Imperial (that is, the Viceroy's) Legislative Council. The most important part of the Memorandum dealt with political reforms, and it is, I think, the most authoritative document yet produced by India's public men on the subject. The chief measures proposed by the additional members were the following:—

*First*, a large increase in the numbers of members of the Imperial and Provincial Legislative Councils.

*Secondly*, the grant to the Legislative Councils of the power to pass laws and resolutions on all matters of Indian administration with the exception of the direction of military affairs, foreign relations, declarations of war, the making of peace and the entering into treaties, other than commercial, which were to be vested in the Government of India. These laws and resolutions were of course to have a binding character, and the only safeguard would have been the exercise of the veto by the Governor-General in Council or Governor in Council, as the case might be.

*Thirdly*, the abolition of the Council of the Secretary of State.

*Fourthly*, the grant of autonomy to Local Governments, and the grant of an immediate full measure of local self-government.

On the executive side the additional members proposed that all the major provinces should be placed under an Executive composed of a Governor from the United Kingdom and an Executive Council, and on the Executive Council one-half of the members were to be Indians. It was further proposed that the elected representatives of the people, that is, the elected additional members of the Legislative Council, should have a voice in the selection of the Indian members of the Executive Council.

Now I have a serious criticism to offer to some of the proposals in this scheme. From the large increase in the numbers of the Councillors it would necessarily follow that the Government would be in a substantial permanent minority, because it is impossible, having regard to the limited number of officials in India to spare, for what would be *quasi*-Parliamentary duties, a sufficient number to counterbalance adequately the increase in the Indian elected members. Without, therefore, other radical changes the effect of the proposals, so far as the Legislative Councils are concerned, would be to place the Government in a constant risk of seeing measures and resolutions carried to which it objected, and the responsibility for the execution and consequences of these measures could never, as in this and other constitutional countries, be placed upon those responsible for their introduction. It is idle to think that the Governor-General's or the Governor's veto would be a sufficient check in such circumstances, because if it is to be of value, such a veto must be used sparingly and in respect of matters of high importance. The weapon would be dulled by constant use, and the position of a Governor who exercised it freely



and not only in matters of high moment would become impossible. The effect of the changes taken as a whole would thus be to accentuate the evil to which I have previously referred. The power of the critics would be increased without their receiving any real additional responsibility, and there can be no sound Government which does not combine these two functions, namely, criticism and responsibility. Again, under the present constitution of India, the Secretary of State's Council performs the necessary part of giving the Secretary of State, who is a politician, usually without first-hand knowledge of India, advice to enable him to exercise the control vested in him by Parliament over the acts of the Indian Government. Until the intellectual and political condition of India has advanced to a stage when this power of control can be safely transferred to the Indian people, the Secretary of State's Council in some form must be retained.

On the executive side there is much to be said for the establishment of Council Government under a Governor from home in all the major provinces, and subject to the necessary changes in the position of the higher elements of the bureaucracy, there is no reason why Government on Western lines, subject to such modification as the special conditions of India entail should not be introduced. But to enable the necessary changes to be effected, careful enquiry is a necessary preliminary. Whatever the result of this enquiry, there would be grave objection to the proposal that the Indian members of the Executive Councils should be selected by the additional members of the Legislative Councils. Members of the Executive Government (and I refer here both to the Government of India and the Local Governments) must be appointed by the Crown on the advice of the Governor-General or Governor as the case may be. The idea of an elected executive is quite unknown to British practice. It would not tend to the establishment of a stable executive. While no doubt the Governor-General or Governor would frequently look to the elected Legislative Councils for his Indian Executive Councillors, he must be free to recommend for the supremely important posts in question those men whom he considers best fitted to discharge the duty. He could not afford to take into his intimate counsel men who might be selected on the strength of a programme that he did not approve, and in whom he lacked confidence.

These are all serious drawbacks in the scheme of the additional members. But I do not think that the Memorandum was by any means a barren document. Its virtue lies in those portions which show that the writers were conscious that a beginning of India's political advancement must be made at once in the provinces. The idea of provincial autonomy and the development of local self-government are fruitful ideas. Indeed, I believe the most pressing reform in India today is in the direction of decentralisation.

This brings me to certain suggestions which I will ask you to consider for the development on sound lines of Indian polity.

I would say at once that, if the ideals of the British Empire stand for anything, India's future must be in accord with those ideals, and her ultimate

ambition which she must one day realise after successfully surmounting the difficulties before her is the attainment of responsible Government within the Empire. This ideal, which took this country many centuries to achieve, cannot be reached in a day, nor can it be given by Acts of Parliament alone. The journey may be long and arduous and the dangers of a false step cannot be ignored. It is the task of British statesmanship, which alone has the necessary experience, to guide India so that she may not falter or relapse on the way.

Now, where should immediate developments and experiments be made? In the Panchayets, the organ of village Government, in the municipalities which administer the town and in the District Boards, which administer country areas.

The municipalities and District Boards should be vested with powers to deal with matters of purely local importance, such as sanitation lighting, and in some cases, primary education; and the powers and responsibilities of the local bodies must be defined by Act so as to ensure the due discharge of the duties entrusted to them. They must have authority within definitely specified limits to impose local taxation for the maintenance of local services. In the event of mal-administration or mis-government, the superior Government, that is to say, the Provincial Government, must have the right by law to intervene, and, if necessary, to exercise control for a period with a view to setting affairs in order. The members of the municipal bodies and their chairmen must be freely chosen by the constituents, to whose welfare they administer. Those constituents must have the right and power to make their influence felt in the event of the local bodies failing to discharge their duties, and to substitute for an inefficient Board, a Board pledged to carry out the reforms which they desire. A healthy local party spirit must come into being as a stimulus to efficient administration; for it is only under the vigorous criticism of those primarily interested that municipal, or, indeed, any communal administration, can be efficient.

I now come to the Presidency and Provincial Governments and their Legislative Councils.

In the granting of wider powers in this connection it will be necessary to examine most carefully the present relations of these Governments to the Government of India, that is to say, the supreme central Government. I am strongly of opinion that such an examination will show that much can be done with great benefit in the direction of decentralisation. It will, I believe, be found that the whole civil machinery of Government in India today is excessively centralised. In other words, the development of the country has outstripped the capacity of any central Government to exercise effective administration. The Government of India holds the threads of detailed administration too firmly in its own hands, and in too many directions controls functions which can be far better performed by Provincial Governments.

As the Provinces in India develop politically and industrially, it is inevitable that the Government of India must become less in touch with their aspirations and necessities. Uniformity of system and procedure imposed from a central Government must become less appropriate and more incongruous with time.

The present system entails unnecessary delay often on matters of local urgency. This creates general suspicion. It impedes progress and engenders discontent, and the idea prevails—however ill-founded—that there is connivance between the Central and Provincial Governments to obstruct advance and action. Such matters as Police, Education, Agriculture, Forestry, Public Works and Buildings, and questions regarding industrial enterprise might be handed over entirely to the larger of the Provincial Governments. In the case of the Police, the Governor should have power to sanction expenditure required without necessarily obtaining the approval of the Legislative Council. Modern India should be treated far less as a group of uniform Provinces under a central Government. Each Province should be allowed to work out its own redemption by itself in accordance with its own capacity.

Such a change will not, of course, be easy. It will not only present many difficulties, but may arouse certain prejudice.

Besides increasing the field of responsibility of Local Governments, I consider that we must aim at transferring definite spheres of public business from bureaucratic to more representative control—a control to be exercised through the medium of elected representatives acting in co-operation with the Government. This might perhaps best be effected by the constitution, somewhat on the French plan, of Standing Committees of the Legislative Councils, containing a large proportion of unofficial members, responsible for assisting the executive in framing its proposals on certain specified groups of questions.

I should like to see instead of an executive consisting of a Governor supported by officials, with one Indian colleague, a Government consisting of a Governor and four Executive Councillors, two European and two Indian. I should regard the members of the Services as eligible for the post of Governor, though no doubt this officer would be usually appointed from home. The Indian members like their European colleagues would be nominated by the Crown on the recommendation of the Governor who would, of course, endeavour to choose men of wide outlook and not necessarily of the official classes. The Government would, as I suggested, act in certain Departments with the assistance of the Legislative Council or a Committee thereof to whom they would refer their policy before its execution. It would then be open to the Legislative Council to criticise and suggest improvements which the Government would adopt unless they could convince the Legislative Council that there were sufficient reasons for acting otherwise. If the Indian members of the

Governor's Council were properly chosen, it cannot be doubted that the Government's policy would be formulated with due regard for the views of the Indian elected members of the Legislative Council. In so far as criticism of their proposals was made in the Council, it may be assumed that it would, as in our Parliament, be due to the fact that there was reasonable ground for the existence of more than one opinion. The debates in the Council would be invested with a reality which does not exist at present; for Indian speakers would not, as now, always be found on the opposition side, and it is to be remembered that, if in deference to the Legislative Council the Government modified their policy, the Council would have to shoulder the responsibility for the results. This is the essence of responsible Government as we understand it. To secure its introduction into Indian Local Government a suitable system of election is important, so that the elected members may be properly representative of the various classes of Indian society. Only if this is done, will it be possible consistently with the interest of the people to make the elected Councillors responsible for policy, and to make them realise that for whatever they say or do they will be held accountable to constituents free to displace them if they fail to give satisfaction.

The method of election should continue as at present to be based on a community franchise, but where possible the system of election should be direct instead of, as now in certain cases, indirect. At the present stage of development this is capable of giving a more democratic representation than would be possible under a purely territorial system which would I have no doubt result in the domination of the Legislative Councils by a single class.

Adequate powers of taxation must be given to the Local Governments to ensure that funds are available for the services they control. At present the Government of India acts as the banker of the Local Governments who deposit their free balances with the Government of India. The Government of India in its turn utilises the money for capital purposes, *e.g.*, on the construction of railways and irrigation works. It thus happens that, if the Local Governments wish, at a time of general stringency, to draw on their accumulated balances for local purposes, they may be unable to do so, as the money is not available in a realisable form. It would, of course, be impossible to tolerate a position in which the Local Governments were free to spend large sums of money when the Government of India was in a position of financial difficulty. But some means must be found of leaving provincial balances to a greater extent than at present under the control of the Local Governments, and only in exceptional cases should the Government of India restrict Provincial Governments from utilising the sums at their credit. In view of the large amount of provincial moneys which have been utilised by the Government of India for capital purposes, it would be impossible, except over a period of years, to place provincial balances in their entirety under the control of the Local Governments, but a beginning in this direction should be made as soon as possible, on

the return of normal financial conditions after the war. Power would, of course, have to be retained by superior authority, as by Local Governments in the case of municipalities, to intervene in the last resort should a province squander its resources and tend to drift into bankruptcy; but I should hope that this power would in practice be only nominal as the provinces can be trusted to exercise wisely the increased powers that this proposal would give them. The real check on provincial mismanagement would come from provincial public opinion, for any deficiency in provincial revenue would have to be made good, either by cutting down the local services or by increasing local taxation. The prospect of these alternatives should ensure a rigid scrutiny over the provincial budget by the representatives of the people of the province.

If the important changes that I have indicated were carried out, it would be undesirable and unnecessary to increase to any considerable extent the number of members of the Provincial Councils. The important thing is to invest the members there are already with responsibility.

Assuming the above suggestions were carried out, it might be found that for efficient conduct of economic and administrative control a wider area of local government should in some instances be adopted. To give effect to this it would be necessary to consider whether and to what extent a grouping of areas under one Provincial Government might be made.

All these proposals pre-suppose the progressive growth of political capacity which is necessarily bound up with the spread of education—literary and industrial. The beginnings will be small. But the seed will be capable of indefinite growth, and if carefully tended will prepare India for the realisation of her final ambition to be a self-governing member of the British Empire.

I now come to the position of the Government of India. It may be that if some such scheme of provincial self-government as I have outlined could be introduced, it would be right for the provinces to transact more of their business with this country and the Secretary of State in direct communication with the India Office instead of almost invariably through the Government of India as hitherto.

I have purposely refrained from discussing the future position of the India Office in any reconstruction of Government that may take place in India. In doing so, I fully realise that changes will have to be effected. It is obvious that any modifications which may be made in the respective powers of the Government of India and Local Governments will entail correspondingly a consideration of the relationship now existing between the India Office and Governments in India. This is an intricate problem which can only be dealt with after careful enquiry, and I prefer to suspend my judgment in regard to it for the present.

But even if these changes, and they are all changes which could only be introduced slowly and on careful enquiry, were made the Government of India would still, and always must, remain responsible for the Imperial side—or I might say federal side—of Indian government. It is impossible that the Government of India should ever divest itself of the control over the Army and the forces for local naval defence, foreign relations, communications (including railways, posts and telegraphs), customs, currency, all of which Services are of wider than local range. The liberalisation of the supreme legislative and executive councils would follow the lines which I have sketched in the case of the provincial councils, but in view of the greater importance of the matters in which the Imperial authorities have to deal, progress would necessarily be slower and would be dependent on the success of the changes in the Provincial Governments.

If all the changes that I have mentioned could in due time be carried out, the picture that India would present would resemble, with the necessary differences entailed by local conditions, in particular the existence of the Native States, that of the Commonwealth of Australia which, as you know, is a Federation of self-governing States in which the central authority exercises control over matters affecting equally all the component units.

In any final scheme of Indian self-government it is clear that provision must be made for the Native States which in area and population cover one-third of the Indian peninsula. Comprised within the legal definition of India, they are excluded from that of British India, and do not form part of His Majesty's Dominions. Proud to acknowledge the paramountcy of the British Crown, their rulers are so far from being British subjects that they enjoy an almost complete internal sovereignty solemnly guaranteed to them, with certain limitations, by formal treaties the scrupulous observance of which is a point of honour with the British Government. And yet, though historically and constitutionally divorced from the body politic of British India, they are inextricably bound up with it by their geographical position, which necessarily exposes them on all sides to influences from without; while railways, posts and telegraphs must tend more and more to level artificial barriers and to foster the growth of common sentiment. Thus it is that making no claim to interfere in the affairs of British India and jealous of interference in their own, they claim to take part in the defence of the British Empire, and wherever the Indian Army has fought, Imperial Service Troops have stood side by side with their British and Indian comrades.

Obviously, therefore, they must occupy an important place in any of our schemes. What that place must be it would be premature to discuss now; but there are certain principles which must always be borne steadily in mind:—

*First.*—The States must come into our scheme of their own free will. We can put no pressure upon them which the letter and the spirit of our treaty engagements with them do not permit.

*Second.*—We cannot ask them to come into any scheme which does not reserve to them all the rights which their treaties guarantee to them. However insistent may be the demands for accommodation and give and take, their treaty rights must be scrupulously respected.

*Third.*—Nothing must be done to impair the personal link which binds them to the Crown.

Subject to the above considerations, there is scope in the future for much mutual intercourse between these States and British India. I can conceive a reciprocal benefit arising to both by such intercourse and I am sure that the Chiefs themselves will from time to time willingly avail themselves of such opportunities that may offer to secure assistance and co-operation from the British Government in any public movement that they may have in contemplation for the advancement and prosperity of their State.

The programme I have sketched—and I repeat no one is responsible for it but myself—can only be successfully achieved if hasty action is avoided, and each step in developing the growth of free institutions is taken after due deliberation as part of a considered plan. Great patience will be needed if the fruit is not to be lost by excess of zeal to pluck it before it is ripe. Political reforms must go hand in hand with an advance in political capacity which in its turn is dependent on the diffusion and improvement of education. Much has been done in recent years to accelerate the advance of education in India. In the last 10 years the expenditure on education has risen from 3,525,500% in 1905-6 to 7,388,600% in 1915-16, and the number of pupils in the primary and secondary schools has risen from 4,490,800 to 6,766,600 in the same time. In England and Wales the number of pupils in the public elementary schools in 1916 was approximately 6,070,300, and you will appreciate the lesson of these figures when you remember that British India has a population of approximately 250,000,000 as compared with 36,000,000 in England and Wales. The proportion of literates in India is, therefore, in spite of recent progress, very low. According to the 1911 census (I give approximate figures) only one male in eight was classed as literate, and only one in 100 as literate in English, and as regards females, only one in 100 was classed as literate and only one in 1,000 as literate in English. Compulsory primary education has not yet been introduced in India, and it will be a long time before higher education can be put within reach of the bulk of the population. Education, more education, seems to me the watchword of policy for the next generation. In addressing such an audience as this, I cannot but feel that you will realise how impossible it is that there can be sound political progress towards responsible government without corresponding progress in the education of the people; for it is only by education that they will be able to exert an effective control over those in authority. But teachers must be found to carry out the work. The teaching problem must be solved in India as a prelude to the wider extension of education. Out of 267,000 teachers in India only 80,000 have undergone a course

of training. Again, this education must not be purely literary; it must be increasingly technical and industrial. If industrial development is to take place as it should on a wide and expanding scale in consonance with the wealth of natural products with which India is endowed, then there must be Indians fitted by scientific and technical training available for the work. Agriculture, the chief industry of India, is capable of immense development if advanced on scientific lines. As I have already said, every provision must be made to ensure that in India itself the best opportunities for a sound education in all branches on modern lines is provided, for it is impossible to expect any real diffusion of education if it can only be obtained by sending Indian boys and girls overseas with all the expense and other disadvantages that this involves. As Indians fitted for employment in the public services—whether administrative or technical services—become available, the Government must not hesitate, but, on the contrary, must do everything it can to take advantage of the material that lies nearest to its door. In this sphere it will probably be found possible to make the greatest progress in the immediate future.

It is generally admitted that recent events throughout the world have combined to accelerate the demand in India for political advance. It is equally admitted that an advance should be made and without undue delay.

The character and degree of this reform can only be adopted after searching examination. The machinery of Government in India is delicately poised, and it would be an evil day for the country and its peoples if changes were effected so precipitately that they ultimately proved incompatible with the peculiar conditions of the country. It is not difficult to set in motion a new system of Government, whilst it would be infinitely difficult to retrace or withdraw that system even if it were found to be disastrous to the country.

The world today has a tragic lesson presented to it—a lesson of which all responsible leaders in every country must take account.

Russia, in her effort to extricate herself from an autocratic system, has allowed herself to be hurled headlong into anarchy by the extremists of her country. Wild and impracticable theorists for a time attained such influence among her people that she was brought to the very brink of national ruin. One cannot refrain from the reflection as to how much misery in Russia and how much suffering among all nations in this war would have been avoided had prudent and practical counsels prevailed as the outcome of the revolution. I would therefore earnestly and sympathetically say to those in India who to-day are advocating extreme measures of reform:—“Be patient.” “Be reasonable.” “Limit your influence and assistance to those measures which are practical towards the solution of the problem.” The end in view can best be reached by gradual and moderate steps. It is suggested by some that nothing short of constitutional self-government should suffice, and that this should be established in India at an early date.



You cannot transform a highly centralised bureaucracy into a set of decentralised self-governing systems in the passing of a night. If any British Government were to attempt such a task, were to allow themselves in a nervous spirit to act against their judgment and experience in the face of agitation, they would indeed betray the trust that has been imposed upon them.

The success of the reforms must depend on the spirit in which they are carried out by those to whom they are granted.

The further development of these reforms will likewise depend on the extent of assistance and co-operation afforded. British and Indian public men and officials must for years to come carve out in joint effort the destinies of British India. Their continued co-operation is a vital element in this great undertaking, as every patriotic Indian who loves his country must realise. The opportunity for India is great. May it be granted that both races, British and Indian, will, with single-minded endeavour, combine to avail themselves of the occasion.

8th August 1917.

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No. 116.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 880, 11th August 1917, 1-36 p. m.

*Private.* Reference your private telegram, dated August 3rd. I have just received from Lord Willingdon a copy of Gokhale's Reform Scheme. I see no objection to its publication on the authority of Aga Khan. Lord Willingdon's views have not yet reached me.

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No. 117.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Tel. P., No. 887, 12th August 1917, 7-50 p. m. (Despd. for Home Dept.)

Please refer to your telegram of August 1st regarding Reforms. The following is the position :—For the past two years greater and greater demands with increasing vehemence have been made by politicians. In March 1916 a deliberate warning was given by Lord Hardinge against lightly raising extravagant hopes. This had no effect, and in the speech, to which reference is made, I found it necessary to repeat the warning. Meantime the Government of India had been considering reforms and their despatch was sent home. Agitation increased, the situation was getting out of hand, guidance was sought by the heads of Local Governments, and they begged for some pronouncement of policy.

It was realised by the Government of India that the only real answer to the agitation lay in such a pronouncement; but as His Majesty's Government were not in a position to make one, they issued their circular. The gist of this was to throw cold water upon extravagant demands as likely to produce bitter disillusionment and to suggest strong measures against those who laid themselves out to excite the young and sow the seeds of anarchy. This was followed by our circular No. 1714, dated the 27th June, in which the question of taking action under the Defence of India Rules in cases in which the public safety necessitated such action was further discussed. It is, and has been, the policy of Government while discouraging extravagant demands to abstain from interfering with constitutional agitation and only to take action against methods which openly provoke disaffection, incite to crime, or are prejudicial to the public safety. This is the natural meaning of Lord Pentland's speech, especially in the light of the subsequent communiqué issued by his Government. The speech made by Sir M. O'Dwyer was on the same line, but he was speaking to a Punjab audience and pointed a Punjab moral from recent Punjab experience. The attitude of Government has been deliberately misrepresented by the leaders of the agitation as being directed against the Congress itself and all constitutional agitation and as intended to check all political progress. This misrepresentation is the keynote of the present agitation, and its ludicrous character is exhibited by the fact that no agitation has ever been so noisy as that which is now in progress. In their present telegram they repeat this misrepresentation and insist that Mrs. Besant's internment is an example of arbitrary use of power to check legitimate agitation. The facts of the Besant case will shortly be in your hands, and you will see that it is her methods that have led to her internment, not the demand for Home Rule.

We may add that the Government of India did not directly inspire either the speeches, communiqué or internments, though no doubt based on the circular issued by them, but Government were on the point of suggesting to Madras the advisability of taking steps to check the mischievous activities of Mrs. Besant.

As regards the weight of this representation, we would ask you to remember—

*First.*—That there is a strong body of moderate opinion which does not readily express itself in the Press or platform, but not a few have in this case had the courage to make themselves heard in opposition to this agitation.

*Secondly.*—The differences of opinion between the Moslem League and its provincial branch in the Punjab, the most important Mahomedan Province, were so acute that this branch was formally disaffiliated by the League.

*Thirdly.*—We hear that at the Conference itself there were strong differences of opinion, and some of the old Congress leaders walked out, being

unwilling to associate themselves with the violent methods proposed by some of those present. The unreasonable and uncompromising attitude adopted by the majority is indicated by their formal decision to consider passive resistance, a form of agitation now openly advocated by some of the extremists, and it has come privately to our knowledge that the idea of a joint Parliamentary Committee or any Committee of investigation was rejected on the ground that there was no room for concession, and that delay would be involved by such an enquiry during which agitation would have to stop.

Little comment is required on their demands; the first is for an authoritative pronouncement of policy. For this the Government of India have ceaselessly pressed for six months, pointing out that, in order to deal with the increasing difficulties of the situation, it was essential. It has not been forthcoming and the difficulties have increased. A mere pronouncement as to the goal of our policy would not however now meet the requirements of the case unless accompanied by some indications that an investigation will be undertaken as to the steps proposed in the immediate future for the attainment of that goal.

The second and third requests are for the immediate concession of Congress demands. You are aware that these conote for all practical purposes Home Rule in domestic affairs, complete power over finances, fiscal autonomy, and the practical abolition of the control of the Secretary of State and Parliament over Indian affairs. The Government of India have expressed their own views, and the Congress demand is considered by them to be wildly extravagant, but they hardly think you wish them to say more on this topic now.

The fourth demand is for the release of Mrs. Besant. This would be a triumph for the party of violence and would make it impossible to control a situation already difficult. It would completely undermine the authority of Government and paralyse the administration.

As regards the Calcutta meeting, we were telegraphing separately.

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No. 118.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Tel. P., No. 1525, 14th August 1917, 10-30 p. m. (Recd. 15th, 8 a. m.)

*Clear the line. Private.* Reforms. Subject to your consent, I have been authorised today by the Cabinet to make the following announcement:—

*Begins.* The policy of His Majesty's Government is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of administration and gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible Government in India under the ægis of the British Crown. They

have decided that substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible. As a preliminary to considering what these steps should be, His Majesty's Government have decided that it is of the highest importance that there should be a free and informal exchange of opinion between those in authority at home and in India. They have accordingly decided that I should accept the Viceroy's invitation to proceed to India to discuss these matters with Viceroy and the Government of India, to consider with the Viceroy the views of the Local Governments, and to receive with him the suggestions of representative bodies and others.

I may add that there will be ample opportunity for public discussion of the proposals that will be submitted in due course to Parliament. The British Government on whom with the Government of India the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian people must be the judges of the time and measure of each advance. They are convinced that the progress which they contemplate can only be accomplished by successive stages, and they must be guided by the extent to which at each stage they receive co-operation and can repose confidence in the sense of responsibility of those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred. *Ends.*

Any suggestions for amendment will of course receive my consideration, but you will realise that amendment will necessitate further delay and Parliament rises next week. Grant of Commissions will be announced at the same time. Kindly reply urgently.

This telegram should be made official, please.

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No. 119.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1524, 14th August 1917, 11-30 p. m. (Recd. 15th, 7 a. m.)

*Clear the line. Private.* Reforms. When the announcement is made here and in India, would you consider whether an amnesty could not at the same time be granted to those who, not guilty of any actual crime, had been dealt with under the Defence of India Act or otherwise for reasons connected with preservation of order in this connection? I would not suggest the exaction of a promise, but the Government of India might perhaps declare, in view of pronouncement as to policy, the opportunity afforded to representative organisations of laying their views before you and me and the necessary publication of any contemplated steps, they expected confidently a truce with agitation, but they reserved the right to act again without prejudice if the public

order were despite this once more jeopardised. Such a recognition of the importance to be attached to the announcement would, I believe, prove worthy of consideration, but against your judgment I will not of course press this view.

This is with reference to my telegram of today.

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No. 120.

Extract from a letter from the Hon'ble Sir Harcourt Butler, K. C. S. I., C. I. E., Lieut.-Governor of Burma, to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 14th August 1917.

I was talking yesterday to a very intelligent Hindu merchant of Bombay, Mr. Lalubhai Samaldas, who is on a visit here. He was rather shocked at the deterioration in the political atmosphere during the last two years. He says that Madan Mohan Malaviya once told him that his head was with the Moderates, but his heart with the Extremists. I am afraid that one of the effects of the war is to let the party of the heart get the better of the party of the head. I don't know whether Islington's pronouncement will in any way assist Your Excellency. To the distant observer it looks as if there were divided counsels in the India Office at present.

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No. 121.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., 15th August 1917.

*Private & Personal.* Reforms. Please refer to my private telegram of today. I wish to draw your attention to the desirability of giving some credit for the policy of announcement of the goal to the Government of India. Invidious comparisons have been made between policy of last Viceroy and mine, and further, when all is said and done, this policy was initiated by us.

Reference your telegram proposing an amnesty. The requisite enquiries are being made by us from Local Governments, as we are of opinion that to come to a decision in a matter of such importance without consulting them would be both unwise and unfair to them. We consider that it would be inexpedient and premature for you to refer to this subject when making public announcement to Parliament.

No. 122.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 901, 15th August 1917, 7-10 p. m.

*Clear the line. Private.* Reforms. Your private telegram of yesterday was considered in Council today. We welcome the proposed announcement of the policy of His Majesty's Government, but we offer for consideration the following suggestions:—

(1) It is desirable to avoid giving the impression that His Majesty's Government and the Government of India are not in accord as to the ultimate goal of British rule in India. We therefore suggest that the preamble should run—The Government of India have for some time been pressing for an announcement by His Majesty's Government as to the ultimate goal of British rule in India, and after consideration of their proposals the Cabinet has authorised me, &c., &c.

(2) We consider that the words "under the ægis of the Crown" are not sufficiently definite and might be misinterpreted. We should prefer to substitute for them or add the words "as an integral part of the British Empire". We would ask you to remember that the words "Provincial Autonomy" in the Delhi despatch were the cause of serious misunderstanding. We wish to make it clear, however, that these are only suggestions, and if such a course involves delay, we do not desire to press for any amendments of the announcement.

Would you kindly let us know the exact date on which it is proposed to make the announcement and inform us of the changes, if any, in the language, so that publication may be made simultaneously in this country.

In our opinion it is undesirable that an announcement of this moment should be published in India through Reuter.

Will you kindly make this telegram official?

No. 123.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Tel. P., No. 903, 15th August 1917, 8-50 p. m. (Despd. for Home Dept.)

We report the following:—

The General Sessions of the Agra Zamindars' Association deprecated present inopportune political agitation. It was resolved by the *raises* and residents of Saharanpur that India was not ready for Home Rule, and they deprecated Home Rule propaganda. It was resolved by the Musalmans

Hardoi District, that Home Rule is inopportune and undesirable, and they repudiated the Moslem League. A memorial has been received by the Governor from the Hindu and Christian Nadars of Madras deprecating Home Rule agitation. In view of backward education of Mahomedans, Anjuman-i-Islam, Mehar Division, Larkhana, emphatically opposed Home Rule movement. Musalmans of Shahjehanpur resolved Home Rule movement premature and likely to affect Musalman interests prejudicially.

This is in continuation of our telegram of 13th July.

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No. 124.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1554, 16th August 1917, 9-15 p. m. (Recd. 17th, 6-30 a. m.)

*Clear the line. Private.* Reforms. Please refer to your private telegram of the 15th instant. The final text of the announcement which I shall make in the House of Commons Monday afternoon next is as follows. You may publish simultaneously :—

*Begins.* The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. They have decided that substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible, and that it is of the highest importance as a preliminary to considering what these steps should be that there should be a free and informal exchange of opinion between those in authority at home and in India. His Majesty's Government have accordingly decided, with His Majesty's approval, that I should accept the Viceroy's invitation to proceed to India to discuss these matters with Viceroy and Government of India, to consider with Viceroy the views of Local Governments, and to receive with him the suggestions of representative bodies and others.

I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages. The British Government and Government of India on whom the responsibility lies for welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples must be judges of the time and measure of each advance, and they must be guided by co-operation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred and by extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility.

Ample opportunity will be afforded for public discussion of proposals which will be submitted in due course to Parliament. *Ends.*

I have telegraphed separately to your Army Department text of announcement regarding Commissions.

Please acknowledge receipt of this telegram, which should be made official.

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No. 125.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1555, 16th August 1917, 11-45 p. m. (Recd. 17th, 9 a. m.)

*Clear the line. Private.* Reforms. Please refer to your private telegram of 15th instant and your private and personal telegram of August 16th. You will notice that I have succeeded in obtaining an alteration in the formula and have substituted the words "as an integral part of British Empire" for the words which were regarded by you as ambiguous. It will also have been noticed by you that I have mentioned the accord of your Government in order that it should not be imagined that there was any difference of opinion between us. I have not been able to give your Government the credit for which you asked and to which you are entitled in some form or other, but I shall take other steps to make that plain. I hope you will be in agreement with me that, compared with the rest, this is of less importance and its inclusion in this particular announcement was not sufficiently important to risk the horrid spectre of further delay.

In regard to my suggestion of amnesty, I quite agree with you that consultation with Local Governments was necessary, and I willingly abandon all idea of making an announcement on this subject on Monday when the other announcement will be made by me. At the same time I would beg you to bear in mind that the success of our announcement depends in some degree on the importance which we ourselves attach to it, and I cannot conceive of anything which would so indicate the belief we have in the alteration which we hope to achieve in the situation than the suggestion which I have in view. I of course recognise that to withdraw the measures we have taken with regard to these people without an announcement would have been very regrettable. So far as I am able to judge, the announcement would seem to me to make a very different matter of it. I do not think it would be possible to apply this principle in some localities and not in others, and I am apprehensive that Local Governments may not see the matter in the new light, as they have not had the same opportunities as we have had of appreciating the difficulties of the position, and their views may be unduly influenced by the feeling that.



relaxation of the orders will be indented with weakness. Even if the action were so misrepresented, I should not hesitate to carry it out, assuming always that it would help us in handling the heavy problems before us, but only if my proposal had your support. I have thought it worth while making these comments. It would be almost impertinent to assure you once again that your handling of the very difficult situation is regarded by me with confidence and sympathy.

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No. 126.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 910, 17th August 1917, 12 noon.

*Clear the line. Private.* Your two private telegrams of 16th instant regarding reforms have reached me. I shall make announcement here on Monday.

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No. 127.

Viceroy (Home Dept.) to all Local Governments.

Telegram, No. 2095-Pol., 17th August 1917.

Following telegrams received from Secretary of State :—

- (1) *Begins. Vide No. 121. Ends.*
- (2) *Begins. Vide No. 122. Ends.*

Government of India would be glad to receive opinion of the Local Government as soon as possible on the proposals contained in the second cable quoted above. An amnesty, such as is proposed, is obviously desirable at the present juncture if it is compatible with the public safety, but the Government of India apprehend that individual cases must be treated separately, and do not think that any restrictions imposed should be relaxed or withdrawn unless the Local Government considers that this can be done without prejudice to the public safety. In considering the question referred to above, the Local Government will doubtless bear in mind the effect within the province of the relaxations and restrictions placed on individuals in other provinces. The words "not guilty of any actual crime" are apparently not to be interpreted as referring only to persons found guilty of an offence by a Court of law, but Secretary of State appears to have in mind the case of persons who have taken part in political agitation only and are not directly connected with revolutionary conspiracies. You will of course treat these telegrams as most secret.

No. 128.

FROM THE RIGHT HON'BLE AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, P. C., M. P.

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*Rowfant, Crawley, Sussex, August 18th, 1917.*

[ Private. ]

MY DEAR CHELMSFORD,

Another mail is in with letters written after receipt of the telegraphic news of my resignation, and yours of the 19th July among them. I do not think that any Viceroy and Secretary of State have ever preserved more cordial relations or secured a greater measure of reciprocal trust and confidence. Indeed I should have regretted, leaving the India Office less, if my relations with you and them had been less cordial and our harmony less complete.

I am so glad to learn that, after experiencing some of the disappointments and delays which fell to my share, Montagu has at last got a decision from the Cabinet and has accepted your invitation to go to India to confer with you. I presume that the announcement will be made before the House rises, and I hope that it will do something to smoothe your path.

Montagu was good enough to propose to me that I should go with him, and I was in many ways sorely tempted to accept. But I have been very much "departmentalised" since the war began, have been very little in the House and have rather lost touch with it, and it is time, I think, that I took my place there again. If I read the signs aright, there is a good deal of restlessness and discontent both in and out of the House, and I think there will be useful work for one to do who can exert some influence to steady public opinion and to see the war fought out to a satisfactory finish. At any rate that is the part which I have chosen, and I shall go back to it after the recess refreshed by a long holiday.

I will not take up what you say about the delay in dealing with your Reforms despatch, for I recognise how much it has added to your difficulties and anxieties, but I can honestly say that it was not due to any lack of zeal or hard work on my part. I shall avail myself of your invitation to write to you from time to time and shall be very glad and very interested if you can sometimes find time to tell me something of what you are doing. Our papers give us very little news from India in these days.

My wife desires to join me in kindest regards to Lady Chelmsford and yourself. You know you have our warmest sympathy and good wishes.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd.) AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 129.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1581, 20th August 1917, 2-40 p. m. (Recd. 9-35 p. m.)

*Clear the line. Private.* Reforms. Please refer to paragraph 1 of my private telegram of the 16th of August. I propose to preface announcement of policy which I am making in reply to Parliamentary question by Charles Roberts by the following words:—

*Begins.* The Government of India have for some time been urging that a statement should be made in regard to Indian policy and I am glad to have the opportunity afforded by my Honourable friend's question of meeting their wishes. *Ends.*

I trust your wishes will be met by this.

No. 130.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Tel. P., No. 1590, 20th August 1917, 9-45 p. m. (Recd. 21st, 6-15 p. m.)

*Private.* Constitutional Reforms. Now that the announcement has been made, I feel I ought to be thinking out action resulting from it. With reference to my visit to you, I am entirely in your hands in carrying out a proposal which emanated from you, and should be glad if you will let me know your provisional views as to programme and as to time which should be allowed for carrying it out. In the present crisis I feel that the absence of the Secretary of State from London should be as short as possible consistent with due discharge of purpose of mission, but I must willingly stay as long as you thought necessary. I rely on you for advice and suggestions as to what this should be. I am of course ready to work continuously from time of arrival. I should also be glad of your views as to those who might come with me. There is a certain amount of preliminary work to be done here, work which I feel may help in the prompt and efficient discharge of the task in India, for I have subordinated all else to getting the announcement. It will not be possible in the circumstances to leave for some time, although I should like to suit you as to time. All the above should, please, be regarded as quite tentative, as I am anxious that you should regard yourself as entirely free in the advice you may give me.

If you would let me have within the next few days your impressions of the effect that the announcement has had on the situation in India, I should be grateful.

I look forward with great pleasure to co-operate with you, for I feel more confident today than ever of general agreement in our points of view. The receipt of your first letter, which is most helpful, emphasises this.



No. 128a.

Governor of Madras to Viceroy.

Tel. P., No. 1579, 19th August 1917.

*Clear the line. Private.* Reference your private telegram of the 17th instant. The following telegram has been sent to the Home Department of the Government of India :—

*Begins.* Your telegram of the 17th instant. On information before them and though their views are uninvited, the Madras Government respectfully beg to record their strong and unanimous opinion that the Secretary of State's proposed announcement is inopportune and impolitic, and also likely to destroy public confidence and to have disastrous results in this Presidency. They consider an announcement at the present moment of amnesty as wholly unwise and an irreparable blow at British authority only justifiable in gravest emergency, which in their opinion does not exist and would accordingly urge its further consideration. *Ends.*

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No. 128b.

Governor of Madras to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1580, Madras, 20th August 1917.

*Clear the line. Personal.* Indian reforms. I most earnestly trust Secretary of State may be induced to reconsider his intentions in the matter.

No. 131.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR JAMES MESTON, K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Govr. of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

*Govt. House, Naini Tal, August 20th, 1917.*

DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I was just sitting down a couple of days ago to trouble you with a long and rather anxious letter when your Home Department telegram arrived with the welcome tidings of the long-awaited announcement. I trust Your Excellency is satisfied with the decision. There is nothing so trying as waiting; and the last few months must have been a very trying time indeed, with every dog in India barking under your window. The mere prospect of a decision of any kind brings us out of darkness into light, for the situation here was becoming very gloomy and uncomfortable. But on its merits the decision seems as good as could have been hoped for. The description of the goal is adequate, and its approaches are defined with caution; and the proposed enquiry is of a nature which should satisfy all reasonable men.

What I had been on the eve of writing to Your Excellency about was the future treatment of agitation *after* the announcement, for the rumour<sup>r</sup> was strong that you were to make an important statement on the 5th September, and it seemed to me essential that we should decide beforehand on some uniform line of action in the event of the Home-rulers starting a fresh campaign of protest against your declaration as falling short of their demands. Such a contingency ought now to be unlikely in view of the form which the announcement is to take. If there is any honesty and sincerity among our Indian politicians—and I believe there is much of both—then the voice of agitation ought immediately to be stilled by this clear declaration of our good faith and of your readiness to hear everyone in calm consultation. Irreconcilables however remain, and there may yet be some attempt to maintain the recent excitements. Should there be any sign of this—noisy meetings or vituperative journalism—I sincerely trust we shall be allowed to stop it *sans phrase*, as a disturbance of the common weal and good government. It is essential that we should now have time to work and think in peace; and it would be particularly unseemly, for example, if the people who are to benefit from the amnesty were to start stamping the country and unsettling our students again.

With the idea of an amnesty, I am in full and respectful accord; but in telegraphing to the Home Department, I have suggested two stipulations, which appear to me of much moment:—

- (1) That the amnesty should be declared by Your Excellency and not by the Secretary of State.

- (2) That it should not extend to persons confined for conspiracy to murder or to incite to rebellion, or for trafficking with the King's enemies.

In the first suggestion I hope you will not think I am exceeding my province; but there is a tendency to make out that the British Democracy is India's only friend, and there is no harm in a reminder that there is also a Government *in* the country. The second condition can be readily defended, and will have the effect of ridding us, during the period of enquiry, of several men who would do their utmost to make any enquiry profitless.

Now that a change for the better seems probable, may I write to Your Excellency briefly about the situation in the United Provinces, and how I have tried to handle it? I should not have troubled you in the matter, were it not that some recent Home Rule speakers and writers have been patting us on the back for being less oppressive than certain other Local Governments. This has made me ask myself whether we have given all the support that we ought to the Government of India and our neighbours; in other words, have we been too weak with the Extremists?

In this province the Advanced Party is stronger and more capable than anywhere else in India outside Bombay. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya is now the ablest man in the whole party. He never rests; his personal character is above reproach; he has consequently much greater influence with the Hindu masses than any of the other leaders; and he has an unrivalled genius for organising an agitation. In this he is ably assisted by a group of Brahman politicians with its focus at Allahabad and branches elsewhere. Co-operating with them from Lucknow is the Raja of Mahmudabad, with a clique of noisy and aggressive Mahomedans of the young party, who make the Raja's house their head-quarters and live and agitate at his expense. They are people of weak character, moral and otherwise; and Mahmudabad himself is a vain, unbalanced creature, whose head has been turned by the deference which is paid, ostensibly to his patriotism, but in reality to his money-bags. He has however a growing following among the younger Mahomedans, who are flattered that he should be taken into the inner councils of the Congress party and fooled with promises of the partnership which the Hindus are going to offer the Moslems when India is free.

The Extremist movement has been developed with great energy and at considerable expense in the United Provinces since the end of 1913. It reached its zenith when the Congress and the League effected their union last Christmas at Lucknow, and put up a combined demand for Home Rule. From that time onwards, any false step on Government's part would have risked widespread trouble. There is no Local Government that is more sharply watched than this one, partly because I am harder

worked, and therefore more likely to trip, than the heads of most of the other provinces, partly in order that any slips may be used to reinforce the arguments for an Executive Council and partly for personal reasons. My relations with most of the agitators are very friendly; but Malaviya, though we are on the best of terms personally, is not of a forgiving spirit and lies in wait to repay two falls which I had to give him when he overdid his part; while Mahmudabad frankly dislikes me, because I have found him out (and he knows that he has been found out) in lying and intrigue. But personal reasons are the smallest factor; there is a constant looking out for unnecessary interference for any loss of patience or temper, for any error of judgment, for grievances of any sort which add fuel to the flame of agitation against the established order.

The issue, whether to treat the Home Rule movement strictly or leniently, was thus one which I had to decide at a very early stage. Subject to Your Excellency's approval, there were many points at which I could have intervened. I could have prohibited Tilak and Mrs. Besant from attending the Congress at Lucknow; Lord Willingdon tells me he was rather distressed that I didn't. I could have stopped the big meetings of protest against the Madras internments, put them out of bounds for students, &c. It would have been much easier to do this than to sit still and be suspected by one's own people of weakness. The question was, whether it was worth while. The time has passed when any Government in this country can stem a tumult by holding up its little finger. The temper of the people was evident. The movement was not to be stopped by prohibiting a meeting here and suspending a newspaper there. Nothing but a general campaign of repression would be of any avail.

Apart from the theoretical drawbacks to repression as a policy, I could not bring myself to believe that it would be the fair or just line to take as a matter of practical business. The Advanced Party had asked a few plain and reasonable questions; did we mean to give India self-government, and, if so, when and how? Did we admit that we were in India in order to train it for the job of managing its own affairs? These were questions that the spirit of the time forced upon them as well as upon us; the manner of asking them was sometimes objectionable; but the questions themselves were perfectly reasonable. It seemed to me therefore that we ran a grave risk of putting ourselves in the wrong if we suppressed all demands for an answer, even if they grew more emphatic and querulous as our silence continued. Accordingly I discarded the idea of spasmodic repression, except of course in cases where the law was obviously and intentionally broken. Waverers no doubt went over the fence in considerable numbers, when they might otherwise have been induced to sit on it or even to remain on our side. But we cannot let waverers dictate our policy; they will come climbing back when we want them.



It is thus an attempt to isolate and restrain the Home Rule agitation on which my officers and I have been engaged. We have tried reasoning where it showed any signs of being listened to. We have put the leaders on their honour to prevent wild talk, and to curb the fierier spirits. A great deal has been done quietly in dissuading local centres from getting up meetings, in inducing people to *think* for themselves what Home Rule means, and in encouraging some independence of judgment against the intellectual arrogance of the Brahman wire-pullers. The result has been that the agitators have, as a rule, been careful of their speech and of their ground. The result has also been, I think, that there will be in this province a large number of intelligent men ready to discuss the problems of self-government in a reasonable way, without the bitterness of any special conflict with Government or its officials at the back of their minds.

All this sounds a very egoistical *apologia*; but I have endeavoured to trouble Your Excellency as little as possible with these matters, and now that this particular phase is presumably over, I thought that you might permit me to sum up the situation. Please do not trouble answering this letter unless you have any instructions to give me on the subject of it; you will have your hands full enough in the next few weeks. I fancy our chief pre-occupation in the near future will be to get incoherent but responsible people, like the landed classes and the more conservative Moslems, to prepare their case for the coming enquiry, and prevent the idealists from proving that the story has only one side to it.

With the utmost respect,

I remain, &c ,  
(Sd.) JAS. S. MESTON.

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No. 132.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 931, 21st August 1917.

*Private.* Your visit to India.

(1) Will you kindly let me know—

(a) when you propose to come ;

(b) how long you propose to stay ;

(c) whether you will be accompanied by any adjuncts or assessors.

(2) Apart from halts at Delhi from November 3rd to November 25th and again from December 30th to January 7th, I shall be, according to present plans, on tour from October 20th to January 20th. The tour includes Calcutta

from December 12th to December 20th and Bombay from December 22nd to December 28th. I would suggest that it might perhaps be possible for your movements to be adapted to fit in with this programme.

(3) I shall be writing to you by this mail in regard to various points of procedure.

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No. 133.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 935, 22nd August 1917.

*Private.* Your visit to India. Please refer to your private telegram of 20th August.

1. I will reply in detail, in due course, but there is one point of immediate importance. I think that you should have associated with you in India two men who could assist you from the Government point of view and from the advanced point of view respectively. I have every confidence in recommending to you Sir William Vincent and Mr. Bhupendra Nath Basu, the newly-appointed Member of your Council. As Mr. Basu is leaving for London by the mail sailing August 31st, please let me know at once about him. Except for necessary staff, I am inclined to suggest that you should confine yourself to men on the spot in touch with the situation.

2. In my private telegram of the 21st instant, I gave you certain dates to work on. As a starting point, I would suggest your being in Delhi by 5th November when I shall be presiding over the Chiefs' Conference.

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No. 134.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1599, 22nd August 1917, 3-15 p. m. (Recd. 23rd, 7 a. m.)

*Private.* My visit to India. Your private telegram of August 21st crossed one from me. I am so anxious to fall in with your wishes that, before sending my suggestions, I shall await yours.

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No. 135.

To H. E. THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE LORD PENTLAND, G. C. I. E., Governor of Madras.

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*Viceregal Lodge, Simla, August 24th, 1917.*

MY DEAR PENTLAND,

Your private telegrams of 19th and 20th instant reached me all right, but were too late to influence the policy that had already been decided upon.

As you will have noticed, the Secretary of State actually made his statement in the House on the day on which your later telegram was despatched.

I am sorry you are dissatisfied with the announcement, and that you apprehend such evil consequences from it. I am bound to say that, had your protest been received earlier, we should not have been able to meet you in any way. For months past all Provincial Governments, except Madras, had been pressing with the greatest insistence for an announcement of policy, and the announcement in its final form was approved both by me and the Members of my Council.

As far as I am at present informed, the effect appears to have been good and to have taken the wind out of the sails of the extremists. Of course the difficult question as to the definite steps to be taken is still ahead of us, but you will agree that steps of some kind could not have been much longer delayed. In the meantime the announcement gives us a breathing space and the moderates an opportunity to rally to us without committing Government too precisely to any definite line.

Very sincerely yours,

(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.

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No. 136.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1622, 24th August 1917, 7-20 p. m. (Recd. 25th, 6 a. m.)

*Clear the line. Private.* Please see your private telegram of 22nd instant. Visit. I think it best, with a view to accommodating our arrangements, to tell you very roughly the kind of programme which seems appropriate. The announcement which was made on Monday associates me with you in considering the problems with your Government and Local Governments and in receiving suggestions of representative bodies and others. Association with you is essential to purpose which is to agree with your main lines of policy which we hope to commend to our respective Councils, Cabinet and Parliament, subject to working out of details afterwards. One stage of our work I thought would be for you to receive deputations and representations of persons in my company; their views might be heard by us in public and we could then discuss them with the deputies *in camera* which would really be valuable part of process. Another stage would be to discuss relevant matters with Heads of Local Governments, then to have discussions with some Chiefs and finally with Government of India. After a short interval for thought and to enable Secretaries to arrange material, there would follow

final stage of discussion with a view to agreement on matters and future procedure. This would wind up the business.

I do not know how this fits in with your own views, and I shall be glad to receive any suggestions from you. Arrangement presumably must be elastic and one stage might prove to overlap another, but obviously if anything like it is to be carried, we must be together practically all the time, and I realise that this must cut across plans which were mentioned in your telegram of the 21st instant. It is most unfortunate for reasons for which neither you nor I are responsible that decision should have been so long postponed, and that your dates had to be fixed without reference to a possible visit of Secretary of State, and I am most reluctant to have to ask you to consider possibility of rearranging them now. I am anxious to do all I can to fall in with your plans, but the occasion is altogether exceptional and I am sure that you will agree that inconvenience to yourself and to those whose plans depend on yours will be more than counter-balanced by taking full advantage of the unique opportunity of settling so large a question in personal intercourse. For reasons what were given in my telegram of the 20th instant, it is difficult for me to leave England before latter part of October, but I will make efforts to place myself in your hands as far as possible as regards dates and places.

Joint procedure which I have proposed will remove any doubts as to your position as His Majesty's representative which might be suggested if I discussed these matters independently. Some papers in India I notice have already begun to talk of this. There can be of course no difficulty between us personally, but I am anxious to maintain unimpaired position of Viceroy. A Secretary of State has no *locus standi* in India, and if you would like to assure public opinion at any time that all public pronouncements as to views or policy of Government in India must be made by you, and that I am only meaning to consult informally with you and others, and that business between Government of India and Home Government will be conducted through regular channels and Council of India, please do so, or I could issue some statement here if preferred by you.

As regards persons to accompany me from this country, apart from necessary staff, I am disposed to think that having regard to position here it would make for success of mission if I were accompanied by representatives of Liberal and Unionist views. Their association with me would, I feel, prove of greatest value in helping measures agreed on between us through Parliament later on. The names I had in mind are Charles Roberts and Lord Donoughmore. Roberts is man of wide sympathies and ripe judgment and his experience at this office as Under Secretary has given him useful insight into system of Indian administration. Donoughmore is Chairman of Committees, House of Lords, was formerly Under Secretary of State for War and commands respect of Unionist party; and though he was member of Mesopotamia Commission, he

is a sensible man. Chamberlain tells me he had similar plans if he had come out. In any case I want to bring Duke of my Council with me. He has the confidence of Council, and Chamberlain and I have been much impressed by his ability and judgment and he has been specially engaged in consideration of Reforms proposals. I am anxious that you should know my case and should like you to give these suggestions your careful consideration, having in view not only demands of immediate situation, but prospective development when measures that we agree on have to be brought before Council and Parliament.

As regards *personnel* from India, I am much obliged for your suggestion about Basu, but I think it is more important that he should take up his duties here as soon as possible, since absence of this Indian Member from Council is unsatisfactory. There are advantages in associating an Indian of Basu's type with our deliberations if only to guard ourselves against accusation of neglecting some point of view, but am I not right in supposing that somebody else might be found and I shall have seen Basu before I start? As regards Vincent, I shall meet him on Government of India, but I had it in mind to ask your view as to whether it would be desirable or feasible to obtain Sir James Meston. This I know would involve revision of arrangement under which his Lieutenant-Governorship has been extended to 15th January, but Craddock would no doubt be able, if given notice, to take over Burma in November, and presumably Butler would take over the United Provinces from Meston at the same time. What do you think of these ideas? You will understand that I am in no way wedded to them, but Meston's special experience and known sympathy with Indian aspirations seem to mark him out for association with the enquiry and it would also be an advantage to have Butler in India, would not it?

I have telegraphed very fully the rough ideas I have in my mind. I hope you will treat them equally frankly. I repeat again I am deeply sorry lateness of decision may cause you inconvenience. But I do not think India will be surprised to find that our deliberations loom large, or even overshadow, the activities of the winter.

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No. 137.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 944, 26th August 1917, 4-40 p. m.

*Private.* Visit to India. Your private telegram of 24th instant. We were on the point of sending our provisional suggestions, but must now defer them pending full consideration of your telegram received yesterday. Alteration of my plans will of course be made to suit you.

No. 138.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 951, 28th August 1917, 4 p. m.

*Clear the line. Private.* Your visit to India. Your private telegram of 24th instant and mine of the 26th. Before I received your telegram I had already considered in Council the possible arrangements for your visit. I then hoped that you might arrive in Delhi when the Chiefs are assembled for their Conference, which begins on November 5th, and that you might remain there till November 25th, receiving with me deputations and memorials, and as proposed in your cable under reply interviewing heads of neighbouring provinces, Ruling Chiefs and members of the Government of India. My visit to Bikaner on 25th November has now been abandoned, and I will alter my plans so as to meet you on arrival at Delhi. We might then on the 12th December proceed together to Calcutta. On the 20th we might together go to Lord Willingdon in Bombay, returning thence to Delhi on 29th. After this it will probably be desirable that a visit to Madras should be arranged, but I may note that it is essential that I should be in Delhi in the first week in January for a meeting of the Executive Council in order to discuss the coming budget proposals which must then be cabled promptly to the India Office. After a visit to Madras, any possible solutions of the problem which you are coming out to investigate might be discussed by you with the Government of India at Delhi.

In regard to procedure, I have consulted my Council and their views as well as mine are embodied in the following remarks:—

I think that you should decline to receive deputations, addresses, or memorials on any subject other than reforms. I suggest that all representations and memorials should be addressed to you through the Governor-General in Council. I am in agreement with you that you and I should receive all deputations jointly, and I see no objection to deputations being received publicly, provided no reply other than a formal one, promising consideration, is given. I would limit any supplementary discussions to private interviews with a few selected members of the deputations on the understanding that by such interviews no definite commitments are involved. I entirely agree that definite and constant association with the Viceroy is essential to the successful settlement of the issues involved. Copies of all addresses, &c., should be sent in beforehand, in order that both you and the Government of India may have an opportunity of examining them, and a time-limit should be laid down, after which no addresses or memorials will be received.

I agree with you as to making a public announcement that your intention is only to consult authorities and others in this country informally and stating that all public pronouncements will be made by the Government of India.

I am of opinion that a statement to this effect might with advantage be published in England and transmitted to India.

Local Governments should, I suggest, prepare lists of persons and associations wishing to have interviews or to present addresses, and should make recommendations as to which should be allowed by reason of the importance of their opinions or their standing. I think also that, in order to facilitate and expedite business, all individuals granted interviews should be invited to send in some time beforehand a brief summary of the points they wish to place before you. Local Governments should also be asked strictly to limit the numbers they recommend.

There is no objection on my part to Mr. Roberts, Lord Donoughmore and Sir W. Duke being associated with you in the enquiry. I am afraid the replacement of Basu adequately will be difficult, if not impossible. I know of no one else who combines practical commonsense with sincerity of purpose and desire for progress and at the same time carries the same weight and influence amongst advanced politicians. I hope therefore that on this point you will reconsider your decision. In the meantime Basu will proceed from Bombay by the mail of the 31st. He could of course be recalled, if necessary, from Aden, or stopped at Bombay if we receive intimation in time.

On the occasion of Lord Crewe's visit to India all official communications and reports to the India Office continued to be sent in the ordinary way without break, and I understand that on the present occasion the same procedure should be followed. It was then suggested that copies of important despatches should be shown to Lord Crewe in India; and though the idea was not pursued, I could of course arrange this if you so desire. I presume you will not wish to deal with petitions from condemned prisoners.

I propose to ask Local Governments for constructive suggestions as to possible lines of political advance with special reference to our reforms despatch and also their consideration of—

(1) The Congress and All-India Moslem League's scheme and the Memorandum of the 19 Members.

(2) Mr. Gokhale's political testament.

(3) Lord Islington's proposals, in connection with which an examination of Curtis' Suggestions for Constitutional Progress in Indian Polity might also be made.

I presume you will take the same precedence in India as Lord Crewe, but perhaps you may be willing to allow Governors' seniority in their own presidencies.

Lastly, as regards your suggestion *re* Sir James Meston. For the following reasons I would deprecate this :—

(1) As you now know from my telegram about Sir H. Butler, it would dislocate administrative arrangements.

(2) It is essential, I think, especially as Provincial Autonomy will form an important part of non-official suggestions which will be made to you, that one of your *adlati* should be a man who can speak with present authority and experience in regard to the Government of India side of this and other matters which will come up. Sir W. Duke's Indian experience has been wholly provincial, while it is now more than five years since Sir J. Meston ceased to be connected with the Central Government. Further the absence of a Government of India representative might, I think, be taken as implying want of confidence in us.

I would therefore once more urge that you should take Sir W. Vincent, who, as Home Member, is primarily concerned with reforms matters, and in whom my Colleagues and I have full confidence.

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No. 139.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1647, 28th August 1917, 3-45 p. m. (Recd. 11-20 p. m.)

*Clear the line. Private.* My visit to India. Please see your private telegram of the 26th instant. Many thanks for your readiness to alter your plans. May I assume that you have no objection to my suggestions as to *personnel* of deputation from here whom I should be glad to approach as soon as possible? If you approve, I would issue invitations without delay in advance, settling programme and procedure, as to which I would wish you not to feel hurried.

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No. 140.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 957, 29th August 1917, 7-45 p. m.

*Private.* Constitutional Reforms. The general reception accorded to the announcement is favourable, but not very enthusiastic. In Madras it is disparaged as unsatisfactory by extreme papers, *New India* and *Hindu*; they demand cessation of repressive measures, and deprecate any weakening of agitation.

The announcement is welcomed by moderate papers and they say that violent agitation must now yield to sane counsels. Lukewarm approval is expressed by *Madras Times* and *Madras Mail*.

In Bombay the announcement has met with a favourable reception by English and moderate papers. The extremist press seeks to minimise it, and



so far there is no indication of agitation decreasing in intensity. The passive resistance movement has, however, received a set back and a development of moderate opinion is anticipated.

In Bengal the announcement has been received favourably by all sections of the Press, but not enthusiastically. It is hoped by European papers that the views of Europeans and moderates and also the general interests of the country will not be disregarded. They fear that the Secretary of State is already committed to an unduly rapid advance. Indian-owned papers are disappointed at qualifying expressions and suggest that progress will be blocked by Lords Curzon and Milner. They however, as does the *Hindu* of Madras, take comfort from the speech made by the Secretary of State in Mesopotamian debate.

The announcement is regarded by the *Bengali* as frigid, but says it is the death knell of bureaucracy.

The *Amrita Bazar Patrika* urges that political agitation should be carried on with increasing vigour.

The general attitude in the United Provinces is one of marked caution. The announcement is welcomed as committing the British Government and is described as significant coming from a Coalition Government with a strong conservative element; but a probable breach of faith is hinted at and hope is expressed that there will be some definition of the period within which full self-government will be granted. It is also urged that, if steps taken are not satisfactory, the agitation must continue, though purged of its bitterness. Reliance is placed on the independence of the Secretary of State.

The announcement is criticised by the *Punjabi* as cautious, and it would have preferred a Parliamentary Committee; adds that the supreme authority is not the British Government, but the British people, and hints at a deputation proceeding to England, if necessary, in the ship in which the Secretary of State returns.

The release of Mrs. Besant is demanded by the *Punjabi Leader* and various other papers.

We have not yet received comments of the Vernacular papers, but they will almost certainly be on the same lines.

As to Commissions, the announcement has been cordially received in the Madras Press, though *Hindu* says that it is a bare act of grace, and *New India* says that it will not evoke enthusiasm.

In the United Provinces and the Punjab the announcement has been welcomed in the Press, but not very enthusiastically.

The above is in compliance with the request made in your private telegram of 20th instant.

No. 141.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1662, 30th August 1917, 9-40 p. m. (Recd. 31st. 2-40 p. m.)

*Private.* Visit. My private telegram of August 30th. Apart from colleagues on delegation, I propose to bring—

- (1) a Private Secretary,
- (2) a Secretary for delegation,
- (3) a short-hand clerk, and
- (4) a personal servant.

In view of local knowledge, do you think it would be useful to associate a junior civilian with the Secretary for delegation? If so, whom would you propose.

Ought those coming to bring uniform either full dress or Levée and orders? Also are top hats required? In present circumstances you will appreciate advantage of economising luggage.

No. 142.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Tel. P., No. 1665, 30th August 1917, 9-40 p. m. (Recd. 31st, 6-30 p. m.)

*Private.* My visit to India. Please refer to your private telegram of the 28th instant. I agree generally with your proposals for visits to Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, and you can rely on my doing all I can to arrive in Delhi as early as possible in November. Would you consider as an alternative with regard to the visit to Madras to go direct from Bombay, returning to Delhi in the first week of January for your Council?

I entirely agree in recommendation that memorials, &c., should be strictly limited to *reforms* and should be addressed through the Governor-General in Council, and I accept your views generally with regard to receipt of deputations and procedure. I suggest that you make announcement in due course as to receiving deputations in public on condition mentioned by you, and provided deputation so desire. Reference to subsequent private interviews with selected Members should also be made in announcement.

I need hardly mention, for I am sure you realise, that care should be taken to avoid charge of refusing to hear any persons or bodies entitled to speak, and that efforts to avoid making access to us too formal will be well repaid. It will be best in cases of doubt to take a liberal view and allow

representation to come forward, but numbers must of course be kept within manageable limits. I presume that, so far as is possible, a daily programme will be prepared beforehand.

As regards the announcement concerning the scope of visit, I will in due course make a statement here and communicate it to you.

As soon as I have replies from persons to be invited from this country, I will let you know. I gladly accept your view as regards Sir William Vincent and shall be glad if you will make necessary arrangements with him.

You are right in understanding that the same procedure in respect of official communications and reports to the India Office should be followed now as on the occasion of Lord Crewe's visit. Important questions of policy will not be dealt with in my absence unless an urgent decision is necessary, when communication of despatch can be arranged in India as suggested by you. I do not of course wish to deal with petitions from condemned prisoners, or do anything else suggesting that I am in India in an executive capacity.

With regard to precedence, I incline to think that, although case is not altogether analogous, Lord Crewe's precedent is preferable. Do you not hold the opinion that when you, the Governor, and I are present together it would be better that I should follow you even in the Governor's own Province? My object would be to avoid emphasising formalities as much as possible, but I doubt whether following the Governor might not on occasion prove inconvenient.

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No. 143.

FROM H. E. THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE LORD PENTLAND, G. C. I. E., Governor  
of Madras.

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*Govt. House, Ootacamund,  
August 31st, 1917.*

[Private.]

MY DEAR CHELMSFORD,

I write to thank you for your letter of the 24th which arrived here yesterday.

As you know, except for an observation in your private letter of June 11th last indicating your hope of some later announcement by the then Secretary of State, no communications have passed between us on the subject of general future policy since this time last year. And though I regret truly that you should have had the trouble of receiving useless telegrams at the last moment, it seemed best that even then you should be informed as to our

opinions, not—I may perhaps add—in regard to the desirability of an announcement, but in regard to the particular announcement then under consideration.

While it is a great regret to us to find ourselves singular in these opinions, we shall of course, I need hardly say, use our utmost endeavours to help and co-operate in every way. We are very grateful for your assurance as to amnesty. And I am very glad to know that so far you are satisfied with the results of the Secretary of State's announcement.

With all kind regards,

I am, yours very sincerely,

(Sd.) PENTLAND.

No. 144.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 977, 5th September 1917, 9-55 a. m.

*Private.* Your visit to India. Your private telegram of the 30th August. Until I have some idea of the approximate date of your arrival, I find it difficult to make further suggestions as to your tour. As my autumn tour programme is causing me difficulty, I shall be obliged if you will communicate on this subject as soon as possible. Can I take it that my dates up to November 20th are free? As soon as the date of your arrival is known to us, I will have a programme drawn up for your consideration, and as soon as the tour programme, including a visit to Madras, is settled, we will start the preparation of a daily programme of engagements. The following is the draft of a communiqué which we propose to issue as regards receiving deputations, &c :—

*Begins.* By the desire of the Secretary of State, the following announcement is made regarding the procedure that will be followed during his approaching visit to India. In the first place this visit is to enable him to hold a free and informal discussion of the matters referred to in his announcement of the 20th August; to consider with the Viceroy the views of Local Governments and to receive with him the suggestions of representative bodies and others. His absence from England during the war cannot be prolonged, and it will be necessary for him to concentrate his attention upon the particular questions at issue. It will therefore be impossible for him to receive deputations, addresses or memorials on any other subject. All representations and memorials on the subject of reforms should be addressed to him through the Governor-General in Council. All deputations will be received by him jointly with His Excellency the Viceroy. To such deputations he will not be in a position to give a considered reply, but he hopes to secure great advantage from private

interviews with selected members of the deputations after they have presented their addresses. All persons or associations wishing to have interviews or to present addresses should make their wishes known to their respective Local Governments, who will submit their recommendations to the Government of India for submission to the Secretary of State. This procedure is necessary in order to enable a daily programme of his engagements to be prepared, and every endeavour will be made to secure that all important associations and persons should be allotted a time for the desired deputation or address.

It will be a convenience if copies of any addresses to be presented could be sent in some little time beforehand, in order to give the Secretary of State an opportunity of appreciating the points to be placed before him, and it will add greatly to the value of the discussions at private interviews if gentlemen who are accorded that honour will similarly send in beforehand a summary of the points they desire to lay before the Secretary of State.

Mr. Montagu is most anxious to hear the views of representatives of all sections of the community, and these suggestions have been made in order that the time at his disposal may be distributed to the best advantage. *Ends.*

There is no intention on my part of limiting the number of addresses and interviews except in so far as may be necessary to keep them within manageable limits and to prevent your being overwhelmed with deputations and personal visits of no real importance, and we will endeavour to make your wishes quite clear to Local Governments when we issue the communiqué. We shall be very grateful if you will communicate to us the terms of the announcement you propose to make as soon as you conveniently can do so, and also inform us of the names of those who will accompany you as soon as this point is definitely settled.

I readily accept your view that, when we are together, you should take precedence of Governors even in their own Presidencies. If by any chance, owing to my absence at the budget meeting or otherwise, you happen to find yourself temporarily alone with a Governor, you might be disposed to let him have the first place, but this point I am content to leave entirely to your decision.

I am grateful to you for deciding to take Sir William Vincent. I presume he will be attached to you in the same way as Sir William Duke and others, and it will be necessary to place him on special duty during your visit and for a short time beforehand.

As regards your other telegram, it will, I think, be most useful that a junior Civilian should be associated with the Secretary for Delegation. I think I know a suitable man, and I am in consultation with the Local Government. I will submit his name on hearing from them.

It will not be necessary to bring top hats and uniform.

No. 145.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1696, 5th September 1917, 8-45 p. m. (Recd. 6th, 2-45 p. m.)

*Private.* From Aga Khan I have received repeated entreaties for employment and offer of service in connection with reforms. There is no doubt that he wants to be of service, and that he regrets his position during the last three years. To associate him with the enquiry is of course out of the question, but he is ill and if you see no objection, I am inclined to tell him that you and I are of opinion that his presence in India during the winter will or may be useful to us.

No. 146.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1707, 6th September 1917, 11-40 p. m. (Recd. 7th, 4 p. m.)

*Private.* My visit to India. Reference your private telegram of the 5th instant. Since my last telegram to you I have been concentrating my attention on arriving as near as possible November 5th. The Admiralty are anxious to keep the dates secret in this country, but I gather that the boat which looks most convenient leaves Port Said on October 26th, and I am going to do my utmost to join it there. Does this suit you? I realise inconvenience I must inevitably cause you, and am anxious to fall in with your wishes in every possible way.

2. With regard to your announcement, I have no criticism whatever to make of it except that it would appear to have been drafted out of courtesy to me in a way which places me personally and prominently as Secretary of State before the public. If you preferred, I should be quite willing to make the announcement more impersonal and suggest that from the words "Governor-General in Council" at the end of the fifth sentence the communiqué should read as follows:—

*Begins.* (R). All deputations will be received by Mr. Montagu and His Excellency the Viceroy jointly. To such deputations it will not be possible to give a considered reply, but it is hoped that great advantage will be secured from private interviews with selected members of deputations after they have presented their addresses. All persons or associations wishing to have interviews or to present addresses should make their wishes known to their respective Local Governments, who will submit their recommendations to the Government of India for submission to the Secretary of State. This procedure is necessary in order to enable a daily programme of engagements to be prepared and every

endeavour will be made to secure that all important associations and persons should be allotted a time for desired deputation or address. It will be a convenience if copies of any addresses to be presented could be sent in some little time beforehand in order that there may be an opportunity of appreciating the points to be raised and it will add greatly to the value of the discussions at private interviews if gentlemen who are accorded that honour will similarly send in beforehand a summary of points they desire to lay before the Secretary of State and Viceroy. It is desired that the views of representatives of all sections of the community should be heard and suggestions have been made in order that time at Mr. Montagu's disposal may be distributed to best advantage. *Ends.*

Although it need not be included in the communiqué, it might be advisable for Local Governments to be told that, as interviews and addresses must be kept within manageable limits, they should urge that applicants submitting representations more or less identical either to amalgamate or to eliminate matter already accepted from more influential people.

I will communicate to you at once in draft the terms of announcement I propose to make. I am waiting in order to include in it the names of those who will accompany me and the office arrangements that I propose to make, and this may require another decision of the Cabinet. In your absence I will certainly give the Governor of a Presidency first place. Seton, who is Secretary of the Judicial and Public Department here, is coming with me as Secretary to Delegation. Duke and Roberts have accepted. I am waiting to hear from Donoughmore, who has to obtain permission to absent himself from the House of Lords.

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#### No. 147.

#### *Suggestions for change in the Constitution of, and Powers exercised by, Provincial Legislative Councils.*

Now that the announcement has been made by His Majesty's Government that the future policy in regard to India is ultimately to endow British India as an integral part of the Empire with responsible government, it is possible to consider the steps which can be taken immediately towards that goal. Moreover, it is necessary, in view of the approaching visit of the Secretary of State for India, that we should be ready as soon as possible with constructive suggestions to this end. The Secretary of State will not only have before him such suggestions as those of the Round Table, of the nineteen Members, and of the Congress and Moslem League, but he will be approached with representations and demands from all sorts of less responsible bodies.

2. Until the announcement was made by the Secretary of State, it was impossible for us to know definitely whether the position taken up by Lord Morley, *viz.*, that it was impossible to convert the Legislative Councils of India into local Parliaments with parliamentary powers of control, would be abandoned or not. Now that the announcement clears the ground in this regard and makes it clear that we have to contemplate a development of self-government up to the stage, ultimately, of full responsibility, it is necessary for us to see whether the machinery which we already have is fitted for, or can be developed into, parliamentary institutions. We still do not know how far the Home Government and the Secretary of State are prepared to delegate their existing powers of control, especially fiscal and financial, but I suggest that we may safely make two assumptions:—

- (i) that, in view of the definite announcement made, they are prepared to delegate powers upon the Government of India and Provincial Governments; and
- (ii) that Indian representation on Imperial Conference to meet annually will enable that delegation of power to be of a very considerable degree.

Hitherto, under the Morley-Minto reforms, the Legislative Councils have been in a position to criticise and considerably to influence public opinion and policy, but, owing to the centralisation of control at home, the Governments, Provincial and Imperial, in India have not been in a position to modify policy in accordance with what they may have conceived, in the light of such criticism, to have been public opinion and Indian interests.

3. I propose to limit this note to the discussion of constructive suggestions relating to Provincial Legislative and Executive Councils, their constitution and powers. My reasons for not including the Governor-General's Legislative Council and Executive Council are—

- (a) it is important that Parliament and the Dominions should be assured that India's foreign policy and her frontiers are not to be the subject of experiment or to be imperilled by domestic political reform;
- (b) provincial reform is more urgent and the experience gained will be of extraordinary value in determining the safest directions in which to reform the constitution and powers of control of the Government of India;
- (c) the reform of the Government of India which, in some respects, is desirable at an early date can be undertaken separately afterwards.

4. As regards (a), I assume that certain of the frontier provinces will be treated as an Imperial asset and administered as at present by the Viceroy and



his Executive Council as part and parcel of the Imperial politics of the British Empire. Such frontier provinces are: all territories to the west of the Indus except Sind, that is to say, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province; Kashmir, Nepal, Assam, Bhutan, Manipur, &c., and Upper and Lower Burma. In regard to Burma, indeed, I do not think that it comes suitably into any scheme of political reform, and, in the suggestions which follow, I omit Burma from their scope. Thus the frontiers of India, which are an affair concerning the whole Empire, will remain entirely outside the scope of any domestic reforms which are immediately under consideration.

5. As regards (b), I want to make it clear, as has, indeed, been agreed to in our despatch, that reform cannot be uniform in all provinces. Speaking generally, the stage of advancement in the three Presidencies—Bengal, Madras and Bombay—is such as to justify a longer step in advance than, for example, the Central Provinces; while the Central Provinces and the United Provinces, together with Bihar and Orissa, are ripe for a measure of advance greater, perhaps, than that which would be found suitable for the Punjab. It is most necessary to determine on the measures suitable in the several provinces and perhaps to see some of the results of such measures before materially modifying the constitution either of the Executive or the Legislative Council of the Governor-General. In regard to (c), it may be admitted at once that certain changes in the constitution of the Governor-General's Legislative Council might be undertaken with advantage, but it is not necessary for present purposes to do more than indicate that, while, pending experience in the provinces the maintenance of an official majority may be necessary, an enlargement of the Council so as to secure by election more complete representation of provincial interests is desirable.

6. When we addressed the Secretary of State last year, we did so as a bureaucratic government with the responsibility of such a government to see that our recommendations, while conscientiously aimed at the goal formulated, should in no way involve the risk of precipitate advance; since we had to bear in mind the fact that any advance we recommended would be of a permanent character, and that we could not recede from any development which we recommended. We were also in ignorance, as I have already said, as to what the Home authorities were prepared to delegate in the way of autonomy. Bearing these considerations in mind, the suggestions we formulated were:

- (1) The deliberate and formal recognition of the goal towards which India should aspire. That goal was defined as being "the endowment of British India, as an integral part of the Empire, with self-government". We went on to safeguard ourselves from the commitment that self-government for India would necessarily mean precisely the same in form and substance as the self-government which has been evolved in different conditions

by different parts of the Empire. I take it, however, that there is no difference of opinion in regard to the question whether by self-government we intended responsible government, and that we contemplated that the form of responsible government would ultimately model itself, with such modifications in detail as are required by India's very exceptional circumstances, upon the principles underlying that of the other self-governing parts of His Majesty's Dominions.

- (2) In the second place, as a step towards that goal, we proposed to pave the way for an ultimate enlargement of the constitutional powers of the Provincial Legislative Councils, but we qualified that step by limiting it for the present to (i) an increase in the elected element; and (ii) a material expansion of the constituencies by which the elected members are chosen. In other words, we proposed a modification of the political *machinery* in order to secure more truly representative bodies upon our Legislative Councils, but, except in regard to budget committees, we entirely omitted to provide for any increase in the *material* upon which the improved machinery would have to work.

7. It will thus be seen that, owing to the circumstances in which we were placed, it was impossible to devise and submit a constructive scheme of material devolution of authority to Provincial Legislative Councils, but I suggest that, in view of the change in the situation, the time has now come not only when we safely may, but when we must, supplement our then proposals by a constructive scheme. While the enlargement of the constituencies and the presence of a larger proportion of elected Members upon the Councils, as proposed by us last year, might, in course of time, give some indication of the aptitude of the electors, on the one hand, for forming a judgment regarding public matters of importance, and of the Members, on the other hand, for gauging public opinion and representing it, we should, in the absence of the delegation of some real power, be in no better position, ten years after the introduction of our reforms in the machinery of the Councils, to estimate the capacity of the elected Members for administration and for the control of affairs than we are after ten years' experience of the Morley-Minto reforms. We should, in fact, be repeating the proposition, which has proved so futile in the past, that we should only extend powers and responsibilities to the people when they had proved their fitness for it, but we should be providing no effective means whatever for fitting them or testing their fitness for their proper discharge. Moreover, it would be unreasonable to ask that the only democratic control which operates in respect of acts of the Government of India, namely, the control of the Houses of Parliament, should be removed unless and until some other form of popular responsible control could take its place. Such alternative control can only come about by the gradual introduction of a real measure of responsible

democratic government in India, subject to such restrictive control as may be necessary to secure the efficiency of the administration for some years to come.

8. In a note which I submitted at the request of His Excellency on the 9th of May 1916, I set forth my general views on the subject of reform, including two suggestions, neither of which was pressed by me at that time for reasons with which His Excellency is familiar. In the first place, I wanted to see the provincial budgets debated and voted upon, subject to certain reservations as to the degree in which the vote would become operative, in the Provincial Councils, these being reconstituted upon a model drawn up *exempli gratia* for the Bombay Presidency and shown in the appendix to this note. I assumed that that model could only apply as an example for one province and would need radical adaptation to other provincial needs as well as probably some changes in the light of Bombay provincial criticism. In the second place, I advocated a step in the direction of associating the representatives of the people with the responsibilities of Government by means of the appointment, by the Governor, to his Executive Council of one elected Member of the Legislative Council.

9. We had before us last year the "Round Table" pamphlet in which were set out other suggested means of devolving powers and responsibilities upon Governments based on popular representation. Those means may be summarised, for my present purpose, as being the transfer, from the existing Executive Government of certain of the provinces, to the control of a Ministry selected from the elected representatives of the Legislative Councils, of the management of certain selected departments of the administration. It was described and criticised as a dyarchy. If the "Round Table" suggestion was understood correctly, it amounted to bifurcating the functions of the Legislative Councils into two distinct channels. Assuming that Departments A, B and C were made over to the Legislative Councils Ministry, and that D, E and F were reserved, the Legislative Councils, in respect of A, B and C, would be a Parliament independent of the Executive Government except for certain limitations—among others, the limitation of finance—inasmuch as they would have the administration only of such funds as might be made over for the administration of the allotted departments. It was, however, contemplated that, for purposes of the administration of those departments, it should be open to the ministry to propose new taxation. The ministry so contemplated would, in fact, be a ministry responsible to the elected assembly, holding office at its pleasure, and with full powers, save as to the permanent civil services, in respect of the departments made over to it. On the other hand, in respect of Departments D, E and F, that assembly would have advisory powers only with no effective control whatever.

10. So far as I am aware, apart from the proposals of the nineteen Members and the programme of the Congress and Moslem League, my own

suggestions and those of the "Round Table" are the only positive proposals that have been put forward aiming at a real delegation of *power* to Indians. I propose first to discuss the "Round Table" suggestion very briefly, because it appears to be open to one radical objection to its acceptance. At first sight, the proposal is an attractive one. It does devolve a real measure of power and responsibility upon Indians selected on a representative basis. It also limits the scope of those powers effectively, inasmuch as it restricts their exercise to the four corners of the allotted departments, and financially, within the limits of the budget allotments made to those departments. Consequently, it is probable that the administration of those departments would proceed with a fair amount of efficiency, and we might reasonably expect that efficiency to increase as time went on. On the other hand, it seems to me for the following reasons almost a retrograde measure in some of its aspects and one which would bring about a position of difficulty and ill-feeling which might develop into serious dimensions. Let us suppose, as would almost certainly be the case, that the Police and Judicial Departments were among those reserved to the Executive, based on the present system; and let us further suppose that it became necessary to present legislation in restraint of the press or sedition within the province concerned. A conceivable situation would be that the Governor and his four Executive Members of Council would find themselves with the whole of the Legislative Council, in its advisory capacity, opposed to them: and the necessary legislation would have to pass into law against the solid and unanimous opposition of the Legislative Chamber, including those responsible ministers, who, in respect of the supposed Departments A, B and C, had been appointed by the Governor. I cannot conceive a more undesirable situation. In an extreme case, it could only result in a deadlock in which no Members of the Legislative Council would accept office on the restricted basis proposed, and the administration of the transferred departments would come to a standstill. I leave aside minor difficulties, such as the certainty of constant attempts on the part of the Legislative Council to assume more and more powers and to obtain the control of more and more departments, because these difficulties are not necessarily vital. There would perhaps be difficulties and conflict, too, in the administration of the country owing to the existence of two separate authorities. But the vital objection is, I think, the one I have indicated, and I confess I cannot see how it could work. There would also be the serious difficulty that the status of the ministers would be lower, and their salaries probably less, than those of the Members of the Governor's Executive Councillors.

11. I now revert to a consideration of my own two proposals (paragraph 8 above) and I will take first the proposal to appoint to the Executive Council an elected Member of the Legislative Council. I contemplated that he should be selected by the Governor as the King selects a minister, *viz.*, on the principle of securing the man who is most likely to be able to command a following—if

possible a majority—in the assembly. Further, that he should be given a portfolio, and paid a salary, in precisely the same manner as his colleagues on the Council, and that he should have the same status. He would be definitely in charge of certain departments, probably some of those that would have been made over to the hypothetical ministry of the “Round Table” scheme. His position would be one of great influence, but it would be a difficult one. He would be bound, so long as he consented to retain office, to support the Government’s programme as a whole, and to do his best to get support to its policy in *all* departments. If he was unable to do this, he would be able to resign; in which case the Governor could send for another member and offer the ministry to him. In an extreme case it is possible that the Governor might find himself unable to find an elected member of the assembly with influence sufficient to secure the support necessary to carry through Government measures. In that event, there would have to be a power of dissolution. The fresh elections might result in a repetition of the deadlock. It was this possibility—the arrival at an *impasse*—that caused me, in the circumstances of last year, not to press this suggestion, for I was conscious that, in the situation in which we were then debating our proposals, these must be such as to involve no such risk, since there could be no going back from them. On the other hand, we might safely assume that the Minister so associated with the Executive Council would find it to his interest, and to the interest of the elected members, his followers, to avoid bringing about an *impasse*. He would, in fact, have a clear stake in the matter of making a success of the change, with a view to an expansion of the system.

12. It would be unwise in any way to minimise the difficulties which might arise owing to an *impasse*, such as has been referred to in the last paragraph, though it is possible to hope that the considerations suggested in the concluding sentences will create automatically an interest on the part of elected members in seeing that the *impasse* be avoided if possible. Again, India’s representation on the Imperial Conference is undoubtedly a factor enabling us to take considerably greater risk than we otherwise could or than we could foresee last year in the measures which we can legitimately propose. I do not, however, disguise from myself the fact that, if a further safeguard could be created in India tending to secure that the delegation of real power would be exercised soberly and with discretion, it would be a very strong support to any proposals which we could devise. The further possible safeguard which I have in mind will be discussed in paragraph 14 *et seq.*

13. I now come to the suggestion that provincial budgets should be debated and voted upon by the reorganised provincial legislatures. That suggestion was of course subject to strict limitations. I had in mind the possibility of giving greater latitude to the Councils than merely the power to dispose of the unallotted heads of the budget. Subject to the maintenance of the appropriations considered necessary by the executive for the maintenance

of the services essential to the working of the various departments, and to the reservation that schemes of development which had received the sanction of the Secretary of State and the Government of India were inviolable, I would propose to throw the whole of the budget open to debate and to decision by the Legislative Councils with a power of veto in regard to any item by the local executive government and with a second power of veto by the Government of India. Such powers of veto, in reference to the appropriations not safeguarded by the reservations, would seldom have to be exercised, since I take it that it would be preferable to permit the local Councils to make mistakes and to profit by mistakes rather than to render their vote nugatory, save in exceptional circumstances relating to budget provision of real importance. The proposals under the head of finance cannot, however, be fully elaborated until we are in a position to know how far the British Government is willing to delegate fiscal and financial powers. My suggestions in regard to the budgets, therefore, are based upon the conditions at present governing our finance, and I should only like to suggest here the great desirability that, if in any way possible, means should be devised for effecting a clean cut between Imperial and Provincial finance. This problem is, I know, at present under the consideration of the Hon'ble Sir William Meyer.

14. In paragraph 2 above, I have alluded to the radical change effected in the situation by the announcement made by Mr. Montagu which brushed aside the old principle that our Legislative Councils were never to be developed into parliamentary institutions. The vital importance of that announcement with reference to the constitution of our Legislative Councils cannot be overstated, and I think we should face frankly the logical consequences which seem to ensue from the changed policy. The objections urged by Sir Reginald Craddock to territorial representation as opposed to communal and class representation have a validity of their own quite apart from the general question of political representation. It is the fact, which many Indians of influence deplore and which is fully recognised by Englishmen having experience of India, that, since we began to associate Indian opinion with our machinery for law-making, we have failed entirely to provide for the representation of the influential aristocratic and conservative parties in the country. The difficulty of remedying this very grave defect, coupled with the steps we have already taken towards democratisation, is almost insuperable so far as concerns our Legislative Councils as at present constituted. If we have taken a false step in failing hitherto to devise measures to secure that representation, I do not think it is possible to contemplate redressing that failure by any reactionary measure affecting the political scheme for representation in the existing Councils. Recognising, however, as one must, that in India, of all countries in the world, where aristocratic influences are still so vital in the social sphere, it was an error to overlook the need for securing representation of conservative and orthodox opinion in the counsels of the country, it seems desirable to examine whether, in devising a further step

towards the devolution of powers and responsibility to Indians, the occasion may not be taken to remedy the defect. In our efforts to secure representation of Indian political opinion in a single chamber, we have, I suggest, ignored history and historical analogy as deducible from the evolution of other countries. We have set up the beginnings of a machine which, if consistently developed, would result in the establishment, ultimately, of responsible Government by a single chamber. That is a development which has no real counterpart in even the most democratic of the democracies of the world. From this point of view, it is arguable that, now that we are about to enter upon changes with the deliberate aim of preparing the provinces of India for self-government leading up to fully responsible administration, we should see whether the constitutional machine does not require radical revision; and it is worth while to suggest that one measure, calculated to afford stability and strength and to provide a safeguard against ill-considered action or extravagant demands, would be the establishment of a second chamber. Incidentally, but by no means of small importance, the establishment of such a chamber would, I suggest, diminish the risks, referred to in paragraphs 11 and 12 above, inherent in the devolution of power to the representatives of the people.

15. In our despatch, paragraph 50, we indicated that it might be necessary to supplement any general scheme for giving effect to the elective system by methods devised to secure proportionate representation of minorities. Even if this were done, however, there can be little doubt that the landed interests will fail to secure representation, in a purely elective chamber, proportionate to their importance to the country, and that the stronger conservative and orthodox interests will fail to secure representation at all, even if the conditions of representation are so laid down that members of those classes are alone eligible to represent them,—a provision to which there would be grave objection. This consideration, I suggest, fortifies the proposal formulated in the last paragraph.

16. To discuss the precise details of the composition and powers of the second provincial chamber would be premature and possibly a waste of labour. But, since the suggestion is that the constitution of the second chamber might afford an additional safeguard against the risks inherent in a transfer of real power to a single elective legislative assembly, I put forward below a rough scheme designed with the object of securing this result, as well as of remedying what I have ventured to call our failure in the past to have due regard to historical analogy.

17. *Composition*.—First of all, the second chamber should be so designed as to secure effective representation of the elements which will probably be left out in any elective assembly chosen on a general franchise; and such representation, to be assured, requires a considerable element of nomination.

Secondly, any second chamber should have a more or less continuing life, *i. e.*, it should not be constituted, whether by nomination or election, so as to

require complete renewal at any fixed period. Thus, if it consisted of 30 members, it should be constituted so that one-third (or some such proportion) only retired at one time, being eligible, of course, *caeteris paribus*, for re-election or re-nomination on retirement.

In the third place, the period for which members are nominated or elected should be different from—probably longer than—the period of membership of the existing chambers (as I believe is the case in the Senate of the United States).

Finally, the number of elected members should exceed the number of those nominated.

18. Clearly, it would be out of the question for this chamber to be regularly presided over, as would be the first chamber, by the representative of the executive government. Nor would it always be possible for the government to be fully represented at its debates on all occasions. Therefore, such chamber must have its own Speaker or Chairman, elected or nominated. It would be necessary, further, either that a member of this chamber should be associated with the executive government, or that a member of the executive government should attend the sittings of the chamber. It is desirable to clear up this point here, because upon its determination must depend, to a large extent, the powers which can be conferred upon the chamber. If the position and prestige of a second chamber is to be at all comparable (as it should be) with that of the existing Council, it would seem necessary that a member of that chamber should, as in the case of the Legislative Council, be associated with the executive. Whether it would be equally essential that such member should be selected on precisely the same principle depends upon the detailed constitution of the chamber; but I venture to think the general postulate that a proportion of the chamber should be nominated, and that it should have a *quasi*-continuing existence, would make it possible for the Governor to nominate to his Council a Member of it in place of the Indian Member of the Executive Council appointed under the existing system. With a chamber of 30, 10 of whom were nominated, with a tenure of the membership of five years both for nominated and elected members, a field of choice would be open to the Governor at least as wide as exists in present circumstances. Of the 20 elected members, 10 might quite legitimately be landed proprietors elected by an agrarian electorate with a strict *educational* qualification, while the other 10 could be elected by general or special constituencies on a property and literacy qualification. (By “general” is meant territorial, and by “special” is intended class or racial.) It is relevant also to the question of the powers and responsibilities of such a chamber to suggest that, while the members of the executive government, other than the member\* nominated from the chamber, should have no power of voting on matters under discussion there, it should be open to such other members of the executive to be

\* Who, conversely, being a member of the executive government, would have the corresponding converse status in the Legislative Council chamber.



present at, and intervene in, debates relating to matters pertaining to their departments.

19. *Powers.*—(a) *Legislation.*—The second chamber should have the same powers as the first. Legislation could be initiated in either, but, to become law, must pass both chambers.

(b) *Finance.*—It would be obviously inconvenient to have to introduce and pass the budget in the second chamber as well as in the first, subject to all the latitude which it is proposed to give the existing chamber. It might be arranged, therefore, that, while the budget could be debated in the second chamber and resolutions upon it proposed, such resolutions should not have binding force upon the Government.

(c) *Resolutions.*—The second chamber should have the same powers as the existing chamber.

(d) In reference to certain matters, power might be given to the Governor of a province to convene a joint sitting of the two chambers.

20. As I have said, it would be premature on my part to go in greater detail into the possible constitution and powers of a second chamber at the present stage. One criticism, which is obvious, is that the proposal to constitute a second chamber in those provinces to which are extended the additional powers which I have suggested, imports a great complication into the machinery of government and provides a constitution too elaborate for the necessities of the provinces of India. To this I would reply that, in the first place, my suggestion only applies to those more advanced and more important provinces to which it may be held to be safe to give the larger powers; and, secondly, that in those provinces, so far as population, &c., goes, it cannot conclusively be contended that a second chamber is either inappropriate or excessive. The smallest province to which my suggestion would extend is the Presidency of Bombay, with a population approximating to 20 millions, and the interests, landed, commercial and economic, inherent in that province, are of great importance. I have heard the suggestion made that, if real powers are to be extended to the Councils of selected provinces, then a safeguard could be established in an aristocratic chamber at the head-quarters of the Government of India. My own view is that such a chamber would neither meet the logical requirements of the case, nor satisfy political opinion or provincial needs to anything like the same extent as a second provincial chamber. At the same time, it is a possible alternative which, however, for the present, I do not propose to examine.

21. I venture now to summarise the argument contained in this note—

(a) Changed circumstances make it politically desirable that the Government of India should propose the delegation of definite powers to the Councils reorganised as has been proposed in our despatch.

(b) India's representation on the Conference modifies the risk of doing this.

(c) The delegation of definite power might be effected in the direction of—

- (i) associating with the Executive Government as Member one elected representative of the Legislative Council (paragraph 11);
- (ii) committing the budget, subject to the limitations indicated in paragraph 13, to discussion by, and the decision of, Legislative Council.

(d) A safeguard, other than (a), is desirable. This can be furnished, with much advantage from the point of view of historical parallel and the need for securing representation of conservative and orthodox interests, by establishing a second chamber. (Paragraphs 14 to 19.)

We have, in our despatch, definitely abandoned the position that Legislative Councils are *not* to develop into Parliamentary institutions; and it is therefore only right that we should face the logical consequences of such a radical change in the position. It is suggested, in this note, that we must now make a beginning in the task of devolving responsibility, but that the Legislative Councils which have come into being, for a strictly limited purpose, in the past, cannot appropriately, by themselves, be made to fit the larger purposes, but require to be supplemented.

22. I do not claim for the proposals contained in this note more than that they may form a convenient basis for the discussion of constructive proposals for the delegation of enhanced powers upon Provincial Legislative Councils. I am fully conscious that the proposals themselves require careful scrutiny from the point of view of the past history of our Legislative Councils and of the future development of the whole machinery of Government in the light of the newly-declared goal. I recognise also that the precise details contained in the suggestions herein made may be inapplicable in any given province, but I have assumed throughout that any suggestions made will be criticised from the point of view of the local needs of each province, and that no attempt will be made on the present occasion to repeat the dead level of uniformity in our political institutions which has been aimed at, I think, too much in the past. In regard, however, to the risk of adopting proposals such as these here adumbrated, I can only say that from my knowledge of one province, namely, Bombay, I do not consider the suggestions either fraught with danger or undue risk. I have seen it so constantly stated that there is difficulty in securing the necessary experience and talent for Indianising the provincial departments of Government that it may not be wholly irrelevant to say in conclusion that there was plenty of talent and capacity among the Members of the Bombay Legislative Council as constituted when I was a Member of the Bombay Government, and that it would not have been difficult to find individuals fully capable of administering some of the departments as in the scheme herein suggested.

## APPENDIX.

*Proposed Constitution for the Legislative Council in the  
Bombay Presidency.*

Number of constitu- encies.	Constituency.	Number of seats.
26	District constituencies, one member each ... ..	26
5	City of Bombay, divided into five wards ... ..	5
1	City of Karachi ... ..	1
1	City of Ahmedabad ... ..	1
1	City of Poona ... ..	1
1	University of Bombay ... ..	2
1	Chamber of Commerce ... ..	2
2	Other Commercial Associations of Bombay... ..	2
1	Karachi Chamber of Commerce ... ..	1
1	Deccan Sardars ... ..	1
1	Gujarat Sardars ... ..	1
3	Two Mahomedan representatives of each Division of the Presidency proper.	6
1	Mahomedan representative of the City of Bombay ... ..	1
Total elected Members ... ..		50
Nominated official (secretaries to Government, Surgeon- General, Inspector-General of Prisons, Director of Public Instruction, &c.)		10
Add Governor and his Council ... ..		5
Reserve 5 seats for distribution by the Governor in Council, by nomination or election at his discretion, among special communities ( <i>e. g.</i> , Jains, Lingayats, Marathas, &c.)		5
Total Membership ... ..		70

Sind electorates will be pre-ponderatingly Mahomedan.

No. 148.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR BENJAMIN ROBERTSON, K. C. S. I., K. C. M. G., C. I. E.,  
Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces.

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*Govt. House, Nagpur, September 8th, 1917.*

MY DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I have received Your Excellency's letter about the amendment of the Press Act. My Legal Remembrancer has gone away on three weeks' leave. On his return I shall go into the matter and send a reply.

The announcement of Montagu's visit has had a steadying effect on public opinion down here and has been well received. It came just before a meeting took place of the Provincial Congress Committee at Nagpur. I told some of the chief men that the idea of passive resistance must be absolutely dropped; and though the Committee did not pass a resolution against it, they gave the proposal no countenance.

Your Excellency's speech in the Council on September 5th appears in the newspapers received here today, and it is certain to improve matters still further, more especially if Mrs. Besant comes into line and accepts the amnesty offered her. I am anxious to know what happens in this connection, as it will have an important bearing on future peace. I do hope that everything goes right, as the past three months have been a constant trial and anxiety which has interfered with work in every direction.

I had a telegram from the Home Department today telling me that Mahmudabad is going to Chhindwara to interview Mahomed Ali and Shaukat Ali, presumably in order to persuade them into a reasonable frame of mind with a view to their release. I shall be only too glad to abdicate my functions as their jailor, as they are an unruly pair and have been a nuisance to keep in order. At one time it was Mahomed Ali's intention to make a fuss over his treatment during his internment, specially about the increased restrictions on his correspondence, reception of visitors and the like, which were imposed from time to time. But it is likely that, if he accepts the amnesty, he will keep his mouth shut, and that we shall have no bother or fresh agitation over this.

The next question that Heads of Local Governments have to consider is what they are to say to Montagu when he arrives. So far all I have seen is the suggestions made for advance which were circulated by Your Excellency in July of last year. When I was at Poona last week on a short visit to Lord Willingdon, I had several talks with him on the subject of reforms, and it occurred both to him and to me that it might be a useful plan to have some such informal meetings between Heads of Governments to rub their ideas together. But first we should know, I think, what lines the Government of

India propose to lay down for the case that is to be presented to Montagu. Perhaps we shall be addressed about this before long. It seems to me that it would be well if we did not speak with too many voices and had more or less well-considered proposals as to the line of advance. In any case I hope it may be possible for the Government of India to give us some definite idea of the scheme which they are prepared to put forward.

We are having excellent rains, if anything perhaps a little too much for the cotton crop. This reminds me of Your Excellency's reply about "Our Day". My suggestion for a later date was to get better contributions from interior of the districts when ryots have brought their crops to market and when they have plenty of ready cash. But we shall do our best to make the occasion a success on the date that has been fixed.

I am, &c.,

(Sd.) B. ROBERTSON.

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No. 149.

To H. E. THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE LORD PENTLAND, G. C. I. E., Govr. of Madras.

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*Viceregal Lodge, Simla, September 8th, 1917.*

MY DEAR PENTLAND,

I must cry "peccavi" with regard to the substance of your letter of 31st August. My only excuse—and I fear it is not a valid one—is that last year I had as my guests all the heads of Local Governments with the exception of yourself, and all of them were made fully aware of the trend of our policy. Moreover, whenever any head of a Local Government asked me for a copy\* of our Reforms Despatch, I promptly furnished him with one. I now realise from your letter that you have been left out in the cold. I shall not make any excuses beyond those above. I recognise that I am fully to blame for what has happened, and on the principle "better late than never" I forward herewith a copy of our despatch. I may tell you that your views on my letter of July 20th, 1916, were forwarded to the Secretary of State, so that he was fully seized of them.

Very sincerely yours,

(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.

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\*Enclosure—copy of despatch to Secretary of State, H. D. No. 17, dated the 24th November 1916.

No. 150.

FROM L. CURTIS, Esq.

*Naini Tal, September 8th, 1917.*

DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I have just received the following:—"Home Member, Simla, wires—'Have you copies of suggestions for constitutional progress in India? Forty pamphlets printed by Smith at Arden Press, London, for Round Table. If so, how many can you supply?' We have no information. Can you give any? Macmillan."

I can only infer that the document in question is in the files of the Home Department, which has not realised its confidential character. I do not quite understand why they have telegraphed to Macmillans, as their name is not on the document, and that firm had no knowledge of it. Apart from this particular document, the Round Table has no secrets to keep, and I shall be only too happy to furnish the Home Department with any studies or information we have. As a matter of fact, I have instructed my printers, Messrs. Wheeler & Co. of Allahabad, to send the Home Department copies of any studies I circulate to my friends, as a matter of routine.

Perhaps it would be as well to acquaint the Department with the reasons why this one document was treated as confidential and to put it in on record in the file in which the pamphlet is kept.

After completing the two first volumes of a study of the Imperial Problem dealing with the Self-governing Dominions (which I had undertaken to compile for the students of the Round Table groups) in 1915, I found myself confronted with the problem of the future place of India in a Self-governing Commonwealth, upon which I had to prepare a third volume. For information on the subject, I was obviously dependant mainly on officials, so with the unofficial but specific permission of Mr. Chamberlain I asked a few friends with official experience to inform me on the question. We had a series of talks, in the course of which I was convinced that responsible government ought to be explicitly accepted as the goal of British Policy in India. But I was not going to commit myself to such a statement in a published book until I could see some practicable path leading from paternal to responsible government. Now all the schemes of which I could hear seemed to me to involve progress towards paralysis of government rather than responsible government. They all proceeded by leaving the executives responsible to the Imperial Parliament, while rendering them dependant first for legislation and presently for supply on Indian electorates. They ignored the fact that this expedient had been

tried in various parts of the British Commonwealth and had always failed. In some cases it had led to serious corruption, in others to disorder and anarchy ending in revolution, and in all cases to a deadlock.

I therefore suggested to my friends the possibility of proceeding on another principle, that of calling into existence provincial authorities responsible to Indian electorates, and delegating thereto specific functions and revenues, adding others from time to time as experience warranted such addition.

They all rejected the idea as inapplicable to existing Indian conditions. Through want of any local knowledge of those conditions, I was unable to test the idea by the necessary process of embodying the principle in an actual scheme. So one of my friends who had such knowledge undertook to draft a scheme on this principle for the purpose of discussion. The first draft was made, and at this juncture I heard from my friend Philip Kerr that you were in London and wished to see me.

I saw you at your house, I think about March 1916, and you asked to be furnished with any results we might produce. In view of this request, my friends and I went to Oxford for three days and thrashed the draft into a shape such as we hoped would best enable you to see what the principle was and to judge of its merits. The thing was an exercise in political research, and I am quite unable to say how far those who took part in it were converted to the principle, still less to this particular application of the principle.

In the ordinary course, I should have circulated the results on my own personal responsibility for criticism to the wide circle of Round Table students. In view of your request, however, we decided not to do this, but to leave the results at your disposal in case you might find anything useful in them. Clearly it was the business of the Government of India at such a juncture as the present to collect and review all ideas, and we thought that, if they found anything new in those ideas which would be useful to them, the public interest could be best served by leaving them to use it as their own. Accordingly it was decided to send the final results to you, and to you alone.

These discussions had convinced me that I could not deal with the subject of India in my book without visiting that country, and I left England after the discussion at Oxford, but before the final draft was completed. In Canada, I received one copy from Philip Kerr, who informed me that only 40 had been printed, a dozen had been sent to you, one to me, one each to the five other friends engaged in the study, and the rest he had kept under lock and key.

On my arrival in India, I gathered that you did not feel that the ideas embodied in this document were applicable to the conditions before you; and there, I supposed, that the matter had ended.

As, however, the matter has been revived by the Home Department, I wish to say that the document does not embody my present views. After nearly a year's study of Indian conditions, I am more than ever convinced that the principle embodied in Mr. Gokhale's scheme and in that of the nineteen Members, which is the logical outcome of the Morley-Minto reform, would lead to increasing paralysis of government, increasing friction, and end in a deadlock which could only be relieved by handing over the entire administration to a community which had been given no exercise in responsible government. Failing to find any other method of procedure than that by way of delegation of specified powers to provincial authorities responsible to electorates, I finally last April worked the principle for myself into a scheme in a letter to my friend Mr. Bhupendra Nath Basu. In order to elicit criticism, I printed and circulated it to a number of friends with my other studies, and I recently sent your Private Secretary copies of some of the criticisms received, as well as to Sir William Vincent and Sir Claude Hill, with a request for permission to circulate it. From the nature of the method adopted, you will see that even the letter to Mr. Bhupendra Nath Basu must not be taken as embodying any final conclusions. As the result of the criticisms received, I am convinced that the principle should be worked out in a different shape. For instance, responsible officials in this vast Province (the United Provinces), of which I am making a special study, have convinced me that it ought to be applied to smaller areas than one containing 48 millions. If India is to be developed in the direction of a Self-governing Dominion with Self-governing provinces, the provincial areas will have to be smaller than the existing satrapies and larger than a division. Otherwise the provinces will fall asunder, as in China, where they are on the scale of great European nations. Oudh is suggested as an example of an area suitable for a Self-governing province.

The fact is that the principle of delegation is highly elastic. That is its merit, because it can be adapted to the different conditions of the different parts of India. It can also be adapted to the different rates of progress of which each is severally capable. One defect of the alternative principle embodied in the Gokhale scheme and that of the 19 Members is that it is too rigid. It gives few steps of advance. All schemes designed on that principle work out to one, closely uniform type. The principle of delegation is capable of infinite diversity.

If, as the telegram of the Home Department suggests, any fresh circulation of the original confidential memorandum in official circles is contemplated, they are quite at liberty to reprint it for the purpose. But I suggest that it be prefaced by a note from yourself saying that before you returned to India you were aware that private friends were conducting these studies in England, and that you asked to be furnished with the results.

The Home Department is in possession of my personal undertaking that I am now the only person in India connected with the Round Table. I shall



be only too glad to place at their disposal any other materials collected by me on behalf of that organisation. Those which I have printed have already been furnished to Sir William Vincent, simply on the principle that I wish to print nothing in this country of which the Government is not cognisant. But a quantity of material, more than I can print, is pouring in daily, and if any of it is of any use to the Department it is at their disposal.

I remain, yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) L. CURTIS.

No. 151.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 1012, 12th September 1917, 7-30 p. m.

*Private.* Your visit to India. Your private telegram of September 6th. I am glad you are proposing to arrive as near November 5th as possible. On that assumption I shall work out a programme, but in view of the uncertainty of mails I shall give you a week's grace and shall take as the starting point November 12th.

I propose that you shall come straight to Delhi and spend the remainder of November there receiving deputations from neighbouring Provinces and interviewing Lieutenant-Governors and Chief Commissioners. In December I propose to take you round to Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, returning to Delhi for the New Year. You could then spend a fortnight or more in discussing problems with Government of India, leaving India in January.

The advantage of starting with Delhi is that any modification you may have to make in date of arrival will not seriously disturb remainder of visit, and it will not be necessary to publish exact date of arrival, and I should be able to take you, if time permits, to Bharatpur and Bikaner for week-end.

We accept your amendment of announcement, and as regards the other points you raise we have made a note.

No. 152.

To H. E. THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE LORD WILLINGDON, G. C. I. E., Governor  
of Bombay.

*Viceregal Lodge, Simla, Sept. 12th, 1917.*

MY DEAR WILLINGDON,

I understand that you, Meston and Robertson contemplate having a confabulation at Pachmarhi, and as I presume you will be talking over Montagu's

visit and the problems to be discussed with him, I write to tell you my views. Sir B. Robertson in a letter to me writes—"It seems to me that it would be well if we did not speak with too many voices and had more or less well considered proposals as to the line of advance". Up to a point I agree. If we really all think the same thing, it would be well that we should formulate it in agreement together. But I am anxious that we should not have any of Palmerston's—"It does not matter much what we say, but we must all say the same thing". At the present moment we want all the best minds to be at work on the great problem. We do not want agreement for the sake of agreement, but the most fruitful suggestions.

For this purpose we are sending to all Local Governments a request for constructive suggestions as to possible lines of political advance with special reference to our reforms despatch and also their consideration of—

- (1) The Congress and All-India Moslem League's scheme and the Memorandum of the 19 Members.
- (2) Mr. Gokhale's political testament.
- (3) Lord Islington's proposals in connection with which an examination of Curtis' suggestions for constitutional progress in Indian polity might also be made.

Further, so far as we have been able to fix up any programme for the Secretary of State, I am arranging for him to be at Delhi during November, and I am going to invite the Lieutenant-Governors of Provinces and Sir B. Robertson to stay with me and discuss these questions. I propose to take the Secretary of State to Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, so that he will have an opportunity of meeting Governors in their own Presidencies.

Very sincerely yours,  
(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.

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No. 153.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Tel. P., No. 1740, 13th September 1917, 5-55 p. m. (Recd. 14th, 11-35 a. m.)

*Private.* My visit. Your private telegram of the 12th instant. I thank you very much for arrangements suggested which are quite acceptable. The prospect of an occasional day or two off in the general vista of strenuous work is refreshing to me, and I am sure equally to you. I hope to send you next week a draft of my communiqué.

No. 154.

To THE HON'BLE SIR JAMES MESTON, K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Governor of the United  
Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

„ „ „ „ BENJAMIN ROBERTSON, K. C. S. I., K. C. M. G., C. I. E., Chief  
Commr., Central Provinces.

*Viceregal Lodge, Simla, September 13th, 1917.*

DEAR { SIR JAMES,  
SIR BENJAMIN,

[ Thank you for your letter of 28th. ] You will, I hope, have received by this time the Home Department letter on the subject of Montagu's visit. The criticism which is made of the proposals in our despatch is that we give no power or responsibility to the elected Councils. We merely amend the basis of representation and probably increase their membership. Our policy was that the first step to be taken should be rather in the direction of making the Councils more representative, and that, until members really represented somebody, it was premature to vest them with powers. Moreover, we looked to the first and second roads of advance—see my speech on September 5th—to furnish the opportunities of education in the region of power and responsibility. However, much water has flowed under London Bridge since the date of our despatch, and it may be that we shall have to consider some possible transfer of power. It is on this point that we especially want the views of heads of Local Governments and it may be that your meeting at Pachmarhi may be able to help us in this matter. But as I have said in my letter\* to Willingdon, which I enclose, we want no artificial agreement, but the opinions of our best minds as to what constructive policy is possible in the above direction, you will no doubt also be considering the question of decentralisation. This is mainly a matter of finance and it must always be borne in mind that any scheme which will be fair and equitable to the majority of provinces will almost inevitably leave Bengal and Bihar and Orissa in a state of insolvency. We are endeavouring to solve this problem ourselves, but any suggestion as to how this difficulty may be overcome will be most useful.

Very sincerely yours,  
(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.

[ ] To Sir Benjamin only.

\* *Vide* No. 106.

No. 155.

To L. CURTIS, Esq., "Emily Cottage", Naini Tal.

*Viceregal Lodge, Simla, September 13th, 1917.*

DEAR CURTIS,

Thank you for your letter of 8th September 1917.

The pamphlets which you mention were sent by me to Members of Council, when we were considering reforms last year, but we have thought it advisable, in view of the Secretary of State's visit, that Local Governments should also see them along with other suggestions of reform in order that they may formulate their views.

I am sending your letter to the Home Department, so that your views may be on record.

Your application to circulate the views you have received from officials with regard to the scheme in your letter to Basu is being considered at the present moment by Council, and I have no idea what attitude Members will adopt towards your proposal, but I will give orders that a reply is to be sent to you as soon as a decision is reached. At the present moment with the Legislative Council sitting delay is inevitable.

Sincerely yours,

(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.

No. 156.

FROM H. E. THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE LORD PENTLAND, G. C. I. E., Govt. of Madras.

*Govt. House, Ootacamund,**September 14th, 1917.*

[ Private. ]

MY DEAR CHELMSFORD,

I hasten to thank you much for your letter of the 8th September with its enclosure which I am very glad to see and shall study.

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd.) PENTLAND.

No. 157.

FROM H. E. THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE LORD WILLINGDON, G. C. I. E., Governor  
of Bombay.

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*Bombay, September 17th, 1917.*

[ Confidential. ]

MY DEAR CHELMSFORD,

Many thanks for your letter of 12th instant and your views on discussions before the arrival of Montagu.

Thanks too for sanctioning my visit to Pachmarhi. I think it must do good to compare notes, and I hope we are none of us likely to adopt the Palmerston plan which you refer to in your letter !

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd.) WILLINGDON.

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No. 158.

### NOTE ON INDIAN RECONSTRUCTION.

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1. Most educated Indians are, I believe, keener on the appointment of Indians to the higher executive posts hitherto held mainly by Europeans than on the grant to Indians generally of increased representation and legislative powers, which can only bear fruit slowly and that after much friction and agitation.

2. If this is so, then the contentment of Indians can be more easily and speedily attained by their appointment to such executive posts than by the grant to them of increased representation and legislative powers, although the one does not of course preclude the other.

3. The grant of increased representation and legislative powers to Indians generally seems to contain the seeds of danger more than the other measure. If it is a large grant, the maintenance of British control may grow difficult and no one can foresee to what it may lead. If it is a small and restricted grant, with the retention of official majorities and the like, it will do little to content the agitators and may be looked on as a political fraud *a la Prusse*.


4. If the contentment of Indians can be more easily and speedily won by a general measure of their appointment to the higher executive posts, than by the grant to them of larger representation and legislative powers, and if the latter is more likely to be dangerous or to be looked on as a political fraud, it seems evident that the former measure should be put in the forefront of our programme.

5. But it will be of little use politically to tinker with the idea of the appointment of Indians to the higher executive posts, as for instance, to begin with the appointment of one or more Indian Commissioners and District Magistrates here and there, and to promise more as officers retire, and subject to the condition that fitting persons are found for the posts, and that the experiment justifies itself, &c., &c. Such a cautious measure would probably also be looked on as a political fraud and would give no great contentment. A wider and more immediate measure which will strike the imagination seems to be needed.

6. The lines on which I\* suggest such a measure are the following:—Abolish Financial Commissioners and Boards of Revenue, giving Commissioners of Divisions their powers of appeal. Relieve Commissioners of their duties of office inspection, leaving them only powers of Land Revenue and Miscellaneous appeal and of general control in Land Revenue and Miscellaneous matters. Relieve District Magistrates and Collectors of all their present work except that of repression of crime and the collection of land revenue and excise and income-tax, and the keeping up to date of land revenue records, and the hearing of land revenue and rent cases and appeals. Offer to appoint Indians, in all provinces but the two Frontier Provinces, to three-quarters of the posts of Commissioner, District Magistrate and Collector (with functions restricted as above), Joint or Assistant Magistrate and Superintendent of Police. Appoint a strong staff of European Inspectors without executive powers, and with advising and inspecting powers only, to inspect the executive offices mentioned above. There might be one such European Inspecting Officer for the executive officer of every two or three districts. Constitute a mixed European and Indian "Board of Promotion, Appointments and Discipline" immediately under the Head of the Province to receive and consider the reports of the European Inspectors and take such action upon them as might be necessary. Retain the greater number of posts of Judges of the High Court and Divisional and District Judges in the hands of Europeans, as at present. Create a new "Development Service" with grades parallel throughout the Administration with those of the Executive Service and to be officered in all but the highest "Development Board" and the lowest subordinate posts exclusively by Europeans (who could be largely drafted into the new service from the officers set free by the appointment of Indian Commissioners, Collectors, Superintendents of Police and Assistant Collectors). There would be for every District a "Development Officer" and "Assistant Development

Officer", for every Division, a "Development Commissioner", and for every Province a "Provincial Development Board". Assign to the "Development Service" all works of development, such as the Settlement (but not Collection) of Land Revenue, Agricultural Improvement, Co-operative Societies, Arboriculture, Horticulture, Town-planning, projects for new roads, new railways, new water-works and irrigation works and new hospitals, Sanitation, Municipalities and District Boards, encouragement of trade and fostering of new industries, mining, technical education. Their functions would be to initiate and push through all such improvements, with the help of the experts in each particular line.

7. The scheme of Administration in a Province would then be as follows :—



This does not comprise the Education and Medical Departments which would presumably be worked much as at present.

8. My guiding principle in suggesting this scheme is to content Indians by giving them the important executive powers and posts for which they crave, while securing a counterpoise for the present defects of their characters, and at the same time disassociating from the chief executive functions the "development" functions for which most Indians seem to have little taste or inclination. Most officers of Indian experience would, I believe, agree that selected Indians of strong character are admirable in the detection and suppression of crime (when their own interests are not acutely involved), and that English education is making them more impartial and less

corrupt. Such officers are also excellent in revenue collection work. If we enquire closely, we shall, I think, find that the few Indians who have been appointed heads of districts have not usually failed in criminal and revenue work and the repression of disorder, but in inspection work, the maintenance of roads and sanitation and generally in the development of their districts on modern lines. Their present defects in criminal and judicial matters are dilatoriness (allowing cases to drag on interminably), occasional partisanship, and a greater tendency to corruption than is found among Europeans. But we must trust them boldly, if we are to trust them at all; and the system of European Inspectorships which has worked admirably in Egypt, with appeals to District and Divisional Judges and High Courts (which would remain for the present mainly European) should suffice to keep them straight. The existence of a mixed Board of Promotions, Appointments and Discipline (as in Egypt), taking prompt action on reported defects, would be salutary. The Inspectors would, I think, have to be exclusively European for a considerable time, as thorough and fearless inspection and the fair reporting of defects is the function in which Indians are weakest. The business of these European Inspectors would not be confined to inspecting and reporting merely on the paper work of the executive offices, but also to reporting generally on the criminal and revenue state of the districts. For instance, if they found that there was in any district a mass of unreported crime, dacoities, &c., or that the Land Revenue papers had fallen into disorder and were full of fraudulent entries of mutations and the like, they would report against the District Magistrate and Collector to the Discipline Board. The presence of Indians on this Discipline Board would, in the eyes of Indians, ensure a fair consideration of the reports made by the European Inspectors.

9. One of the chief merits of the scheme would be that it would avoid the great defect of most schemes for the replacement of Europeans by Indians, namely, loss of general efficiency. It is generally agreed that, from the material and technical point of view, India has now reached a stage at which there are immense possibilities of development in the way of industries, mining, extension of communications and trade, and that the character of Indians is not, as a rule, adapted to the initiation and supervision of such development. They cannot do it, or, if they can, it does not attract them. Therefore development should be in the hands of Europeans. But, on the other hand, it has been supposed that Indians cannot be trusted with the highest executive functions, repression of disorder and control of the police. And they must, it is thought, receive *some* important posts to content them. So the tendency has been to suggest that they should be put into the important development posts for which they are least fitted, for which they do not care so much as for the important executive posts, and the gift of which does not therefore really content them, so long as they are excluded from the important executive posts. It has thus been proposed to purchase Indian



contentment at the expense of general technical efficiency. But in fact the grant to Indians of development posts, while sacrificing efficiency, would not give contentment.

10. Another merit of the scheme is that it would release the Collector and District Magistrate from the mass of confused and badly done development work which now falls upon him. He is a maid of all work. He scamps his appeals or his inspection of Land Revenue records, because he is conscious of numbers of files about Municipal, sanitation, or water works, or new roads and buildings awaiting his attention on his table. He scamps consideration of these in their turn, because he has to go and hear his appeals. He has no time for anything and does little thoroughly. The natural bent of the European is for development work. As a rule, he detests cutcherry. But he is doomed to sit in cutcherry most of his life and to leave his favourite development work undone or badly done.

11. A third merit of the scheme (and politically perhaps the greatest) is that the Indian Executive Officers would incur all the odium of repression and punishment and tax-collection, while the European development officers would stand forth in a rôle of exclusive benevolence. It is a truism that the attitude of most European officials towards Indians is warped by the fact that, being mainly concerned with the repression of crime and the hearing of cases, they see in their official capacity only a constant procession of malefactors and of Indians showing their worst sides, which invariably come out in court. Most respectable Indians won't go to court at any price. Again it is notorious that an official charged with the repression of crime or the collection of taxes rarely gets the confidence of the people. They are ever on the alert against his trying to "get at them". When there is, for instance, a revenue settlement going on in a district, it is usually the Settlement Officer and not the Collector and District Magistrate who knows what is going on and what the people are really thinking about.

12. A further merit of the scheme would be that it would be capable of immediate execution, places in the "Development Service" being found for all the Europeans turned out of the purely executive posts to make way for Indians.

13. A final merit of the scheme is that it would leave to the Indians hope (which Bacon says is the best means of preventing civil commotions) of still further advancement. There would still be the possibility of giving them more and more of the judicial appointments; and in the future, when they have taken to real technical education and research and are imbued with the true spirit of development, they could of course get a good share of the development posts also. In the meanwhile they would have taken an immense stride forward in securing so many high executive posts.

14. Against the scheme the principal objection to be foreseen is that the British Government might lose executive and political control. It will be

said that they might not in emergency be able to depend on the Indians at the head of the executive and police—(a) to tell them what is going on beneath the surface; and (b) to repress noxious political movements honestly, or even perhaps not to take part in them. But some risk must be taken, if we are to do anything at all; and, as I have already shown, the European “development” officers, exercising their beneficent functions and gaining the confidence of the people, as the European heads of districts and Superintendents of Police now cannot do, would be in a far better position on emergency to keep track of political movements than the present heads of districts, with all their repressive work. If anything serious lay ahead, they would be able to give warning, and the heads of the Government could then take special measures.

15. Another objection would be that of increased expense. But, if India is to be developed, money must be spent lavishly; and the war has altered our conceptions of the scale of expenditure necessary for a great country, in spite of Lord Cromer’s dictum that the best administration for Oriental countries is that which keeps taxation lowest. Besides the rapid development which would follow on the appointment of a development service would equally rapidly develop the sources of taxation, while, on the other hand, the hoped-for international agreements for the preservation of peace after the war may enable military expenditure to be cut down and thus set free funds for development.

16. A further objection may be that the scheme would fail to content Indians, because they would resent (a) the reservation of Inspectorships to Europeans, and (b) the reservation of most development posts to Europeans. As to the Inspectorships, I doubt whether the exclusion of Indians would be resented. Powers of inspection without executive powers command little *izzat* in the East; and the European Inspectorates in Egypt have, I believe, not been seriously complained of even by the Egyptian Nationalist Party. Moreover, the seating of some Indians over the heads of the European Inspectors on the important “Discipline and Promotion Board” would give them all they want.

As to the “Development” posts, far less prestige would, in Indian eyes, attach to these than to the executive posts. It is true that the salaries of the “development” posts might be hankered after. But the work and position are not of the kind that the average Indian cares for. He prefers on the whole to be feared and flattered rather than to be loved, and to amass and collect rather than to produce and develop. There would, I believe, be only slight opposition to the scheme for placing all active development in the hands of European officers; while the presence of Indians on the Provincial Development Board would ensure sufficient consideration for Indian prejudices and ideas, and secure at least one or two of the best paid and most prominent “development” posts also to Indians.

*The 17th September 1917.*

(Sd.) H. DOBBS.

## No. 159.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 1047, 20th September 1917, 1-55 p. m.

*Private.* I have selected Sloan, recently Under Secretary, United Provinces, to assist your Secretary for delegation, and trust the choice will be agreeable to you. Sir James Meston speaks highly of him.

This is with reference to your private telegram of 30th August 1917.

## No. 160.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Tel. P., No. 1794, 21st September 1917, 11-25 p. m. (Recd. 22nd, 9-50 p. m.)

*Private.* My visit to India. Sloan. I entirely approve. I hope to send you next week communiqué about my visit. I am trying to avoid saying anything which will give the appearance of a committee or commission with reports and minority reports and other horrors. You and I to confer, the rest will help us.

The above has reference to your private telegram of the 20th instant.

## No. 161.

To	H. E. THE RIGHT HON'BLE	THE LORD PENTLAND, P. C., G. C. I. E., Governor of Madras.
"	"	" THE LORD WILLINGDON, G. C. I. E., Governor of Bombay.
"	"	" THE EARL OF RONALDSHAY G. C. I. E., Governor of Bengal.
"	THE HON'BLE SIR JAMES	MESTON, K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Governor of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.
"	THE HON'BLE SIR MICHAEL	O'DWYER, G. C. I. E., K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Governor of the Punjab.
"	"	" MR. W. F. RICE, C. S. I., Lieut.-Governor of Burma.
"	"	" SIR EDWARD GAIT, K. C. S. I., C. I. E., Lieut.-Governor of Bihar and Orissa.
"	"	" SIR BENJAMIN ROBERTSON, K. C. S. I., K. C. M. G., C. I. E., Chief Commr., Central Provinces.
"	"	" SIR ARCHDALE EARLE, K. C. I. E., Chief Commr., Assam.

*Viceregal Lodge, Simla, September 27th, 1917.*

[ Private. ]

DEAR \_\_\_\_\_

You have received from the Home Department the announcement of the conditions under which the Secretary of State's visit to India will be conducted and the arrangements to be made in regard to deputations and interviews.

It is all-important that the interests of every class, including those of the European and commercial communities, those of the landed aristocracy and those of people professing moderate and conservative opinions, as well as of people holding advanced opinions, should be represented before the Secretary of State and myself.

If you find that any important classes or interests which ought to be moving in the matter are not alive to the position, I would suggest that you should point out to them the desirability of their taking steps to secure that their views receive proper consideration.

Yours, &c.,

(Sd.) CHELMSFORD.

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No. 162.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Tel. P., No. 1831, 28th September 1917, 10-50 p. m. (Recd. 29th, 11 p. m.)

*Private.* Reforms. Telegrams from European Association, Chambers of Commerce are being received by me which, like all other comparable communications, I am ignoring. But I do not know why they seem to have concluded that in receiving deputations and representations their views will be ignored or discounted. If you are of opinion that it would be any use, perhaps you might take steps to assure such bodies that we regard views they represent as important factors in the situation and would be glad to treat them accordingly.

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No. 163.

FROM H. E. THE RIGHT HON'BLE THE LORD WILLINGDON, G. C. I. E.,  
Governor of Bombay.

*October 1st, 1917.*

[ Confidential. ]

MY DEAR CHELMSFORD,

I am in receipt of your letter with its recommendations as to who we should get to come forward and give their views and opinions on reforms when Montagu appears.

We have already taken steps in this matter, and I quite agree that land-owners and men of influence should represent their views as well as the politician.

I got a wire from Montagu yesterday which gives me the impression that he will be out here before the end of October.

If that is so, may I ask if you will have instructions sent me as to whether he is to have an official or non-official arrival and whether he means to stay in Bombay?

I take it that he receives no formal address from the Municipality.

Yours very sincerely,  
(Sd.) WILLINGDON.

No. 164.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram R., No. 1086, 2nd October 1917, 1 a. m.

*Private.* Please refer to your private telegram of 28th September regarding telegrams from the European Association, &c. On the 26th September, in closing the Session of my Legislative Council, I made a short speech towards the end of which I said—

*Begins.* Every interest and class will have an opportunity of putting their views before Mr. Montagu and myself, and provided these are consistent with main principles of the policy formulated by His Majesty's Government, they will receive sympathetic consideration. Let me assure those non-official Members who represent European commercial interests, in this Council, that these important interests will of course be fully considered. Everyone, I am sure, Indian and European alike, recognises the historic position of the British community in India, and the debt which India owes to its enterprise and its energy. And no scheme of reform which was sound could be based on injustice to the British or to any other community. We want all the best minds and the co-operation of all classes of the community. *Ends.*

No further assurance, is I think, necessary.

No. 165.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1871, 6th October 1917. (Recd. 7th, 6 a. m.)

*Clear the line. Private.* My visit to India. Please refer to my private telegram of the 21st of September. Following is the communiqué which I propose to issue, subject to your concurrence, as soon as possible:—

*Begins.* It is understood that Mr. Montagu has invited the Earl of Donoughmore, K. P., Chairman of Committees of the House of Lords, and

Mr. Charles Roberts, Member of Parliament, to accompany him to India, and that they have accepted his invitation. As stated by him in the House of Commons on the 20th of August, his visit to India is for the purpose of free and informal exchange of opinion with the Viceroy, the Government of India and others on the matters of policy then announced. He will then confine himself to consultative and deliberative work of this kind. He will of course, while in India, make no public announcement of policy, and business as between India and England will continue to be conducted through the regular channels of the Government of India and the Council of India. During the absence of the Secretary of State for India Lord Islington will represent him in Parliament and in the Ministry. *Ends.*

Please telegraph reply with as little delay as possible whether you agree or have any observations to make.

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No. 166.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 1112, 8th October 1917, 4-55 p. m.

*Clear the line. Private.* Visit to India. Your private clear the line telegram, dated 6th October. The proposed communiqué has my concurrence.

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No. 167.

FROM THE HON'BLE SIR JAMES MESTON, K. C. S. I., Lieut.-Governor of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

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*Camp Garhwal, October 10th, 1917.*

DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

I am very much indebted for Your Excellency's kind letter of the 6th instant, and I shall most gladly come to you at any time in November when you are ready to take up the question of constitutional reforms. I had had strong hopes that you would be able to have a sitting at Lucknow. If that is not possible, I shall be at your disposal by telegram on any of the dates you mention. At present I am touring in the best recruiting district of this province, and trying in the peace of the hills to meet the Home Department's indent by the 15th instant; but I shall not find it possible to send more than an outline of my ideas by then, and shall have to ask Your Excellency to let me develop it later.

I apologise for having left so long unanswered your letter of the 13th September, with which you sent me a copy of your letter of a day earlier to Lord Willingdon. I postponed replying until I had seen Willingdon and Robertson; and immediately after returning from my visit to them I had Council meetings, and no spare moments have come along until now. Our consultations were, I think, of great help to us all; and there is certainly no risk of any artificial agreement on any single point. We were all three working on the problem from different aspects, and the help we wanted was mutual fortification in the formulating of broad principles which can be accepted as underlying the infinite variety of provincial conditions and schemes. In this direction we made progress, and I think it would be of the greatest assistance both to ourselves and to the Government of India if more inter-provincial discussion were possible. It is in the provincial sphere that reforms will mainly be feasible; it is Local Governments that they will chiefly affect; and it seemed to us that it would make your task of enquiry and decision easier if we had a chance of reducing by consultation the inevitable differences of detail in our various projects of reform. As time, however, makes further meetings impossible, we are going to interchange notes of what we are doing; and I hope it will be at least useful for each of us, when you come to examine us, to be aware of the general direction of the others' views.

A year ago, the enlargement and popularisation of the Legislative Councils, with the subsidiary advances which Your Excellency contemplated, seemed as much as we could hope to accomplish, and as much as thinking India would expect. But the position has greatly changed since then, both in and outside India; and power without responsibility has been pushed into the region of the impossible. Lord Willingdon still clings to the idea of an elected Council, which he will keep straight by persuasion, *plus* a power of Veto and Ordinance in the background. As I told him, this seems to me simply gambling on his personal popularity; if his successor should not inherit that quality, the Veto and Ordinance will come out of the cupboard every day, and there will be a smash in six months. My own idea is that we must give genuine self-government in specified subjects and in smaller areas,—divisions or sub-provinces, enlarging the subjects and perhaps the areas as experience brings political wisdom, until our present Provincial Councils gradually die of atrophy. But I need not trouble you with this now, when I shall shortly be sending up a detailed set of proposals.

On the question of provincial decentralisation, mentioned at the end of Your Excellency's letter of the 13th ultimo, I consider no scheme to be possible which will do justice as between Bengal and Behar on the one hand, and us other provinces on the other. But is it necessary to have uniformity of treatment? And, if we have to admit that it is impracticable for the British Government to revoke the Permanent Settlement, would it not

be well to allow its consequences, and the injustice which they cause to the rest of us, to soak in until the *vox populi* of all-India forces an Indian, or semi-Indian, government in the future to remedy the mistake? I certainly do not think that the tax which the Permanent Settlement imposes on temporarily-settled provinces can for a moment obstruct a real financial autonomy for provinces when once the idea of a popular government begins to take root; and we had much better anticipate the demand for such autonomy, even at the loss of financial symmetry, than wait till it is forced upon us. If I can be of any help in working out the complete separation of Imperial and Provincial finance, I hope Your Excellency will command my services.

With utmost respect to Your Excellency, believe me,

Sincerely yours,  
(Sd.) JAS. S. MESTON.

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No. 168.

Viceroy to Secretary of State.

Telegram P., No. 1126, 11th October 1917, 1-45 p. m.

*Private.* Visit to India. I should be obliged if you could give me some indication of the lines on which your thoughts are running with regard to reforms in India in order that we may consider the question from your point of view.

Could you tell us for our secret information the approximate date on which you will arrive; it is essential that we should know this.

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No. 169.

Secretary of State to Viceroy.

Telegram P., No. 1929, 16th October 1917, 10 a. m. (Recd. 10-30 p. m.)

*Private.* Reforms. Please refer to your telegram of the 11th instant. I am glad to be able to give you some information on this matter, although it will be easily understood by you that I have endeavoured to keep an open mind so far as was humanly possible on these subjects, with a view to making our colloquies in India in every sense real and sincere. As you are aware, I have asked a Committee, over which Duke has been presiding, to advise me on reforms, but I am quite prepared to find, and I think that the Committee will be prepared to find, that evidence which we receive in India may make it necessary to consider



larger proposals than those we have yet contemplated. Now that our policy has been announced, its instalments must be as large as can be granted with safety. I understand that Duke's Committee will make recommendations of which the following is an outline :—

*Begins.* Principal advance to be in Provincial Governments. Executives as proposed by you half official, half Indian, but all nominated and not dependent on the legislature. Legislatures to be increased so as to give small elected majorities and direct election on moderate franchise to be substituted for present indirect elections. Departments of Provincial Governments to be divided into those in which executive will have last word and those in which it would ordinarily defer to will of legislature. In former, the present system will not be materially altered, though there will naturally be changes in procedure with a view to fuller discussion. In latter, a system of standing Committees of the legislature is proposed to confer with the executive on new schemes and resolutions which the executive are unwilling to accept ; but if difference proved irreconcilable, the executive would ordinarily defer to will of legislature, especially if a dissolution left it unchanged. Therefore even within these departments its powers would have to be hedged in by fundamental constitutional checks. One instalment of such a check would be restriction of power to alter rules of appointment to certain branches of public service and conditions of service generally.

2. *Finance.*—Greater freedom for provincial finance seems essential. Provincial legislatures to vote the provincial budget, subject to appropriate checks, such as not budgetting for an excess of recurring expenditure over revenue or for reduction of balance below prescribed minimum or for reduction of grants proposed by executive for certain scheduled services, such as police. If budget not passed by legislature within fixed date in conformity with prescribed conditions, the executive to have power to spend on scheduled services the amount proposed by them and on other services amounts in budget last passed by legislature. Provincial Governments should have power to draw on their balances above the prescribed minimum unless they had lent them to Government of India at short date or surrendered them in exchange for an additional annual allowance. It has been suggested that instead of present system of shared heads the administration of Provincial revenues should be wholly provincial and the yield primarily provincial, subject to fixation of standards of taxation by the Government of India and right of the Government of India to impose fresh Imperial taxation. Provinces would contribute to the Government of India, first, a fixed cash contribution ; second, a definite percentage of all increase. The power of taxation for provincial purposes to be conceded to Provincial Governments, the scope and extent of the powers being fixed from time to time by Government of India legislation. Taxation bills to be introduced only by the Government. Provinces also to have borrowing powers subject to appropriate checks. *Ends.*

I have expressed no opinion on these proposals, for I have not yet received them, but they seem to me to be eminently promising. We shall have to consider details. For instance, is it necessary to lay down that all the Members of a Provincial Executive Council who are not Indians must be Members of the Indian Civil Service, and whether it would not be advisable to nominate the Indian Members from a panel chosen by the Legislative Council on the lines suggested for recruiting Indians to the Council of India in Lord Crewe's Bill of 1914? And there are of course many other matters we have not yet dealt with.

Whatever reconstitution of Provincial Governments we decide on, must involve proportionate and conformable alterations in system and machinery of control, but it seems better to defer the consideration of latter until the nature and scope of former have taken fairly definite shape. For instance, in your letter received by this mail you ask me definitely what financial control the India Office would be prepared to give up as part of a devolution scheme. My answer would be that we must begin from the other end, and that our big moves must be in local self-government, on which we are all agreed, and provincial devolution. If these big moves are accepted, I personally should be prepared to consider any devolution of control financial or other which you would suggest as the necessary result. My own view is that Parliament will never allow the Secretary of State in Council to abandon control unless he can show that in substitution for it certain responsibilities have been given to Indians, but I would try and obtain from Parliament anything you may feel to be necessary in the direction indicated above.

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